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ABSTRACT 
 
Where do the opportunities for gendered institutional change lay in post conflict 
transitional states? In particular, what processes explain the transformation of gender 
roles within traditionally male-dominated sectors such as security? The post-conflict 
South African State provides the institutional backdrop against which the gender 
equality gains of women in the security sector are explored. The rare opportunities 
presented in the transitional context are a key factor in understanding the promises and 
limits of gendered change within the institutional arena, both in terms of the descriptive 
and substantive representation of women. 
 
This thesis explores the processes of gendered institutional change from a feminist 
institutional perspective, incorporating a range of normatively nuanced variables that 
examine the mechanisms by which socially-constructed gender norms are altered within 
the security sector, situating power at the heart of the contextually driven analysis.  
 
The thesis argues that the paths which emerged over the course of the liberation 
struggle as a result of three key historical legacies enabled a transformation of gender 
roles and institutional norms with respect to security. Specifically, the intertwined 
legacies of an equality-based liberation movement, the continuous increase in women’s 
autonomy, and the legacy of militarisation all contributed to the opening of spaces for 
women’s strategic action. Through process tracing methodology, the thesis reveals how 
South African women strategically wielded their power to consolidate gender gains 
embedded within the foundational documents of the new democratic regime. In so 
doing, women capitalised on a range of timeous exogenous influences within the 
broader feminist movement, particularly the global shift towards institutionally-focused 
gender mainstreaming strategies. 
 
The focus on the security sector is viewed as a litmus test for the advancement of 
gender equality within the institutional structures of South Africa, given the rigidly 
patriarchal and masculine norms permeating the security arena. Among the contextual 
considerations which produced openings for the gendering of State security structures 
was the adoption of the human security paradigm, which called for a holistic, people-
  xii 
centred vision of security centred around development and stability. The resulting 
overhaul of the security sector, and the repositioning of the South African military on 
the national and regional stage, presented further opportunities for strategic 
interventions by women to transform the institutional culture of the State security 
structures. Bolstered by exogenous influences such as innovative regional and 
international instruments and organisations, a new military culture began emerging in 
South Africa, with women positioned to play a central role in its development. The 
manner in which women engaged with this process is a demonstration of the extent to 
which gendered norms have become entrenched in the institutional structures of the 
post-conflict South African State, revealing the constraints of inherited structures, and 
the power of institutional layering in restructuring women’s security roles within the 
State. 
 
The successes and failures of the gendering of the security sector are embodied within 
the complex case of the arms acquisition. This example is analysed as a “case study 
within a case study”, and clearly highlights the intersection of the multiple variables 
discussed in the thesis, revealing the manner in which evolving institutional norms 
promote and foreclose gendered change, and the implications of the struggle between 
old and new gendered legacies. The infusion of gendered norms into the security sector 
is also considered through the perceptions of government and civil society respondents, 
as an indicator of the “stickiness” of the gender equality rhetoric, and of the progress 
made towards transforming the masculine domain of the security arena.  
 
The unique attributes of the South African case yields insights into the opportunities 
and constraints of post-conflict institutional change, contributing to the broader 
feminist institutional literature through the focus on the complex processes of gendered 
institutional change and continuity within the overlooked security structures of the 
State. 
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South Africa has been lauded as a political ‘miracle’, the ‘rainbow nation’, a model for a 
peaceful transition to democracy in a continent that is blighted by civil war and unrest. 
Often described as “two nations” in one state1, South Africa is characterised by deep 
economic, political and social divides, presenting a range of challenges and opportunities 
to the democracy building exercise that has been underway for the last decade and a 
half. Prime among these are the difficulties faced in bringing about broad-based 
empowerment and development while ensuring that security needs are met and do not 
impede the process of democratic consolidation.   
 
In part, democracy and good governance could be seen as striving for the attainment of 
representativeness of elected officials and constructing an enabling environment for 
participatory governance in which all stakeholders have a voice. While women constitute 
more than half of the population, they have been consistently under-represented in 
formal decision-making bodies, particularly in the “higher” offices and in certain 
portfolios, such as Defence. The historical subjugation and institutionalised exclusion of 
women from positions of authority is a universal predicament, and is an ongoing 
concern in developing states, particularly as gender inequality has been identified as a 
significant obstacle to the attainment of development goals.  
 
The inability to solidify the gender gains made during periods of strife in the post-
conflict period has proved to be a commonality across varied historical and ideological 
contexts. As Waylen (2007a: 521) explains, most transitions have been unable to deliver 
the expected “positive gender outcomes” although “the South African case has been 
seen as an exception”. Contending with the various historical legacies impacting on 
gender equality in the economic, social, and political sphere, South African women have 
                                                 
1 This description was made by Thabo Mbeki in his opening statement for the National Assembly session 
on “Reconciliation and Nation Building” in 1998 (Mbeki, 1998).  
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made tremendous gains in the attainment of descriptive and substantive equality within 
general government structures.  
 
From the inception of the new democratic regime women have maintained positions of 
influence and prominence, including traditionally male-dominated posts such the vice-
presidency, security, and foreign affairs. Following the meteoric increase in women’s 
parliamentary representation in 1994 from 2.7% to 27%, the latest elections places 
South Africa 4th globally with 43%, behind Rwanda (56%), Sweden (47%) and Cuba 
(43.3%) (GenderLinks, 2009). After the 2009 elections, women comprised 42% of the 
Cabinet, including as Ministers for portfolios such as Agriculture, Defence, Energy, 
International Relations, Mining and Public Enterprises (Mbola, 2009). Four of the nine 
provincial premiers are women, the official opposition is led by a woman, as are a 
number of other political parties. Even the notoriously patriarchal Zulu-based Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP) put forward a woman for its stronghold of KwaZulu Natal 
(GenderLinks, 2009). Female combatants2 who had actively participated in the armed 
struggle for democracy entered formal State institutions in esteemed positions - a rarity 
in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
As Graph 1.1 shows, the parliamentary representation of women in South Africa over 
the last 15 years has been consistently higher than that of both the regional and world 
average. How was this achieved? What factors account for these gender gains? Where 
did the opportunities in the transition to democracy lie? How were these opportunities 
grasped and consolidated into gains, particularly within the State security structures?  
 
                                                 
2 The majority of female combatants discussed in the research are drawn from the African National 
Congress (ANC) and their armed wing, Umkhonto we Siswe (MK). 
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Adapted from UNSTATS (2009: Table 6a Women in Parliament). 
 
Considering South Africa as a “best case scenario” in a number of respects, the thesis 
focuses on understanding how institutional change is gendered and specifically how 
gendered institutional change was instigated within the security structures of the 
democratic South African State. Acknowledging that a number of fortuitous conditions 
existed at the time, which may not be replicable elsewhere, the achievement of 
significant gender gains may also prove attainable in other developing world contexts by 
gaining a clearer understanding of how these processes of change occurred and the 
manner in which gender gains were consolidated.  
 
By highlighting the strategies pursued by women in South Africa, and exploring the 
mechanisms by which gendered change was affected, the thesis adds to the body of 
knowledge on gendered institutional change, particularly within State security structures. 
Given the diversity of problems faced by South Africa in terms of development and 
security challenges (akin to other states in the developing South), the array of 
institutional mechanisms geared towards enabling the substantive participation of 
women calls for a deeper understanding of how these structures were established, and 
what lessons can be learnt from the South African experience. The unique attributes of 
the South African case could therefore yield insights into the opportunities and 
constraints of post-conflict institutional change and the processes by which the 
institutional culture is gendered, particularly in the security sector, providing some best 
practices for other post-conflict developing states.  
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1.1 The Research Question in Broader Perspective 
 
The central research question explores the consolidation of gender gains within the 
security structures3 of post-conflict South Africa from a feminist institutionalist (FI) 
perspective, asking “how did gendered institutional change happen in the State security 
structures?”. Within this focal question, the research seeks to answer these subsidiary 
issues: How were women’s roles within the security sector expanded? Are women’s 
roles in post-conflict South Africa’s security institutions indicative of substantive 
gendered change? Are there mechanisms for participation that enable women to 
influence the decision-making process in the security sector?  
 
The research aims to uncover the means through which women consolidated gender 
gains within the State security structures by exploring the historical legacies that 
impacted on women’s autonomy and power, while incorporating the internal and 
external influences on the paths set in motion by these historical legacies. The progress 
made in terms of gendering the institutional structures of the security sector is measured 
in terms of both the descriptive and substantive representation of women within these 
structures, utilising the measures provided by the gender mainstreaming strategy. In 
other words, seeking evidence of women’s full and meaningful participation in the 
decision-making processes of the State, both through the attainment of positions of 
influence and authority, the existence of functioning gender machineries that facilitate 
the consideration of gender differentiated needs during policy formulation, the 
promulgation of policies that address gender inequality, and other such measures that 
point to a changing institutional culture. 
 
Approaching the investigation of the complex interplay between historical legacies and 
institutions from a New Institutionalist (NI) perspective blurs the conceptual divide 
                                                 
3 Throughout the thesis, the use of “security structures” refers to all the institutions directly associated 
with State-run security concerns: those bodies and positions wherein national security decisions are 
made and which implement the defence mandate of the State. These structures include the Armed 
Forces (army, navy, air force and police), Department of Defence (DoD), Department of Foreign 
Affairs/International Relations, the Presidency, Cabinet, and the parliamentary committees associated 
with security. Where the influence of related bodies is relevant to the discussion, such as that of the 
Department of Finance, oversight bodies such as the Standing Committee on Public Accounts 
(SCOPA), or other associated parliamentary committees, these structures and mechanisms will be 
specifically identified, and are not included in the admittedly broad definition of “security sector” 
adopted for the purposes of this research. 
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between institutions and culture (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 947) when considering how these 
interactions both promote and foreclose change, and the opportunities which arise for 
the institutionalisation and consolidation of gender gains. Gender gains in this sense are 
taken to include the descriptive and substantive representation of women in the 
decision-making structures of the State, the creation of mechanisms for sustainable 
participation, and the measures to transform the formal institutional rules and informal 
norms and values that perpetuate gender inequality. The framework for analysis 
considers the opportunities and constraints of transitional institutional restructuring and 
layering, particularly the prospects for and limits of continuously contested change.  
  
The focus on the security sector draws in further considerations, such as the evolution 
of gender roles in relation to security, the formal recognition of these roles, and the 
contributions that women make to the security goals of the State. The security aspect of 
the research question echoes the New Institutionalist (NI) approach as it considers the 
impact of timing on the consolidation of gender gains. The potential for affecting 
meaningful change through the layering of pre-existing and new institutions, and the 
manner in which institutional design and reform can be gendered during this transitional 
process, form a key part of the FI approach and facilitates the consideration of 
influence, access and power in relation to the gendering of State security structures. 
 
1.1.1 Gender Gains: Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Women 
 
What is meant by gender gains? Varying definitions of the descriptive and substantive 
representation of women are explored within an extensive body of feminist literature, 
with varying interpretations of the links between the two concepts, and their 
relationship with institutional structures and broader societal forces. In a general view, 
descriptive representation considers the impact of “numbers” in terms of the 
representation of women in government. Substantive representation is concerned with 
the extent to which women’s interests are effectively represented and seeks evidence of 
meaningful gains in gender terms with respect to policy outcomes and institutional 
change. The use of gender mainstreaming policies can thus be seen as a sign of the 
gendering of institutional processes (Sorenson, 1998; Heinecken, 2002; Lowe Morna, 
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2003; Rai, 2004; Hassim, 2004; Daly, 2005; Koen, 2006; Subrahmanian, 2007; Celis & 
Childs, 2008; Mackay, 2008; Gouws, 2008b; Waylen, 2008, amongst others).  
 
Within this broad characterization of the descriptive representation of women (DRW) 
and the substantive representation of women (SRW) exists a plethora of overlapping 
theories concerned with issues such as the “politics of presence” and the nature of 
women’s contributions (Mackay, 2008). Critical mass arguments form part of this 
debate, arguing that women need to be represented in significant numbers in order to 
both affect change and bestow legitimacy upon democratic political institutions.  
 
Essentially, such investigations are aimed at determining whether (and to what extent) 
women “act for” women, the impact of mitigating factors such as differences in identity 
based on experience and political agendas, and the influence of institutional factors 
(Young, 1994; Mansbridge, 1999; Mackay, 2004; Puwar, 2004; Bratton, 2005; Childs & 
Krook, 2006; Batliwala & Dhanraj, 2007: 32; Waylen, 2007b: 15; Gouws, 2008b; 
Annesley & Gains, 2010). While women may bring a particular perspective to the policy 
and governance process, they are not a homogenous group with a unified view or a 
singular purpose. Thus, the focus of SRW is less concerned with the numbers of 
women, and more focused on how women participating in the process gain and wield 
power to affect change, and the role that numbers plays within this process.  
 
An integral part of this approach is the assessment of the gendered institutional 
environment and its complex web of formal and informal rules and structures that 
impact upon the power dynamics and resource allocation required for affecting change 
(Lovenduski, 1998; Seidman, 2001; Mackay & Meier, 2003; Chappell, 2006; Kenny, 
2007; Galligan & Clavero, 2008). The difficulty lies not only in identifying the causes of 
continuity and change, given the intricate inter-weaving of many variables, but also in 
assessing the impact of SRW and how gender issues are kept on the agenda (Fraser, 
1995; Sawer, 2002; Goetz, 2003; Daly, 2005; Mackay, 2008; Waylen, 2008).  
 
The increasing awareness and understanding of how institutional factors affect the 
DRW and SRW is amply demonstrated within the growing body of FI literature, which 
is elaborated upon in the following chapter. The issues outlined above are incorporated 
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into the model for analysis, enabling the consideration of factors such as the “politics of 
presence”, gendered power dynamics, and women “acting for” women. Particular 
attention is paid to the presence of women in positions which command power and 
resources by virtue of their location within the institutional structure, and the effect this 
has on the institutional gendering process.  
 
For purposes of clarity, “gender mainstreaming” will refer to the strategies aimed at 
achieving both DRW, in terms of numbers, and SRW, measured in terms of substantive 
changes to the institutional environment, such as: the creation of gender machineries, 
the implementation of strategies aimed at gendering the policy-making process (such as 
Women’s Budgets), the crafting of gender-aware policies, and the presence of women in 
positions of influence and power. These indicators inform the assessment of the 
gendered institutional change of the South African security sector, providing tangible 
and identifiable criteria on which to chart the progress of women within both the 
general governance structures of the State and the security sector of post-conflict South 
Africa. 
 
The way in which women in South Africa self-consciously organised around gender 
issues as part of the State-building exercise had a significant impact on the process of 
consolidating gender gains within the security sector. Examining how this was done 
reveals the forces at play in the gendering of institutions, enriching the understanding of 
how these processes of gendering and change are played out within the security 
structures of the State, as this sector represents perhaps one of the most daunting 
challenges for the consolidation of gender equality. The timing of the transition to 
democracy played a critical role in the evolution of women’s strategic organising in 
South Africa. The evolution of the broader feminist movement, considered in 
conjunction with the shift in security thinking in the developing world, contextualises 
the research question and highlights the unique moment captured by South African 
women.  
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1.1.2 Timely Transitions: South Africa and the Global Feminist Movement 
 
From a gender perspective, the transition to democracy in South Africa occurred at a 
fortuitous time in relation to the global feminist movement, which had acquired a 
decidedly more structural focus in the 1990s than in preceding eras in terms of targeting 
State institutions as key arenas for affecting change. The waves of feminism, which 
began with the suffrage movement at the turn of the 20th century, initially focused on 
legal equality and the attainment of fundamental political and economic rights. The 
focus then shifted towards the construction of identity and difference between the 
sexes, and means of mitigating the stigma attached to the “weaker sex” with respect to 
political participation (West, 1997; Jackson & Pearson, 1998; Gaitskell, 2002; Cornwall, 
2003; Haslanger & Tuaba, 2004; Kolmar & Bartkowski, 2005; Squires, 2007). 
 
These efforts were aided by the successive United Nations (UN) World Conferences on 
Women, and the scores of protocols, agreements and declarations that aided activists’ 
efforts in lobbying governments to begin entrenching gender rights within their 
legislation. Among the notable instruments that emerged during this time (and within 
which the evolution of the gender debate can be charted) was the UN General 
Assembly Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which formalised legal and 
political equality, and the UN General Assembly Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1979), which dealt more explicitly with 
women’s rights and measures that states should undertake to ensure the full and 
equitable participation of women in all spheres (UN, 1948; 1979). A defining moment 
occurred at the Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995) wherein 
twelve areas of concern were highlighted (including issues related to the participation of 
women in the security sector), and more far-reaching interventions on the part of the 
state were called for (UN, 1995a).4 The language utilised in this instrument, in particular 
the framing of the issues, represented a significant shift in the gender debate, moving 
towards a relational understanding of gender inequality. 
 
                                                 
4  An overview of these agreements, as well as the regional and continental instruments which charted the 
evolution of the gender debate, are included in Appendix 1 – Timeline of Gender Agreements. 
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The failure of women-centred approaches in addressing the power relations between the 
sexes which maintain gender inequality, as well as the cultural norms which support 
them, thus led to a shift towards a new epistemological approach which focused on 
gender relations, and moved the debate beyond being a “woman’s” issue (Baden & 
Goetz, 1998: 19; Jackson & Pearson, 1998: 5; UN Women Watch, 2000; Sardenberg, 
2007: 58).This stemmed from the concern about the fundamental exclusion of women 
from the creation of knowledge within society, whether this knowledge relates to the 
manner in which their societies function, the mode of decision making, or even what 
constitutes “gender”. The one-sided production of knowledge ensures that the status 
quo (generally accepted as being patriarchal and hierarchal) is preserved. Without 
addressing contextual factors (including ethnicity, culture and economic status), the 
continued casting of women as lesser citizens would continue unabated (West, 1997: xii; 
Steans, 1998; Cranny-Francis, Waring & Stavropoulos, 2003: 2; Haslanger and Tuana, 
2004; Kolmar & Bartkowski, 2005: 45).  
 
Recognizing that gender inequality is created through deeply rooted societal practices, 
and is further entrenched in the imbalances in the structures which govern society, it 
was imperative that any approach aimed at overcoming this inequity acknowledged 
more than the lack of women in decision-making structures (Cranny-Francis et al, 2003: 
49; Kabeer, 2003: 2; Subrahmanian, 2007: 112; Svensson, 2007: 13). It was also 
necessary to address the under-valuing of women’s knowledge, experience and needs in 
the construction of public policies and programmes, enabling their voices to be heard in 
a manner that influenced the discourse of the State. This shift in the framing of the 
gender equality discourse signalled the transition from the “Women In Development” 
(WID) approach towards the more holistic “Gender And Development” (GAD) strategy.  
 
The acknowledgment of the sway held by institutional, social and cultural beliefs in 
terms of the impact on collective and individual decision-making practices was a 
significant development in the evolution of feminist theory (Seidman, 2001; Cranny-
Francis et al, 2003: 49; Daly, 2005), particularly in the view that gender inequality is a 
societal construct which transcends formal laws and is maintained through the 
interactions of individuals and structures within society (Kabeer, 2003: 2; Puwar, 2004: 
77; Daly, 2005; Svensson, 2007: 13).  
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The focus on institutional mechanisms for change, together with the socially-
constructed nature of norms, prioritises the redefinition and reconceptualisation of 
women’s relationships to the State and their societies, particularly for women embroiled 
in nationalist movements as the transitional period offers a rare opportunity to 
transform the perceptions of gender roles within the structures which create and 
maintain societal norms (West, 1997: xiii; Seidman, 2001; Vincent, 2001; Waylen, 2007a, 
2007b).  
 
The integrationist gender mainstreaming strategy promulgated by GAD identifies the 
State as the key actor for affecting substantive change (Subrahmanian, 2007: 112). As a 
result of its legitimating power, the State can bring its weight to bear in altering the 
structural inequalities of society. This State-centric focus is shared by feminist 
institutionalists such as Chappell (2011: 165) who considers the means through which 
institutions advance gender goals, asking “to what extent has past gender norms and 
practices been carried forward in their design and operation?”. In other words, 
recognising the role institutions play in gendering the norms and rules while maintaining 
an awareness of the historical legacies that impact on the gendering process are 
interlinked concerns, and are explored further in the following chapter.  
 
It was at this juncture in the mid-1990s, as GAD was gaining prominence following the 
1995 Beijing Declaration that women in South Africa were participating in the shaping 
of a new democratic dispensation in the post-conflict State. The GAD strategy, which 
advocates a normative and structural focus for addressing gender inequality, was evident 
in the manner in which South African women approached the new dispensation. A 
mixture of WID and GAD tools were employed, as advocated by the gender 
mainstreaming approach which was gaining prominence across the world. This strategy 
included the use of quotas and positive action, the establishment of gender machineries, 
and the use of policies such as gender budgeting. All of these measures had a decidedly 
structural goal in terms of transforming the institutions which perpetuate gender 
inequality, and the inclusion of gender mainstreaming policies as a variable for 
measuring gendered institutional change is therefore well suited for inclusion in a FI-
oriented analytical model.  
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1.1.3 Shift in Security Thinking: Placing People First 
 
Timing is a critical consideration from the security standpoint of the research question 
as well, given that the transition to democracy in South Africa occurred at a crucial 
juncture in global security thinking. The paradigm shift in security thinking (particularly 
in developing states) from a State-centric to a people-centred model was a significant 
development in the re-structuring of the new democratic South Africa. Focusing on the 
inter-connection between development, stability, and democracy the Human Security 
Paradigm (HSP) advocates addressing the personal, community, economic, food, health, 
environmental and political factors that contribute to the rise of instability, and utilising 
a contextually-driven approach towards attaining socio-economic centred security 
(UNDP, 1994; Schoeman, 1998; Acharya, 1999; Stewart, 2006; Hendricks, 2007; Clarke, 
2008; Jones, 2009; Tshitereke, 2009, amongst others). The participation of a range of 
stakeholders at various levels is thus seen to be essential to the successful 
implementation of such an ambitious endeavour. Therefore, the provision and 
protection of human rights forms an integral part of this process.  
 
The ascendance of the HSP at the end of the Cold War played into the interlinked 
historical legacies of militarism and women’s autonomy which affected the process of 
re-positioning the role of the military within South Africa, and the manner and extent to 
which women participated in this process. The central philosophy of the African 
National Congress (ANC) was closely aligned with the HSP approach in its emphasis on 
broad-based empowerment and development, and it therefore provided an useful focal 
point around which the restructuring of the armed forces of the State could be 
organised, as well as creating openings for women’s strategic action as a result of its 
emphasis on equality. 
 
The established links between development and a stable security environment 
necessarily impact upon the attainment of a secure democracy and the realisation of 
good governance ideals (Bell, 2000; Stott, 2002; Maclean, Black & Shaw, 2006; Stewart, 
2006; Hendricks, 2007; Svensson, 2007; Tieku, 2007; Spears, 2007; Hutton, 2009; Jones, 
2009; Makinana, 2009, amongst many others). Yet the role of women in shaping post-
conflict developing world societies in terms of security at the State level is a relatively 
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new research concern5. The paucity of research is partly due to the protracted violent 
conflicts that followed the wave of independence movements sweeping across Africa in 
the late 1960s. Indeed, many states across Africa remain embroiled in violent 
altercations.6 New accounts continue to surface about the evolving roles women are 
playing during and after conflicts, lending credence to the view that conflict presents an 
opportunity for the transformation of gender roles (see for example Cock, 1991, 2009; 
Cockburn, 1998; Strickland & Duvvury, 2000; Heinecken, 2002, 2009; Nzomo, 2002; 
Pillay, 2006; Koen, 2006; Motumi, 2006; Svensson, 2007, 2008; Clarke, 2008). However, 
West (1997: xiv) points out that “academia has not caught up with women in current 
political struggles … Women remain invisible, subsumed under the ‘fraternity’ of 
nation”.  
 
The adoption of the HSP by the democratic South African regime thus provides 
another layer of analysis when considering the claim by Svensson (2007: 3) that 
revealing the power structures that both define and operationalise concepts within the 
security arena lies at the heart of feminist security research: understanding how security 
is being reconceptualised to meet the demands of a new century enables feminists at 
various levels to engage more effectively with the structures as they are being 
transformed. The assertion made is that “if women’s perspectives – as well as their 
kinship, trading, and distribution networks – were taken seriously, perhaps security itself 
would be reconsidered and incorporated into the reform of security structures” (Clarke, 
2008: 60-61). 
 
The role of women within the State security structures is also a crucial consideration. 
Feminists themselves are divided as to what roles women should play within the armed 
forces of the new democratic State, with disagreements on various issues including 
physical ability, social and cultural expectations and military and tactical concerns 
(Enloe, 1989; Modise & Curnow, 2000; Tickner, 2001; Heinecken 2002: 715; Cohn, 
                                                 
5 As authors such as Waylen (2003) have pointed out, even where some research into the role of women 
in transitional situations has been carried out this has been emphatically gender-blind, and often does 
not incorporate the necessary level of nuance with regards to the relationship between the women’s 
movement and the changing political context. Some of the authors who have started addressing this gap 
include Cock (1991, 2007, 2009); Heinecken (2002); Hassim (2004); Cherry (2007); Suttner (2007); 
Clarke (2008); and Hendricks & Hutton (2008). 
6 See Appendix 2 - Conflicts in Africa for an overview of the conflicts afflicting African states in the 
decades since independence. 
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2004; Cherry, 2007; Suttner, 2007; Cockburn, 2007; Clarke, 2008). The post-conflict 
experiences of women have also had a bearing on the roles undertaken, as Modise and 
Curnow (2000: 40) point out: 
“women who fought in the struggle are stigmatised, especially by their male 
comrades. For some inexplicable reason she feels they have been tainted by their 
fight ... Modise identified a similar marginalisation among Mozambican, Namibian 
and Zimbabwean women former freedom fighters. They too fought a two-pronged 
battle, similar to that of Modise and her comrades; the dual oppressions of 
colonialism and misogyny. ... Modise believes that ex-women soldiers and prisoners 
are still being marginalised within the ANC”. 
 
This points to the complexity of the roles that women have had to play within the South 
African liberation struggle, and the extensive ramifications on the functions they now 
fulfil in the fledgling democracy. Black women in particular have had to fight a war on 
many fronts; against cultural patriarchal traditions, colonial subjugation7, the inhumanity 
of the Apartheid system which restricted the fulfilment of day to day responsibilities, 
and finally against the very system which they helped to put in place. As Cock (1991: 26) 
points out, the “triple oppression of black working class women in South Africa, who 
are located at the intersection of three lines along which privilege runs – gender, race 
and class” face a greater disadvantage in the battle for power and access. Similarly, 
Britton (2002) expands on the concept of “double militancy” present in many liberation 
struggles, including in South Africa, wherein women fight both within a system for 
broader change as well as against the system for gendered change. These layers of 
oppression influence the viewpoints and strategies of both civil society and government, 
as there are starkly contrasting views on how to pursue equality across all divides. 
 
The focus on the security structures of the State therefore provides a useful case study 
of how women utilise a variety of contextual factors (from historical developments, 
exogenous events, timing, and evolving social norms) to negotiate entry into a sphere 
that has been historically hostile both to women’s concerns and their presence within 
the structure. Further, the security arena represents a set of institutional norms that are 
under-explored in political studies in general, and feminist institutionalist studies in 
particular, especially given its importance in the context of transitional states. The 
                                                 
7  West (1997: xiv) asserts that “patriarchal nationalism was disseminated through colonialism”, which can 
certainly be substantiated through the history and experiences of many sub-Saharan states. However, 
cultural and social traditions pre-dating even the earliest colonial settlers were decidedly patriarchal, 
characterised by an unequal division of labour, and lack of property and personal rights in most tribal 
and cultural groupings throughout Sub Saharan Africa, as Gasa (2007) also discusses. 
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examination of the security structures of the post conflict South African State is seen as 
a means of understanding the complex interplay between historical legacies and 
institutions, and how these various factors interconnect and interact to promote and 
foreclose the opportunities for the consolidation of gendered gains – and the impact 
this has on gendered institutional change. Central to this discussion are feminist 
institutionalist concepts such as institutional layering and “nested newness” (Mackay, 
2010; Chappell, 2011) which have particular utility for case studies such as this, as will 
be discussed in Chapter Two. 
 
Thus, the focus on the gendering of State security structures has the potential to reveal 
the mechanisms by which meaningful institutional change is wrought and can facilitate a 
deeper understanding of the manner in which sustainable transformations of gender 
norms could be achieved, filling a gap in the literature. Specifically, how have women 
gained access to these State security institutions? How have their experiences 
throughout the militarised process of democratisation shaped their entry into these 
bastions of masculinity? Have they retained their pre-transition power to enact change 
within these most gender-biased of State structures? What factors account for their 
advancement in these structures? Finally, what do the answers to these questions reveal 
about the processes of gendered institutional change? 
 
1.2 Structure of Thesis Text 
 
The thesis is divided into four parts, dealing respectively with the theoretical foundation 
underpinning the research (Chapter Two), the historical context informing the legacies 
of militancy and autonomy within general governance structures of the State (Chapters 
Three, Four and Five), the security dimension of the research question (Chapters Six, 
Seven and Eight), and concluding with the summation of the findings (Chapter Nine). 
 
Part I situates the research within the broader NI/FI literature, and facilitates the 
construction of the analytical framework utilised in the research. Chapter Two, Feminist 
New Institutionalism and Transitional States, demonstrates the utility of an institutionally-
focused gendered approach towards the understanding of the processes, promises and 
limitations of institutional change. This framework enables the systematic consideration 
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of the variables with respect to the South African case study, as well as being compatible 
with the incorporation of the security focus as an additional dimension to the 
investigation of gendered processes of institutional change.  
 
The methodological issues affecting the research are assessed, noting the manner in 
which biographical and autobiographical accounts were utilised together with primary 
data derived from questionnaires and interviews to aid the process tracing approach 
adopted. Challenges arising from an investigation of the security sector are addressed, in 
terms of access, negotiating the political climate8, the challenges (and opportunities) of 
context, and the interpretation of the responses received.  
 
Part II considers the historical context informing the progression of women’s autonomy 
and power within South Africa, and the manner in which the exogenous influences and 
key moments of the past have impacted on the gendering of institutions in the 
transitional post-conflict state. Chapter Three, Learning from Legacies: Women and South 
African History, and Chapter Four, Transition to Democracy: Women Organising to Consolidate 
Gender Gains, chart the gender gains of women with specific examples tied to the course 
of the liberation struggle. By demonstrating the influence of the historical legacy of 
militancy which permeates South African society, the importance of timing on the 
increasing autonomy of women is also made apparent. The variables identified within 
the framework are utilised to account for the position of women at the time of the 
transition to democracy, and how the historical context provided opportunities for 
effecting gendered institutional change. Chapter Five, Women and the First Democratic 
Regime, looks at how these historical trends were manifested within the general 
governance structures of the State, asking: How did women consolidate their gains 
within the formal governance structures? What accounts for their descriptive and 
substantive gains? Part II serves a dual purpose in providing both a historical context 
and serving as a bridge to the specific case study of the security sector.  
 
                                                 
8 Fieldwork was conducted during an election year that also saw deep divisions within the ANC: the 
resignation of President Thabo Mbeki, and the establishment of a breakaway political party that resulted 
in resignations and restructuring at the highest levels of government. This is discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter Two. 
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In order to address this question, variables such as the process of institutional layering, 
timing, and informal rules are explored. The perceptions of parliamentarians (derived 
from the interviews and surveys) are also utilised in order to construct a better 
understanding of the underlying norms which continue to influence the process of 
gendered institutional change within the structures of governance. The picture which 
emerges serves as a helpful comparison for the later analysis of the gendering of the 
security structures of the State. Although DRW represents an easily traceable indicator 
of progress in women’s representation, the focus of this thesis is on the SRW, which is 
focused towards gendered changes in institutional norms and rules. The integration of 
subjective views, such as those of parliamentarians and civil society practitioners, aids in 
the analysis of whether the intangible institutional norms are evolving to create an 
environment that is more open to gender claims. These are considered in conjunction 
with the existence of structural mechanisms such as gender machineries, and gendered 
processes such as the Women’s Budget. 
 
Part III deals specifically with the security dimension of the research question, exploring 
the opportunities for gendered transformation of the security sector as a result of, 
amongst others, the shift in security thinking towards a holistic, rights-centred approach. 
Chapter Six, Evolving Notions of Security: Opportunities for Transformation, outlines the 
underlying philosophy of the Human Security Paradigm, and shows how the emphasis 
on stability, development and security created openings for the consolidation of gender 
gains within the security sector. Further, the policies pursued as a result of the adoption 
of the Human Security Paradigm, primarily Security Sector Reform (SSR), enabled 
women to participate in the re-construction of the institutional structures of the State 
and influence the normative development of the new security apparatus of the State. 
This is considered in detail in Chapter Seven, Institutional Gendering and the South African 
Security Sector, which illustrates how the convergence of the historical legacies of 
militancy and autonomy with the gains made in the transitional period enabled women 
to push for the consolidation of gender gains within perhaps the most masculine of 
State structures. The exogenous influences which played a role in the transitional 
process are also shown to have a bearing on the developments within the security arena, 
particularly in terms of the new mandate for the security sector and the role which 
women play within it. However, the limits of the transformation process must also be 
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considered, and are encapsulated within the “case study within a case study” presented 
in Chapter Eight, Lessons from the Arms Deal. The complex saga of the Arms Deal 
demonstrates the difficulties in overcoming entrenched normative rules within 
institutions, and highlights the manner in which the factors identified in the analytical 
framework, such as power, informal rules, coalitions and institutional layering, are both 
a hindrance and a boon in the process of effecting institutional change, particularly with 
respect to gender. The case study asks: What are the nuances of the institutional 
gendering exercise? What are the partial successes and setbacks which exemplify the 
experiences of women within the South African security sector? 
 
Part IV draws the central arguments of the sections together in Chapter Nine, Conclusion: 
Gendered Institutional Change in the South African Security Sector, leading to the emergence of 
a picture of how women in South Africa approached the consolidation of gender gains 
within the security sector. The application of the FI-based model allows the findings to 
be dissected in a manner which depicts the various factors impacting on the trajectory 
of women within the new democratic dispensation, and highlights the central features of 
the strategy utilised by women in affecting change within the security structures of the 
State. The concluding chapter also situates the research findings within the broader FI 
literature. 
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How does gendered institutional change occur in post-conflict transitional states? What 
variables account for the gendered processes of institutional continuity and change? The 
explicit linkage of gender and institutions, evident in contemporary Feminist Political 
Science (FPS)9, increasingly highlights the importance of the institutional context and its 
impact on women’s descriptive and substantive representation, drawing on the many 
complementary aspects between New Institutionalism (NI) and Feminist 
Institutionalism (FI) (Kenney, 1996; Goetz, 1997; Hawkesworth, 2003, 2005; Mackay & 
Meier, 2003; Martin, 2004; Chappell, 2006; Kenny, 2007, 2011; Waylen, 2009; Annesley 
& Gains, 2010: 4; Franceshet, 2011; Krook and Mackay, 2011).  
 
The normative slant of FI blurs the “conceptual divide between ‘institutions’ and 
‘culture’”, necessitating explanations of institutional change to incorporate elements of 
both organisational norms and broader cultural beliefs (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 947; 
Mackay & Meier, 2003: 15; Kenny & Mackay, 2009: 276; Mackay, Monro & Waylen, 
2009; Krook & Mackay, 2011). The intertwining of sex and gender with other 
constitutive elements of identity (including race, ethnicity and nationality) “are 
interpreted according to cultural codes that have implications for masculinity and 
femininity as well as for institutional behaviour”, since “organisations are built around 
such masculinities and femininities” (Lovenduski, 1998: 348; Hawkesworth, 2003, 2005).  
 
The assertion is that the relations between actors and institutions (and their formal and 
informal rules and norms) are central to “explaining patterns of institutional creation, 
continuity and change, as well as the scope for agency within institutional constraints” 
                                                 
9 The incorporation of FPS with the central tenets of NI will hereafter be referred to as Feminist 
Institutionalism (FI), representing an approach that considers the gendered aspects of institutional 
theory. 
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(Krook & Mackay, 2011: 13; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Kenny, 2007; Mackay et al, 2009: 
254; Freidenvall & Krook, 2011). By providing a means to “conceptualise and 
understand the imbalanced structure of gender relations”, this FI approach can reveal 
“patterns of distribution advantage ... [and] makes power a central analytic focus” 
(Mackay & Meier, 2003: 15-16; Kenny, 2007: 96). It also offers a means to methodically 
analyse the manner in which power is gendered within institutions and uncover how 
change and political outcomes come about. This, in turn, provides clearer 
“understandings of (institutions as) rules of the game; the implications of nested 
institutions and rules and the ways in which symbols and cognitive scripts might be 
reframed to incorporate new values and meanings” (Mackay & Meier, 2003: 13).  
 
Institutions are thus the arenas within which prejudicial norms and values interact, 
providing the environment within which power relations are exercised (and created). 
The gendered view of institutions that emerges from this rich literature forms the 
central tenets on which the analytical model utilised in the thesis is based, given its utility 
for tracing the processes of gendered change in post-conflict South Africa. 
 
The model is premised around the normative notion that institutions are altered by the 
dominant ideas that are maintained or changed through social interactions and 
relationships. These relations are governed by shifting power between actors within the 
institution, and influenced by historical legacies (and path dependencies), key moments 
and exogenous influences resulting in institutional change (or continuity). The purpose 
of this chapter is to explain the concepts and variables employed within this eclectic 
model, clarifying the terminology used and demonstrating how these variables are 
positioned in order to address the research question.  
 
First, the theoretical framework of the model is unpacked through an exploration of the 
gendered view of institutions put forward by FI scholars. The starting point is the view 
of the relational power between the sexes as affected by the norms of institutions, which 
“prescribe (as well as proscribe) ‘acceptable’ masculine and feminine forms of 
behaviour, rules and values for men and women within institutions” (Chappell, 2006: 
226). The outcomes emerging from these institutions then “re/produce broader social 
and political gender expectations” (Chappell, 2006: 226). For example, according to 
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Lovenduski (2011: ix), the NI view of institutions as constraining actors through the 
‘rules of the game’ leads to an underrating of agency. The addition of agency into the 
toolkit of NI is one area in which feminists can enrich explanations of institutional 
change. The importance of structure, agency and power is thus dissected in order to 
understand gendered processes of institutional change and continuity (Streeck & 
Thelen, 2005: 18-19; Kenny, 2007; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Krook & Mackay, 2011: 6-
7; Waylen, 2011: 151-152). This investigation of power contends that this variable lies at 
the heart of institutional gendering processes, and thus forms the lynchpin of the model.  
 
The next section considers the contributory causes of institutional change, classified as 
historical legacies, key moments and exogenous influences. These classifications of 
variables aim to provide a holistic model to explain the processes and causes of 
gendered institutional change. They create an analytic framework that aids the 
understanding of how women in South Africa negotiated entry into the security 
structures of the State and consolidated the gains made incrementally over decades of 
strategic organising. The chapter concludes with a description of the methodology 
employed in the study, and the methodological challenges anticipated and encountered 
in the collection of data. 
 
2.2 A Broad View of Institutions 
 
“Institutions are the rules that structure political and social life ... they are the 
configuration of ideas and interests” (Lovenduski, 2011: viii) 
 
Expanding on the disaggregated conceptualisation of institutions put forward by 
sociological institutionalists (Ikenberry, 1994; Hotimsky, Cobb & Bond, 2006; 
Lovenduski, 2011), FI goes beyond the traditionally narrow definition of formal 
institutions and structures to include “rules, informal structures, norms, beliefs and 
values, routines and conventions, and ideas about institutions” (Thelen & Steinmo, 
1992: 2; Hall  & Taylor, 1996: 938; Mackay & Meier, 2003: 6; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; 
Kenny, 2007). This web of formal and informal structures serves as the institutional 
arena for political action, providing both constraints and opportunities for actors (Hall 
& Taylor, 1996: 938; Mackay & Meier, 2003: 9; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Leach & 
Lowndes, 2007: 184-185), allowing access for some (and not others), thereby 
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maintaining certain political values (Mackay & Meier, 2003: 9). The FI view is thus that 
by uncovering and understanding how institutions are created and maintained and, 
crucially, how gender (and gender inequality) is embedded within institutions, it would 
be possible to “illuminate and change the status of women” (Lovenduski, 2011: vii). 
 
Notably, informal structures are given as much credence as formal institutions when 
explaining institutional continuity and change, and are defined as “socially shared rules, 
usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially 
sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 726-727; Kenny, 2007; Leach & 
Lowndes, 2007; Freidenvall & Krook, 2011; Franceschet, 2011: 61-62; Krook & 
Mackay, 2011: 4). Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 726-727) assert that these informal 
structures “shape the performance of formal institutions in important and often 
unexpected ways” and are also “often critical to explaining institutional outcomes”.  
 
The inclusion of informal structures is critically important when analysing gendered 
institutional relations. Firstly, women tend to organise informally when institutional 
structures are hostile to their demands, and secondly, the historically entrenched “old 
boy’s networks” are omnipresent in many institutional structures (Franceschet, 2011: 62; 
Annesley & Gains, 2010: 11). These “old boy’s networks” are particularly evident within 
State security structures, which are infused with patriarchal norms. Accounting for the 
influence of the informal networks and rules within institutions is crucial, as while 
informal rules might not be explicitly acknowledged or sanctioned, “non-compliance 
might involve ... being shut out of informal power networks” (Franceschet, 2011: 62), 
which would effectively limit access and therefore diminish capacity to affect 
substantive change. The inclusion of informal structures and networks is therefore an 
important component of the model in order to successfully explain the processes of 
institutional change within post-conflict South African security structures. 
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2.2.1 Normative Nuances of New Institutionalism  
 
One of the merits of the expansive definition of institutions put forward by FI is that 
the inclusion of “norms, values and ideas, incentive systems and its ability to explain the 
persistence of social structures” facilitates the integration of a gendered viewpoint into 
institutional analysis (Lovenduski, 2011: ix; Ikenberry, 1994; Hotimsky et al, 2006; 
Kenny, 2007: 95; Kenny & Mackay, 2009: 272; Waylen, 2011: 152). As Chappell (2006: 
223) asserts, the gendering of institutional norms is not considered within mainstream 
neo-institutionalist literature, despite its ‘normative turn’, and “a more nuanced 
understanding of the ‘logic of appropriateness’ underpinning political institutions … will 
contribute not only to knowledge about the internal operation and effect of institutions, 
but also about how institutional gender patterns shape external social relations”.  
 
The inherently patriarchal nature of institutions as being representative of the norms 
and values prevalent within a society, and the manner in which these beliefs are 
manifested in the structures and relationships which define that society, are discussed by 
many feminist scholars including White (1994: 517), Cranny-Francis et al (2003: 13),  
Hawkesworth (2003, 2005), Kabeer (2003) and Daly (2005: 447). The consensus is that 
political equality cannot be attained “without changing the existing institutional 
framework and the political culture dominated and defined by men” (Marques-Pereira & 
Siim, 2002: 177; Peterson, 1992: 1; Goetz, 1997; Hawkesworth, 2003; Chappell, 2006: 
224; Kenny, 2007). Thus, explaining the processes through which institutions are 
gendered requires uncovering the “submerged values” of institutions, and 
acknowledging the intertwining of the political and social contexts which create and 
uphold unequal gender relations (Mackay and Meier, 2003: 9), reflecting a focus shared 
by FI and NI strands such as Historical Institutionalism (HI) and Discursive 
Institutionalism (DI). 
 
The focus on normative concepts allows for the scrutiny of the relationship between 
structure and agency, and how this impacts on the manner in which institutions are 
gendered (Waylen, 2011, 149). The institutional ‘turn’ in feminist research therefore 
begins addressing the gendered dimension of the interaction between society and the 
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State (Kenney, 1996; Goetz, 1997; Mackay & Meier, 2003; Hawkesworth, 2003; 
Chappell, 2006; Kenny, 2007; Krook & Mackay, 2011, amongst others). 
 
This work builds on the social constructivist assertions put forward by Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) that knowledge is dynamically created through the social experiences 
and interactions of groups and individuals. The norms and values of society thus 
generate the norms and value of institutions (and vice versa). Extending this philosophy 
towards the gendering of institutions, the manner in which contextual variables impact 
on the gender relations within institutions starts becoming apparent. Understanding 
these institutional gendering processes is, according to Mackay and Meier (2003: 2), 
“central to understanding the practices, ideas, goals and outcomes of politics; the 
dynamics of change (and continuity); and ... the ways in which institutions reflect, 
reinforce and structure unequal gendered power relations”. 
 
The normative slant of the wider FI definition of institutions permits the emphasis on 
ideas in the toolkit of variables explaining change. Discursive institutionalists argue that 
institutions are predicated on ideational influences, and that these determine the shape, 
design, and development of institutions (Schmidt, 2008; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 15; 
Hall & Taylor, 1996: 936; Chappell, 2006: 226; Leach & Lowndes, 2007: 185; Krook & 
Mackay, 2011: 10;). Institutional norms and values are reflections of these “ideational 
influences”, and are sustained through the inherently hierarchical and asymmetrical 
power relations between actors within institutions (Kabeer, 2003: 47-49; White, 1994: 
517). Changing the status quo is therefore reliant on altering the power dynamics within 
the institution by infusing prevailing norms with new ideas. Competing and 
complementary notions of power within the gendered institutional context are discussed 
at greater length later in this chapter. 
 
While NI contends that institutions provide the structures or “arenas” in which political 
events occur, institutions are “never the sole ‘cause’ of outcomes” (Thelen & Steinmo, 
1992: 3; Hall & Taylor, 1996: 942). There is a reciprocal relationship of influence 
between actors and institutions, actors and society, and institutions and society. Further, 
the State is not a “neutral broker among competing interests but [a] complex of 
institutions capable of structuring the character and outcomes of group conflict” (Hall 
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& Taylor, 1996: 938). Thus, institutional change has an impact not only on the 
institutional context and its formal rules, but also on the actors within them and the 
society within which it operates. This correlates with Waylen’s (2009: 247) assertion that 
“institutions operate not just as constraints but also as strategic resources for actors” – 
institutions operating as both dependent and independent variables in explaining 
change.  
 
2.2.2 Institutional Layering 
 
The complementary relationship between NI and feminist research is apparent in the 
multiple nodes of commonality described above, and in the myriad of ways in which the 
two approaches bring valuable insights to the consideration of institutional change. This 
section considers the addition of another set of variables that allows for the specific 
analysis of institutional change in transitions. In particular, the HI concept of “layering” 
adopted by FI, in which institutions are not wholly replaced or displaced but rather 
added to and modified (Mackay & Meier, 2003; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Waylen, 2009; 
Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 16; Schmidt, 2010). This draws heavily on the disaggregated 
institutional definition, put forward above, which gives equal prominence to formal and 
informal structures. 
 
The addition of new rules and norms to existing institutions alters the opportunities and 
constraints offered by the particular institution. Incremental changes can result in 
significant adjustments to the status quo, and, in certain cases, lead to the 
transformation of the institution over time (Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Schmidt, 2008: 317; 
Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 17). The motivations behind institutional layering vary 
between contexts, and can result from one set of actors striving to maintain the status 
quo, new actors attempting to displace entrenched norms or values, or as a 
complementary system of filling gaps in the institutional structure. This is an especially 
useful concept within the context of transitional states. In states like South Africa, the 
new regime does not start with a ‘blank slate’. Instead, some institutions (and the norms 
and values they embody) will remain largely unchanged, while some wholly new 
structures are added. Both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutions will be operated by a 
combination of ‘old guard’ and incoming actors, bringing discordant ideas and values 
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into conflict which must compete for prominence. The intersecting spheres of influence 
between these ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutions will also create openings, contested spaces 
wherein new norms can be entrenched. The idea of institutional “conversion” is also of 
importance here, as it is characterised by the “redeployment of old institutions to new 
purposes” (Streeck & Thelen, 2005: 31). The possibilities for institutional change 
presented within such “layered” and “converted” structures are further widened when 
taking into consideration the informal structures which accompany the range of ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ structures.  
 
Three concepts are carried through from the above definition of institutions that 
permeate the new model explaining gendered institutional change. Firstly, the normative 
focus that encompasses the explicit and implicit norms of institutions. This 
acknowledges the socially constructed nature of the values and ideas that mediate the 
relationships within the institution, and thus impacts upon the gendered nature of 
institutions. Secondly, a contextual focus that takes formal and informal structures into 
consideration, and which has a bearing on explanations of power distribution and the 
susceptibility of institutions to change. Lastly, the notion of institutions as presenting 
both opportunities and constraints for actors seeking change, whether of a gendered or 
any other nature. Institutions are thus arenas for continuously contested change. The 
next section outlines the causes of institutional change: the events that interact with 
institutional norms and values and thereby affect the gendered power relations that 
uphold the status quo.  
 
2.3 Explaining Institutional Change 
 
Understanding the causes of institutional change is central to answering the research 
question at the heart of this thesis: how did gendered institutional change occur in South 
African security structures? In addition, unravelling the contributing factors to these 
causes of change aids the identification of opportunities for gendered transformation, 
particularly in transitional contexts where widespread institutional restructuring takes 
place, such as in the post-conflict South African security structures. Building on the 
definition of institutions as a normatively bound web of formal and informal structures 
that provide both opportunities and constraints for the actors operating within their 
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spheres of influence, the next layer of analysis considers various explanations for the 
sources of institutional change. Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 16-17) identify four 
“empirically intertwined” yet distinct causes of change: the introduction of new actors 
who have attained power into existing institutions; changes to existing institutions 
without necessarily introducing new actors; ‘old’ actors in ‘new’ institutions; and changes 
causing dormant institutions to gain prominence and thereby alter the political 
environment.  
 
Thelen’s model of “dynamic constraints” asserts that “strategic manoeuvring by political 
actors ... within the institutions in response to these external events [demonstrates that] 
actors [are] capable of acting on ‘openings’ provided by such shifting contextual 
conditions in order to defend or enhance their own positions” (Thelen & Steinmo, 
1992: 17). This demonstrates that institutional change occurs both from outside 
(exogenous influences, key moments) as well as from within (actors, historical and 
political legacies), and that actors utilise their power and influence to capitalise on these 
changes by using the “shifting contextual conditions” to push their ideas onto the 
agenda and thereby alter institutional processes. This will be shown to be particularly 
relevant to the Security Sector Reform processes in post-conflict South Africa. 
 
Chappell (2006: 231) cautions that permanent change is rare, and that “positive 
advances can only come about at those times when there is an alignment of political 
opportunities – for instance, a responsive government”. In addition, while drastic 
changes to the system such as “crises or shocks ... can induce an acceptance of different 
or new norms”, the process of change is “often driven by ‘policy entrepreneurs’ or 
innovators working from within or outside institutions to change the rules” (Chappell, 
2006: 230).  
 
This alludes to the complicated and sometimes ambiguous sources of institutional 
change, which can rarely be attributed to a single factor. Instead, a confluence of events 
can be accountable for the change, sometimes internally and externally generated, 
occurring over a long period of time or as a relatively sudden event, all of which collude 
to produce an alteration in the system, sometimes with unexpected results (Pierson, 
2000b). The role of actors in affecting change or maintaining continuity is discussed in a 
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later section, and forms another key variable that interacts with the categories of change 
described here, as it speaks to the need for actors to construct alliances in order to 
initiate certain events. This will be shown to have been the case in South Africa’s 
Security Sector Reform process. 
 
The causal events that can result in institutional change are categorised into three 
groups, which, while drawing from NI concepts (particularly HI and DI) and 
considering the FI view, are somewhat more broadly defined and depart in some 
respects from the traditional definitions. The manner in which the three groupings of 
historical legacies/path dependency, key moments, and exogenous influences were 
defined (as will be described below) was necessitated by the atypical nature of the South 
African case, and the desire to incorporate a range of events in a systematic and 
categorical manner.  
 
2.3.1 Historical Legacies and Path Dependency  
 
Political and historical legacies fundamentally shape notions of citizenship and identity 
in all arenas; private, political, institutional and societal. Their influence cannot be 
disregarded when attempting to comprehend how current institutional formations came 
into being, nor can their impact on shaping the behaviour of actors within those 
institutions be ignored. During the 1980s and 1990s, feminists looked closely at 
concepts of identity and difference (Haslanger & Tuana, 2004). The underlying logic 
was the perceived tension between attaining equal treatment while still recognising the 
differences between the sexes, which Squires (2007: 9) describes as “oscillating between 
demands for inclusion into existing institutions according to existing norms, and an 
assertion of the limitation of these institutions and norms, which have frequently been 
formulated such that they structurally disadvantage women”. The fear of assimilation 
was at the centre of this wavering focus – that by absorbing women into a 
fundamentally unchanged patriarchal structure would not result in change at all.  
 
The political legacies of institutions entrenched binary views of differences between the 
sexes (Cranny-Francis et al, 2003: 2), and these views were reinforced as continuity 
within institutional norms was maintained by those actors holding the power. This 
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power was wielded through the policy outcomes produced by the decision-makers, 
feeding into societal values and further entrenching the status quo.  
 
Considering institutions as the “political legacies of concrete historical struggles” 
(Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 7), new institutionalism provides the means for a 
contextualised gender analysis which considers the events that shaped institutional 
norms and values, and enabled the continuity of the status quo. Understanding the 
manner in which these norms and values are maintained enables the formulation of a 
strategy for recasting the way in which masculinity and femininity are viewed, 
particularly within the security arena.  
 
Historical legacies are based on the notion that “past events influence future events” 
(Mahoney, 2000a: 510). A similar view is taken by other historical institutionalists that 
the “contextual features of a given situation [are] often inherited from the past ... 
Institutions are seen as relatively persistent features of the historical landscape and one 
of the central factors pushing historical development along a set of ‘paths’” (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996: 941). This does not imply that path dependencies result in pre-determined 
outcomes, but rather that within the evolution of institutions “unintended consequences 
... result from such historical development” (Schmidt, 2010: 10). To some extent, the 
paths created are one of the factors structuring “a nation’s response to new challenges 
[due to] ... the impact of existing ‘state capacities’ and ‘policy legacies’ on subsequent 
policy choices” (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 941).  
 
It is especially important to pay attention to historical and political legacies when 
considering “layered institutions”, described by Waylen (2009: 247) as “new institutions 
added on to existing ones”. In other words, wholly new structures are not created; 
current institutions evolve and are added to over time. This will be clearly shown to be 
the case in South Africa – inherited institutions transformed through both path 
dependency (incremental change over time) and the critical moment of democratic 
transition, with some structures being amended rather than replaced (Streeck & Thelen, 
2005; Waylen, 2009). The layering of institutions also raises issues about the schism 
between intention and outcomes, as discussed by Chappell (2011: 164), which arises due 
to the influence of past legacies on institutional design. In other words, not only does 
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the past matter in the evolution of institutions, it matters to the creation and functioning 
of new institutions as well – as is explored in practical terms in Chapter Eight.  
 
Path dependency falls within this inclusive category of historical legacies, the “"idea that 
choices made early in the life of an institution, system or a policy (historical legacies) will 
routinely determine subsequent choices unless 'sufficiently strong political force' 
counteracts this" (Peters, 1999: 19)” (quoted by Mackay & Meier, 2003). This category 
thus focuses on endogenous institutional influences, from the historical legacies that 
gradually shape institutional norms to the day-to-day manoeuvrings of actors to either 
maintain or alter the paths that govern the institutional environment (Kenny, 2007; 
Schmidt, 2008; Krook & Mackay, 2011). 
 
While the concept of path dependency is utilised within NI (particularly HI), the range 
of events that are considered “path dependent” vary widely. Pierson (2000a: 252) 
outlines the various conceptions of path dependence, from broad to narrow, including 
the deterministic notion of “increasing returns” whereby certain courses become self-
reinforcing (Pierson, 2000a: 262; Mahoney, 2000a: 507-8), discussed later in this section.  
 
While narrower definitions certainly have utility for various kinds of institutional 
research, this particular study benefits from a broader conceptualisation. As Pierson 
(2000a: 252) points out:   
“... we cannot understand the significance of a particular social variable without 
understanding "how it got there" - the path it took. Previous events in a sequence 
influence outcomes and trajectories but not necessarily by inducing further 
movement in the same direction. Indeed, the path may matter precisely because it 
tends to provoke a reaction in some other direction”. 
 
Given the multiple (and contested) definitions attached to the idea of path dependency 
(Pierson, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2004; Mahoney, 2000a; Waylen, 2009: 247, amongst 
others), the broader category of “historical legacies” is understood to incorporate all 
prior events that contributed to the institutional environment under investigation, while 
those which had a clearly discernable knock-on effect in steering institutional continuity 
or change are described as a “path”. Thus, multiple events input into the system 
(historical legacies), some of which are “stickier” than others. These events, usually in 
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conjunction with a series of related events (path dependency), can explain a moment of 
change.  
 
Consequently, this broader conceptualism conceives path dependency as the cumulative 
events that have produced certain values and norms within an institution. It is not seen 
as a deterministic trajectory immune to influence from either internal or external events, 
but as an explanatory series of occurrences. Multiple paths may be present within each 
formal and informal institution, presenting various opportunities and constraints for 
change where these two spheres overlap. This notion of “multiple paths” is explored by 
Lieberman (2002: 704), although the emphasis of his perspective is on the opportunities 
that arise as a result of the friction and uncertainty resulting when these paths are not 
concordant. This tracks with the view of institutions as “historical creations of human 
agency whether intentional or unintentional”, although it is also noted that “once 
created, institutions can be difficult to change and are an important structuring context 
within which political action occurs” (Mackay & Meier, 2003: 9). In other words, while 
the institutional procedures constrain behaviour and structure the interactions of actors 
within the institution, they remain dynamic in evolving to reflect the context (and 
society) in which they operate.  
 
The possibility of unintended consequences is a critical consideration (Pierson, 2000b, 
2004; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Waylen, 2009; Krook & Mackay, 2011) as it could 
conceivably be a factor within any of the three categories of change. For example, 
Pierson (2004: 10) observes that relatively minor interventions can have a wider impact 
than anticipated at a later stage in the “path”. This is partly due to self-reinforcing 
processes, referred to above, which he argues are also applicable to unequal power 
relations, where seemingly unimportant inequalities gradually become entrenched in 
institutional processes (Pierson, 2004: 11; Mahoney, 2000a: 509).  
 
These unintended consequences could be due to the unexpected ways in which actors 
react to events, or due to the timing of events, constituting a critical consideration 
according to Pierson (2000c; 2004), Mahoney (2000a) and Waylen (2009). Two of the 
four features of self-reinforcing processes described by Pierson relate to this: contingency, 
where “relatively small events, if occurring at the right moment, can have large and 
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enduring consequences”, and timing, which argues that “when an event occurs may be 
crucial. Because early parts of a sequence matter much more than later parts, an event 
that happens ‘too late’ may have no effect, although it might have been of great 
consequence if the timing had been different”(Pierson, 2004: 44).10 This view is shared 
by North (1999: 316) in his statement that “without a deep understanding of time, you 
will be lousy political scientists, because time is the dimension in which ideas and 
institutions and beliefs evolve” (quoted by Pierson, 2004: 1). The sequencing of events is 
also emphasised (Pierson, 2000b, 2000c) because the order in which events occur 
impacts on the self-reinforcement of the path. 
 
A potentially useful distinction between event sequences and chains is drawn by Pierson 
(2004: 68). Chains are described as “tightly linked causal connections unfolding over 
time” and are not contingent on sequential order to reach a particular outcome. 
Sequences, however, are “cases where different temporal orderings of the same events 
or processes will produce different outcomes” (Pierson, 2004: 68), reiterating that when 
matters as much as what. Therefore, these chains and sequences represent two examples of 
paths that may be present concurrently within institutions, some with overlapping 
events. Whether these individual events form part of a sequence is determined by when 
they occur in relation to other events. Causal chains are equally important as they are 
useful in “contexts where political actions have multiple consequences, and major long-
term outcomes are by-products rather than the principal focus of intended actions” 
(Pierson, 2004: 88). This will be shown to be particularly relevant for the gendering of 
security structures within post-conflict South Africa. 
 
Historical legacies are especially important when considering gendered institutional 
change, as inherited patriarchal structures with entrenched norms and values that 
privilege the masculine undoubtedly impact upon relations between women and men in 
institutions, as has been discussed. When analysing security structures, the deeply 
ingrained masculine norms governing institutional interactions are particularly relevant 
in explaining gendered institutional change. The range of events that influence this type 
                                                 
10 The remaining two features are multiple equilibria: “under a set of initial conditions conducive to positive 
feedback, a range of outcomes is generally possible”; and inertia: “once such a process has been 
established, positive feedback will generally lead to a single equilibrium. This equilibrium will in turn be 
resistant to change” (Pierson, 2004: 44). 
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of case study thus necessitates a broad definition of historical legacies and, within that, 
path dependency. Acknowledging the agency of actors within institutions also calls for a 
less deterministic view of these concepts. As Streeck and Thelen (2005: 18) point out  
“... enterprising actors often have enough ‘play’ to test new behaviours inside old 
institutions, perhaps in response to new and as yet incompletely understood 
external conditions, and encourage other actors to behave correspondingly”. 
 
Thus, historical legacies as a category considers prior events in the institutional and 
societal history that have impacted upon the norms and values governing institutional 
behaviour, and created opportunities and constraints for the exercising of power. Within 
this broader category, path dependency is then understood to be a series of causally-
related events happening within a specific space and time, and which can be shown to 
be the most likely factors bringing about a specific change, based on a subjective 
interpretation of the outcomes. Consequently, even seemingly insignificant events, when 
considered together with more far-reaching events, can provide the confluence of 
factors that assist in transforming an institutional norm, or even a set of institutions. 
 
2.3.2 Key Moments 
 
Within the model, key moments are conceptualised as the junctures at which 
institutional operations are fundamentally altered, transforming the norms and values 
governing actors’ behaviour (Thelen 1999; Grace: 2011: 97). Such moments can be 
initiated externally or internally to the institution, reflecting broader societal upheavals 
(such as the transition to democracy) or representing the cumulative effects of an 
internal (path dependent) series of events which result in a major reconstruction of 
institutional norms.  
 
The significance of context within FI allows for the consideration of more than local 
factors: international influences are afforded a space within institutional analysis as well. 
Waylen (2009: 248; 2011, 152) argues that HI in particular is “already in a good position 
to understand and demonstrate that, because in national contexts distinct mechanisms 
of reproduction sustain different institutions, common international trends can have 
divergent domestic consequences. Additionally, sequencing and timing can play a central 
role in ensuring that factors play out differently across distinct contexts”. Similarly, the 
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actions of critical actors must also be considered within context as “this both enables 
and constrains their ability to make substantive policy changes” (Annesley & Gains, 
2010: 5), particularly when investigating how institutions are gendered. Sources of 
change must therefore be contextualised in order for meaningful conclusions to be 
drawn. 
 
Although some actors may persist in attempting to preserve the institutional status quo, 
these key moments require some sort of transformation to be effected in order to 
restore balance to the system. In other words, key moments can interrupt or redirect 
path dependencies within institutions “because institutions continue to ‘evolve in 
response to changing environmental conditions’ (Thelen 1999: 387)” (quoted by Grace: 
2011: 97). 
 
Within the broader canon of FI literature, the concept of key junctures that signal a 
critical shift in norms and rules is most often characterised as a “critical juncture”, as 
described by Mahoney (2000a), Thelen (2000), and Pierson (2000c), amongst many 
others. These seismic shifts in the institutional environment indicate a decisive change, 
usually with wide-ranging consequences – moments of no return. For example, in the 
South African case, the transition to democracy would constitute a “critical juncture” as 
it represented a fundamental transformation of the State and society.  
 
However, this conceptualisation does not accommodate the inclusion of significant 
events which altered the trajectory and development of the historical legacies and path 
dependencies outlined earlier in this chapter. Some occurrences had a considerable 
impact on the narrative of both the liberation struggle and the women’s movement, but 
are too “small” to fit into the conceptualisation of “critical junctures” as put forward by 
FI. Thus, this study has adopted a somewhat wider definition, akin to that put forward 
by Haydu (1998) and Haskova and Saxonberg (2011), which considers such events as 
part of a series of moments that contribute to the development of a broader legacy or 
legacies. In other words, these “key moments” signal events of significance that 
punctuate broader historical legacies, indicating important shifts in formal or informal 
rules and norms. By using “key moments” as opposed to “critical junctures”, seminal 
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moments that shaped the rise of women’s autonomy and equality are captured within 
the analytical model as explanatory factors for gendered institutional change. 
 
2.3.3 Exogenous Influences 
 
The understanding of “exogenous influences” 11 utilised by the study refers to external 
influences not originating from the local environment or society, not instigated by actors 
within institutions, and to events not occurring due to the legacies or natural evolution 
of the institution. These events have the potential to profoundly affect institutional 
structures by altering the paths within them, prompting new paths, or by contributing to 
key moments. In other words, exogenous influences serve as generators of new ideas, 
which, if introduced into the institutional process by actors with power, can contribute 
to institutional change. For example, exogenous influences would include changes made 
to institutions as a result of compliance with regional and international treaties and 
protocols to which the state is party, obligations and opportunities that arise as a result 
of regional memberships and aspirations, and the influence of other states and 
organisations. 
 
A specific example from the South African case study (which will be extensively 
elaborated upon in Chapters Six and Eight) refers to the fluctuations of power within 
State structures dealing with security as a result of the Executive’s campaign to 
reposition South Africa within the region. The internal shift to democracy (which had 
repercussions on the values pursued by the State), coupled with commitments as a result 
of African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC) membership 
(exogenous influences), could be viewed as a critical juncture in the State’s defence 
policy, marking a definitive shift in the positioning of the role of the military within the 
State and the region. The new focus on peacekeeping enabled the maintenance of a 
somewhat altered version of the status quo in terms of military size and defence system 
acquisitions, where the requisite changes to conform to international and regional 
demands of the security system would not diminish the power and influence of 
institutional elites. From a theoretical perspective, this is explored by Thelen and 
                                                 
11 Although some NI models privilege exogenous factors as explanatory of institutional change, Schmidt 
(2010: 5) argues that endogenous variables are present within all NI strands, whether it is the self-
reinforcing processes of Rational Choice or the layering and conversion of HI. 
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Steinmo (1992: 21) who show “how institutional change results from deliberate political 
strategies to transform structural parameters in order to win long-term political 
advantage”. This demonstrates how a combination of the categories of change, 
identified in the model, work in tandem to bring about institutional change, even if that 
“change” is oriented towards maintaining continuity. 
 
Further, exogenous influences such as treaties and protocols are used as tools for actors 
to instigate changes. For example, the agreements emerging out of the various UN 
World Conferences on Women (especially the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action), from 
other multilateral bodies such as UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325), 
or regional proclamations such as the AU’s Post Conflict Reconstruction and 
Development Policy (PCRD), all enabled women to call on the State to fulfil their 
obligations to gender equality. They served as an opening for access into discussions, a 
means to get onto the agenda.  
 
Each of the categories of change described above relies on some measure of gendered 
power to be sustained, and eventually entrenched, within the institution. While 
institutions are not static, the evolutionary process in path dependence is slow, and even 
the more sudden changes wrought by key moments require adroit manoeuvring by 
actors to influence the agenda with their ideas and interests. Key moments could be 
viewed as the dramatic culmination of various historical legacies and path dependencies 
within institutions and/or society, as will be shown to be the case in the South African 
example, with exogenous influences also contributing to the trajectory of path 
dependencies. Historical legacies (and, within that, path dependency) are thus utilised 
most heavily within the model as an explanatory factor in understanding gendered 
institutional change. 
 
The next section considers the relationship between institutions, ideas and power. In 
particular, how institutions shape the objectives of actors and their power to achieve 
them (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 6) as well as prescribing the resources (human and 
otherwise) available for their attainment. The redistribution of power that occurs 
through this process has a direct bearing on how the ideas of actors can shape 
institutions. Indeed, Waylen (2009: 248) argues that institutions “reflect, reproduce and 
Chapter Two: Feminist New Institutionalism and Transitional States        37 
magnify particular patterns of power”. A deeper understanding of how institutional 
change is affected within the State security structures in South Africa can be attained by 
clarifying how power and ideas are conceived. 
 
2.4 Institutional Transformation: Power in Action 
 
“So when does an idea's time come? The answer lies in the match between idea and 
moment. An idea's time arrives not simply because the idea is compelling on its own 
terms, but because opportune political circumstances favour it. At those moments 
when a political idea finds persuasive expression among actors whose institutional 
position gives them both the motive and the opportunity to translate it into policy -
then, and only then, can we say that an idea has found a time” (Lieberman 2002: 709). 
 
The model for analysis revolves around the following key factors: the centrality of 
power, and its relation to ideas within the institutional decision-making process. The 
possession of power, relative to other actors or groups of actors within institutions, 
determines the range of change possible, as well as whether the status quo can be 
maintained. Continuity and change are dependent on who has the power and how they 
choose to wield it. 
 
Despite criticisms of NI regarding the poor prominence of power, particularly in terms 
of race and gender (see Hawkesworth, 2003; Kenny & Mackay, 2009: 275), the approach 
has been recognised as having immense potential for feminist analysis. As Kenny (2007: 
96) points out, the ‘tools’ offered by the approach provide “important insights into how 
gender norms operate within institutions, and, therefore, offers a greater understanding 
of the interaction between institutions and institutional actors”. This is achieved by 
finding likely sources of institutional change, sources which go beyond “exogenous 
shocks or environmental shifts” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 3), and consider subtle 
internal changes and the manoeuvrings of actors within institutions. While the 
categorisation of sources of change utilised in the study (historical legacies, key 
moments and exogenous shocks) constitute events that impact upon institutions, 
thereby bringing about change, it is in essence the shift in power amongst actors that 
produces change. In other words, the opportunities that arise as a result of institutional 
events, whether externally or internally generated, need to be seized by actors in order to 
result in change. Actors utilise their power to bring about institutional change, or to 
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maintain the status quo: the existence of the opportunities arising from these events is 
not necessarily enough to bring about change. 
 
Elements of power are discussed to some extent within traditional NI theory, 
particularly HI, which cites the relational power between actors, and between actors and 
institutions, as an explanatory factor when describing the manner in which actors 
establish and describe their goals, including party system structures and the relationships 
between government structures (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 2; Pierson, 2004: 36-37; 
Franceschet, 2011: 65). For example, the use of the proportional representation system 
based on party lists (together with the use of gender quotas) is of significant import to 
the South African case study, as the power of the party over representatives both 
increases and decreases their individual agency to bring about change, particularly in the 
case of women. This manner of selecting representatives influences the stated goals of 
party members in order to advance up the list, and further ensures that deviance from 
the party line is minimised in order to retain position, power and privileges. An overt 
“feminist” agenda would decrease their power within the party if it is deemed to be in 
conflict with the interests of party elites, making their reappointment (and the retention 
of their power to affect change) unlikely. These issues became apparent in South Africa, 
particularly in the post-conflict security structures, and will be addressed in subsequent 
chapters.  
 
This emphasis on differing and conflicting interests in political organisations is 
discussed by Lukes (2005: 20) and Franceschet (2011: 65) as indicative of the 
“mobilisation of bias”12 within the system, which is maintained through the “socially 
structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups and practices of institutions” 
(Lukes, 2005: 26). The norms, values and interest of elites are maintained to the 
detriment of lower-ranking groups with less relational power (Mahoney, 2000a: 521; 
Lukes, 2005: 21; Franceschet, 2011: 65). The norms and values of institutions also 
impact upon the type of power that certain groups can exercise. Annesley and Gains 
(2010: 5) argue that prevailing cultural expectations of women “impact on their capacity 
                                                 
12 The concept of “mobilisation of bias” is based on the work of Schattschneider (1975), who asserted 
that “organisation is itself a mobilisation of bias” as it serves as a forum through which political action 
is mediated (Schattschneider, 1975: 30). In other words, institutions influence the manner in which 
participants interact due to its inherently value-laden nature. 
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to operate at this level [the core executive]. The gendered disposition of these 
institutions acts as a constraint to feminist actors seeking policy change”. 
 
The HI view of relational power, or “asymmetrical relations of power”, is that power is 
assigned unevenly to actors within institutions, whether this is manifested in terms of 
access, decision-making privileges, or voice, and that this relational power is cast as a 
win-lose scenario (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 940-1). This relates to the discussion on 
substantive versus descriptive representation: if women are not able to exercise agency, 
the use of quotas would be reduced to “window dressing” appointments aimed at 
upholding the status quo. However, men are also expected to toe the party line: the 
difficulty comes in differentiating between demands that are aimed at creating a more 
equitable society, and those that reflect a difference of opinion. Lukes (2005: 12) 
addresses this with the statement that: 
“Power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, and never 
need to be, exercised); and you can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others’ 
interests ... power as domination is only one species of power”. 
 
This suggests a number of scenarios. Firstly, that by choosing not to exercise its power in 
maintaining the status quo, the institutional/party elite allow women to lobby for change, 
a view which alludes to indulgent condescension. The change is thus not as a result of 
women’s power, but the lack of opposition from the elite. Secondly, changing the status 
quo occurs in those areas where it is in the elites’ interests to do so: the advancement of 
women’s goals in the process is a peripheral concern. This is especially prevalent within 
the security arena, where women’s interests (and their relative power) have been 
historically marginal, as will be discussed in the analysis of the South African case study. 
 
It also raises the issue of whether the manner in which women acquire their power, and 
the way in which they gain access to an institutional decision-making space, affects their 
ability to wield power and affect change. Using the South African case, do former MK 
commandos have more legitimacy in the view of the institutional security elites, and 
does this endow them with greater agency? If institutional norms are not sufficiently 
transformed through this process, it would imply that each subsequent generation of 
women would face the same “legitimacy” test, with the result that women’s power in the 
security arena would be steadily eroded as frontline positions remain the domain of men 
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in the new dispensation.  This underlines the importance of a genuine transformation of 
institutional norms in order to entrench structural change. This aspect is explored within 
subsequent chapters. 
 
Wider institutional and social arrangements cannot be disregarded when considering 
power, particularly in terms of dominating the agenda, although ascertaining causation 
between structural procedures and the “exercise of power” can be problematic. This 
difficulty is partly due to the assertion by Lukes (2005: 26, 30, 54) that power is value-
dependent in that any definition attached to it is “inextricably tied to a given set of 
(probably unacknowledged) value-assumptions which predetermine the range of its 
empirical application”. Given that institutions are value-laden, and that the actors 
wielding the power subscribe to various values as well, it can be surmised that power 
itself is not a neutral concept, and neither is the wielding of it.  
 
Steans (1998) offers an analysis of Michel Foucault’s theory of power in connection to 
gender inequality, which speaks to the significance of institutional values to power 
relations, stating that:  
“Foucault’s work on discourse suggested that the production of knowledge was 
bound up historically with specific regimes of power ... every society produced its 
own ‘truths’ which had normalising and regulatory functions” (Steans, 1998: 13-14). 
 
The manner in which power is wielded is also largely contingent on the ranking of 
actors. The two-dimensional view of power typology incorporates coercion (where 
compliance is secured through the “threat of deprivation”), influence (where the 
behaviour of one actor is changed without threats, implicit or explicit), authority 
(compliance due to a recognition of “legitimate” and “reasonable” claims), force 
(removing alternatives) and manipulation (as a “sub-concept of force” where 
compliance occurs without full knowledge of the compromise being made) (Lukes, 
2005: 21-22; Pierson, 2000a: 259). Each of these requires different “types” of power by 
the actor or group of actors employing it. In most scenarios, influence, authority and 
manipulation are the primary options for women, as few women have advanced 
sufficiently up the ranks to amass the requisite political capital that would allow 
deprivation of a resource (coercion) or force (removal of alternatives). Indeed, it could 
be argued that the inclusion of more alternatives is the purpose of the gendering process. 
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Further, it brings in the dichotomy of “power to” versus “power over”. Steans (1998: 
170-171) suggests that this is due to the “different life experiences of men and women 
[which] give rise to different conceptions of power”, explaining that “women are 
positioned in particular kinds of power relationships, but nevertheless have a different 
understanding of power”. 
 
One conceptualisation of this is put forward by Kabeer (1999: 437), who posits power 
as being contingent on resources (pre-conditions), agency (process), and achievements 
(outcomes), where the power to choose “refers to the expansion in people’s ability to 
make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied them” 
(Kabeer, 1999: 437). Further, the focus is on “possible inequalities in people’s capacity to 
make choices, rather than in differences in the choices they make”, which necessitates a 
distinction between preferences and a “denial of choice” (Kabeer, 1999: 439). Thus, 
concepts of empowerment require a nuanced understanding of local contexts, resulting 
in policies or approaches that “are sensitive to the domain of possibilities in which 
women are located” (Kabeer, 1999: 462). 
 
Kabeer’s conceptualisation of resources ties in with Luke’s typology of influence in 
relation to power, arguing that resources “are acquired through a multiplicity of social 
relationships conducted in the various institutional domains which make up a society” 
(Kabeer, 1999: 437). Thus, the networks and relationships within the institution are the 
means through which influence is exerted in order to bring about change – the 
exercising of power through the introduction of new ideas. Krook and Mackay (2011: 
10) recount the work of Freidenvall (2009) which surpasses notions of power-
distributional models by suggesting that “discourse itself is a medium of power ... In this 
view, power is not simply defined in terms of positional power within a particular 
institutional context: rather, ideas and discourses construct and shape the very ‘exercise 
of power’”. Franceschet (2011: 66-67) has a similar view, noting that FI “takes this 
insight even further, showing how ideas and norms about gender are reflected in myriad 
ways in institutions”, and “can also serve as powerful mobilising forces”. 
 
The influence of informal institutions in relation to power is raised by authors such as 
Lukes (2005), Franceschet (2011) and Pierson (2000a: 259), who note that “power 
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asymmetries are often hidden from view; where power is most unequal, it often does 
not need to be employed openly”. Pierson further argues that while power can be 
utilised to initiate institutional change, even “relatively small disparities in political 
resources among contending groups may widen dramatically over time as positive 
feedback sets in” (Pierson, 2000a: 259). Thus, relational power is a key consideration for 
any analysis focused on explaining gendered institutional change. 
 
2.4.1 A Profile of Power  
 
A multi-faceted definition is required in order to consider the various permutations of 
power that come into play during the examination of gendered political change, 
particularly in post-conflict transitional states. This is drawn from the many viewpoints 
expressed above, bearing in mind the distinct demands of the case study.  
 
Above all, power is considered in terms of capacity (Kabeer, 1999; Allen, 2005; Lukes, 
2005; Annesley & Gains, 2010): capacity to act upon opportunities that arise within 
institutions or the wider societal context, capacity to influence the norms and values of 
institutions, and capacity to bring about change. Power is relational in multiple senses: in 
terms of asymmetrical power relations, as well as relational to the context in which it 
operates. In other words, power is value dependent (Lukes, 2005: 26, 30, 54; Kabeer, 1999; 
Annesley & Gains, 2010; Schmidt, 2010). Power is central to the model because the 
opportunities that arise within institutions, whether internally or externally generated, 
require actors to exercise their relative power in order to initiate, sustain or avoid 
institutional change. This power is utilised to generate new ideas, and to entrench these 
ideas within the institutional norms and values.  
 
2.4.2 The Power of Ideas 
 
The relationship between diverse interests, knowledge creation and power has been 
discussed within feminist critical theory (Lovenduski, 1998, 2005; Cornwall, 2003; 
Puwar, 2004; Daly, 2005; Chappell, 2006, amongst others), particularly in terms of 
unravelling how the “construction of gender has served to legitimise the subordination 
of women and of how hegemonic structures are imbued with patriarchal ideology ... 
Chapter Two: Feminist New Institutionalism and Transitional States        43 
[highlighting] the ways in which ideologies of gender play a role in producing and 
reproducing power relations and how these relations are structured and transformed” 
(Steans, 1998: 173-4). FI researchers such as Kenney (1996), Inhetveen (1999), Pierson 
(2004: 36-37), Connell (2006), Driscoll and Krook (2009), Waylen (2009), Annesley and 
Gains (2010), and Mackay and Meier (2003: 14) draw attention to “the way institutions 
shape, reflect and reinforce unequal power relations ... and on the way in which social 
and political institutions are themselves shaped by social divisions”. Schmidt (2010: 1) 
discusses ideas within the institutional context as an explanatory factor for change, and 
in an earlier work notes that the “subordination of agency (action) to structure (rules) is 
the key problem for HI, SI, and RI, and it is why all manner of new institutionalists have 
turned to ideas and discourse in recent years”(Schmidt, 2008: 314). 
 
Schmidt (2010: 1) approaches the concept of ideas from a discursive perspective, noting 
the “potential for providing insights into the dynamics of institutional change by 
explaining the actual preferences, strategies, and normative orientations of actors”. This 
stems from the assertion that the three strands of new institutionalism (Rational Choice, 
Historical and Sociological) are “better at explaining continuity than change” (Schmidt, 
2010: 1-2; Lieberman, 2002; Mackay & Meier, 2003; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Kenny, 
2007, amongst others). Exogenous shocks are viewed as the primary cause of change, 
with endogenous sources of change, such as historical legacies and cultural 
considerations, only entering the framework recently (Schmidt, 2010: 1-2). This view is 
not shared by Hall and Taylor (1996: 942) who point out that historical institutionalists 
“have been especially attentive to the relationship between institutions and ideas or 
beliefs”, although there is agreement that the rational choice school tends to 
oversimplify the complex web of values and ideas that constitute institutions.  
 
The conceptualisation of ideas within discursive institutionalism is broad, incorporating 
“interest-based logics” (which corresponds with the Rational Choice view), as well as 
normative concepts such as values and appropriateness (Schmidt, 2010: 3). The 
explanations offered about the placement of ideas within institutions draw in many 
elements of the preceding discussion on power: balancing “appropriateness” based on 
differing value systems, and managing the diversity of actors engaged in the 
“construction of policy ideas ... who bring the ideas developed in the context of the 
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coordinative discourse to the public for deliberation and legitimation” (Schmidt, 2010: 
3). Women’s agency, in terms of “strategic, creative and intuitive action as well as 
calculating self-interest” (Mackay & Meier, 2003: 14), operates within the constraints of 
the institutional context “in which and through which ideas are communicated” 
(Schmidt, 2010: 4). Thus, ideas are conceptualised as purposive strategic agency, albeit 
with unintended consequences at times. The norms and values which ideas can shape 
(given power, context and opportunity) arise as a result of contextual evolution, created 
due to historical legacies and societal influences.  
 
Thus, ideas reflect the preferences, strategies, and normative orientations of actors, 
which can in turn instigate institutional change by influencing the norms and values of 
the formal and informal structures of the State. An understanding of the relationship 
between actors and institutions therefore constitutes the next layer in the model for 
explaining institutional change (and continuity) within the post-conflict South African 
state. 
 
2.4.3 Actors and Institutions  
 
The importance of actors is considered within the contextual constraints and 
opportunities of the institutions in which they operate, the manner in which these 
institutions affect political outcomes and processes, and the behaviour of the role 
players (Mackay & Meier, 2003: 8-9; Waylen, 2009: 247; Annesley & Gains, 2010: 4). As 
Hall and Taylor (1996: 939) argue, “it is through the actions of individuals that 
institutions have an effect on political outcomes”, while Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 10) 
proclaim that “institutional analysis ... allows us to examine the relationship between 
political actors as objects and as agents of history” (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 10). 
Further, the importance of the institutional context is paramount to such investigations 
as the “opportunities for and constraints on women’s descriptive and substantive 
representation relate strongly to the configuration of political institutions ... it is 
important to be clear about where the power lies in any institutional context (Chappell, 
2004) as well as processes of policy change” (Annesley & Gains, 2010: 4). Thus, 
examining the way in which institutions, actors and the environment interact is one of 
the variables explaining institutional change.  
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Incorporating female actors into institutions that were historically steeped in masculine 
traditions necessarily draws attention to the newcomers, and the manner in which their 
presence (and their goals, norms and values) alters – or fails to alter – the institutional 
status quo. Waylen (2009: 247) asserts that actors “are strategic, seeking to realise certain 
complex, contingent, and constantly changing goals”. However, the gendering of 
institutions constrains female actors through the accepted rules and norms of what 
constitutes the “ideal” institutional player. For example, Chappell (2006: 227) recounts 
the work of Stivers (1993) who spoke of the value attached to “masculine traits”, such 
as objectivity and dispassion, while “emotional” values ascribed as “feminine traits” 
were viewed as “excessive and laden with bias”.  
 
This is one example of the gendering of institutional norms, which permeate the 
decision-making process and serve to perpetuate the unequal power relations between 
male and female actors, as described by Chappell (2006: 228): 
“The assumptions underpinning both concepts are highly gendered. While women 
are considered less deserving of promotion because of their purported irrational 
nature, their historic absence at senior levels of the bureaucracy has had a further 
gendering effect: Without women’s input, policy decisions that are made at the 
highest level have tended to disregard (and thereby reinforce) the unequal political, 
economic, and social position of the two sexes, as well as make stereotypical 
assumptions about male and female behaviour”. 
 
The strategies promoted by gender mainstreaming represent a combination of preceding 
feminist approaches aimed at altering the institutional status quo, with one dimension 
being the critical mass arguments. This  proposes that women would alter “the very 
nature of power and the practice of politics through values of cooperation and collaboration, 
holding power in trusteeship (power on behalf of, not over) and acting with greater 
transparency, honesty and public accountability; in other words, there was a belief that 
women would play politics differently and exercise power accountably … once women had 
access to political power, they would act for gender justice and equity” (Batliwala & 
Dhanraj, 2007: 27-28; Chappell, 2002; Beckwith, 2007; Annesley & Gains, 2010, 
amongst many others).  
 
Setting aside the controversial assumptions about women’s inherent values and nature 
(Annesley & Gains, 2010: 3), this statement alludes to the transformational power of 
parity, particularly in relation to structural processes, although it disregards the influence 
Chapter Two: Feminist New Institutionalism and Transitional States        46 
of the entrenched system which may still be promoted by male members who view the 
situation as a ‘zero sum game’. This view is expanded upon by Cornwall (2003: 1330) 
who cautions against the reflexive assumption that women will engage as “women” (in 
the sense of placing their gender identity at the forefront), particularly as cultural norms 
may result in woman submitting to the views of male members, regardless of parity, 
thereby serving as little more than legitimating ‘rubber stamps’. Thus, the continuing 
institutional constraints must be factored in any gendered analysis as it impacts upon the 
agency of women, particularly in understanding how actors acquire and wield power. 
 
A central concern is that equal rights and opportunities do not necessarily imply equal 
outcomes and benefits, particularly as prevailing structural dynamics may interfere. The 
Commonwealth Secretariat suggests that one strategy for addressing this concern is the 
undertaking of positive or affirmative action measures, as the achievement of equality 
represents a “fundamental component in the democracy-building process” 
(Commonwealth Secretariat,  2005: 9). This concern is echoed by Kabeer (2003: 3) who 
suggests that, in order to overcome structural inequality, substantive equality and 
equality of agency must be considered. The former refers to the diverse qualities and 
contexts of men and women that need to be balanced in the formulation of policy to 
avoid the perpetuation of imbalanced outcomes. The latter requires access to the 
structures that will enable women to “make strategic life choices for themselves (and 
help determine the conditions under which these choices are made)” (Kabeer, 2003: 2). 
Vincent (2001) suggests that the inclusion of women in decision-making forums 
(particularly post-war reconstruction debates) does necessarily go beyond concepts of 
fairness, in that “women have a set of interests different to those of men which can only 
be defended by other women”. While this raises concerns about homogenising women 
as a single entity with undifferentiated needs, it also points to the idea that women have 
an alternative perspective to offer, based on their position and roles within society.  
 
However, Puwar (2004: 77) argues that the insertion of a previously marginalised group 
does not automatically rectify an inherently flawed institutional culture, noting that “the 
substantive contours of the hidden racially specific masculine norm underlying claims to 
neutrality and impartiality have to be made visible ... given that these groups occupy a 
tenuous position as ‘space invaders’ the expectation that their mere presence will be 
Chapter Two: Feminist New Institutionalism and Transitional States        47 
enough to transform political styles is unrealistic ... the question for our times is how the 
‘other’ can exist without making the ‘other’ the same”. In addition, women are not 
generally assigned ministerial portfolios in areas which command high power or 
generous resources, leading Annesley and Gains (2010: 9) to argue that the “allocation 
of political and organisational resources in the core executive is gendered”. Thus, actors, 
and their roles within institutions, are an important factor when considering how change 
is brought about. It will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters detailing the South 
African experiences that actor’s roles, and the manner in which they are viewed by other 
actors (for example, as outsiders, “others”, or as affirmative action appointees), impact 
upon their realm of influence and the power they have to effect change. 
 
Actors are considered to be “deeply embedded in a world of institutions, composed of 
symbols, scripts and routines, which provide the filters for interpretation ... not only do 
institutions provide strategically useful information, they also affect the very identities, 
self-images and preferences of the actors” (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 939). Reiterating the 
reciprocal relationship between actors and institutions, Thelen and Steinmo (1992, 16-
17) discuss a few of the many ways in which actors impact upon institutions, including 
the initiation of new players, introducing ‘old’ actors into ‘new’ institutions, and 
amending existing institutions. The concept of “layering” discussed earlier can 
incorporate a permutation of these, with the possibilities for change varying depending 
on the context.  
 
The stance of the analytical model is that change is brought about through actors 
utilising their power to capitalise on the openings created by fluctuating contextual 
circumstances, by altering the agenda and institutional processes and thereby affecting 
institutional change. The various concepts and forces discussed in the preceding 
sections are brought together below in the holistic analytical model, which clarifies how 
these variables interlink to form a toolkit for the systematic investigation of the 
opportunities for gendered change within the South African security sector. 
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2.5 Model for Gendered Analysis of Post-Conflict States 
 
The model for analysis presented here represents a framework for the systematic 
exploration of opportunities for gender transformation in post-conflict South Africa, 
and how women capitalised on these openings to bring about gendered institutional 
change.  
 
As has been established in this chapter, NI lends itself to the proposed methodological 
framework as “institutionalists have constructed important analytical bridges between 
State-centred and society-centred analyses by looking at the institutional arrangements 
that structure relations between the two” (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 10). The 
complementary and contradicting elements of the various strands of NI necessitated the 
eclectic approach to this model. As Hall and Taylor (1996: 936) have commented: 
“some of the ambiguities surrounding the new institutionalism can be dispelled if we 
recognise that it does not constitute a unified body of thought”. Consequently, the 
model utilised in this study draws from the rational choice, historical, sociological and 
discursive traditions, as well as from FI, in an effort to account for the key influences 
that explain gendered institutional change within the South African security structures.  
 
This model, diagrammatically represented in Figure 2.1, draws on the wider literature 
discussed in this chapter in compiling a theoretical framework for examining 
institutional change within South Africa. It systematically takes into consideration the 
various influences and factors which accounted for substantive change within the State 
(and the security structures specifically) by utilising the tools provided by the FI/NI 
view of continuity and change within institutions. 
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Figure 2.1 Analytical Model for Gendered Institutional Change 
 
 
The various elements of FI, many of which have multi-directional impacts, are 
considered within three domains for the purposes of this study: actors, institutions, and 
the environment. The elements that prompt change, or into which causes of change can 
be classified, are considered within “key moments”, “historical legacies” and 
“exogenous influences”. Power is positioned as the central element, that is, as the key 
determinant in both affecting and sustaining change. Power is conceptualised in terms 
of ideas, the capacity to bring about change in the norms and values of institutions, 
actors and society, influencing the dominant ideology within institutions.  
 
The HI frame of reference is the most utilised, primarily as a result of the emphasis on 
“asymmetries of power associated with the operation and development of institutions”, 
the centrality of path dependence in explaining continuity and change, and the 
prominence of factors such as ideas in the institutional analysis (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 
938). In addition, credence is given to the notion that new norms (whether emanating 
from the local or international environment) can “challenge and replace existing ones 
within institutions” (Chappell, 2006: 232). Lastly, the ability of institutions “to privilege 
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some interests while demobilising others” (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 937) is crucial to 
understanding the gendering of institutions and of institutional change. This institutional 
focus is an acknowledgement of the  
“interdependence of individual and structural change in processes of empowerment. 
Structures shape individual resources, agency and achievements. They also define 
the parameters within which different categories of actors are able to pursue their 
interests, promoting the voice and agency of some and inhibiting that of others. 
And finally, they help to shape individual interests so that how people define their 
goals and what they value will reflect their social positioning as well as their 
individual histories” Kabeer (1999: 461). 
 
A keen awareness of the manner in which structures and institutional cultures inhibit (or 
facilitate) change or growth is critical in transitional states, such as South Africa. As 
Waylen (2007a: 529) points out “... the new government would inherit a largely 
unchanged state structure that had been created to support and uphold Apartheid”, a 
system that was aimed at entrenching White minority male rule. The transformation of 
the institution to conform to the ideals of the black majority presented the ideal 
opportunity to affect change within the realm of gender relations as well. However, 
given that patriarchal traditions run as deeply within the various South African cultures, 
this transformation is not automatic, as will be discussed in-depth in subsequent 
chapters. From a new institutionalist perspective, the transformation is slowed due to 
the “logic of appropriateness”, which enables institutional players who hold power to 
perpetuate the status quo by referring to accepted institutional norms (Chappell, 2006: 
225). By understanding the processes through which change is effected (or continuity is 
maintained), feminist actors can maximise opportunities for transformation (Chappell, 
2006: 224). 
 
It is therefore understandable that the redefinition and reconceptualisation of women’s 
relationships to the State and their societies is a priority for women embroiled in 
nationalist movements (West, 1997: xiii; Vincent, 2001), as it will have a direct impact 
on their roles within the new dispensation. This reformulation is made possible because 
gender inequality is a societal construct that transcends formal laws, and is maintained 
through the interactions of individuals and structures within society (Kabeer, 2003: 2; 
Svensson, 2007: 13), as well as through the informal institutions discussed previously. 
 
Chapter Two: Feminist New Institutionalism and Transitional States        51 
Within the model, institutions limit opportunities through structural norms developed 
over time, as well as through rules aimed at maintaining the status quo. However, 
change is possible, given the normative nature of institutions as reflections of the actors 
operating the system and the society in which the system operates. Opportunities are 
presented to create new norms and rules through external forces, through the actions of 
actors, and through the institution itself adapting to meet evolving demands. In the 
context of post-conflict states, such as South Africa, many of the previously accepted 
stereotypes and inequalities have been challenged or even completely obliterated by the 
roles assumed by women during times of conflict. Thus, the post-conflict period, which 
generally entails transforming institutions in line with the new dispensation’s worldview, 
represents a unique opportunity to fundamentally overhaul the manner in which the 
State approaches gender relations. The deciding element is where the power lies at a 
given juncture; whether a specific group of actors holds sufficient sway to alter the rules, 
whether an entrenched set of actors has retained sufficient power to maintain the status 
quo, or whether external forces, such as broad societal transformations, wield enough 
power to force change. 
 
The following chapters operationalise this framework with respect to the South African 
case study, and the manner in which the State security structures have been gendered, 
starting with the armed movement that brought about democratic change and the role 
women played within it. It illustrates the convergence of historical legacies, path 
dependent events, the sudden shocks of a series of key moments, and the impact of 
exogenous influences on women’s relational power to the State and society, and also the 
manner in which this dramatically increased their relational power during the critical 




The normative focus of FI underlying the study, together with the contextually-driven 
model for analysis described above, prescribe the methodological approach utilised for 
data collection. Cognisance was taken of the broader range of variables being considered 
due to the use of a single case study (South Africa) focused on a particular sector 
(security). The range and depth of the variables, in contrast to a comparative study, 
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further necessitated the normative and contextual approach employed for data 
collection. The methodological approach was therefore oriented towards qualitative 
process tracing (Checkel, 2005: 6; Ruback, 2006: 2; Tansey, 2007: 765).  
 
As process tracing infers causality to sequences of events (George & Bennett, 2005: 212; 
Checkel, 2006: 363; Falleti, 2007: 2; Tansey, 2007: 765), in keeping with the FI focus on 
timing and incorporating elements of path dependency (discussed earlier in this 
chapter), it was a good fit for the types of questions being asked. The importance of 
recognising “key decision points or branching points” is an essential component of this 
approach (George & Bennett, 2005: 212) – and these are incorporated into the model in 
the form of “key moments” – providing another point of synergy with the FI approach.  
 
Checkel (2005: 6) cautions that “process tracing is strong on questions of how and 
interactions; it is much weaker at establishing structural context”, while Falleti and 
Lynch (2009: 3) argue that “valid causal inference requires contextualizing causal 
mechanisms”. In this regard, FI strengthens the use of this research methodology with 
the emphasis on context and normativity, enriching the understanding of “how” 
interactions occur within a specific time and place. In particular, the centrality of 
historical narratives to the process tracing methodology aid in the contextualising of 
processes of gendered change, especially while “highly abstract theories and 
explanations” are factored into the analysis as well (Falleti, 2007: 4, 1), as “mechanisms 
alone cannot cause outcomes ... causation resides in the interaction between the 
mechanism and the context within which it operates” (Falleti & Lynch, 2009: 3). 
Further, multiple causal mechanisms may be utilised as part of the process tracing 
evidence set, and some may be specious (George & Bennett, 2005: 222), reiterating the 
importance of context in the analysis. 
 
While it is argued that process tracing is not especially useful for generating generalisable 
theories, it does have the advantage of placing “theory and data in close proximity” 
(Checkel, 2005: 22). In other words, the depth of the data collected can more accurately 
depict the processes underlying the issue being explored – in this case the gendering of 
the South African security structures. It is also beneficial for illustrating theoretical 
constructs in a real world setting – the manifestation of FI principles in the case study.  
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The use of multiple data collection methods is also advocated within the process tracing 
approach as a means of corroborating causality and conclusions drawn (Berry, 2002: 
680; Checkel, 2005: 6; 2006: 363; Tansey, 2007: 766). These include historical memoirs, 
surveys, interviews, press accounts, and documents, all of which have been incorporated 
in the data collection methodology for this study, as discussed later in this section. 
Interviews, and elite interviews in particular, are cited as useful tools for establishing the 
perceptions of a knowledgeable group of people, reconstructing events and making 
inferences from this data as part of the causal process-tracing methodology (Berry, 2002: 
679-681; Tansey, 2007: 766). The flexibility of interviews also enables going beyond 
“party line accounts” (Berry, 2002: 680; Tansey, 2007: 767), and asking “theoretically 
guided questions about issues that are highly specific to the research objectives” 
(Tansey, 2007: 767). 
 
Process tracing is described by George and Bennett (2005: 215) as an “opportunity to 
differentiate and enrich the general theory” for “deviant” cases (such as South Africa) as 
it can generate explanations “not predicted or explained adequately by existing theories” 
(George & Bennett, 2005: 215).  The benefits of comparative studies towards the 
comprehension of different gender outcomes in transitions are well documented by 
authors such as Waylen (2007a, 2007b), who argues that carefully chosen cases and 
variables can establish trends which produce useful explanations about the 
circumstances in which positive gender outcomes might emerge as a result of 
democratic transitions. Waylen utilises examples from Latin America and Eastern 
Europe, and includes South Africa as an outlier for reasons similar to those outlined by 
George and Bennett (2005: 215). 
 
As noted previously, the normative slant of New Institutionalism/FI enables an 
emphasis on context which is critical in explaining the nuances of gendered institutional 
change and continuity (Lovenduski, 1998; Mackay, 2004; Mottier, 2004; Siim, 2004; 
Childs and Krook, 2006), and which therefore encourages the pursuit of detailed single 
case studies that can delve more deeply into the various elements impacting on the 
consolidation of gender gains. Thus, the use of a single in-depth study has the potential 
to yield rich information in terms of explaining the processes of institutional change, 
including the gendered nature of continuity and change within the institutional context 
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(Kenney, 1996; Lovenduski, 1998; Mahoney, 2000b; Chappell, 2002, 2006; Mackay, 
2004; Siim, 2004). Further, the importance of timing can be explored in greater detail 
within a single case study (Thelen, 1999; Pierson. 2000c: 72; Childs and Krook, 2006). 
This enables the consideration of a longer time frame, providing a larger pool of data on 
which to base conclusions, and facilitating the inclusion of the context-specific nuances 
present in the complex processes of gendered institutional change and continuity. 
 
Criticisms of selection bias can be problematic, as pointed out by Achen and Snidal 
(1989), Geddes (1990), Mahoney (1999) and Waylen (2007a, 2007b), particularly in 
terms of generating representative findings that are applicable across various cases. 
Nevertheless, a preoccupation with the application of findings across various 
institutions or countries can be “inappropriate and sometimes counterproductive” 
(George and Bennett, 2005: 31; Hyden, 2006: 2). Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that atypical 
case studies can achieve more useful results by considering a greater range of factors, 
and thereby providing a deeper analysis of the root causes and effects of the various 
factors affecting institutional continuity and change. Similar arguments are put forth by 
Gerring (2004), Mackay and Kenny (2007), and Mahoney (2000b). For example, Mackay 
and Kenny (2007) concentrate on the post-devolution gendering of female candidate 
selection in Scotland, highlighting the factors that have contributed to the decline of 
female candidates. These findings can then be considered within other contexts, 
whereupon patterns may emerge with regard to the manner in which women enter and 
participate in gendered State structures. The use of a single case study therefore 
provides “opportunities for inductively identifying complex interaction effects” (George 
& Bennett, 2005: 212).  
 
The emphasis on context and temporality brought to the fore by NI/FI is enhanced by 
the ability to consider multiple variables, in that the convergence and interaction of 
various factors and process can be considered in greater detail (George & Bennett, 2005: 
212). The researcher’s familiarity with the social and political under-currents of the 
country, borne from working within the security arena (in civil society and academia), 
further informs the analysis of the contextual factors at play. This knowledge is 
expanded and enriched by the wide array of literature from multiple perspectives 
available on the history and transition of the South African state. 
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Finally, the use of South Africa as a single case study is based on the temporal focus of 
NI/FI as the confluence of events which occurred towards the start of 1990s had a 
significant impact on the transitional and democratisation processes of the State and, 
therefore, on the gendering of State institutions. These events include the end of the 
Cold War, the emergence of the Human Security Paradigm, the greater prominence of 
regional organisations (and the impact this would have on national policies in various 
sectors, specifically in the security sector), the broader gender debates emerging from 
the third wave of feminism, and the continental ambitions of the new regime. The 
manner in which these events came together in a specific time and place constitutes a 
critical consideration in forming a coherent picture of how women self-consciously 
organised around security and human rights issues, and strove for the formal 
consolidation of gender gains within the new democratic state.  
 
Thus, there are a number of compelling reasons for undertaking a single case-study 
using process tracing methodology that focuses on South Africa. Firstly, the ability to 
conduct an in-depth analysis of a single context within a broader time frame, which 
takes cognisance of a wider range of variables and considers a number of historical 
legacies. This can produce a more nuanced understanding of how gendered institutional 
change takes place, and the process by which gender gains can be consolidated or lost. 
These results may then have utility in explaining why and how these processes are (or 
are not) replicated elsewhere – whether in other institutions in the same State, or in 
other developing states. Secondly, the exploration of an anomalous case such as that of 
South Africa may produce insights into other contexts, which would not be possible 
through a comparative study. 
 
Two strands of data were required in order to address the research question. The first 
strand focused on the events which transpired (classified in the model according to 
historical legacies, key moments, and exogenous influences) and on the developing 
philosophies within the State, particularly towards issues of equality, security and good 
governance. The second strand dealt with the perceptions of these events. Given the 
normative focus of the study, the provision of enabling mechanisms such as gender 
equality policies and gender machineries (strand one) is not necessarily effective if the 
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goals of these instruments (equal gender participation) are not accepted as legitimate and 
necessary by the actors within the institutions (strand two).  
 
Data for the first strand was drawn from scholarly and historical texts (original 
documents and analysis by a range of experts), political party archives, the media13, and 
civil society reports. The second strand was informed by primary data derived from 
interviews and surveys, and corroborated and enriched by secondary sources such as 
autobiographical and biographical accounts.   
 
The first general set of accounts deals with the events shaping the liberation struggle 
and the process of democratic transition in South Africa, while imbuing the narrative 
with a revealing perspective on the underlying norms of the time. For example, works 
about the Struggle leaders such as Nelson Mandela (Mandela, 1995), Oliver Tambo 
(Jordan, 2007), Walter Sisulu (Sisulu, 2002), Desmond Tutu (Allen, 2006), Jacob Zuma 
(Gordin, 2010) and Thabo Mbeki (Gevisser, 2007; Roberts, 2007; Pottinger, 2008) chart 
the development of the present-government’s equality-centred philosophy of 
governance. This had an immense impact on the gender and security aspects of the 
research question, as do more general accounts about the liberation movement (see, for 
example, Slovo, 1997; Govender, 2007; Feinstein, 2007; Suttner, 2008) and the changing 
societal dynamics of the transitional state (Malan, 1990; Van Zyl Slabbert, 2006; Calland, 
2006; Harris, 2010; Bloom, 2010).  
 
Some of these accounts also speak indirectly about the role of women within the 
liberation struggle, revealing the often hidden contributions of women. The 
contributions of high-profile female leaders such as Winnie Madikizela-Mandela (Du 
Preez Bezdrob, 2004), Albertina Sisulu (Sisulu, 2002), and Helen Suzman (Suzman, 
1993) provide insights into the motivations behind women’s participation in dangerous 
activities, and disclose some of the difficulties faced by women challenging accepted 
gender roles (Ginwala, 2001; Suttner, 2007; Govender, 2007; Gasa, 2007). This theme is 
also dealt with in the security-specific chronicles of women’s participation in the 
                                                 
13 Given the bias of the State-controlled media prior to the transition, media accounts were primarily 
drawn from the “liberal” press and independent newspapers. Some information was also derived from 
the autobiographical accounts of journalists, such as Marinovich & Silva (2000), mainly for the 
corroboration of other sources. 
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underground struggle, whether as combatants or activists (Cock, 1991; Modise & 
Curnow, 2000; Du Preez Bezdrob, 2004; Hutmacher Maclean, 2004; Cherry, 2007; 
Gasa, 2007; Govender, 2007; Samuelson, 2007; Suttner, 2007; Trewhela, 2009).  
 
These accounts show the practical and strategic measures taken by women to overcome 
the discriminatory norms permeating the security structures of the underground armed 
movement, which informed the manner in which gender equality was approached 
within the security arena of the new democratic state. In addition to the scholarly and 
governmental14 works detailing the security sector reform process in the transitional 
period (discussed in Chapter Four), accounts of personal experiences before, during, 
and after this period are provided by Thompson (2006), Feinstein (2007), Govender 
(2007), and Memela-Motumi (2009), amongst others. These stories enrich the 
understanding of the specific challenges faced in terms of the prevailing values 
governing gender roles within both the general governance structures of the State as 
well as within the security arena. 
 
Extensive use has also been made of secondary interview material published by authors 
such as Cock (1991), Suttner (2007) and Thompson (2006), particularly of interviews 
with former combatants in the armed forces, both formal (primarily in the South 
African Defence Force) and informal (primarily in MK). As with the biographical and 
autobiographical works described above, these accounts offer the insights of individuals 
directly engaged with the liberation struggle, the armed struggle, the transitional process, 
or the democratic dispensation. Gaining direct access to these individuals, and the 
likelihood of obtaining such frank observations as those contained in these materials, 
would be unlikely. This is due in part to the nature of the subject matter, and the societal 
and cultural norms that vary across race, age and gender.  
 
The subjective nature of these observations and perceptions, particularly those of 
invested participants as opposed to impartial observers, is a concern in a study of this 
nature. However, the potential pitfall of this approach in terms of bias colouring the 
data was viewed as an advantage of sorts, as statements of perceptions can be revealing 
                                                 
14 These include White and Green Papers, policy papers, parliamentary proceedings, statements and 
speeches. 
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about the values of the participant. A biased response can therefore provide further 
insights into the investigation.  
 
Areas of commonality and divergence can be identified by examining the perceptions of 
a variety of actors from different areas of the gender/security arena: politicians and 
parliamentarians with varying ideological stances, and civil society practitioners with 
differing experiences of the State security architecture. Issues on which consensus 
emerges serve as corroboration of the prevalence of that perception, while those 
statements in which little agreement is evident reveal the spheres of continuing 
contention15. The application of some quantitative methods on qualitative perceptions 
of issues, such as the factors affecting the advancement of women, aids in establishing 
trends within these subjective valuations, as is described in the exposition of the primary 
data collection methodology below. 
 
2.6.1 Primary Research 
  
Given the normative focus of the study, primary data collection was focused on gaining 
an understanding of the perceptions of participants towards the integration of gender in 
the security structures of the State. Is gender equality a concern within the security 
structures of the State? Do women make an important contribution to the development 
of security policy? What factors are perceived to play a role in the advancement of 
women in the security sector? These observations were then considered in conjunction 
with the secondary materials described above, and analysed in accordance with the 
analytical framework. 
 
Primary data was collected through surveys, semi-structured interviews and informal 
briefings by anonymous informants. A number of surveys were developed, with varying 
purposes. Firstly, the survey aimed to elicit the perceptions of participants towards 
gender equality issues within general governance structures and the security structures of 
the State, in order to contrast the responses received about the two spheres. Similar 
questions were asked about both arenas, such as the factors affecting women’s 
                                                 
15 In both the primary and secondary data, actors with varying ideological stances and experiences within 
the State security structures were considered to broaden the perspective of the data pool.  
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advancement and the appropriateness of measures such as quotas. The second goal was 
to gather opinions on how gender equality is viewed within the two arenas, particularly 
by senior leadership and policymakers. The same base issues were present in all surveys, 
with the wording adapted slightly to suit the three categories of respondents: 
government, civil society, and members of the armed forces16. The survey was a mix of 
open-ended and Likert-scale statements. An opportunity to comment was provided 
after each scaled question and, on certain questions, further comment was explicitly 
prompted. All questions offered the respondent the option to remain anonymous, in 
order to elicit more complete responses17.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a range of policy actors at various 
levels, both in civil society and Parliament, who had some experience with parliamentary 
processes or security. The semi-structured format yielded helpful data as respondents 
were able to move naturally through topics that they deemed to be important, while 
allowing the key issues of the research to be addressed. The approach utilised is similar 
to that advocated by Berry (2002: 681) who remarks on the utility of open-ended 
questions to highlight important or valuable issues that may be unknown to the 
interviewer, as discussed in the previous section. 
 
Prior to interviews, most respondents received a copy of the relevant survey18 as an 
introduction to the issues that would be discussed. This served as an icebreaker, as 
respondents knew what to expect and could formulate considered responses. Given the 
security focus of the study, and the political context during the fieldwork period 
(discussed below), many informants were not willing to be formally interviewed or 
complete the survey. The informal discussions held with these anonymous informants 
yielded primarily background information and corroboration of insights drawn from the 
perceptions of other participants. While members of most political parties were 
agreeable to discussing the issues raised within the research, only three were willing to 
do so “on the record” (Democratic Alliance (DA), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and 
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)). All other governmental participants spoke only on 
                                                 
16 An abbreviated version of the survey, omitting some of the broader open-ended questions, was also 
used in certain cases. 
17 The survey circulated was explicitly identified as an opinion-based questionnaire, and included a brief 
introduction to the research and how the information gathered would be used. 
18 A copy of the survey distributed to government participants is included in Appendix 3 as an example.  
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condition of anonymity, including the ruling African National Congress (ANC). The 
same pattern held true for the completion of questionnaires, although the ANC did 
complete a questionnaire, marking all responses “anonymous”. Civil society 
practitioners (including those with experience within the security sector) were more 
open and completed the surveys in more detail, with no requests for anonymity.  
 
The four parties included in the survey results (ANC, DA, FF+, IFP) represent a wide 
spectrum of political ideologies, from liberal (ANC, DA) to conservative (FF+, IFP), 
and inclusive (ANC, DA) to exclusive (IFP, FF+). While such a small sample cannot be 
viewed as conclusively indicative of the wider perceptions within government with 
respect to gender, and gender within the security sector, they serve a useful purpose in 
terms of highlighting trends and attitudes. For example, patterns emerged in the 
responses in accordance with gender (two male and two female respondents), political 
ideology (conservative versus liberal), and experiences during the liberation struggle, 
some of which were unexpected, as will be discussed in later chapters. The data yielded 
by the surveys, as with the information gained from interviews and informal discussions, 
was not used as the basis for findings but as contributory or supporting knowledge 
corroborating the insights gained from the application of the analytical model. 
 
2.6.2 Methodological Challenges 
 
In keeping with the contextual focus of the study, a number of methodological 
challenges were considered in the course of investigating the processes of gendered 
institutional transformation within the security structures of the State. Some of these 
have been addressed above, such as the clarification of what is considered evidence and 
the importance of perceptions in lending weight to the evidence of gendered 
institutional change. Four further methodological challenges are discussed here, each 
with theoretical and practical implications. 
 
The first challenge refers to the limitations created by the political climate during the 
fieldwork period and the subject matter of the study, and the impact these had on the 
data collection process. Secondly, the opportunities and challenges of conducting 
research in a developing world setting, which relates directly to the third challenge: 
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access. Lastly, the importance of approaching the research question from a development 
perspective that takes cognisance of the post-colonial divisions of knowledge 
production. In other words, prioritising local knowledge within the framework of a 
northern scholarly discourse in keeping with the contextually-focused research design. 
While these particular issues do not represent a comprehensive list of the 
methodological challenges faced, they wield significant influence on the manner in 
which this research project was approached.  
 
i. Trying Times: Political Tension During Fieldwork 
 
In June 2005, President Thabo Mbeki had relieved Jacob Zuma of his duties as Deputy 
President of South Africa. This was attributed to his upcoming rape trial (he was found 
not guilty in 2006), as well as to the corruption charges brought against him relating to 
the Arms Deal19. In the run up to the ANC Conference in Polokwane (December 
2007), divisions within the ruling ANC began to be publicly played out. At the 
Polokwane Conference, Zuma defeated Mbeki’s bid for the Presidency of the ANC, 
securing his place as the presidential nominee of the ANC for the 2009 general 
elections.  
 
Tensions simmered until September 2008, when the corruption charges against Zuma 
were dropped, based on the finding by Judge Chris Nicholson of the High Court that 
the charges were based on unlawful procedural grounds. In his ruling, the Judge 
commented that “political meddling cannot be excluded and ... existed to a sufficiently 
egregious degree that it justified inclusion in the papers” [referring to the application to 
drop the charges] (Nicholson, 2008: para. 238). A number of people were cited within 
the ruling, and the inference was that Mbeki had been improperly involved in this 
decision.  
 
Following the Court’s decision, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC 
elected to “recall” President Mbeki, and he tendered his resignation of the Presidency in 
September 2008. ANC Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe was sworn in as interim 
President of South Africa until the general election in April 2009. Following Mbeki’s 
                                                 
19 The Arms Deal forms a major part of the thesis, and will be discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. 
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ousting, 14 members of the 31-member Cabinet resigned, including Deputy President 
Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka, Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel, Deputy Minister of 
Finance Jabu Moleketi, Minister of Intelligence Ronnie Kasrils, Minister in the 
Presidency Essop Pahad, Minister of Local Government Sydney Mfumadi, Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad, Minister of Public Service and Administration 
Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, Minister of Public Enterprises Alec Erwin, Minister of 
Public Works Thoko Didiza, Minister of Correctional Services Ngconde Balfour, and 
Deputy Minister of Correctional Services Loretta Jacobus.  
 
Tensions escalated further following the formation of the Congress of the People 
(COPE) in 2008, a breakaway party from the ruling ANC created by the defection of 
some prominent ANC members. These included Mbhazima Sam Shilowa (Premier of 
Gauteng 1999-2008), Mosiuoa “Terror” Lekota (Minister of Defence 1999-2008), and 
Mluleki Editor George (Deputy Minister of Defence 2004-2008). The cumulative effect 
of these events led to a general climate of mistrust, with the continued sidelining of 
ANC members perceived to be ideologically aligned with former President Mbeki, and 
the rising of tensions within the ANC’s tripartite alliance with the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU). 
 
Fieldwork was undertaken from January to November 2009, and most interviews and 
informal briefings were conducted in Cape Town (Parliament), Pretoria (seat of 
government), and Johannesburg. The tense political atmosphere played an influential 
role in the data collection process, as did the unavailability of respondents due to, 
amongst others, the general elections. This brief overview situates the fieldwork in a 
particular context. The events described above contributed to the reticence of 
participants about speaking on the record, particularly about sensitive topics regarding 
security. This is partially due to the continued scrutiny of both the Arms Deal and the 
general state of the defence force, which are elaborated on in forthcoming chapters. 
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Discussions around gender issues were also perceived as sensitive as a result of events 
surrounding President Zuma’s rape trial, and his pending nuptials to his sixth wife20.  
 
Following the general elections, participants were more readily available for informal 
discussions, but remained unwilling to be quoted, even as anonymous sources. The 
impression was that the internal political manoeuvring had not yet settled, and few were 
willing to be perceived as speaking against the party or the government, which in many 
instances were accepted as the same thing. Despite the general unwillingness of 
participants to speak “on the record”, most were agreeable to discussing the research 
questions informally. These discussions, while not quoted or paraphrased within the text 
as per agreement with the informants, served to clarify various themes and issues within 
the study, revealing concerns not previously considered, and reinforcing certain insights. 
 
ii. The Challenge (and Opportunity) of Context 
 
While being a developing state is usually characterised as an obstacle, it can also present 
a valuable opportunity for gendered institutional change, in terms of reforming ‘old’ 
institutions or in shaping ‘new’ institutions from the ground up. The relative youth of 
post-independence governance structures may provide openings for changes that would 
be difficult in the more mature bureaucratic structures of the developed states, which 
have entrenched systems. Within the context of the Apartheid struggle in South Africa, 
a number of occurrences enhanced the potential for substantive changes to the gender 
equality of women in South Africa, particularly in terms of access to decision-making 
positions. These “windows of opportunity” as they relate to South Africa are discussed 
in subsequent chapters, but it is useful to note here that the presence of these factors all 
combined to create the ideal environment for an overhaul of gender stereotypes and 
gender relations in South Africa. These factors include the timing of the liberation 
struggle within broader trends of global developments, the centrality of equality in the 
ANC Charter and the subsequent inclusion of women at high levels of decision-making, 
the presence of women at the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum, and their involvement in 
the redrafting of the Constitution. 
                                                 
20 Jacob Zuma has been married six times (divorced once, and widowed once). He currently has four 
wives, twenty children (13 with his past and present wives, and seven illegitimate children). He has paid 
lobola (bride price) for another fiancé.  
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These distinctive prospects provided by transitional states imply that women can, to 
some extent, mould the inherited patriarchal institutions of the State as it is being 
transformed in the larger political sense, as discussed in part by Jansen (2005: 17). As the 
South African democracy matures, the State machinery is naturally subjected to changes 
in structure and modes of functioning are altered. By constructing spaces within which 
women can operate, gains made are consolidated, and further achievements are 
facilitated. This situation is not as replicable in long established democracies where 
procedures and organizational models are more firmly entrenched. These circumstances 
provide a number of research opportunities as it is a rare occurrence for an African state 
to be democratically progressive in terms of gender rights, have a reasonably strong 
capacity to implement change (comparable to other developing states), and be in a 
position to lead other states in the region (and internationally) on the issue. The research 
thus attempted to maintain an awareness of this unique South African context, as well as 
integrate the challenges that arose from working in a developing state.  
 
iii. Access: Practical Considerations 
 
The South African democratic process places a strong emphasis on participatory 
governance, involving widespread consultations with a variety of stakeholders at most 
levels (Baden, Hassim & Meintjies, 1998: 23). Access to parliamentarians and other 
office bearers is therefore less problematic than in other post-conflict developing states, 
such as Angola. However, as with most bureaucracies, the gatekeepers can be difficult to 
bypass and can impose unnecessary constraints on interactions with parliamentarians. 
Having worked with parliamentarians in Southern Africa in recent years provided an 
understanding of the bureaucratic process and established a number of direct contacts. 
This allowed some circumvention of lower level gatekeepers. Further networking 
opportunities existed through both these contacts and civil society interactions. This 
may have improved the quality of information gathered, as there were fewer limitations 
on the conditions of the interviews, and some trust was already established that 
potentially sensitive data would be handled in a responsible manner. This also resulted 
in a “snowball” effect of referrals, leading to further informal briefings. 
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Considerable difficulty was encountered at times in gaining access to certain documents 
and statistics, particularly those related to security issues. While many official documents 
are easily accessible, it was somewhat more complex to obtain internal working 
documents that would be invaluable in revealing the in-house policy process, the key 
players, and their roles. The convoluted bureaucratic processes involved in gaining 
access to such information are described by Jansen (2005:18) as being particularly 
prevalent in developing states and newly formed democracies due to “an unusual level 
of political sensitivity” – a description that had a direct bearing on the volatile political 
situation at the time in South Africa.  
 
The nature of the research constitutes a further challenge, as one of the key principles of 
gender mainstreaming is that “everyone at all levels” is supposed to share responsibility 
for implementing reforms within their departments, yet there is uncertainty about 
targets and what the strategy actually entails. These individuals may be wary of sharing 
information about their gender related activities (or lack thereof) for fear of appearing 
uninformed about the process or confirming that no substantive progress has been 
made. For example, some departments claimed not to have gender point persons at all 
despite what was said in their official communications, while some junior level 
respondents claimed the existence of a range of gender-related activities that could not 
be substantiated with either documentation or the knowledge of more senior level 
respondents. In this case, familiarity with the institutional context in which the data was 
being collected had the further advantage of identifying anomalous responses.  
 
At the same time, there are instances where this type of familiarity can raise a few issues. 
Prime among these is the danger of bias in conducting research within your indigenous 
environment – referring to the bias of the researcher towards the subject matter, and the 
bias of respondents towards the researcher. This concern has a strong link to the 
normative nature of bias, and the assumptions made on the basis of gender and race. In 
a discussion of “indigenous” researchers working in their own communities, Smith 
(1999: 5) raised similar concerns about working across divisions of gender, age and race 
– a common occurrence in a country as diverse as South Africa. The centrality of race in 
particular as a shaping force in South African history cannot be discounted, while 
gender forms a second barrier especially in the context of the security dimension of the 
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research. The age consideration aided to an extent as participants were more willing to 
“explain how it really was” to a younger researcher, overcoming gender and racial bias 
to some degree.  
 
In analysing the responses received, the perceptions of the respondents towards the 
researcher are important filters for bias in terms of the perceived expectations of the 
researcher (What does the researcher want to hear? What will be done with the collected 
data? What does the researcher (and their audience) think of the respondent and their 
actions?). As Nanda (1998: 287) asserts, concepts of rationality and truth are reliant on 
cultural constructs, which are further mediated by gender, class, and race. Thus, the 
social category into which the researcher is classified will influence both expectations 
and answers, as it will be used by respondents as a basis for justifying the inclusion or 
exclusion of information (Agar, 1996: 91). 
 
This can be partly overcome by applying lessons learnt by King (2000: 270) who argues 
that what is not said can reveal as much as what is shared. This strategy was useful in the 
identification of problematic issues that warranted further exploration and in deciding 
which areas to exclude. As the primary format for data collection consisted of semi-
structured interviews and informal conversations, respondents in general revealed as 
much (or as little) as they were comfortable doing. Very few probing questions were 
asked of respondents with whom no prior relationship existed. With the data collected 
from surveys, there was no face-to-face interaction with respondents, eliminating some 
of the biases listed above but losing the non verbal data gathered during personal 
interactions (such as body language and tone of voice).  
 
Despite appealing to both male and female respondents, the majority of civil society 
respondents were women; either as they heeded requests for participation, or as they 
were assigned as spokespeople by the organisations contacted. Amongst government 
respondents, the gender divide was more evenly split, although the higher number of 
male respondents in this group could be attributed to acquaintances formed while 
conducting previous research in Parliament. It should be noted that among government 
respondents, males were more likely to allow statements to be attributed to them; 
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women made more frequent use of the “Anonymous” tab on questions related to both 
gender and security. 
 
A noteworthy trend emerged during the course of the informal interviews with male 
informers who had participated in the Struggle, as opposed to male informers employed 
in State structures at the time or who had little or no direct involvement in the liberation 
struggle. The “Struggle” men all had definitive views on gender, gender equality, and the 
value of women’s contributions to the Struggle. This could be attributed to the rhetoric 
at the time, which emphasised equality across all sectors (race, class, sex, ethnicity), as 
well as to the prevalent discourse during the first decade of democracy in particular, 
which focused on building a participative governance system. White male respondents 
who had been employed in various capacities within the previous system of governance 
seemed most uncomfortable with the topic, and would often suggest speaking to a 
female colleague instead. On general security matters, this group was more willing to 
share general experiences, but very rarely specifics. This is partially due to the nature of 
the activities undertaken, but is also attributable to cultural norms governing what is 
acceptable to disclose. This is dealt with at length in the work of Thompson (2006), in 
which the author interviews men who served in the South African Defence Force 
(SADF) (either fulfilling their obligatory national service or as volunteers) – the 
reticence in sharing their experiences was clearly shown to be a combination of the 
nature of the experience (and how it is viewed now by society at large) and the customs 
imposed by their social and cultural contexts. The highlighting of noteworthy trends in 
the responses of both civil society versus government respondents, and of men and 
women, will occur throughout the thesis as relevant data is analysed within each chapter.  
 
iv. The North-South Divide 
 
As has been established in Chapters One and Two, the view of gender and gender 
relations as socially constructed has a direct bearing on the understanding of gendered 
institutional change. As this is the central theme of the research, an awareness of how 
these normative constructs are understood is of paramount importance. In particular, 
the manner in which these context-specific norms and values are analysed will impact 
on the conclusions drawn. This raises a philosophical quandary when the environment 
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under observation is fundamentally different to the environment in which the analytical 
tools were developed. In other words, the methodological framework by which the 
processes of gendered institutional change can be understood is a construct of the 
developed “North” but is being applied in the developing “South”.  
 
Post-colonial debates regarding the oppressive nature of Western knowledge and the 
South’s struggle to generate a new identity are themes that bear exploring, particularly in 
terms of framing the experiences of Northern and Southern feminists and finding 
points of commonality (Steans, 2006: 18). This is discussed in Chapter Three, but it is 
flagged here as the challenges presented by the persistence of the “Northern ivory 
tower” continue to dominate the literature and research tools for social research 
regardless of the context, as discussed by Pearson (2004), Jansen (2005), Hyden (2006), 
Seekings (2010), and a variety of researchers in Hammett & Wedgwood’s (2005) 
exploration of methodological challenges in Africa. For example, Pearson (2004) offers 
a feminist perspective that highlights the benefits of differentiated analysis. One 
criticism put forward is that imperialist methods of grading indigenous knowledge and 
analysing it through Western filters before “importing” it back to the South presents a 
particular set of challenges for contemporary researchers (Smith, 1999: 1). This common 
problem is expanded upon by Jansen (2005: 20) who notes the continued reliance on 
theoretical models emanating from the developed world, due to the comparative 
underdevelopment of Southern alternatives.  
 
Overcoming the challenge of the North-South divide lies in ensuring that the positive 
contributions made by knowledge from the North are recognised and retained. Stephens 
(2005: 28) contends that it is plausible to be critical of Western theories (in terms of 
their base assumptions) while still utilising the practical aspects of the theory, provided 
that context (particularly cultural factors) is taken into consideration. This is clearly a 
case of not reinventing the wheel; the theoretical developments and the wealth of 
experience amassed by Western feminists represents an immense pool of knowledge 
from which developing world feminists can draw. This is predicated on the 
contextualisation of the knowledge, applying it as specifically as possible to the situation 
at hand, and being mindful of the limitations not only of cultural and social norms but 
also of the fragility inherent to most post-conflict states. This is not to say that harmful 
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or problematic practices must be accommodated or integrated into the strategies, but 
rather that incremental changes, which are aware of the limits of a society’s ability to 
rapidly adapt to a range of changes in many sectors, have a better chance of being 
accepted as the new status quo. In other words, a wholesale importation of a Western 
model (and its attendant norms and values) is unlikely to result in lasting substantive 
change. A model tempered by the realities of a developing post-conflict state, together 
with an understanding of the underlying contextual challenges, is a more appropriate 
approach. Familiarity with and an understanding of the local cultural and social 
dynamics is advantageous when analysing the prevailing norms, available resources, and 
capacity of participants to instigate change within the institutional environment. As 
emphasised throughout the study, gender policies cannot succeed without addressing 
underlying customs, given that concepts of gender are socially constructed (Daly, 2005: 
439). Thus, relevance and context are the key contributors to understanding the 
complexity of the local environment (Jasanoff, 2002: 265). This view reinforces the 
validity of the normative and contextual approach of FI in understanding the processes 




This chapter established the utility of a feminist institutionalist approach in answering 
the questions: How does gendered institutional change occur? What variables account 
for the fluctuating power relationships within institutions? How does the institutional 
layering of old and new structures affect the consolidation of gender gains?  
 
By adopting a normative approach sensitive to a range of contextual factors, a clearer 
understanding can be gained of the gendered processes of institutional change and 
continuity, enabling a critical examination of the gendering of the South African security 
sector, and contributing to the broader knowledge of gendered processes of institutional 
change.  
 
The application of this analytical model to the unique South African context does more 
than generate insights into the process of gendered institutional change following a 
transition. The model reveals the methods through which women attained the requisite 
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power and capacity to enter the system, and the development of the strategies through 
which institutional change was enacted. The contextual and normative focus of the FI 
approach facilitates an examination of how “past legacies [inform] institutional design – 
and consequently, the lack of fit between intention and outcomes [which] is central to 
understanding institutional origins” (Chappell, 2011: 164). This is especially apt for the 
South African case, as will be shown in the forthcoming discussion, as the interweaving 
of historical legacies with emerging norms and values, new rules and institutions, and 
ambitious transformation goals, affect the processes of gendered institutional change. 
 
The use of process tracing methodology aids in this investigation of how gendered 
change occurred in the South African security sector. The data derived from multiple 
sources including interviews, biographies, surveys, and documentary evidence provide a 
contextual depth that facilitates the understanding of how the historical legacies 
influencing women’s autonomy and power developed, the exogenous influences that 
shaped society, and the multitude of other factors that impacted on the course of the 
women’s movement in South Africa. 
 
The following chapter lays the historical foundation and contextual backdrop against 
which these changes occurred, and establishes the historical legacies of women’s 
growing autonomy and militancy. These were affected by exogenous influences such as 
the end of the Cold War and the evolution of the international feminist movement, as 
well as by various key moments within the liberation movement’s history. By placing the 
women’s movement within the broader context of the South African history, Chapter 
Three presents the first step in unravelling the puzzle of how women affected gendered 
institutional change within the security structures of the State. 
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LEARNING FROM LEGACIES:  




The role played by women in the South African armed struggle as combatants, 
organisers and leaders, has a clear link with the militarised past of South Africa and the 
socialisation of women into militarised roles (Cock, 1991; Modise & Curnow, 2000; 
Gasa, 2007; Suttner, 2007, 2008; Clarke, 2008;). As Cock (1991: 104) asserts: 
“One of the defining features of South Africa as a militarised society engaged in a 
‘war’ (as viewed by the black majority), or in defending itself against the ‘total 
onslaught’ (the view of the state and many whites) is that the battlefield is the entire 
society. A clear demarcation of the battlefield is the fulcrum of the connection 
between militarisation and gender” (Cock, 1991: 104). 
 
The juxtaposition of “atypical” gender roles with traditional gender roles associated with 
patriarchal societies had an immense impact on women’s demands of the State, and 
their envisioned roles as political actors within State structures, with no delineation 
between stereotypical “woman’s” roles and those situated within the masculine realm. 
What events prompted this change? Which historical legacies were capitalised upon in 
order to transform the gendered norms constraining women’s roles within society, 
particularly the relationship between women and security?  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the background against which women began 
organising politically. Demonstrating the contextual influences which prompted 
increasingly militant action against the oppression of the State, and highlighting the 
events which drew more women to explicitly take up the banner of the national 
liberation struggle in a variety of roles, will reveal the historical legacies that 
fundamentally impacted upon gendered notions of identity and citizenship. These 
legacies are central to uncovering how institutional change occurred in the South African 
post-conflict State, and furthering the understanding of how women as political actors 
influenced the norms and rules of the ANC structures. The chapter concludes with an 
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examination of exogenous influences to the women’s movement in South Africa, noting 
the role that global feminism debates played in shaping the demands and tactics of 
women in South Africa, particularly during the transitional stages of the new democracy. 
 
3.2 Colonial Conflicts 
 
The legacy of militancy within and between South Africa’s many competing cultural 
groups21 was firmly established early in South Africa’s history, with the legacy of equality 
becoming intricately interwoven with the path of militancy after the arrival of colonial 
settlers in the Cape in 1652 (Thompson, 2000: 33; Welsh, 2000: 21).22 Altercations 
amongst indigenous peoples rapidly escalated with the arrival of settlers, who pushed 
the borders of their seized territories outwards, encroaching on indigenous grazing and 
farming lands (Thompson, 2000: 54-55). As the Europeans migrated north and east, 
bloodier conflicts began to arise between these settlers and the indigenous nations, 
including the KhoiKhoi Dutch Wars (1659-1677), and the Cape Frontier/Xhosa Wars 
(1779-1879). These battles were never evenly matched as the technological superiority 
of Western weaponry, combined with the systematic destruction of indigenous homes, 
crops, livestock and reserves, ensured that the Europeans emerged victorious 
(Thompson, 2000: 72). 
 
Later, there was also bloodshed between the competing colonial powers, such as at the 
Battle of Muizenberg in 1795 that resulted in Britain gaining control of the Cape from 
the Dutch (Welsh, 2000: 89). By 1806 Britain had completely annexed the Cape, 
claiming it as a British Colony, and necessitating the imposition of a governance system 
                                                 
21 The racial classification system dating back to the period of colonial rule and entrenched by the 
National Party government remains in use today, although with different intent. Therefore, the same 
terminology is employed in this thesis: African refers to the indigenous Black population, White to 
citizens of European descent, Coloured to citizens of mixed heritage, and Indian to those of Asiatic 
descent, predominantly drawn from India, Madagascar, Ceylon and Indonesia. Within these broad 
categorisations, further distinctions will be drawn where appropriate, such as between Xhosa and Zulu 
(two dominant ethnic populations within the political context), and English-speaking Whites and 
Afrikaners who are predominantly of Dutch descent. 
22 Despite South Africa’s lack of natural harbours and the existence of treacherous ocean currents, its 
advantageous position on the oceanic trade route prompted the Portuguese to land in Mossel Bay in 
1487, the first Europeans to do so. However, it was not until 1652 that a permanent settlement was 
established in the Cape by Jan van Riebeeck as a refreshment station for the Dutch East India 
Company (Thompson, 2000: 33; Welsh, 2000: 21).  
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to protect their interests from the groups of indigenous peoples bordering their eastern 
territories, and also from various settler groups who were largely a law unto themselves 
(Thompson, 2000: 52-53). Prompted by the social unrest in the United Kingdom (UK) 
derived from high unemployment, the British Parliament began transferring settlers to 
South Africa to begin farming communities (Thompson, 2000: 55). In 1820, over five 
thousand settlers started occupying former tribal lands. These settlers did not integrate 
with the primarily Dutch Europeans (Afrikaners/Boers) already residing in South Africa, 
although they mimicked their forceful seizing of land and resources from the indigenous 
people (Meintjes, 1996: 51; Thompson, 2000: 56-57), perpetuating the legacy of 
militancy. 
 
The British regime increasingly alienated the Afrikaner population through the 
imposition of a cultural and legislative system that reduced their farmlands through 
annexation, the forced abolition of slavery (which drastically reduced the cheap 
workforce upon which they were dependent), and the use of English throughout the 
Government and schooling systems. Dissatisfied with their loss of autonomy, and 
unable to maintain self-sufficiency,  approximately 12 000 Voortrekkers (pioneers) of 
primarily Flemish, Dutch and German descent migrated to establish the Boer Republics 
in the former Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal regions in 1830 (Leatt, Kneifel & 
Nurnberger, 1986: 71; Thompson, 2000: 67-69, 87-91; Welsh, 2000: 166). Moving 
inland, where they could self-govern, these Voortrekkers engaged in numerous 
altercations with the indigenous groups living in the hinterland.  
 
An integral part of these skirmishes stemmed from the expansion of the Zulu empire by 
the warrior King Shaka, whose strategic prowess saw the formation of a “militaristic 
kingdom” stretching between the Pongola and Tugela Rivers (Thompson, 2000: 83; 
Welsh, 2000: 139). This prompted the dispersal of other ethnic groups, causing upheaval 
throughout the south-east as the Voortrekkers moved through. The more militant among 
these indigenous refugees began creating new settlements, including the Ndebele (of 
Nguni descent), who subsumed some Sotho and Tswana chiefdoms into a state nestled 
between the Vaal and Limpopo Rivers (Thompson, 2000: 86).  
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The distribution of the indigenous groups at this time is represented in Map 3.123. As 
the map shows, the British engaged in altercations with indigenous inhabitants along the 
eastern coast of the country as the colony expanded. Following the path of the 
Voortrekker migration northwards, battles erupted between the Afrikaners and the tribal 
armies whose lands they were traversing. The overall view of Map 3.1 clearly illustrates 
the militant mindset of all the parties involved: the Afrikaners, the British and the 
indigenous population24. It also assists in demonstrating the development of the closely 
linked legacies of militancy and equality: militant actions were repeatedly utilised in 
order to assert equality and acquire autonomy, whether it was the Afrikaners asserting 
their independence from the British, or the Ndebele claiming autonomy from the 
expanding Zulu kingdom. 
 
A decisive turning point occurred in 1838 following the Battle of Blood River25, where 
the defeat fractured the Zulu kingdom and paved the way for the Afrikaner settlement 
in the high rainfall area of the east coast (Welsh, 2000: 173; Thompson, 2000: 91). It 
also served as one of the first significant moments around which an Afrikaner identity 
and common history began to emerge, as it symbolised the triumph of the Afrikaner 
after decades of suppression by the British, vindicating the decision to strike out in 
search of a state of their own. The Afrikaners, while by no means a cohesive group 
ideologically, had achieved their goal of independence by 185426.  
 
The discovery of gold in 1864 and diamonds in 186727 led to further territorial 
conflicts28 (Meintjes, 1996: 51; Thompson, 2000: 110), most notably the First Anglo 
                                                 
23 Map 3.1 is adapted from Mayhew (1980: 10, 11, 153, 345), Welsh (2000: xiv-xv, 98-99, 141, 142-144, 
154-155, 204-205, 211), Thompson (2000: 3, 34, 74, 82, 89, 149), SA-Venues (2011) and South African 
History Online (2011). The battles indicated on Map 3.1 are listed in Appendix 4 – Major South 
African Battles 1779-1902. 
24 It should also be noted that the majority of conflicts between indigenous groups involved the Zulu and 
the Xhosa. These two ethnic groupings are the dominant forces within the current democratic regime.    
25 An army of ten thousand Zulus attacked a commando of five hundred Afrikaner settlers. However, the 
settlers, armed with guns and cannons, killed three thousand Zulu warriors without losing a single 
settler (Welsh, 2000: 173).  
26 The Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions formalised their withdrawal from British sovereignty, 
establishing the Boer Republics in the Orange Free State and Transvaal, and enabled the “Afrikaners to 
[begin] self-consciously fashioning a national historical tradition” (Thompson, 2000: 96; Leatt et al, 
1986: 71).  
27 These discoveries are of significant import to later developments as the immense labour needs of the 
mining industry spawned a range of strategies forcing African workers into urban areas, since farming 
land had been appropriated by settlers in the formalisation of the racial segregation laws that would be 
expanded under the Apartheid regime (Thompson, 2000: 111). 
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Boer War in 1880, in which the Boer Republics defeated the British through the use of 
guerrilla warfare tactics29. The Second Anglo Boer War in 1899 resulted in a victorious 
Britain, who had adapted their strategy by employing a scorched earth policy and 
building concentration camps30 to house captured commandos and civilians (Leatt et al, 
1986: 17-18; Thompson, 2000: 132-143). However, the defeat served to strengthen 
Afrikaner unity by fostering a sense of nationalism among the settlers, which had 
previously been lacking, centred around anti-imperialist sentiments and the need for 
self-governance. In 1910, the Union of South Africa was created as a dominion of the 
British Empire (Thompson, 2000: 154).  
 
By 1934, the Status of the Union Act consolidated the gains from the Statute of 
Westminster and effectively provided for South African independence from Britain by 




                                                                                                                                          
28 The major battles of the two Anglo-Boer Wars are indicated on Map 3.1, and in Appendix 4. 
29 The motivation for war was not the securing of the mineral wealth per se, but rather an attempt by the 
Afrikaners to preserve their independence and fledgling culture from the “menace” of incoming 
English immigrants (Welsh, 2000: 325). 
30  Approximately 28 000 Afrikaner civilians died in these camps as a result of disease and malnutrition 
(Thompson, 2000: 143). 
31  South Africa became a Republic in 1961, leaving the Commonwealth. 
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  Map 3.1 Battle for Autonomy in Colonial South Africa 
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3.3 Birth of the Opposition Movement: The Formation of the 
South African Native National Congress (1912) 
 
The establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 by the British saw the demise 
of Afrikaner independence, and also highlighted the urgent need for African nationalists 
to organise at a national level. The need to oppose the flood of inequitable laws and 
policies emanating from Parliament32 led to the creation of the South African Native 
National Congress (SANNC)33 in 1912 (Leatt et al, 1986: 58; Meintjes, 1996: 51).  
 
The ANC, together with the South African Indian Congress and the South African 
Coloured People’s Organisation, adopted a liberal agenda for affecting change based on 
cooperation between various African bodies and other multi-racial organisations 
pursuing similar goals of equality in terms of defending the “freedom, rights and 
privileges” of the majority (SANNC, 1919: Clause 6; Leatt et al, 1986: 59; Gaitskell & 
Unterhalter, 1989: 59). The attainment of political equality was seen as the necessary 
first step towards achieving this goal. The 1919 Constitution of the South African 
Native National Congress called for collective action in the form of protests, 
“constitutional and peaceful” propaganda, and enquiries and “passive” action (SANNC, 
1919: Clause 13) as a means of achieving its manifesto. Violent tactics were implicitly 
prohibited. This conservative approach would only alter with the formation of the 
Youth League decades later. In all its proclamations and statements, the attainment of 
equality remained the cornerstone of the ANC’s manifesto: a vital source of access with 
respect to gender claims and participation, as it was framed broadly in terms that 
encompassed race, ethnicity and gender (Waylen, 2007a: 524).  
 
While the manner in which this goal was pursued necessarily evolved over time in 
response to the political, economic and legal constraints imposed by the State, the 
inclusive framing of equality did not waver, creating a much wider base for participation 
than in other mass movements in South Africa. This represented a crucial discursive 
                                                 
32 While these laws would intensify after 1948 when the National Party seized power, the entrenchment of 
racial inequality had already begun with the 1913 Native Land Act (a precursor of the Group Areas 
Act) and the pass law system imposed by the British (Welsh, 2000: 375-376). 
33 SANNC was renamed the African National Congress (ANC) in 1925. For purposes of clarity, the 
organisation will be referred to as the ANC throughout the text. 
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legacy in terms of the women’s movement in South Africa, and established an entry 
point for women into the formal structures of the ANC.  
 
The way in which the struggle for liberation was conceptualised within the ANC was 
not necessarily without internal contestation. For example, many senior members of the 
party had overlapping membership with the Communist Party and thus viewed class 
disparities as an important element of the liberation movement (Nugent, 2004: 299). 
There was also a contingent of Africanists who were suspicious of multi-racial politics, 
communists and especially of Whites (Thompson, 2000: 210; Nugent, 2004: 300). This 
eventually led to the formation of a breakaway group under Robert Sobukwe in 1952: 
the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The PAC was exclusively and militantly African, 
stating “Whites could not be trusted because their material interests lay in a perpetuation 
of the structures of racial domination, whatever their intellectual conversion” (Nugent, 
2004: 300). 
 
The ANC Constitution established a democratic governance culture, making provisions 
for tribal leadership structures as well, and enabling an expansion of the organisations 
base (SANNC, 1919). The organisational structure was explicitly detailed in the 1958 
Constitution, with national, provincial and branch structures and responsibilities clearly 
outlined34. Membership was not restricted in terms of race or gender35, with the only 
explicit proviso being that the applicant be older than 18 years of age. While women 
were not formally included in the early leadership structures of the ANC, they 
nevertheless participated in the “deliberations, decision making and campaigns of the 
organisation” (Ginwala, 2001; Cock, 1991: 47). This was partly due to the amenability of 
the ANC to gender issues, and represented a crucial opportunity for the expansion of 
women’s political power (Waylen, 2007a: 524). This early inclusion and participation in 
the decision-making structures of the ANC is therefore of critical importance in terms 
                                                 
34 The two signatories of the Constitution, Albert Luthuli (then President General) and Oliver Tambo 
(then Secretary General), were both influential in subsequent decades in advancing women’s equality, 
as will be shown in this chapter and in the forthcoming discussion on the transitional phase.  
35 By 1958, women’s equal status within the organisation was enshrined in the ANC Constitution, 
including the right to participate in elections and to stand for any position within the ANC (ANC, 
1958: Clause 7). The 1991 Constitution of the ANC also explicitly called for women’s equality (ANC, 
1991: Clause B7) and carried this through subsequent Constitutions (ANC, 1994; 1998; 2002). The use 
of quotas to increase the representation of women was clarified in the 1994 Constitution (ANC, 1994: 
Clause 14), and by 1998 this was quantified at a minimum of one third in all structures, and maintained 
in subsequent Constitutions (ANC, 1998; Clause 14; ANC, 2002: Rule 6). 
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of creating openings for women to organise politically, and served as a base from which 
to begin consolidating political gender gains. The emphasis on inclusivity and equality as 
core values early in the history of the ANC aided in the establishment of a legacy of 
equality within the organisation, which in turn played a role in the development of the 
twinned legacy of increasing women’s autonomy through the course of South African 
history, as this chapter shows. 
 
3.4 Women Get Organised: The Bantu Women’s League (1918) 
 
The formation of the Bantu Women’s League36 in 1918 was a pivotal experience as it 
served as an “acknowledgement [by the ANC] that women were entitled to organise 
politically” (Ginwala, 2001). Although the creation of this body was supported by the 
ANC leadership, the Bantu Women’s League was not formally affiliated and could thus 
pursue its own agenda. As with many of the contributory occurrences explaining 
women’s active participation in the struggle for liberation, the combination of an 
enabling organisational environment (dependent on male co-operation), the ability of 
women to organise themselves effectively in pursuit of their own goals, and the 
presence of remarkable leaders (both male and female) all coalesced to produce results. 
Charlotte Maxeke, the leader of the Bantu Women’s League at the time, had national 
esteem within the party and the capacity to deal effectively with leaders from the 
movement and State officials. This endowed the Bantu Women’s League with greater 
credibility and empowered women to “articulate their demands and make their own 
representations”, having been freed of the need for male interpreters or spokesmen 
(Ginwala, 2001). Gasa (2007: 215) notes that “from their very first entry into the 
political space, women resisted male domination, acting on their own, representing 
themselves directly to the Union government and even in their appeals to the empire”.  
 
Given the independence of the Bantu Women’s League from the central ANC 
structures, there was a need for the ANC Women’s Section to be revived as a forum for 
women’s formal representation within the organisation, although there was a significant 
overlap of membership (Ginwala, 2001). An annual subscription fee enabled self-
                                                 
36  The Bantu Women’s League, although created separately from the ANC’s Women Section (later 
Women’s League) had the same leadership and overlapping membership.   
Chapter Three: Learning From Legacies - Women and South African History           80  
sufficiency (to an extent) and the Provincial Presidents of the Women’s Section were 
included in the ANC’s executive body (Ginwala, 2001). This clearly demonstrates the 
growing autonomy of the ANC women’s movement. 
 
By 1943, the status of women within the organisation was further elevated with the 
formal establishment of the ANC’s Women League (ANCWL), which replaced the 
Women’s Section.37 The ANC Executive confirmed their autonomy in a resolution, 
although their independence was qualified with the statement that it should “not mean 
parallelism, but co-operation and mutual assistance in the building up of membership” 
(Ginwala, 2001). While women were full members of the ANC by this time, the 1945 
Draft Constitution clarified the reasoning behind the establishment of the Women’s 
League as follows: 
"In the Congress women members shall enjoy the same status as men, and shall be 
entitled to elect and be elected to any position including the highest office. 
Notwithstanding this fact, however, and without in any way diminishing the rights 
of women members, the Congress may, recognising the special disabilities and 
differences to which African women are subjected and because of the peculiar 
problems facing them, and in order to arouse their interest and facilitate their 
organisation, create a Women's Section within its machinery” (Ginwala, 2001). 
 
While national liberation remained the overarching goal, women railed against the 
National Executive Committee (NEC) exercising complete control over their activities 
(Hassim, 2004: 434), and called for the ANCWL to be endowed with greater authority. 
This was seen as a crucial step in consolidating women’s power and in building the 
required political capital to affect substantive change, remaining central to their activities 
in the coming decades. 
 
3.5 Radical Views: Establishment of the ANC Youth League (1944) 
 
The Youth League arose due to dissatisfaction within the party with the reticent manner 
in which the ANC leadership continued to engage with the State despite its increasingly 
draconian suppression of African civil rights. Nelson Mandela described this period of 
ANC history as the “era of delegations, deputations, letters and telegrams. Everything 
was done in the English manner, the idea being that despite our disagreements we were 
                                                 
37 The organised women’s division within the ANC went through numerous name changes throughout 
the course of the liberation struggle. For clarity, it can be assumed that ANCWL and Women’s Section 
refer to the same entity. 
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all gentleman” (Mandela, 1995: 113). A more militant approach was desired, one which 
would place greater emphasis on African nationalism, while maintaining the central 
goals of the ANC in terms of achieving non-racial democratic governance (Mandela, 
1995: 112-114; Ginwala, 2001; Welsh, 2000: 458; Thompson, 2000: 211; Nugent, 2004: 
298). 
 
Formed on Easter Sunday in 1944, the Youth League was made up of a notable group 
of emerging leaders who would transform the political landscape in the coming years. 
These included Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tambo and Anton Lembede38 – 
the first president of the Youth League (Mandela, 1995: 113; Nugent, 2004: 298). By 
1947 Peter Mda, who had succeeded Lembede as President of the Youth League, 
“believed the [Youth League] should function as an internal pressure group, a militant 
nationalistic wing within the ANC as a whole that would propel the organisation into a 
new era” amid concerns that the ANC was “generally poorly organised, operating in a 
haphazard way” (Mandela, 1995: 123; Nugent, 2004: 298). The 1949 Conference saw the 
Youth League backing Dr James Moroko for ANC president after Dr Alfred Xuma 
refused to support the more militant Programme of Action calling for civil disobedience 
(Mandela, 1995: 131-132; Welsh, 2000: 431; Nugent, 2004: 298). Walter Sisulu became 
Secretary-General and Oliver Tambo was appointed to the National Executive 
Committee (NEC), thus placing the Youth League within the senior echelons of the 
organisation.  
 
The Programme of Action was a radical departure for the ANC, who had previously 
been at pains to stay within the letter of the law. The calls for “boycotts, strikes, stay-at-
homes, passive resistance, protest demonstrations and other forms of mass actions” 
thus moved the ANC into a “more activist stage”39 (Mandela, 1995: 130; Nugent, 2004: 
298). The fundamental shift in the political landscape, brought about by the electoral 
                                                 
38 It should be noted that the issue of racial exclusivity was not as clear-cut within the Youth League as 
within the broader ANC. Some, like Lembede, maintained that only by standing alone could Africans 
achieve true liberation, while others called for the inclusion of Indians and Coloureds. Some argued 
that only true non-racialism would ensure liberation, but many remained distrustful of Whites 
(Mandela, 1995: 115). 
39 For example, less than a year later, the ‘Defend Free Speech Convention’ drew 10 000 protesters 
(Mandela, 1995: 132). However, the use of mass action was not without its problems, as participants 
faced incarceration, loss of employment, and the retraction of passes to reside in urban areas (and thus 
the ability to seek or gain employment) (Mandela, 1995: 135). 
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victory of the National Party (NP), prompted the immediate implementation of this new 
approach. 
 
3.6 The National Party and Apartheid (1948) 
 
The rise of Afrikaner nationalism, which was to irrevocably shape the political landscape 
of South Africa in coming decades, was due in part to the alienation that the Afrikaners 
felt from the other European settlers. It fostered the need to create a common identity 
using the basis of shared language, faith and recent history with others who felt 
oppressed by the imposition of “foreign” rule in the form of the British (Leatt et al, 
1986: 70; Mandela, 1995: 128). The Anglo-Boer Wars, in particular, strengthened the 
resolve to create a haven in which the Afrikaners could be in control of their own 
destiny. The success of the National Party in 1948 gave hope that this dream could be a 
reality, as described by Mandela (1995: 128): 
“In the distorted cosmology of the Afrikaner, the Nationalist victory was like the 
Israelites’ journey to the Promised Land. This was the fulfilment of God’s promise, 
and the justification for their view that South Africa should be a white man’s 
country forever”. 
 
The National Party was established in 1914 in response to the 1910 Union of South 
Africa, and morphed into the Purified National Party (PNP) under the leadership of the 
ultra-conservative DF Malan in 193440 (Welsh, 2000: 407). The PNP was focused on 
closing the gap between Afrikaners and English-speaking Whites: in 1946 the income 
level of Afrikaners was less than half that of English-speaking Whites (Thompson, 2000: 
188). Once the NP was in power, State contracts, government positions, investment 
houses and banks, and even publishing houses were directed towards Afrikaners, rapidly 
expanding the middle class and closing the economic gap between the English and the 
Afrikaners (Thompson, 2000: 188; Welsh, 2000: 411). 
 
The policy of Apartheid, or “separate development” for which the renamed National 
Party became notorious, did not ascribe to the idea of “separate but equal”, irrespective 
                                                 
40 The formation of the PNP was a reaction to the merging of one faction of the National Party with Jan 
Smuts’ South African Party to form the United Party, which had an English and Afrikaans-speaking 
support base, and some Coloured supporters as well. The PNP is referred to as the National Party 
(NP) throughout the text, as the party returned to being known as the NP following the 1948 electoral 
victory. 
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of the rhetoric utilised by the State. Initially, Afrikaner nationalists might not have 
viewed ethnically divided group areas as unjust as it was “their own desire for separation 
and ethnic identity” that prompted the development of the system of Apartheid (Leatt et 
al, 1986: 72-73). It was driven as much by a need to preserve the fledgling Afrikaner 
group identity as it was by the aspiration of a State modelled around their guaranteed 
prosperity and way of life.  
 
However, racial segregation was not an original Afrikaner initiative; the Dutch and 
British colonial rulers (and every administration thereafter) had implemented prejudicial 
policies on the basis of race (Leatt et al, 1986: 72). Nevertheless, Apartheid 
 “represented the codification in one oppressive system of all the laws and 
regulations that had kept Africans in an inferior position to Whites for centuries. 
What had been more or less de facto was become relentlessly de jure. The often 
haphazard segregation of the past three hundred years was to be consolidated into a 
monolithic system that was diabolical in its detail, inescapable in its reach and 
overwhelming in its power” (Mandela, 1995: 127). 
 
Every aspect of life would come to be affected by the immense network of laws and 
regulations implemented under Apartheid, with devastating repercussions for the social 
and cultural structures of society. Inter-racial relationships were prohibited through the 
Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the Immorality Act (1950), prohibiting miscegenation. 
Even the use of public premises and transportation was divided by race (Reservation of 
Separate Amenities Act, 1953) (Leatt et al, 1986: 72; Mandela, 1995: 130). The Bantu 
Education Bill (1953) limited the educational opportunities for Black (and to a lesser 
extent, Coloured and Indian) students, aiming to provide a semi-skilled workforce that 
would never be able to compete with Whites (Welsh, 2000: 447). 
 
One particularly notorious piece of legislation was the Group Areas Act (1950)41, 
allocating urban areas according to race and forcibly removing people from designated 
“White” areas (Meintjes, 1996: 53; Thompson, 2000: 194; Welsh, 2000: 340). Nelson 
Mandela (1995: 130) commented that “in the past, Whites took land by force; now they 
secured it by legislation”. The Group Areas Act, in combination with the Population 
                                                 
41 These laws were extensions of pre-existing legislation, some dating back to the colonial era, such as the 
Native Land Act (1913) prohibiting Black ownership of land, and the Natives in Urban Areas Bill 
(1918) that regulated urban settlements according to race. 
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Registration Act (1950) and the system of pass laws,42 further eroded family and 
community structures as men were forced to reside in the urban centres where they 
worked, while women and children remained in the homelands43. This effectively 
created a matriarchal structure within a patriarchal system whereby women assumed 
responsibility for the upholding of familial and societal structures while having to 
conform to traditional expectations. Every tool at the disposal of the State was called 
into service to implement and maintain this vast system of social engineering.  
 
During the Apartheid era, South Africa engaged in a sustained military and economic 
destabilisation campaign in the region (Stott, 2002; Anderlini, 2004, 14) in an effort to 
create a buffer between South Africa and “hostile” (Black-led quasi-socialist) African 
states (Nugent, 2004: 295)44. The activities undertaken by the South African Defence 
Force (SADF) included: 
“... invasions and "hot pursuit" operations into Angola, pre-emptive strikes against 
the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia and Angola, 
actions against the [ANC] in exile in countries such as Mozambique, Swaziland and 
Lesotho, and military support for rebel anti-Marxist groups such as RENAMO 
[Mozambican National Resistance] and UNITA [National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola]. From 1975, the SADF invaded southern Angola 
regularly ... In response to ANC refugees in Lesotho, the SADF attacked "targets" 
in the capital, Maseru, in 1982 and 1985, killing 36 ANC members and 15 Lesotho 
citizens. … In Mozambique, South Africa's support for RENAMO and its direct 
military actions against ANC bases in Maputo, led the ruling party [FRELIMO – 
the Liberation Front of Mozambique], to curb the ANC's presence in its territory 
officially, as part of the infamous 1984 Inkomati Accord” (Stott, 2002). 
 
This aggressive interventionist stance led to the formation of the Frontline States (FLS) 
in 1975 – an organisation of Southern African states45 that both aimed “to formulate 
and coordinate policies in support of national liberation movements, initially those in 
Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and later in South Africa, and also to counteract their 
dependence on and therefore the regional hegemony of South Africa” (Swart and Du 
Plessis, 2004: 26-27).  
                                                 
42 Pass laws required all people of colour to carry passbooks in order to regulate their movements and 
restrict access to designated “White” areas. 
43 Also known as “Bantustans”, the homelands were designated areas set aside for Black and Coloured 
settlements, as a precursor to establishing “autonomous” states (ANC, 1980). 
44  States such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were economically dependent on South Africa, and 
Namibia (formerly South West Africa), as a South African mandate territory, also posed little threat to 
the NP-regime (Nugent, 2004: 295). 
45  Members included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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As internal opposition to its policies increased, the SADF would be sent into the 
townships to quell protests, often using excessive force (Cock, 1991: 8; Thompson, 
2000: 249; Marinovich & Silva, 2000). The use of the national defence force within 
South Africa’s borders against its own people further contributed to the militarisation of 
society (Clarke, 2008; Cock, 2009), leading to the formation of the armed opposition 
movement, as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Despite the heavy-handed use of the defence force both at home and in the region, the 
Western international community viewed South Africa as a “bulwark against 
communism and an island of stability in a rapidly disintegrating Africa” (Welsh, 2000: 
455). As Cold War rivalries played out across the Continent, South Africa found that it 
could garner support while pursuing its own objectives through the aforementioned 
destabilisation campaign in the region. Indeed, Western states, including the US, would 
often provide material support for these actions, as was the case during the Angolan 
liberation struggle (Nugent, 2004: 289).  
 
South Africa used the antipathy towards communism to further domestic objectives as 
well. The 1950 Suppression of Communism Act “was drafted in such a broad way that 
it outlawed all but the mildest protest against the state, deeming it a crime to advocate 
any doctrine that promoted ‘political, industrial, social or economic change within the 
Union by the promotion of disturbance or disorder’. Essentially, the bill permitted the 
government to outlaw any organisation and to restrict any individual opposed to its 
policies” (Mandela, 1995: 134; Welsh, 2000: 431). Even as international opinion started 
turning and investors began withdrawing, the economy continued to grow at a rate of 
around 7%, with exports continuing to increase46, allowing the NP to maintain its 
course. It was not until the sharp recession in the 1970s that the economy began to 
stagnate, forcing the NP to begin considering concessions to its policies (Thompson, 
2000: 221). 
 
                                                 
46 Exports to Asia exploded by more than 300%, while American and European exports rose by 65% and 
50%, respectively (Welsh, 2000: 456). 
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3.7 Organised Opposition: The 1952 Defiance Campaign and the 
Freedom Charter (1955) 
 
The 1952 launch of the Defiance Campaign marked an upsurge in civil disobedience, 
aimed primarily at the pass laws, with the most common form of protest being the 
destruction of the passbooks followed by the protestors presenting themselves for 
arrest, or the blatant use of “White’s only” entrances and facilities in order to prompt 
arrest and clog the Apartheid system (Mandela, 1995: 149; Meintjes, 1996: 50, 54; 
Anderlini, 2004: 5; Nugent, 2004: 299). The tone of protests was to remain non-violent, 
as the State had already demonstrated its willingness to use brutal force against 
demonstrators (Mandela, 1995: 147). As the protests gathered momentum, a cross-racial 
alliance slowly emerged, forming the basis of the “Congress Alliance” of a wide swathe 
of political opposition movements. The wave of mass actions served to enhance the 
credibility of the ANC. The increased co-operation amongst the various movements 
solidified into a cross-party alliance at the Congress of the People in Kliptown in 1955, 
where 3000 delegates adopted the landmark Freedom Charter that would serve as a “set 
of principles for the foundation of a new South Africa” (Mandela, 1995: 199; Leatt et al, 
1986: 59; Nugent, 2004: 299; Hassim, 2009: 456). 
 
Based on multiracial equality and ideas from people across the country (submitted 
through their representatives), the Freedom Charter would be the guiding statement 
which carried the ANC (and its alliance partners) through the struggle against Apartheid 
(Gaitskell  & Unterhalter, 1989: 59; Mandela, 1995: 199; Nugent, 2004: 299; Anderlini, 
2004: 5; Suttner, 2008: 153). As the ANC anticipated that it would soon be forced to 
operate illegally underground, the event also provided an opportunity to publicly 
demonstrate its policies, gather support and present a “public display of strength” 
(Mandela, 1995: 199). 
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The Freedom Charter was envisaged as “a convention uniting all the oppressed and 
progressive forces of South Africa to create a clarion call for change” (Mandela, 1995: 
199): 
“like other enduring political documents, such as the American Declaration of 
Independence, the Drench Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Communist 
Manifesto, the Freedom Charter is a mixture of practical goals and poetic language. 
It extols the abolition of racial discrimination and the achievement of equal rights 
for all. It welcomes all who embrace freedom to participate in the making of a 
democratic, non-racial South Africa, It captured the hopes and dreams of the 
people and acted as a blueprint for the liberation struggle and the future of the 
nation” (Mandela, 1995: 203). 
 
The preamble of the Freedom Charter encapsulated the spirit of the struggle, declaring 
“only a democratic state, based on the will of the people, can secure to all their 
birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief” (ANC, 1955), once again 
reiterating the commitment to equality in all spheres. Thus, the Freedom Charter served 
to further entrench women’s claims on full and equal participation, enshrining their calls 
for equality as central to the liberation struggle.  
 
There appeared to be a delicate balancing act between the autonomy of the women’s 
movement (in terms of making representations on their own behalf) and working 
through the broader ANC structures. For example, while the Women’s Section was a 
fairly autonomous organ within the ANC, women also participated within the central 
party structures. This participation is described by Bernstein (1985) as a recognition of 
“women's clear understanding that the reforms they need are dependent upon a 
restructuring of the state itself”, and that this would only achieved within a broader 
liberation movement, particularly given the power of the NP-regime.  
 
This did not imply that they assumed national liberation would automatically result in 
women’s liberation, but that transforming the governance structures of the ANC would 
strengthen their position once national liberation was attained. As such, women 
continuously strived to “reorganise and strengthen the ANC” through their 
participation on committees such as Resolutions and Finance (Ginwala. 2001). This 
involvement stemmed from the openings created by documents such as the Freedom 
Charter, which enshrined their right to representation. 
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However, the prevailing gender norms continued to inform some of women’s activities 
within the ANC, casting them in the roles of “wives and daughters of the ANC 
leadership” (Ginwala, 2001; Suttner, 2007: 237). Nevertheless, these roles also served as 
the basis for their political participation, as they mobilised around matters that had 
“immediate and direct relevance to their daily lives”47 (Ginwala, 2001; Meintjes, 1996: 
50; Govender, 2007: 67). This enabled a wide support base to be drawn from “below”. 
Thus, the form of women’s early participation within the ANC should thus not be 
dismissed as being “supportive of the role of men or performing conventional female 
roles”. Rather, by broadening the definition of “feminist roles”, the possibility should be 
considered that fulfilling these traditional roles within the political arena could in fact 
transform the way women are viewed as political agents (Suttner, 2007: 237; Govender, 
2007: 80). The dichotomy of this view was not entirely shared within the ANCWL, and 
the dual objectives of organising around grassroots “women’s” issues as well as 
mobilising around broader political concerns began to cause tensions amongst women 
within the group, as well as in affiliated bodies such as the National Council of African 
Women (NCAW).  
 
This cleft could also be seen as the playing out of Molyneux’s distinction between 
strategic and practical women’s interests. While both interests arise out of the 
subordinate positioning of women in society, strategic needs are focused on creating 
“alternative, more satisfactory set of arrangements to those which exist”, while practical 
needs are centered on the “concrete conditions of women’s positioning within the 
gender division of labour” (Molyneux, 1985: 232-233; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 134). In 
other words, practical gender concerns are “usually a response to an immediate 
perceived need, and they do not generally entail a strategic goal such as women’s 
emancipation or gender equality” (Molyneux, 1985: 233).48 This conflict would continue 
through the liberation struggle, gaining intensity as women in exile began integrating 
feminist ideas into their goals, while women who remained in the country maintained a 
focus on grassroots issues49.  
 
                                                 
47 For example, the undue economic burden placed on women by the law stipulating the purchase of 
permits for municipal wash houses led to the Orange Free State Anti-Pass campaign (Ginwala, 2001). 
48 Moser (1993) and Hassim & Gouws (2000) are among the many authors who expand on these 
concepts, outlining the practical and theoretical implications of this view of gendered interests. 
49  This is discussed in greater length at a later stage in this chapter. 
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Nevertheless, the history of women’s effective organising within the mass liberation 
movement had been established (Ginwala, 2001; Waylen, 2007a: 524; Gasa, 2007; 
Govender, 2007). The unifying element for the ANC Women’s League and the 
organisations to which it was affiliated was that national liberation was perceived as a 
necessary first step towards achieving gender equality (Cock, 1991: 48; Govender, 2007: 
80).  
 
These organisational legacies being established were consolidated as women in South 
Africa from all racial and ethnic backgrounds organised on multiple levels and within 
various (sometimes overlapping) structures in their campaign for equality in all spheres. 
For example, white-based women’s organisations such as the Black Sash gained 
international recognition for their silent protests (wearing the ubiquitous black sash) and 
offered assistance to those communities affected by Apartheid laws (Meintjes, 1996: 55; 
Thompson, 2000: 205; Welsh, 2000: 452; Anderlini, 2004; Black Sash, 2011). Founded 
in 1955, Black Sash had an overt agenda to protect human rights, while not attempting 
to push a specific political ideology (Rauch, 1994; Meintjes, 1996: 55; Thompson, 2000: 
205; Welsh, 2000: 452; Anderlini, 2004; Black Sash, 2011).  
 
A notable example of the cooperation and consolidation amongst women’s groups was 
the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW)50, which consisted of women’s 
organisations drawn from across the racial spectrum. The Women’s Charter, drawn up 
at the 1954 inaugural conference, explicitly outlined the terms for women’s 
emancipation. Arguing that the “status of women is a test of civilisation”, the Women’s 
Charter called for equal rights in all spheres, specifically noting suffrage51, property 
ownership, pay and education (FEDSAW, 1954). As Govender (2007: 82) relates 
“women had been working hard at all levels of the struggle against Apartheid and in 
many instances in the struggle against patriarchy too, and had achieved a great deal 
throughout the country”. For example, the 1957 demonstration against the continued 
imposition of pass laws on African Women was an experience that inspired and 
mobilised generations of women. Thousands of women were arrested across the 
                                                 
50 FEDSAW was the precursor to the Women’s National Coalition that was formed in 1992, and would 
prove integral to the participation of women in the transition to democracy, as will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
51 White women received the right to vote in 1930. 
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country, including Winnie Mandela. Nelson Mandela (1995: 257) acknowledged the 
extraordinary power of the women’s civil disobedience campaign as “courageous, 
persistent, enthusiastic, indefatigable ... [setting] a standard for anti-government protest 
that was never equalled” (Mandela, 1995: 257). Mandela went on to quote Chief Luthuli 
who stated that “when the women begin to take an active part in the struggle, no power 
on earth can stop us from achieving freedom in our lifetime” (quoted by Mandela, 1995: 
257).  
 
3.8 Treason Trial (1956) 
 
On the evening of 5 December 1956, the majority of the ANC’s executive leadership52 
around the country was arrested by the security police on charges of high treason and “a 
countrywide conspiracy to use violence to overthrow the present government and 
replace it with a communist state” (Mandela, 1995: 231-233). The indictment included 
the 1952 Defiance Campaign and the 1955 Congress of the People (where the Freedom 
Charter was drawn up). High treason was defined as a “hostile intention to disturb, 
impair or endanger the independence or safety of the state” and carried the death 
penalty (Mandela, 1995: 236). The Congress Alliance defence team responded that they 
would “strenuously repudiate that the terms of the Freedom Charter are treasonable or 
criminal. On the contrary ... the ideas and beliefs which are expressed in this charter, 
although repugnant to the policy of the present government, are such as are shared by 
the overwhelming majority of the citizens of this country” (Mandela, 1995: 244). While 
much of the State’s evidence was proved to be fabricated, and various witnesses 
discredited, it was nevertheless decided after a year of preparatory statements that there 
was “sufficient reason” for the trial to proceed to the Transvaal Supreme Court 
(Mandela, 1995: 244-248).  
 
The trial concluded more than four years later, in March 1961, with all parties being 
found not guilty. The eloquence with which the accused presented the principles and 
goals of their respective organisations, combined with the avid interest of both 
                                                 
52 156 people were arrested: 105 Africans, 21 Indians, 23 Whites and 7 Coloureds representing a range of 
organisations that had come together under the Congress Alliance (Mandela, 1995: 232), including 
respected activist Helen Joseph. 
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spectators and the press, meant that the trial was a publicity windfall for opposition 
groups of all races.  
 
However, the occurrence of the Sharpeville Massacre during the trial fundamentally 
altered the manner in which the liberation struggle would continue, and represented a 
key moment in the way in which women participated in the political emancipation of the 
state, particularly following the formation of the armed resistance movement. 
 
3.9 State of Emergency:  
Sharpeville and the Banning of the ANC (1960)  
 
The transition to more militant resistance was predominantly precipitated by the 
increasingly draconian laws issued by the Apartheid State, as well as by the escalating 
violence with which the armed forces were reacting to protests. The Sharpeville 
Massacre, an anti-pass demonstration organised by the PAC on 21 March 1960,53 
constituted a key moment in the liberation movement (Welsh, 2000: 454).54 During a 
“positive action” protest, participants would give themselves up for arrest at police 
stations in order to “clog up the machinery of justice” (Thompson, 2000: 210; Frankel, 
2001: 68; Nugent, 2004: 301). Instead of the peaceful mass protest envisaged by 
organisers, police in the township of Sharpeville outside Veereniging (near 
Johannesburg) opened fire on demonstrators, killing sixty-nine people as they fled and 
wounding 168 others (Welsh, 2000: 454; Thompson, 2000: 210; Frankel, 2001: 150-151; 
Nugent, 2004: 301; Anderlini, 2004, 6). In the wake of the massacre, the country was 
swept with strikes and civil disobedience acts, including a march of 15,000 to 30,000 
protesters to Cape Town’s Parliament (Thompson, 2000: 210). 
 
The government responded by declaring a State of Emergency on 30 March, allowing 
the mobilisation of army reserves. Scores of people were arrested55, amongst them the 
                                                 
53 The PAC protest was scheduled to pre-empt a planned action by the ANC (which was due to take place 
ten days later) in an attempt by the PAC to win supporters from the ANC (Welsh, 2000: 454; Nugent, 
2004: 301).  
54  For an in-depth analysis of the Sharpeville Massacre, see Frankel (2001). 
55 The tally for those arrested in the wake of Sharpeville includes 98 whites, 90 Indians, 36 Coloureds and 
11, 279 Africans. A further 6,800 were jailed following the protests in March (Thompson, 2000: 210; 
Welsh, 2000: 456). 
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organisers of these events, including the leader of the PAC Sobukwe, severely 
incapacitating the party. The Unlawful Organisations Bill was put into action, which 
banned the ANC and PAC together with all other political movements in opposition to 
the Apartheid State (Meintjes, 1996: 50; Thompson, 2000: 210; Welsh, 2000: 456; 
Nugent, 2004: 301; Anderlini, 2004, 6). The result was that all demonstrations (peaceful 
or otherwise) were declared illegal and opposition movement leaders were driven 
underground, signalling a new era in the liberation struggle.  
 
The banning of the ANC in 1960 effectively banned the ANCWL as well56 (Mandela, 
1995: 301; Hassim, 2004: 434-5). However, the women of the ANC continued with their 
mandate of recruiting more active female members and campaigning for international 
support, both economic and political (Hassim 2004: 435). The ANCWL has been 
described as the ANC’s “social worker ... performing the caring tasks that arose when 
people were far from their conventional support networks. Frene Ginwala comments 
that its role was ‘supportive, a social network rather than political’ ... [and] functioned as 
a network of solidarity rather than a mobilising agency” (Hassim, 2004: 435).  
 
While the continued focus on social and supportive activities was critically commented 
upon by militant women activists, it raises important questions about what constitutes 
important work within a national liberation movement. As will be explored more fully 
within the discussion on security, the tasks performed by the ANCWL at that time may 
not have been glamorous or high profile but it does not detract from their necessity. 
Further, the fact that they conform to traditional gender stereotypes in terms of being 
“caring” and “nurturing” tasks does not render them unimportant. As Hassim (2004) 
comments: 
 “... the necessity of the Women’s Section’s practical activities shaped its 
conventional role as a women’s auxiliary of the national liberation movement. In 
this capacity, its role was both validated and valuable for the movement; however, 
this work pushed some women activists to question the extent to which the 
movement was, in practice, committed to women’s equality and whether in fact 
women stood to gain equality automatically from national liberation. ... such moves 
to question the theoretical hierarchy of nationalist struggle and the male structures 
of authority within the ANC were less than easily accepted” (Hassim, 2004: 436). 
 
                                                 
56 The Women’s Section, under the leadership of the Women’s Secretariat, was created at the 1969 
Morogoro Conference to replace the suspended ANCWL (Hassim, 2004: 435), and benefitted from 
the leadership of a number of influential women, including Ruth Mompati, Gertrude Shope, and 
Zanele Mbeki. 
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It must also be remembered that the penalties for engaging in political activities were as 
harsh for the women as for men. These included bannings, imprisonment, and loss of 
employment that was often the only source of income in many households. Such 
measures would be increasingly applied against women as the Struggle intensified. 
 
3.10 Spear of the Nation:  
The Formation of Umkhonto we Siswe (1961) 
 
The violent overreaction of police to the student protests in Sharpeville, followed by the 
declaration of the State of Emergency that banned political organisations, significantly 
hampered efforts at organised civil disobedience. This necessitated a new approach by 
the mass liberation movement. The ANC resolved to form an armed wing to undertake 
acts of sabotage against the State, since the armed movement would not be able to 
directly confront the immense State machinery (Mandela, 1995: 336; Nugent, 2004: 302; 
Anderlini, 2004, 6).  
 
Umkhonto we Siswe (Spear of the Nation, or MK) was established in 196157. While 
membership of the ANC Executive was not open to Whites, MK favoured a more 
inclusive approach as it would allow the participation of a number of strategic partners, 
including the South African Communist Party (SACP), which had already began 
undertaking acts of sabotage (Mandela, 1995: 323). Nelson Mandela was given the task 
of setting the plan into motion, reasoning that sabotage would be the best course of 
action: 
“since it did not involve loss of life, it offered the best hope for reconciliation 
among the races afterwards ... animosity between Afrikaner and Englishman was 
still sharp fifty years after the Anglo-Boer War; what would race relations be like 
between white and black if we provoked a civil war? Sabotage had the added virtue 
of requiring the least manpower” (Mandela, 1995: 337). 
 
The structure of MK initially mimicked that of the ANC, with a tactically-oriented High 
Command, Regional Commands in each province, and Local Commands overseeing the 
cells (Mandela, 1995: 336-337). Cadres were trained in exile (including in Angola, 
                                                 
57 Other active armed movements at the time included the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA), 
and Poqo (the armed wing of the PAC, meaning “pure”/”alone”) which was largely defunct by 1963 
after numerous arrests (Thompson, 2000: 211; Welsh, 2000: 514, Anderlini, 2004, 6). These 
movements did not necessarily share the ANC’s views on avoiding civilian casualties.   
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Mozambique, China and Russia), and by necessity aligned with other communist 
powers, including Cuba (Mandela, 1995; Nugent, 2004: 302). MK cadres would also be 
integral to the formation of “self defence units” within the South African townships, 
formed to protect residents from attacks by other armed units and “third force” agents 
(Marinovich & Silva, 2000)58. 
 
The first offensive was launched on the day MK announced its formation, 16 December 
1961, a public holiday commemorating the Battle of Blood River. Bombs were set off at 
government offices and power stations in Durban, Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth. 
The only casualty was an MK soldier (Mandela, 1995: 338).59 
 
MK also participated in the liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia60, 
in keeping with their stated objectives of the broader manifesto enshrined in the 1958 
ANC Constitution where the organisation explicitly stated its support for the “national 
liberation and the right to independence of nations in Africa” (ANC, 1958: Clause 2). 
This statement of action would later define the foreign defence policy of the democratic 
regime.  
 
3.11 Women, the Armed Struggle and MK: Transforming Roles 
 
The roles that women fulfilled in MK were a curious amalgamation of traditional 
“feminine” and militantly masculine roles, blending stereotypical expectations with the 
requirements of the changing South African context. This dichotomy is raised by Cock 
(1991: 183), who comments “women have often participated in wars of resistance 
throughout Africa in their traditional roles. Women who carried firewood in traditional 
society carried arms in the liberation struggle. But war alters social maps”. Moreover, 
                                                 
58 These activities intensified in the pre-transition period, largely due to State instigators, and will be 
explored more fully in the next chapter. 
59 Examples of MK sabotage activities included an attack on the SASOL (South African Coal and Oil) 
complex in the Orange Free State in 1980, the firing of rockets at the military base in 
Voortrekkerhoogte in Pretoria in 1981, explosions set off at the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station in the 
Cape in 1982, and a car bomb detonated at the South African Air Force Headquarters in Pretoria in 
1983 (Mandela, 1995: 338-9; Welsh, 2000: 285; Williams, 2006: 26). 
60 Wars in which the Apartheid government was also involved, although without fail they would be 
fighting for the other side, ostensibly to stem the tide of communism. 
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women in MK pushed the bounds of “acceptable” gender roles, striving for formal 
recognition of their status as equals to the male combatants. 
 
Women formed an integral part of the broader underground movement and MK61, 
undergoing the same training as the men, and serving in leadership positions with men 
under their command62 (Cock, 1991: 163; Modise & Curnow, 2000: 37; Geisler, 2000; 
Anderlini, 2004, 8; Suttner, 2007: 240). Women engaged in direct combat as well, 
although these battles occurred predominantly outside South Africa, primarily in 
Angola. Suttner (2007: 245) recounts one example from an interview with Wally Serote, 
where a female combatant provided artillery fire during a UNITA ambush, sacrificing 
herself to cover her retreating comrades (Suttner, 2007: 245).  
 
While the overturning of long-held stereotypes about women’s abilities was not always a 
smooth process, the intolerance of discrimination by certain respected male leaders, 
such as Chris Hani and Joe Modise, did much to ensure that women received the same 
opportunities as men (Suttner, 2007: 240; Suttner, 2008: 126). In addition, the influx 
into MK of women who had been local level leaders and “couldn’t be pushed around, 
they stood their ground” further aided the process of recasting gender roles (Hassim, 
2004: 440; Modise & Curnow, 2000: 37; Anderlini, 2004, 8). These women often viewed 
the liberation struggle as an opportunity to challenge gender roles, and became 
increasingly militant and proactive (Cherry, 2007: 292).  
 
As more women moved into exile (and into MK), they no longer confined themselves 
to separate women’s organisations, expecting to be treated as equal participants within 
the broader structures of the ANC, including MK.63 This expectation derived in part 
from the ANC’s stated commitment to equality in all spheres, as reiterated in the 
Freedom Charter. Further, the militarised legacies of South African history reinforced 
                                                 
61 Women represented 20% of MK cadres by 1991 (Cock, 1991: 162; Hassim, 2004: 440). 
62 Jackie Molefe, Lindiwe Sisulu, Thandi Modise, Marion Sparg and Thenjiwe Mtintso are just a few of the 
women who led squads within MK (Suttner, 2007: 239). Some of them would later hold senior 
positions within the newly created South African National Defence Force (SANDF), as is discussed 
later in the thesis. 
63 The growing involvement of women was not confined to the opposition movement: women were 
engaging in activities on behalf of the State’s Security Branch as well. For example, Olivia Forsyth and 
Joy Harnden were both intelligence operatives who infiltrated the ANC (Cock, 1991: 139-142), 
fulfilling what Cock describes as the “traditional female role of spy ... ‘the Mata Hari phenomenon’”. 
Chapter Three: Learning From Legacies - Women and South African History           96  
the view that armed insurrection was the accepted means by which political change was 
affected. This is supported by Cock (1991: 198) who argues that the “widespread 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the armed struggle and the notion of a ‘just war’ means 
that the Western connection between feminism and pacifism is loosened in the South 
African context. In fact, the female soldier, the MK guerrilla, is a popular mass image of 
the strong, liberated women”. Therefore, the right to militantly oppose oppression 
(whether in the guise of the Apartheid state or the patriarchal attitudes of society) was 
considered an inherent right by these women. 
 
While there were obvious differences between the conventional armed forces of the 
SADF focused on conservatism and the guerrilla forces of MK aimed at change, there 
were also numerous similarities between MK and the SADF with respect to women, as 
Cock (1991: 162-163) points out: 
 “In both the SADF and MK, women constituted a small minority in the 1970s ... 
In both the SADF and MK there were dramatic increases in the numbers of women 
soldiers between 1976 and 1989. Women now constitute almost 14 per cent of the 
Permanent Force of the SADF and approximately 20 per cent of cadres in MK. The 
two processes were connected in that MK’s expansion after 1976 fuelled the SADF 
perception of ‘threat levels’ and a ‘manpower’ crisis, to which the increasing 
incorporation of white women was part of the solution. Despite this process of 
increasing incorporation, in both armies women are under-represented in positions 
of leaderships and authority”. 
 
Women in the SADF served almost exclusively in support roles such as administration 
and in the medical corps (Unterhalter, 1987: 108-115; Cock, 1992; Anderlini, 2004, 7; 
Moller, 2006). Unterhalter (1987: 111) describes the “patronising attitude towards 
women in the SADF”, arguing that “white women are no more equal in the SADF than 
Blacks are” (Unterhalter, 1987: 115). The opportunities to attain positions of influence 
were also limited, not least by the fact that women did not receive comparable training 
to the men (Unterhalter, 1987: 115; Cock, 1992; Anderlini, 2004, 7). 
 
Both Unterhalter (1987: 117) and Cock (1992) comment on the “elaborate cultivation of 
femininity” within the SADF that sought to preserve rigidly defined conceptions of 
women’s roles within security. This was achieved not only through the curtailment of 
the roles and positions open to women, but also in the training provided for female 
recruits. Courses included instruction on proper dress and use of cosmetics, diet, and 
household management (Unterhalter, 1987: 117-118; Cock, 1992). Unterhalter (1987: 
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118) suggests that this “maintenance of ‘femininity’ is an appeal to perceived traditional 
values of gender difference which need to be preserved in times of stress and change”, 
while Cock (1992) considers it as evidence that the “incorporation of women does not 
eliminate the subordination of women or even erode patriarchal authority relations”. 
 
This can also be seen in the manner in which motherhood was linked to militarism by 
both the Apartheid regime and the ANC, as explored by Gaitskell and Unterhalter 
(1989: 59), who sought to uncover points of similarity and contention in the strategies 
of these oppositional forces. In the NP propaganda at the time, women’s roles as 
mothers was often cast as an alternative form of soldiering, as seen in literature which 
called women “indispensable soldiers within our country’s borders ... their spiritual 
power is South Africa’s secret weapon” (Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 66). Another 
example of this linkage by the State of motherhood and militancy cited by Gaitskell and 
Unterhalter (1989: 66) is: “women were also ‘doing service’ every day, ‘ without call up 
instructions, without military pay, but in the service of the things which are dear to us- 
our families, our countries, our nation’ ”. The cross-racial unifying power of the ANC 
was viewed with concern by the Apartheid State, leading to attempts to emulate the 
ANC strategy by using the common experience of motherhood to draw in women from 
across the racial divide (Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 66-67; Tickner, 2001: 58). 
However, “when the situations of mothers in different race groups is in fact so 
manifestly different, and in a context where radical transformation of South African 
society is not on the agenda, ‘bridge-building’ on the basis that the home is what 
mothers have in common becomes farcical” (Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 67). The 
ANC also acknowledged the role of “motherhood” in drawing women into the 
liberation struggle, and retained its cross-racial emphasis in the statement made by the 
NEC in 1987:  
“The mothers of the nation, the womenfolk as a whole, are the titans of our 
struggle. The oppressors and the exploiters see in black womanhood nothing but the 
calloused hands of the washerwoman, the cleaner, the agricultural and factory 
worker: their white sisters are themselves domesticated possessions kept as objects 
for reproduction. Our revolutionary movement has long recognised the fact that an 
oppressive social order such as ours could not but enslave women in a particularly 
brutal way. One of the greatest prizes of the democratic revolution must therefore 
be the unshackling of the women ... These black and white mothers must reach 
across the divide created by the common enemy of our people and form a human 
chain to stop, now and forever, the murderous rampage of the apartheid system” 
(ANC, 1987; Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 71). 
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Later, women’s organisations affiliated to the UDF (discussed in Chapter Four), such as 
the Federation of South African Women (FSAW) and the United Women’s Congress 
(UWCO), utilised the mobilising power of “women’s identities as mothers” (Hassim & 
Gouws, 2000: 136) to further expand their support bases. 
 
The primary difference between the strategies of the ANC and the NP is that the 
ANC’s approach seems “to go a considerable way to explaining the new vision of 
motherhood in the ANC as something dynamic and activist, rather than passively in 
need of protection” (Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 73). However, Hassim and Gouws 
(2000: 141) caution that there is an inherent tension between the “conservatising aspects 
of motherism and the project to transform gender relations”, arguing that “a political 
strategy based on motherhood is not inherently progressive, no matter how strongly 
rooted it may be in women’s experience”. That being said, it is useful to note the 
following statement made by Hassim and Gouws (2000: 142), as it intersects with the 
forthcoming argument about the manner in which feminism has been conceptualised in 
South Africa:  
“motherism is an authentic alternative to South African feminist consciousness. It 
has played a central role in making space for the discussion of the relationship 
between nationalism and women’s rights in a context in which the more 
conventional western forms of feminism had little to offer South African women”.  
 
This argument is raised again in the following chapter, as the unifying power of 
motherhood was also utilised by the End Conscription Campaign, an organisation of 
predominantly white women using the basis of shared motherhood to protest the 
militarisation of South African society. 
 
Within the context of this period of history, the diverse (and sometimes oppositional) 
ways in which the mother-military linkage has been conceptualised by the ANC and the 
NP had the effect of casting (or keeping) women in the SADF in far more passive roles 
than the women in MK, despite calling on similar gendered stereotypes. As Anderlini 
(2004: 7) argues: “whereas MK prompted change, the inherent ideology of the SADF 
was to maintain the status quo, not only of white supremacy but also of male 
dominance”. Taking this argument a step further, it could be seen that using 
motherhood as a unifying concept created a starting place for the dialogue on what 
feminism means in the South African context.  
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The reconciliation of multiple conflicting roles provided some challenges. For example, 
while “maternal” roles remained part of the MK women’s contribution, bearing children 
could limit mobility in terms of deployment. A range of approaches emerged from the 
various camps. Some report that “women deployed to the Angolan camps were inserted 
with IUDs [intrauterine devices] as a matter of policy”, while another cadre comments 
“I didn’t have to choose between motherhood and politics because the Women’s 
Section made it possible for me to do both. I knew I could leave my child in good 
hands” (quoted by Hassim, 2004: 436). Other camps, such as those in Tanzania, 
established childcare facilities to accommodate female cadres who had children (Suttner, 
2007: 242). There are some accounts of women taking their children with them on 
certain assignments in an effort to disguise their missions from authorities (Suttner, 
2007: 243). 
 
The dismissal of some of women’s activities as restricted to logistical and “care-taking” 
tasks as opposed to frontline combat is misleading (Suttner, 2007: 233-244). The 
reconnaissance work done by cadres, such as Totsie Memela prior to Operation Vula 
(including the preparation of hidden guns caches, maps of safe houses and safe routes), 
and the provision of safe houses by activists such as Dorothy Nyembe (and many 
others) were activities just as dangerous for the women as for the men they were 
harbouring (Anderlini, 2004, 8; Suttner, 2007: 244; Suttner, 2008: 35). Drawing on 
interviews conducted with cadres, Suttner (2008: 63) relates how  
“these women organised safe accommodation for individuals on the run from the 
police ... managed an elaborate communications system and courier network linking 
the different units ... ensured that they knew the conditions of various people in 
need of assistance after experiencing repression and attended to their welfare”.  
 
The penalties were as severe if they were caught by the State: imprisonment (which 
included torture and extended periods of solitary confinement) and banning orders were 
common, which severely curtailed their ability to meet their familial and social 
responsibilities (Suttner, 2008: 35).  
 
Thus, while providing safe houses and undertaking logistical tasks could be viewed as 
stereotypically female roles, the context within which these actions were undertaken 
(and the penalties if caught) transformed the manner in which these acts were viewed. 
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As Suttner (2007: 233) argues, women were “not merely perpetuating traditional female 
roles, but performing an essential element of the success of a military operation”.  
 
Cock (1991: 30-31) asserts that “in both the African and Afrikaner traditions there is an 
image of the tough but submissive female”, which suggests that while men expected to 
be dominant, there was also an assumption that women would participate but in 
different roles. Cock also describes women undertaking activities such as armaments 
production and participation in commando units (predominantly in rural areas where 
women were compelled to take more responsibility for their own safety as men were 
absent for extended periods, or not at hand to offer assistance in an attack), and notes 
that “in this process of incorporation, traditional notions of femininity are restructured 
and expanded” (Cock, 1991: 112). However, this does not imply that established gender 
roles are disregarded; rather it refers to the addition of further roles. 
 
Both Cock (1991) and Hassim (2004) have produced research about women in the 
armed struggle, based on many in-depth interviews with male and female MK cadres, 
which delves into the positive and negative repercussions of the armed struggle on 
gender roles. As Suttner (2008: 105) points out “liberation struggles are often seen as 
essentially defined by masculinist discourse, an essentially male and public terrain where 
women periodically enter” (Suttner, 2008: 105). Some accounts point to the assumption 
of masculine traits by female cadres, while others allude that liberation from traditional 
roles did not necessarily entail the abandonment of femininity. Negotiating the divide 
between masculinity and femininity in this context is therefore complex64. By and large, 
female cadres saw the experience as beneficial, as MK’s standing within the ANC was 
such that it created new opportunities for leadership65 (Hassim, 2004: 440).  
 
This is echoed by Suttner (2008: 121) who declares that “the political predominance of 
the ANC means that understanding its gender practices and notions of manhood may 
be one of the bases on which gender equality will have to be grounded in the future”. 
This is an important observation, as it was on the basis of the strength of the ANC that 
                                                 
64 Duncanson (2007) provides an in-depth exploration of the construction of militarised masculinity and 
its implications for gender relations within the military. 
65  For example, Commander Thandi Modise had a distinguished career within MK, as well as serving as 
Deputy President of the ANC Women’s League, and later went on to become the Chairperson of the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence (Modise & Curnow, 2000: 36). 
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women were later able to create openings within the security structures of the new 
democratic State, emboldened by the emphasis on equality that permeated the ANC. 
  
The willingness of women to engage in combat was outside the realm of the SADF’s 
experience, as women were not viewed as having either the capacity or the inclination 
for violent conflict. As has been pointed out by Cock (1991: 162-163; 1989; 1992) and 
Anderlini (2004), women in the SADF rarely served in leadership positions, fulfilling 
more “traditional” administrative roles. Thus, the discovery by the State that White 
women activists such as Barbara Hogan and Marion Sparg did not only support the 
goals of the liberation movement, but were also volunteering for combat positions 
within the movement, prompted vitriolic attacks aimed at their femininity, labelling 
them “butch” and “misfits” (Suttner, 2007: 248). The ingrained ultra-conservative and 
racial dogma of the State could not comprehend that these women could choose to 
reject and violently oppose the ideology that was being crafted for their “benefit”: it 
went against all accepted notions of White femininity.  
 
Regardless of the assumptions of the State (or men in the liberation movement) about 
the “appropriate” roles for women in the struggle, women themselves continued to 
militantly engage in all forms of protest against inequality. These activities would 
increase as the male leadership of the party became fragmented, either through arrest or 
exile, necessitating the women of the ANC to step into the breach and maintain the 
presence of the ANC, continuing to violently oppose the State’s oppression of their 
rights. While women had proved to be effective leaders within the ANCWL, the 
assumption of more high-profile leadership roles in the general ANC structures went 
beyond what was perceived as “appropriate” feminine behaviour. The expansion of 
women’s roles was a direct response to the needs of the movement, and served to 
demonstrate their capabilities and further entrench the growing political power wielded 
by women.  
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3.12 Leaders Lost: The Rivonia Trials (1963) 
 
The key moment that facilitated the expansion of women’s leadership roles stemmed from 
the passage of the Sabotage Act into law in 1962, which allowed for house arrests and 
bannings not subject to challenge in the court (Mandela, 1995: 402). This law greatly 
increased the powers of the State to detain individuals under the flimsiest of pretexts, 
and carried a maximum penalty of death66 (Mandela, 1995: 402- 403). Nelson Mandela 
was arrested in August of 1962 on charges of travelling without valid documents and 
inciting workers to strike. Mandela used his trial as an opportunity to voice his 
opposition to oppression and inequality in all guises, once again utilising the stage 
provided by the State to clarify and disseminate the ANC message (Mandela, 1995: 374-
395). He was sentenced to five years imprisonment without parole, and began serving 
his time on Robben Island. 
 
Nine months into the sentence, the State discovered the MK headquarters at Lillisleaf 
Farm in Rivonia. The entire MK High Command was arrested67 and would be tried with 
Nelson Mandela under the Sabotage Act, with the State seeking the death penalty on 
charges of “complicity in over two hundred acts of sabotage aimed at facilitating violent 
revolution and an armed invasion of the country” (Mandela, 1995: 419). By not charging 
the leaders with treason, the State would not need to overcome the hurdle of reasonable 
doubt through the provision of witnesses and evidence on each charge, as “under the 
Sabotage Law, the onus was on the defence to prove the accused innocent” (Mandela, 
1995: 419). At the same time, the State stepped up its harassment of the leaders’ wives, 
for example refusing Winnie Mandela permission to attend court (she was under a 
banning order at the time) and detaining Albertina Sisulu and Caroline Motsoaledi under 
the Ninety-Day Detention Act (Mandela, 1995: 419). Following international media 
coverage of the trial, and protests from statesmen and citizens in the United States (US), 
United Kingdom (UK) and Russia, amongst others, a sentence of life imprisonment was 
                                                 
66 The provisions for house arrest were also expanded and used aggressively against activists such as 
Helen Joseph and Winnie Mandela. A related Act of Parliament made the printing or dispersal of any 
statements by banned persons illegal (Mandela, 1995: 402-403). 
67 Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, Andrew Mlangeni, Bob Hepple, Raymond Mhlaba, 
Elias Motsoaledi, Dennis Goldberg, and Rusty Bernstein were all arrested. Only Joe Slovo and Bram 
Fischer were not present at the time of the raid (Mandela, 1995: 414-415). 
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handed down in June of 1964 and the men were sent to Robben Island (Mandela, 1995: 
443-447; Nugent, 2004: 302). 
 
The imprisonment of the male leadership pushed women to the fore; their 
organisational capacity maintained the momentum of the movement in a myriad of 
ways. Rebuilding the ANC’s networks was one of the most crucial activities, and 
required “a balance between apparent low-profile inactivity (for purposes of police 
attention) and simultaneously undertaking – under the noses of the police – the difficult 
task of gradually building some semblance of ANC underground machinery” (Suttner, 
2008: 63). Albertina Sisulu, Winnie Mandela and Lilian Ngoyi were central figures in this 
process, although their styles differed considerably, with Winnie Mandela’s tactics 
considered somewhat “risky” (Suttner, 2008: 64). As Nelson Mandela noted, Winnie 
“behaved as much like a soldier as a wife” (Mandela, 1995: 343).  
 
The upsurge in women’s explicit political organising to compensate for the 
imprisonment and exile of male leaders did not go unnoticed by the State. Winnie 
Mandela remained a constant thorn in the State’s side, but their continual harassment 
did little to deter her political activities. She was placed under banning orders in 1961 
and again in 1962 (Mandela, 1995: 477; Du Preez Bezdrob, 2004: 111). After her arrest 
in 1966, Winnie Mandela lost her employment as a social worker and the primary source 
of income for the household (Mandela, 1995: 414, 477, 506). In 1969, when detained 
under the Terrorism Act, she was “relentlessly and brutally interrogated” for six months 
before being released without charge seventeen months later – spending almost the 
entire period of her incarceration in solitary confinement (Mandela, 1995: 530; Du Preez 
Bezdrob, 2004: 155).  
 
After being imprisoned again in 1974 for violating her banning order, the State banished 
her to the small, ultra-conservative town of Brandfort in the Free State, placing her in a 
bleak township where she did not speak the language, had no running water, heat or 
toilet (Mandela, 1995: 587; Du Preez Bezdrob, 2004: 181-209). Despite ongoing police 
harassment and intimidation, Winnie was undaunted: she soon established a soup 
kitchen and a township crèche, and started fundraising for a medical clinic. Albertina 
Sisulu was also placed under numerous banning orders, restricting her to the township 
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of Orlando, and prohibiting her from visiting any educational institutions, hospitals or 
media outlets in an attempt to curb her political organising (Sisulu, 2002: Du Preez 
Bezdrob, 2004: 181-209).  
 
Undeterred by the imprisonment of key leaders and the exile of remaining principals, 
the liberation movement continued, reinvigorating its efforts against the State and 
building momentum towards the end of the 1970s. This serves as another example of 
women seizing (and creating) opportunities for change, even within situations that 
appear restrictive and closed to action. 
 
3.13 Students Spark a Change: The Soweto Uprisings (1976) 
 
The NP, under the leadership of President P.W Botha, began a series of piecemeal 
reforms in an effort to revive the now flagging economy. The economy was suffering 
from the “critical shortage of skilled labour” brought about by the Bantu Education Bill 
(noted previously), and the lack of foreign investment due to South Africa’s increasingly 
grim international reputation (Nugent, 2004: 311). These reforms included attempts to 
rebrand Apartheid in different terms while retaining the core of racial segregation that 
protected White interests. For example, limited representation was offered to 
Coloureds, Indians and some Africans, pass laws were eased for urban dwellers to 
enable home ownership, and the establishment of unions was allowed68 (Nugent, 2004: 
311).  
 
While it was hoped that these measures would attract people of colour to the NP, as a 
result of “sharing in the spoils” to a degree, they were insufficient to produce any 
tangible results. Instead, the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) began gaining 
momentum, drawing inspiration from Africanist rhetoric across the continent as well as 
from the ANC and PAC. It emphasised Black self-reliance and called for “principled 
non-co-operation with Apartheid structures” (Nugent, 2004: 304-306; Leatt et al, 1986: 
                                                 
68 The sharp increase in labour unrest in the 1970s was exacerbated by the State policy at the time that left 
employers with no worker’s leadership with whom to negotiate (Nugent, 2004: 305-306). Once the 
disruptive capacity of strikes was demonstrated, the right to form unions became a necessity, and from 
1979 urban workers were allowed to unionise. It was hoped that instead of being “political agitators”, 
the unions would focus on “bread-and-butter” issues (Nugent, 2004: 312). The participation of the 
unions in the struggle will be briefly discussed later in this chapter. 
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59; Anderlini, 2004, 6). The underlying tenets were adopted by a variety of liberation 
groups, some of which utilised the rhetoric to justify racial exclusion of all but Africans. 
For example, the Black Women’s Federation was formed as a national umbrella body of 
the Black Consciousness movement in order to “[mobilise] women against racial 
discrimination” (Geisler, 2000: 609). Others, such as the South African Students 
Organisation (SASO)69, attempted to operationalise the fundamental goals of the 
movement, maintaining the inclusionary approach of the ANC by extending 
membership to Coloureds and Indians as well (Seekings, 2000: 30; Nugent, 2004: 306). 
One of the key goals of BCM and SASO was the promotion of literacy through better 
educational access, which ultimately sparked the controversy that led to the Soweto 
Uprisings.  
 
The Soweto Uprisings of 16 June 1976 centered around the use of Afrikaans as the 
language of instruction within educational institutions, which the students saw as a 
double insult: an inferior education delivered in the language of the oppressor (Meintjes, 
1996: 50; Thompson, 2000: 212). After a series of boycotts in schools in Soweto, the 
South African Students Movement coordinated the mass demonstration of 15,000 
pupils aged between ten and twenty (Nugent, 2004: 307). In an effort to disperse the 
crowd, police fired live ammunition into the mass of students, killing 96 and leaving 
more than a thousand wounded (Nugent, 2004: 307). While the instigators of the 
Soweto Uprisings were students, the events set off a series of mass protests that 
fundamentally altered the liberation struggle, primarily due to the State’s response.  
 
Riots broke out across the country as the news spread, with workers joining in the 
protests. Collective resistance campaigns continued until 1977 when the government 
finally suppressed the dissent (Nugent, 2004: 307-310). The involvement of workers in 
the protests eventually prompted the creation of a “super-federation” of 34 affiliated 
unions in 1985: the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which 
included the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), the National Union 
of Mine Workers (NUM), and various independent unions (Nugent, 2004: 314). The 
                                                 
69 SASO was founded in 1969 on the non-White university campuses of South Africa as a representative 
body for students and was a co-sponsor of the Black People’s Convention in 1972 (Nugent, 2004: 
304). 
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combined membership of 500,000 workers made it a formidable political force70, 
especially once its overtly political goals were clarified: “the removal of the SADF from 
the townships, the unbanning of proscribed organisations and the repeal of racist 
legislation” (Nugent, 2004: 314). While unions had initially been hesitant to engage 
directly in political action for fear that it would undermine their negotiating position, it 
soon became evident that “it was meaningless to distinguish between community and 
labour struggles” and the number of wildcat strikes increased, leading to record 
numbers of workdays lost and establishing the unions as potent participants on the 
political scene (Nugent, 2004: 314; Meintjes, 1996: 50; Anderlini, 2004). While the ANC 
was not the organiser of the protests, its credibility amongst citizens was further 
increased and membership swelled – including more than 5,000 student activists who 
immediately went into exile (Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 70; Nugent, 2004: 310).  
 
In the aftermath of the Soweto Uprisings, a number of the concerns regarding the 
intersection of the women’s movement with the broader liberation movement needed to 
be addressed. Prime amongst these issues was the level of autonomy that women’s 
structures should have within the ANC. This in turn related to the membership profile 
of the movement, which included a significant number of women who were still largely 
treated as “second class members” until the 1980s, despite the provisions in the ANC’s 
Constitution. Another factor was determining how international feminist movements 
(particularly those in Africa and other post-independence states) related to the ANC and 
its goals. The result was that “these influences intersected to reshape the ANC and lay a 
basis for new practices and discourses of gender equality and democracy” (Hassim, 
2004: 434). 
 
                                                 
70 Women were union members, but very few had leadership roles, even in unions such as the Garment 
Workers Industrial Union (GWIU) where women made up the majority of the workforce (Govender, 
2007: 96). 
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3.14 Women Reflect on the Way Forward 
 
There was a clear chasm between the ANC women’s movement in exile and the ANC 
women who remained in South Africa. One way of characterising the split is that 
women in exile were focused on means of consolidating the gains of women in the 
post-liberation period, while women in South Africa were concerned with how best to 
confront the practical constraints imposed by Apartheid. The two sides began to 
coalesce following the 1976 Soweto Uprisings, which saw a sharp increase in the 
number of young women joining the ANC in exile (Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989: 70; 
Hassim, 2004: 440). This required a stronger organisation that could provide strategic 
leadership to activists, both within the borders of South Africa and those outside. It was 
decided to reactivate the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW), which had 
originally been formed in 1954, and retain the focus on national liberation while pushing 
the gender agenda in a more coordinated fashion. Although the internal and external 
women’s movement never functionally coalesced around the FEDSAW structure 
(Hassim, 2004: 446; Govender, 2007: 83),  women were “beginning to organise more 
self-consciously around gender issues even if they did not use the term feminism overtly” 
(Waylen, 2007a: 527). 
 
Of particular concern to the exiled women’s movement was the lack of substantive 
representation in the broader ANC decision-making processes, and the lack of 
autonomy of the Women’s Section, despite various guarantees in documents such as the 
ANC Constitution and the Freedom Charter (Hassim, 2004: 434). It is important to 
point out that “substantive” representation was the goal; it was becoming increasingly 
clear that the political will of various leaders was the deciding factor, which would thus 
result in a loss of gains when that political leader moved on. For example, Oliver Tambo 
is cited by various women as a key ally: “it was Tambo who was able to shift the tone ... 
from haranguing women to emphasising the importance of finding out what gave rise to 
women’s unhappiness. Without the space he created, the antagonistic response of the 
[National Executive Committee] might have ended women’s attempts to transform the 
internal culture of the movement” (Hassim, 2004: 447). As Acting ANC President, 
Tambo used his influence to further the goal of women’s substantive contribution to 
the Struggle by appointing representatives such as Lindiwe Mabuza, Barbara Masekela 
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and Ruth Mompati. While not necessarily ascribing to feminist theories, this action 
allowed the women to “demonstrate their skills and also exposed women in the ANC to 
the rising tide of feminism internationally” (Hassim, 2004: 443). 
 
By the 1985 ANC National Consultative Conference in Kabwe, women had clearly 
articulated their stance that the “traditional, conservative and primitive constraints 
imposed on women by man-dominated structures within our movement” was a primary 
concern (Hassim, 2004: 447). In essence, the women concluded that gender equality 
must first be attained and consolidated within the movement if it was to be translated 
into the post-liberation democracy. The NEC, under the leadership of Acting President 
Oliver Tambo71, acknowledged the validity of this argument for the first time “formally 
recognising that women’s equality would deepen and enhance the quality of democracy 
itself” (Hassim, 2004: 447). However, the awareness of women that their participation 
and autonomy was largely reliant on the political will of the leadership led to an 
increased commitment to providing political education to women activists; it was the 
only means by which opportunities would be identified and seized. 
 
3.15 Women and Feminism: The Third World View 
 
Within South Africa, feminism was not a rallying point for women activists. In an in-
depth study with a range of informants, Cock (1991: 147) described the opinions of the 
women interviewed as revealing “widespread suspicion and rejection of feminism as 
anti-men or as bourgeois and divisive, as essentially reformist and concerned with 
entrenching and extending privilege”. This was, in part, due to the way in which 
feminism was “marketed” at the time; the issues that were deemed to be important, 
such as sexual preference and lesbian rights, were, within the South African context, 
“viewed as irrelevant” and oriented towards the “promotion of middle-class women’s 
interests” (Cock, 1991: 47, 1992; Gouws, 2008b). This was glaringly obvious under 
Apartheid, where Black women in particular suffered under far more restrictions than 
White (and to an extent Coloured and Indian) women. In addition to the cultural and 
social burdens faced by most women, the harsh laws restricting movement and 
livelihoods further curtailed their ability to exercise control over their lives (Waylen, 
                                                 
71 Nelson Mandela, then President of the ANC, was incarcerated at Robben Island at the time. 
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2007a: 526). While some of the same hardships were shared by Black men, the domestic 
problems created by the draconian Apartheid laws fell disproportionately to women to 
solve, whether due to the men being employed far away in urban centres, in jail or in 
exile, or as a result of prevailing cultural norms that allocated the responsibility for the 
household to women. The interaction between Western feminist ideals and the goals of 
the women in the developing South is thus outlined in this section, which seeks to 
contextualise the experience of South African women.  
 
The manner in which feminism debates interacted with the goals of national and gender 
equality was a point of contention, and was closely related to the split between the exiled 
and internal women activists (Govender, 2007: 124). Gasa (2007: xvii) argues that as 
women across the developing world sought “ways in which their own cultural and 
historical realities can be taken as a point of departure in feminist scholarship and 
worldview”, women in South Africa continued to view Western liberal feminism as 
“suspect” or even “irrelevant”, as discussed above.  
 
This situation arose, in part, from the consistent depiction of women from Third World 
countries as passive, weak victims, whose life experiences get “reduced and 
universalised” (Kabeer, 1999: 459), more so than women from other contexts. This is 
particularly the case in matters related to women in conflict situations, where the 
essentialist descriptions of women deny the existence of female instigators and 
perpetrators of violence (Vincent, 2001). This is an important element in understanding 
the evolution of women’s roles in relation to security, and is discussed at length in 
Chapter Six.  
 
Suttner (2008: 124) concisely captures the essential differences between how Western 
feminists and women in the developing world view the role of women in conflict:   
“The fact that women have often entered liberation struggles initially as mothers 
has been seen by some as immediately disqualifying any feminist significance in 
their action, and as automatically and comprehensively reproducing patriarchal 
relations. Another argument is that participating in a liberation struggle tends to 
subordinate and ultimately displace feminist demands in favour of larger nationalist 
ones. It is also claimed that the military efforts of women tend to have no effect on 
their status after the war, and this idea seems to have proved true in many such 
struggles” (Suttner, 2008: 124). 
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While it is certainly true that gains made during conflict are often lost in the post-
liberation period (Waylen, 2003; 2007a, 2007b), reducing the value of the contributions 
made by women performing “stereotypical” or “traditional” roles further reinforced the 
sense that two different concepts of feminism were developing as a result of vastly 
different experiences being played out in disparate contexts. 
 
The concern therefore centers around the conversion of theory to practice, and the 
need to “develop contextually-based strategies and create workable alliances in 
constrained environments” (Standing, 2007: 109; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 131-132). 
This is echoed by Jasanoff (2002: 265) who warns that Northern concepts of gender 
relations critically underestimate the complex environments in which they must operate. 
Without a clear contextual grounding, the socially constructed notions of gender cannot 
be challenged effectively, as each society has entrenched processes of constructing and 
deconstructing social relations (Daly, 2005: 439). In other words, women in developing 
states did not see the utility, practicality or desirability of the ideas being sold by Western 
feminism – it did not have resonance with their daily realities72.  
 
The Cold War had a significant impact on the feminist debate in Africa as the wave of 
Marxist and Socialist ideology swept the continent (Waylen, 1996: 70-71; Heinecken, 
2002: 717). The resulting exposure to liberal ideas from the diaspora created a melting 
pot of ideas that combined Western, Eastern and Developing World experiences and 
ideals. Even within South Africa, the overlapping memberships between the SACP and 
the ANC led to a diffusion of ideas about the ideal society and where women would 
find themselves after liberation. 
 
A single unifying definition of feminism acceptable to developing world women which 
could overcome the “racist and ethnocentric assumptions of mainstream (Western and 
white) feminisms” (Sardenberg, 2007: 51) was thus difficult to come by. This was (and 
                                                 
72 This is most often seen in the growing use of the term “empowerment”, which aims to comprehend 
the underlying social and economic practices that impact upon gender relations (including colonialism 
and development policy) and thereby “[transform] women’s position in national and international 
contexts” (Datte & Kornberg, 2002: 2). However, some analysts contend that empowerment is 
”rooted in the Western culture of individualism and personal achievement” (Datte & Kornberg, 2002: 
3), which is often at odds with the communal credo common to African states and the concept of 
ubuntu, which places the community at the centre as opposed to individuals.  
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still is) partly because of the varying experiences of women arising from class, race, age, 
and ethnic differences, as well as differing views on new national identities. It made the 
formulation of a singular definition of feminism, which did not homogenise women and 
their understandings of their place within society, impossible (Waylen, 1996: 22; 
Mangaliso, 1997: 134; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 131-132; Sardenberg, 2007: 51). 
 
The need to define feminist objectives within the development framework (such as 
welfare, poverty and education), instead of through abstract notions of power and social 
injustice, was a key concern, particularly as those who stood to benefit from the changes 
to the status quo “carry very little clout with those who set the agendas in major policy-
making institutions” (Kabeer, 1999: 435). It was also a more definitive rallying call for 
women’s movements themselves, as the clamour for resources was necessarily focused 
on issues of greatest national need, as well as matters of local concern, such as 
reconciling newly assumed gender roles in the post-conflict states with the continued 
cultural and social subordination (Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 131-132; Heinecken, 2002: 
726). What women did take from the feminist debate (both in the West and from the 
experiences of other developing nations) was that while gender equality would not be 
achieved without national liberation, they would need to operate strategically within the 
Struggle to ensure that their issues remained on the agenda (Bernstein, 1985; Cock, 




Stretching back to pre-colonial times, military conquest has laid at the heart of nation-
building and identity formation within a variety of sub-national factions in South Africa. 
This trend accelerated with the arrival of the colonial powers and the newly formed 
ethnic societies, such as the Afrikaners, who assimilated the militaristic traditions into 
their developing cultures, further entrenching the centrality of organised militancy 
within South African society. 
 
The rise of the NP regime in 1948 represented a key moment in the history of the country 
given the lengths to which it was prepared to go to realise its vision of an ideal society. 
Consequently, the 1950s represented a distinctive shift in the manner in which the 
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ANC, as the dominant opposing force to the NP, articulated and pursued its goals of 
political equality, which in turn affected the way in which women were viewed and 
participated within the organisation and the broader liberation struggle. During the same 
period, a number of catalysts for change occurred, including the influx of influential new 
members, the formation of the Youth League and the Women’s League, as well as the 
influence of regional and international events, such as the rise of communism. The wave 
of independence movements sweeping the continent were also influential, as they 
impacted on the modus operandi of the ANC, and lessons were drawn by the women in 
South Africa that would prove significant in the battle for equality. The impact of the 
NP regime and its policies on the opposition movement further necessitated the shift 
from passive resistance towards a more militant approach, and this fundamentally 
altered the manner in which women participated in the struggle for democracy.  
 
The other “shift” or key moment occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, when the 
imprisonment and exile of the majority of the Struggle leaders necessitated the 
transformation of women’s political, social and economic roles. Women were active 
political participants since the inception of the opposition movement in 1912, albeit 
with varying degrees of autonomy in relation to the liberation organisations such as the 
ANC. While their formal equality would be codified in various documents, including the 
Freedom Charter, their substantive equality would somewhat wax and wane in response 
to the historical events that impacted the broader movement, as well as the political 
support they could garner from the male leadership. When the struggle for national 
equality turned more militant, women grasped the new opportunities for more active 
involvement. This started the process of consolidating their power as political players in 
their own right, making their status within the liberation movement less contingent on 
the vagaries of the leadership, and enabling them to maintain the broader organisation’s 
momentum when the State’s policies began throwing the male leadership into disarray. 
This chapter also illustrated how women utilised their relative power as actors within the 
liberation movement to alter some of the norms and rules within the liberation 
movement by pushing for the recognition of the evolution of women’s political roles, 
thereby impacting on the institutional environment in which they were operating. 
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The events described in this chapter establish the historical legacies of militancy, equality 
and increasing women’s autonomy, which built the momentum of the women’s 
movement towards a decisive key moment: the transitional phase culminating in the first 
democratic elections. These events also demonstrate the importance of timing, and 
particularly the sequences discussed by Pierson (2004: 68), in that the occurrence of 
certain events in the sequence in which they happened had a definite impact on the 
evolution of the women’s movement in South Africa. In particular, the sequence of 
events had consequences for women’s relative power, and their rising autonomy within 
the movement, which affected women’s capacity to instigate change. 
 
Building on this base, women began consciously planning for the post-liberation era, 
determined to heed the experiences of women in other liberation struggles in the 
developing world. First and foremost on the agenda would be securing a place at the 
negotiating table during the transitional phase. This would require careful manoeuvring, 
utilising all the hard-won gains such as the explicit inclusion of gender in various 
proclamations, both local and international, and the broad support base provided by 
their networks and alliances. The expansion of women’s roles, and the political savvy 
gained from keeping the ANC afloat during the tumultuous preceding decades, made it 
a realistic proposition.  
 
The next chapter details the transitional phase to democracy, showing how women 
approached the gendering of inherited state institutions under the new democratic 
regime. The complex layering of inherited state structures with newly established 
institutions presented a new challenge for the women’s movement, and multiple 
strategies would be required in order to infuse the institutional arena with the principles 
(ideas) of equality and diversity espoused by the liberation movement. Understanding 
how this task was undertaken within the general governance structures of the State 
serves as a basis for comparison in the later investigation of the gendering of the 
security structures.  
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4 
 
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: WOMEN 




Throughout the tumultuous history of South Africa, women’s roles in all spheres were 
expanding as a result of the intersecting legacies of equality, increasing women’s 
autonomy and militancy. The broader historical legacy of developing an equality-based 
society facilitated the creation of an active women’s movement, as shown in Chapter 
Three. At each successive key moment in the liberation movement, women acted 
strategically to entrench gender equality gains in the formal structures and instruments 
of the opposition movement. The inclusion of gender within the ANC Constitution and 
the Freedom Charter, the gradual rise of women within the leadership structures of the 
ANC following the Treason Trials, and the influx of women into the underground 
movement following the Soweto Uprisings had the cumulative effect of consolidating 
the gains made by women in the pursuit of equality, and increasing their autonomy. In 
other words, the legacies of equality and autonomy served to increase their relative 
power as political actors within the structures of the ANC liberation movement. As the 
momentum for regime change accelerated, women remained mindful of the experiences 
in other developing states: it was not guaranteed that women’s liberation would follow 
from national liberation.  
 
The transitional period that followed would thus be critical for the women’s movement. 
Chapter Four resumes the timeline of the previous chapter, charting the continuation 
and expansion of the historical legacies of equality, autonomy and militancy that 
contribute to the understanding of how gendered institutional change was effected. What 
means were employed to keep gender on the agenda? How did women seize the 
opportunities created by the negotiation process? What mechanisms for inclusion did 
they utilise or create? An understanding of the bridging period between the ANC as an 
opposition movement and the birth of a political party reveals the means by which 
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women inserted gender claims into the foundation of the new State, creating spaces for 
participation and ensuring their input in the crafting of an equality-based democratic 
society responsive to gender claims on the State.  
 
4.2 The Collapse of Apartheid 
 
The demise of the Soviet Union in 1989 diminished international support for the 
Apartheid regime as Western states began to capitulate to the demands of their local 
constituencies to end their policies of “constructive engagement” that had been pursued 
during the fight against communism (Ramphele, 2008: 32; Hassim, 2009: 453-454). The 
ANC was also forced to re-evaluate its position as it could no longer count on material 
support from its Soviet allies (Stott, 2002; Solomon, 2004: 6; Ramphele, 2008: 31).  
 
As sanctions began being introduced by the international community, the NP regime 
was initially able to stave off some of the impact. For example, large-scale operations 
had been developed to produce petrol from coal and South Africa generated half of the 
electricity used by the continent (Welsh, 2000: 489). The imposition of a mandatory 
arms embargo by the UN in 1977 (Thompson, 2000: 222; Solomon, 2004: 7) prompted 
the expansion of the South African arms industry (including significant exports), and the 
development of at least six nuclear weapons (Welsh, 2000: 489)73. However, these 
efforts were not enough to sustain the flagging economy.  
 
Afrikaner unity was also dissolving with the emergence of a wealthy middle class 
(Thompson, 2000: 223) which started feeling the effect of a rapidly shrinking market 
and increasing isolation from the rest of the world. The economy started to freefall, due 
in part to the lack of a skilled workforce, disruptions in production due to strikes, and 
diminishing markets regionally and internationally as pressure for meaningful reforms 
mounted (Thompson, 2000: 221-228; Anderlini, 2004, 9). The effects of the oil crisis in 
the 1970s were also being felt, as loans were called in and investors withdrew (Welsh, 
2000: 491; Saunders, 2004: 160). 
 
                                                 
73 This would have a significant impact on the South African security sector, as will be discussed in 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. 
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Some reforms aimed at projecting an image of a more moderate regime to both 
international and domestic critics were attempted, although they were not regarded as 
the start of the dismantling of Apartheid. For example, some of the pass laws were 
repealed, as were segregationist policies such as those concerning miscegenation, job 
reservation and wide wage disparities (Thompson, 2000: 226-227; Welsh, 2000: 491; 
Anderlini, 2004, 8). However, these reforms were not considered sufficient74; as Nelson 
Mandela commented “this is a pinprick ... it is not my ambition to marry a White 
women or swim in a White pool. It is political equality we want” (Mandela, 1995: 620).  
 
At Oliver Tambo’s urging, the campaign to “render the country ungovernable” was 
stepped up, prompting the State to impose another State of Emergency in 198675 
(Mandela, 1995: 630-631). This unrest was initially limited to non-White areas; however, 
building on the momentum of the Soweto Uprisings and the rolling strikes by the trade 
unions76, resistance towards the Apartheid regime intensified77, drawing participants 
from across the racial and economic spectrum (Thompson, 2000: 228). Exogenous 
influences such as the end of the Cold War and the imposition of sanctions were thus 
impacting on the strategies of both the Apartheid state and the liberation movement.  
 
4.3 United Democratic Front – Cooperation and Coordination  
 
The upsurge of defiance campaigns necessitated coordination and, as a result, the 
importance of the ANC in exile increased dramatically following the Rivonia Treason 
Trials and the banning of the party in South Africa, as described in Chapter Three. 
Diversifying from fund-raising and organising military training for cadres, the 
administration of the entire organisation was now under the purview of the exile 
                                                 
74  For example, while Black education funding increased, the State was “still spending more than seven 
times as much to educate a White child as to educate an African child” (Thompson, 2000: 227). 
75  The State of Emergency would extend throughout 1987 and 1988 as the violence continued unabated 
from both sides of the ideological divide (Mandela, 1995: 644). 
76  By 1986 the two national union federations, COSATU and the Council of Unions of South Africa-
Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (CUSA-AZACTU), had a membership exceeding a million 
workers. Both union federations were politically militant and represented a “central force in the 
struggle for power in South Africa” (Thompson, 2000: 225). 
77  In 1985 alone, there were school and bus boycotts, 146 insurgency attacks, 390 strikes (by more than 
240 000 workers), and a recorded political violence death toll of 879 (Thompson, 2000: 229). A 
nationwide hunger strike by political detainees resulted in the release of more than 900 political 
prisoners (Mandela, 1995: 655). 
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movement. Mandela (1995: 521) notes that the “external Mission not only had to create 
an organisation in exile, but had the even more formidable task of trying to revitalise the 
underground ANC inside South Africa”. There was continued tension between the 
movement in exile and the party members remaining in South Africa regarding the 
direction that the Struggle should take. This division arose primarily due to conflicting 
ideas about the continuance of the armed movement and the prudency of engaging in 
talks with the State.  
 
The acts of sabotage carried out by MK were thought to be striking a blow to the State, 
and making it more likely that they would engage in talks for a democratic dispensation. 
MK remained focused on strategic targets, such as the 1982 explosions at the Koeberg 
nuclear power plant and the detonation of a car bomb at the Pretoria based air force 
and military intelligence office in 1983 (Mandela, 1995: 617). The State retaliated with a 
strike against ANC members in Lesotho where 42 people were killed, including women 
and children (Mandela, 1995: 617).  
 
Mandela (1995: 702) argued that while MK was no longer particularly active during the 
late 1980s, “the aura of the armed struggle had great meaning for many people. Even 
when cited merely as a rhetorical device, the armed struggle was a sign that we were 
actively fighting the enemy. As a result, it had a popularity out of proportion to what it 
had achieved on the ground”.78 The continuation of the armed movement, even if it was 
in name only, was thus vital in terms of morale. However, the campaign to render the 
country ungovernable was reaping better results and drawing more participants as its 
effectiveness became apparent.  
 
There were three main schools of thought within the ANC at this time: one which 
supported the escalation of the armed conflict to bring about a revolution (which 
represented a minority), one which saw the armed movement as a means to force talks 
and a negotiated settlement (which had the majority support), and the third which 
advocated initiating peace talks with the State. 
                                                 
78 The activities of the armed movement in general, and MK in particular, were a sticking point once 
“talks about talks” began, as the State wanted the ANC to renounce the armed struggle before 
negotiations could start, while the ANC maintained that it was a defensive strategy against State 
violence, particularly the ‘third force’ activities described later in this chapter. 
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Irrespective of the differences in opinion regarding the course of the Struggle, both 
factions of the ANC, internal and external, recognised the need to increase the 
coordination and cooperation between the various liberation parties and movements in 
order to be effective.  
 
This resulted in the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983. The 
UDF united over 600 organisations ranging from trade unions to community groups, 
women’s organisations to sporting bodies, with the aim of providing co-ordination for 
the mass protests aimed at overthrowing the Apartheid regime (Seekings, 1991: 93-94; 
2000: 29; Mandela, 1995: 618; Geisler, 2000; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 135-136; 
Thompson, 2000: 228; Welsh, 2000: 487; Hassim, 2003a: 48; Anderlini, 2004, 8; 
Govender, 2007: 79). The overarching purpose was to “create a united and democratic 
South Africa”, based on the principles of the Freedom Charter which emphasised 
equality in all spheres (Thompson, 2000: 228-229; Seekings, 1991: 94; Hassim, 2003a: 
48). The formation of an alliance with COSATU in 1989 under the banner of the Mass 
Democratic Movement (MDM) ensured that the subsequent boycotts and defiance 
campaigns mobilised a significant swathe of the population (Mandela, 1995: 655; 
Seekings, 2000: 228). 
 
The UDF’s primary function was to bring about democratic change, although some of 
the organisations affiliated with the movement also saw their involvement as an 
opportunity to further related goals, by virtue of their participation. Pregs Govender, an 
activist who would later serve in the first democratic Parliament, noted that women 
were able to demonstrate their strategic organising power on equal footing with many 
other parties and organisations, and further raised the profile of debates around 
women’s equality (Baden et al, 1998: 8; Geisler, 2000; Hassim, 2003a: 48; Govender, 
2007: 80). The UDF provided another space for action: women’s activist groups saw the 
coalition as a means to both fight for national liberation and further broader gender 
transformation goals, an assessment shared by Geisler (2002: 610). 
 
The formidable leadership of the various women’s organisations became more 
prominent. This was partly due to the emphasis on grassroots power structures (Hassim, 
2003a: 48), which had the effect of highlighting the existing power of women built over 
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the preceding years of gradually increasing autonomy, and which “catapulted women 
into public view as political actors” (Hassim, 2003a: 50; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 135-
136). Hassim & Gouws, (2000: 135-136) comment that the women’s organisation 
affiliated with the UDF “articulated linkages between women’s issues and national 
issues”, further pushing gender onto the national liberation agenda.  
 
While the advances made would not overturn assumptions overnight or recast 
stereotypes altogether, it strengthened the campaign for equality as the women’s 
capacity for mass mobilisation was demonstrated time and time again, particularly in the 
formation of the Women’s National Coalition (WNC) in 1992.  
 
Both the UDF and the WNC were important structures in terms of forging new 
alliances between women’s groups, and between women’s groups and other 
organisations – relationships that would prove useful in the new democratic era. 
Another influential alliance structure active at this time was the End Conscription 
Campaign (ECC). Formed in 1984, the ECC was a national coalition of 52 member 
organisations comprised predominantly of white women (Nathan, 1989: 308; Rauch, 
1994; Anderlini, 2004, 8). The aim of the ECC was to protest the “increasing 
militarisation of South African society, and the role the South African military was 
playing in the front-line states and in the townships” by raising awareness and agitating 
for the withdrawal of compulsory conscription (Rauch, 1994; Nathan, 1989). The ECC 
argued that “conscription intensifies violent conflict in society and, in effect, denied 
South Africans their basic human rights” (Anderlini, 2004, 8), showing some points of 
commonality with another influential white-based women’s organisation: Black Sash.  
 
The campaign identified strongly with imagery of motherhood in order to garner 
support, particularly amongst white middle class women (Anderlini, 2004, 8), in a similar 
manner to the ANC, as described in Chapter Three. Nathan (1989) and Anderlini (2004: 
9) argue that the ECC “was the first step towards political and gender consciousness for 
many white women; for the first time, many were becoming aware of the depth of 
patriarchy in their society ... especially in the political and security domains. In 
challenging conscription, they were questioning the militaristic values of the government 
as well as the idea of white male supremacy at the roots of the Apartheid state. This 
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increased consciousness and direct engagement with military matters proved essential to 
women’s ability to engage in the subsequent debate on national security”. The ECC also 
served a similar political educational purpose for white women that MK political 
training did for black women: it stimulated debate and prompted action against a 
gargantuan system that had an impact on every aspect of women’s lives. Most 
importantly, it furthered the experiences of women in building effective coalitions that 
expanded the support base for the liberation movement, raising the profile of women 
leaders, and consolidating gains made in terms of women working as political actors in 
the public arena. 
 
Hassim and Gouws (2000), Geisler (2000), Seidman (2001), and Britton (2002) expand 
on the crucial role played by these and other coalitions forged by women, not only for 
the impact they had during the liberation struggle but also for the critical role which 
these alliances played in the transitional period to democracy. These experiences in 
coalition-building would continue to be utilised to great effect during the transition and 
in the new democratic dispensation, as will be demonstrated in forthcoming chapters. 
 
One of the key factors strengthening the mass alliance of the UDF was inclusivity based 
on broad equality, which cut across gender, race, ethnicity and religion. The emphasis 
on the application of the principles outlined within the Freedom Charter was indicative 
of the underlying resolve of a variety of political and civic organisations to create a new 
South Africa in which all South Africans would be equal participants. This 
determination would emerge repeatedly during the transition process, with the result 
that a diversity of citizens would be empowered to participate in the (re)construction of 
the State. As Seekings (1991, 2000) and Hassim  and Gouws (2000: 135-136) argue, the 
significance of the UDF did not revolve primarily around the campaigns launched by 
the organisation and its affiliates, but rather in its role as a unifying umbrella structure 
bringing together various groups and movements that were striving for similar goals. It 
served to highlight the potential power of such co-ordinated action, proving that broad-
based participation in the construction of a new political reality was both possible and 
effective.   
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Tying in with this emphasis on diversity and participation was the incorporation of 
gender as a key value of the broader vision for a democratic South Africa by a national 
network of powerful organisations (Geisler, 2000; Seidman, 2001; Hassim, 2003a: 64-
64). While the UDF as a structure would not increase the number of women in 
leadership positions within the national liberation movement, it “hinted at the political 
possibilities that might exist when women’s political roles were central to the survival of 
broader national politics” (Hassim, 2003a: 64). Thus the active involvement of women 
in the actions undertaken by the UDF served to not only advance the goals of the 
liberation movement and the women’s movement in South Africa, but also aided the 
slow process of transforming political norms regarding the roles of women as political 
actors. 
 
The commitment to unify citizens across racial and ethnic grounds promoted by the 
UDF was, however, not universal. The State continued instigating and exacerbating 
existing animosities between rivals in order to fragment the growing unity of purpose 
amongst the liberation movements, and to strengthen its own position within the 
negotiations that would inevitably be taking place.  
 
4.4 Township Violence and the ‘Third Force’ 
 
The 1980s and 1990s were characterised by the united efforts of political movements to 
bring about change through coordinated mass action. This spirit of camaraderie was not 
evident in the townships of South Africa, where savage violence was becoming the 
norm. In part, this was explained by the actions of rival criminal gangs, with very loose 
associations with the political struggle, taking advantage of the lack of law and order to 
wage turf wars (Thompson, 2000; Marinovich & Silva, 2000). At the same time, it was 
becoming apparent that not only were the State forces not quelling the violence, they 
were instigating and fomenting it. 
 
The opportunity for State security agents to agitate an already volatile situation was 
presented in the form of existing animosities within the townships. The deepest 
divisions ran between Xhosa residents and Zulu migrants in the townships of 
Johannesburg, and the particularly intense hostility between IFP- and ANC-supporting 
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Zulus (Welsh, 2000: 508-509; Marinovich & Silva, 2000: 15; Harris, 2010: 11). While the 
ANC was multi-ethnic in membership, there was a perception that the leadership was 
dominated by Xhosas. The IFP had explicitly branded itself as the Zulu Party. Secret 
State security agents, dubbed the ‘Third Force’, would clandestinely support IFP armed 
gangs, providing arms and assistance during raids and attacks (Mandela, 1995: 703; 
Thompson, 2000: 229; Welsh, 2000: 509; Harris, 2010: 11). 
 
From the State’s point of view, the ongoing violence provoked by the ‘Third Force’ 
would disrupt the negotiations, extending the tenure of the NP, and could be covered 
up as “black on black violence” (Baden et al, 1998: 7; Marinovich and Silva, 2000: 14; 
Welsh, 2000: 509; Thompson, 2000: 249). The IFP feared that a negotiated settlement 
would result in the loss of the partial autonomy of the KwaZulu homeland, which 
would then become part of the unified South Africa led by the ANC (Marinovich & 
Silva, 2000: 15). The IFP thus accepted the military training and arms offered by the 
State. Marinovich and Silva (2000: 14) recount the “sustained campaign of brutal killings 
and terror, covertly planned, funded and executed by government security units and the 
police”, citing examples where “policemen and soldiers assassinated political figures, 
community leaders and also hired gangs to spread terror in the townships”. 
 
A clear illustration of the complicity between the State and the IFP in the township 
violence occurred in July 1990, when the ANC was tipped off about a planned IFP 
attack on ANC members living in the Sebokeng township near Johannesburg. The 
Minister of Law and Order, the Police Commissioner and various other officials were 
informed and asked to intervene. Instead, police escorted the busloads of armed IFP 
supporters into the township and more than thirty people were massacred (Mandela, 
1995: 704). Nelson Mandela reported that “the police and defence force were 
destabilising the area. I was told of the police confiscating weapons one day in one area, 
and then Inkatha [IFP] forces attacking our people with those stolen weapons the next 
day. We heard stories of the police escorting Inkatha members to ... their attacks” 
(Mandela, 1995: 703)79. In the Natal stronghold of the IFP, there were unrelenting 
                                                 
79 By July of 1991, sufficient evidence had come to light confirming the financial and material support of 
the government to the IFP in the township massacres, becoming known as ‘Inkathagate’ (Welsh, 2000: 
509). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1998) would amass further evidence detailing the 
participation of the State in these ‘Third Force’ activities (TRC, 2003). 
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violent altercations between ANC and Inkatha supporters where villages were razed to 
the ground and hundreds injured: 230 people died in March of 1990 alone, and the 
countrywide political death toll would exceed 1,500 in that year (Mandela, 1995: 689-
701).  
 
While women were routinely victims of the township violence, some were also active 
participants in the atrocities (Baden et al, 1998: 7), particularly in the vigilante justice that 
was meted out to suspected informers. Given the brutality with which police raids were 
carried out, being a traitor was the most serious charge that could be levelled at a 
township resident. The preferred punishment was “necklacing”, where a tyre filled with 
petrol would be placed around the informer’s neck and set alight (Welsh, 2000: 487; 
Marinovich & Silva, 2000: 48-49). One the most respected figures within the ANC, 
Winnie Mandela, dubbed the “Mother of the Nation”, endorsed the use of this penalty. 
At a speech in Munsieville in 1986 she proclaimed that "we shall liberate this country 
[with] our boxes of matches and our necklaces" (Beresford, 1989). Winnie Mandela later 
received a six-year prison sentence80 for the infamous kidnapping and assault of four 
youths, one of whom died of multiple stab wounds at the hands of her “bodyguards”: a 
gang known as the Mandela United Football Club (Beresford, 1989; Wren, 1989; 
Mandela, 1995: 710-711; Thompson, 2000: 251).  
 
While Winnie Mandela’s actions were not the norm, township women reacted with 
increasing violence to the brutality they faced in their communities each day. The 
expansion of these women’s roles within the informal security arena of the liberation 
struggle could be cast as an instinctive response for survival in what increasingly 
resembled a civil war in pockets of South Africa. It is also one of the many motivations 
through which women’s combative participation in the formal armed movement can be 
understood. 
 
                                                 
80 On appeal, this was reduced to a fine and a two-year suspended sentence. 
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4.5 Run Up to the Negotiations: Talks about Talks 
 
The rapidly deteriorating situation within South Africa led to the realisation by both the 
State and the senior leadership of the ANC that a negotiated settlement would be the 
only way to quell the violence and begin repairing the economy. Overtures began 
between Nelson Mandela (who was still incarcerated) and a few key figures within the 
State in a slow process of mostly informal meetings that stretched from 1987 to 1989 
(Mandela, 1995: 636-660; Welsh, 2000: 495).  
 
The ANC stipulated a number of demands before negotiations could take place, 
including unbanning restricted organisations and persons, releasing political prisoners, 
lifting the State of Emergency and withdrawing SADF troops from the townships 
(Mandela, 1995: 660-663). Mandela (1995: 663) “stressed that a mutually agreed-upon 
ceasefire to end hostilities ought to be the first order of business, for without that, no 
business could be conducted”. Mandela (1995: 663) further argued that the demands 
“put the onus on the government to eliminate the obstacles to negotiations that the 
State itself had created”. 
 
By the 1990 opening of Parliament, the newly elected President F.W. de Klerk 
demonstrated that a new era had begun. Sweeping changes were announced, and the 
dismantling of the Apartheid system appeared to have started. Bans were lifted on all 
“illegal” organisations (including the ANC, PAC, and Communist Party), political 
prisoners would be released, the death penalty was suspended, and a number of 
restrictions put in place under the State of Emergency were removed81 (Mandela, 1995: 
666; Welsh, 2000: 499; Waylen, 2007b: 77). 
 
Once the “talks about talks” were formally underway in 1990, there were high hopes 
that the parties could reach consensus on the form the negotiation process would take. 
The first scheduled meeting was to take place in April, but at the end of March police 
fired live ammunition at a fleeing crowd of unarmed demonstrators in the Sebokeng 
                                                 
81  The State of Emergency continued and troops were not withdrawn from the townships (Mandela, 
1995: 666). 
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township outside Johannesburg, killing twelve and leaving hundreds injured (Mandela, 
1995: 691; Thompson, 2000: 248).  
 
Talks were resumed in May 1990, resulting in the Groote Schuur Minute. The ANC 
delegation, headed by Nelson Mandela, consisted of Walter Sisulu, Joe Slovo, Alfred 
Nzo, Thabo Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, Joe Modise, Ruth Mompati, Archie Gumede, 
Reverend Beyers Naude, and Cheryl Carolus. The female delegates were powerful 
players both within the ANC and within the wider liberation movement. In the Groote 
Schuur Minute, both sides undertook to ensure a peaceful negotiation process once the 
State of Emergency was lifted (Mandela, 1995: 694; Welsh, 2000: 508). It was also 
proposed that an interim government drawn from multiple parties be instated as the 
“government could not be both player and referee” (Mandela, 1995: 694).  
 
The subsequent Pretoria Minute acknowledged the cessation of armed action, set dates 
for the release of political prisoners and called on the government to overhaul the 
Internal Security Act (Mandela, 1995: 702). However, violence in the townships 
increased during this time amid reports of “third force” activities and, after calls for the 
State to dismantle the secret “counter-insurgency” units, talks were suspended again in 
May 1991.82 
 
In July 1991, Nelson Mandela was elected as ANC President at the annual Conference, 
with popular unionist Cyril Ramaphosa serving as secretary-general (Mandela, 1995: 
709). Key among the concerns voiced at this time was the transformation of the ANC 
from an “illegal” resistance movement to a legitimate political party, and the merging of 
returning exiles with members and affiliated organisations that had remained active 
within South Africa (Mandela, 1995: 709-710).  
 
                                                 
82 The Institute for Race Relations estimates that in 1990 there were 3,699 political killings; similar figures 
are reported for 1992 through to 1994 (Thompson, 2000: 248). The majority of these occurred in the 
townships. From the Soweto Uprisings in 1976 until the elections in 1994, an estimated 30,000 people 
died in political violence, which Ramphele (2008: 39) describes as a “struggle that had all the hallmarks 
of a civil war”. 
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4.6 Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) 
 
Formal negotiations finally commenced in December 1991. The Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) brought together eighteen delegations 
representing a wide spectrum of political, ethnic, racial, religious and ideological groups, 
and was observed by representatives from the United Nations (UN), Commonwealth, 
European Union (EU) and Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (Mandela, 1995: 712; 
Thompson, 2000: 252; Harris, 2010: 13). Both the PAC and the IFP elected to boycott 
CODESA83.  
 
An exceptional characteristic of the CODESA negotiations was that 
“unlike the negotiations preceding new dispensations in African states like 
Zimbabwe and Angola, which required outside mediators, we in South Africa were 
settling our differences among ourselves” (Mandela, 1995: 713). 
 
The government finally committed to a “power-sharing” transitional governance 
structure (Mandela, 1995: 713). A Declaration of Intent, signed by all political parties, 
outlined the vision for the new South Africa. This vision included enshrining multi-party 
democracy predicated on universal suffrage, an independent judiciary upholding 
constitutionally protected equal rights, and a new bill of rights (Mandela, 1995: 713-714; 
Thompson, 2000: 252). Five working groups would convene in preparation for the 
second round of CODESA in 1992, with the purpose of reaching agreement on issues 
such as the constitutional principles upon which the new State would be based, the form 
of the interim government, and the restructuring of various State entities (Mandela, 
1995: 714). A referendum of the White population in April of 1992 revealed that 69% of 
Whites supported the negotiations for a new Constitution based on non-racialism 
(Mandela, 1995: 717; Welsh, 2000: 511; Thompson, 2000: 254), further driving the 
process forward. 
 
A few days prior to the start of CODESA 2 in May 1992, two revelations of 
government misconduct became public. The first was the uncovering of widespread 
corruption within the Department of Development Aid, which administered the funds 
                                                 
83  The PAC had negligible national support at this stage, while the IFP was still committed to the idea of 
a federal system that would preserve Zulu autonomy in Natal (Mandela, 1995: 713; Welsh, 2000: 505; 
Harris, 2010: 13). 
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for the homelands (Mandela, 1995: 721). The second was further corroboration of 
“Inkathagate” activities (discussed previously), in which evidence was revealed of State 
involvement in the death of four UDF members, including activist Matthew Goniwe 
(Mandela, 1995: 721; Welsh, 2000: 511). Mandela (1995: 721) commented that these 
events “undermined the credibility of the government and strengthened our hand”, 
placing the ANC in a better position to direct the negotiations towards a more equitable 
solution. 
 
The CODESA 2 mandate was for the multi-party transitional council to create the 
interim Constitution, in preparation for the general elections which would elect the 
constituent assembly and the legislature, drawn from both national and regional lists 
(Mandela, 1995: 721-722). However, the talks were deadlocked over the minority veto 
powers that the government was trying to build into the system in a variety of ways 
(Mandela, 1995: 723). Before a way out of the impasse could be found, the IFP 
launched an armed raid on the township of Boipatong on the evening of 17 June 1992, 
killing 46 people, mostly women and children. It was the fourth attack on ANC 
supporters in one week, and reports of government complicity gained further credence 
when no arrests were made and no investigation initiated (Mandela, 1995: 724; Welsh, 
2000: 512; Thompson, 2000: 254).  
 
Withdrawing from the negotiations, the ANC embarked on another mass action 
campaign to demonstrate its support within the country, including a march of 100,000 
protestors to the Union Buildings in Pretoria84. A march on Bisho, in the Ciskei 
homeland, ended in bloodshed when the police fired on the crowd, killing 29 and 
injuring more than 200 (Mandela, 1995: 725-726; Welsh, 2000: 512). It was clear that 
only by re-opening negotiations would the violence ever cease, and in September of 
1992 a Record of Understanding was reached wherein the terms of CODESA 2, 
described above, were finally agreed upon (Mandela, 1995: 726; Thompson, 2000: 255).  
 
Further, following an initiative by Joe Slovo, a Government of National Unity would be 
formed for a period of five years. This would amount to a form of power sharing in 
order to keep the bureaucracy functioning during and immediately after the transition. 
                                                 
84 The seat of Government. 
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In effect, civil servants would remain in place, the National Party would participate in 
the governance of the State (provided it attained enough votes in the general election), 
and security officers would be given amnesty (Mandela, 1995: 727; Welsh, 2000: 514; 
Thompson, 2000: 257). The Record of Understanding further established the basis of 
the proportional representation system that would enable any party gaining at least 5% 
of the vote in the general election to have a voice in the new multi-party cabinet 
(Mandela, 1995: 727). 
 
This was a significant breakthrough and set the scene for the first general elections to be 
held. The fragile peace was soon broken by the assassination of the enormously popular 
communist leader Chris Hani85 by a member of the ultra-militant Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)86 in April 1993 (Mandela, 1995: 729; Thompson, 2000: 
255). Impassioned pleas by the ANC leadership managed to divert the violence 
threatened by the youths of the ANC and SACP, who viewed Hani as a martyr to be 
avenged. A key moment during this period of upheaval was the announcement of the 
first democratic elections, to be held one year later on 27 April 1994, easing tensions 
considerably. 
 
4.7 The First Democratic Elections 
 
In the intervening period, the Multi-party Negotiation Forum (MPNF) was convened as 
the successor to CODESA 2. An interim Constitution was drafted, which established a 
bicameral Parliament consisting of a national assembly of 400 members, following a 
system of proportional representation drawn from national and regional party lists. 
Regional legislatures would indirectly elect the senate (Mandela, 1995: 733; Thompson, 
2000: 257-258). 
 
As voter education drives and electioneering began, potential electoral spoilers emerged. 
The IFP refused to register for the elections, and thousands of its supporters marched 
on the ANC headquarters, Shell House in Johannesburg, causing the deaths of 53 
                                                 
85  Hani was a widely respected leader within the Communist Party, as well as the ANC, who had played a 
key role within MK, serving as its Chief of Staff at one stage (Mandela, 1995: 729). 
86 The AWB (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) later tried to disrupt the talks again by driving an 
armoured vehicle into the negotiation venue (Thompson, 2000: 256). 
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people. The White right-wing continued demands for a homeland of their own, and also 
refused to register (Mandela, 1995: 738-739; Welsh, 2000: 513; Thompson, 2000: 259; 
Harris, 2010: 153-155). Eventually both parties were brought on board in time to 
participate, alleviating some of the tension.87 
 
Given the turmoil in the run-up to the election, the four days allocated to voting (26-29 
April 1994) were surprisingly free of serious violence. An estimated 86% of the 
electorate, nearly twenty million people, participated in the landmark elections 
(Thompson, 2000: 263). The ANC won the majority of votes in seven of the nine 
provinces, with the IFP sweeping KwaZulu Natal and the NP winning the Western 
Cape (largely due to the Coloured vote which was based on shared language and 
religion) (Mandela, 1995: 743; Thompson, 2000: 264). Nationally, the ANC stood at 
62.6% of the popular vote (252 seats), followed by the NP at 20.39% (82 seats) and the 
IFP at 10.54% (43 seats). As part of the sunset clauses negotiated by Joe Slovo, former 
President F.W. de Klerk became Second Deputy President, while Thabo Mbeki served 
as First Deputy to President Nelson Mandela (Mandela, 1995: 743; Thompson, 2000: 
264; Anderlini, 2004, 13). The NP would have 5 seats in Mandela’s new Cabinet, and the 
IFP would have 3. 
 
Mandela (1995: 173) noted that he was “relieved” that the ANC did not get a two thirds 
majority because if they “had been able to write a Constitution unfettered by input from 
others, people would argue that we had created an ANC Constitution, not a South 
African Constitution. I wanted a true government of national unity”. This comment 
once again reflected the determination of the ANC to forge an inclusive regime of 
governance in which all the diverse sectors of South African society would have a voice; 
a commitment that would be echoed in the Constitution drawn up through widespread 
consultation. The Constitution of South Africa would entrench the principles of equality 
and inclusivity, which not only formed the basis of the new democratic regime but 
created unprecedented opportunities for the expansion and consolidation of women’s 
descriptive and substantive representation.  
                                                 
87  Another spoiler who attempted to disrupt the process was the Azanian People’s Liberation Army 
(APLA), who killed 12 worshippers and injured 56 during an attack on St James’ Church in Cape 
Town in July 1993 (Welsh, 2000: 514). The AWB also planted numerous bombs in the run up to the 
election (Harris, 2010). The PAC did participate in the 1994 elections. 
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4.8 Women and the Transition: The WNC 
 
 “the nature of the transition from non-democratic rule – it’s timing, whether it is a 
slow or quick, pacted or unpacted one and its openness to gender claims – is 
another important factor. Do different paths offer women actors different 
opportunities?” (Waylen, 2007b: 40). 
 
The transition to democracy represented an opening, with a specific time frame, in 
which to instigate meaningful gender change. The capacity to seize this opportunity for 
the entrenchment of gender equality within the new democratic state was built over the 
course of the armed liberation movement (as described in Chapter Three) and 
strengthened during the transitional period as will be discussed in the next section. In 
particular, the power vested in women by their broad support base at the grassroots 
level and their solidarity with the party leadership, would play an integral part in securing 
their place at the negotiating table and enable them to influence the (re)construction of 
the institutional structures of South Africa. The formation of the Women’s National 
Coalition (WNC) was central to this process, which demonstrated the influence of 
women’s strategic organising facilitated by the legacies of equality and increasing 
autonomy throughout the liberation struggle. 
 
Although there were sharp divisions between the various women’s movements, and 
within the ANCWL itself (as examined previously), the need for united action was 
apparent. The Malibongwe Conference (held in Amsterdam in 1992) allowed, for the 
first time, for robust debate between activists, academics, and exiled women (Meintjes, 
1996: 47-48; Baden et al, 1998: 8-9; Geisler, 2000: 611; Anderlini, 2004, 9; Waylen, 
2007a: 529). The two key conclusions drawn during the conference were that women’s 
liberation and national liberation were inseparable, and that it was imperative for women 
to have meaningful representation at the forthcoming negotiation forums. 
 
In 1992, the women of the ANC initiated the broadest alliance of women’s 
organisations in the history of the country. Gathering under the banner of the Women’s 
National Coalition (WNC) were women from political parties including the PAC, NP 
and the Communist Party, as well as a range of liberal and conservative organisations, 
representing both rural and urban women from every racial, religious and ethnic group 
(Meintjes, 1996: 47, 49, 59; 2005: 231; Baden et al, 1998: 8; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 137; 
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Geisler, 2000: 613; Britton, 2002; Hassim, 2003b: 505; Govender, 2007: 125; Waylen, 
2007b: 77). The 90 organisations and 13 regional coalitions that constituted the WNC 
operated independently as a movement with two goals: to establish a unified national 
women’s movement, and to participate in the political process of engineering the new 
State (Meintjes, 1996: 47, 59; Geisler, 2000: 610; Albertyn, 2003: 101; Anderlini, 2004, 9; 
Waylen, 2007b: 77). 
 
Gender equality had been placed on the agenda as part and parcel of the opposition 
demands for the new democratic regime (Seidman, 2001; Anderlini, 2004; Waylen, 
2007b: 77), although the convener of the WNC, Frene Ginwala, who would later 
become the first Speaker of Parliament, pronounced 
“Our experience has been that the more powerful the committee, the fewer the 
women ... They will talk of non-sexism, they will not practice it. The air around us is 
thick with talk of change, of the end of racism and Apartheid, of a new era of 
democracy. Is the change we are all talking about going to mean simply adding 
some black where white men sat before?” (quoted by Govender, 2007: 126). 
 
It was therefore imperative that women remained focused on not only keeping gender 
equality on the agenda, but also pushing for its operationalisation. In this way, gender 
rights could be entrenched from the inception of the negotiation process, consolidating 
the gains made over the decades of the Struggle, and ensuring that women would be 
equal participants in the new regime emerging from the MPNF. 
 
Given that negotiations with the State for a new democratic society had already begun, 
women were galvanised into action to ensure their voices were heard and that the 
process of Constitution-building included their point of view (Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 
138; Britton, 2002; Albertyn, 2003; Hassim, 2003b: 505, 508; Anderlini, 2004, 10; 
Meintjes, 2005: 232; Waylen, 2007b: 77). To this end, the coalition launched the 
Women’s Charter, under the leadership of Pregs Govender, to articulate their goals and 
generate publicity for their issues (WNC, 1994; Meintjes, 1996: 60-61; 2005: 231-232; 
Geisler, 2000: 613; Govender, 2007: 126-130).  
 
The Women’s Charter recognised the political, economic and social ramifications of 
excluding women from the development of South Africa, noting women’s “invaluable 
contributions to society despite widespread gender discrimination” (WNC, 1994). 
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Asserting the need for “shared responsibilities and decision-making in all areas of public 
and private life”, the Women’s Charter explicitly laid out its mandate: 
“Democracy and human rights, if they are to be meaningful to women, must 
address out historic subordination and oppression. For women to be able to 
participate in, and shape the nature and form of our democracy, the concepts of 
both human rights and democracy must be redefined and interpreted in ways which 
encompass women’s diverse experiences. We require society to be reorganised, and 
its institutions to be restructured to take cognisance of all women. In particular, 
women should have full opportunity and access to leadership positions and 
decision-making at all levels and in all sectors of society” (WNC, 1994). 
 
The reasoning behind this unifying Charter was that “unless women at the negotiating 
table were backed by a strong women’s movement, they would not be taken seriously. 
They would be powerless to make the changes women needed in South Africa’s new 
Constitution” (Govender, 2007: 126; Albertyn, 2003: 99-101; Hassim, 2003b: 508; 
Anderlini, 2004, 10; Waylen, 2007b: 77-78). The results were heartening: at the next 
round of negotiations, the Multi-Party Negotiation Forum (MPNF), women represented 
50% of the official delegates, with all participating organisations undertaking to include 
at least one female delegate on technical committees (Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 124; 
Britton, 2002; Albertyn, 2003: 101; Anderlini, 2004, 11).  
 
Gender equality was reaffirmed as a core constitutional principle. Most notably, the 
constitutional gender clause would supersede the authority of customary law, which was 
also part of the new Constitution, in order to foster unity with traditional leaders 
(Geisler, 2000: 614; Albertyn, 2003: 101; Meintjes, 2005: 232; Waylen, 2007b: 78). This 
constituted a significant achievement because in many African liberation movements 
women had been excluded from formal and informal negotiations, particularly high-
profile events (Sorenson, 1998: iv; Walsh, 2006: 85). This exclusion would invariably 
result “in a lack of direct influence on the identification of reconstruction priorities that 
are usually part of a peace agreement” (Sorenson, 1998: iv).  
 
The cumulative effect of the increasing autonomy and relative power of the South 
African women’s movement therefore enabled women to participate in the transitional 
process to a greater degree, or, as Hassim and Gouws (2000: 139) put it: “the broader 
context of transition provided a framework within which an articulate women’s 
movement could make certain gains”. 
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However, the WNC did not expect vague “notions of sisterhood ... to sustain us” 
(Govender, 2007: 127; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 139-141): the women affiliated within 
the WNC were all working towards the twin goals of national liberation and gender 
equality, and had established their own networks, target issues and activities. These were 
not subsumed by their membership of the WNC. Instead, Pregs Govender pitched the 
coalition as a catalyst for change:  
“Women had to start from this reality, recognise their own power and raise the 
debate in the country by putting women’s issues on the agenda in all political 
parties, in trade unions, in sport, media, the law and education. It was up to each 
one of us individually and collectively to do this, and to make each other aware of 
what we could achieve when we came together. As women took action in different 
parts of the country, these experiences would build the campaign nationally. And so 
my mantra became: ‘Use the coalition campaign as a catalyst to build women’s 
power. Don’t expect power to come from up above, like manna from heaven’” 
(Govender, 2007: 127). 
 
The combined effort of women politicians, activists, feminists and academics provided a 
strategic advantage which was effectively wielded at a critical moment in South African 
history (Meintjes, 1996; Anderlini, 2004; Waylen, 2007b: 78). The power of the WNC 
during the transitional period was largely due to its ability to draw participants and 
partners from most active political parties and movements, widening its constituency 
and empowering women to push their organisational leadership for change (Baden et al, 
1998: 24; Britton, 2002; Albertyn, 2003: 101; Anderlini, 2004).  
 
The manner in which women organised as women, and used their political power to 
affect institutional change (in terms of shaping the new institutional environment), was 
critical as it created spaces for future participation. Meintjes (1996: 59) and Britton 
(2002: 39) comment on the extraordinary unity of purpose demonstrated by the WNC, 
given the diversity of the alliance’s membership: a testament to the expanding 
experiences of women actors in the art of coalition building. Hassim and Gouws (2000: 
143-144) assert that the “successes of the [WNC] have also opened up the discursive 
space for feminism to be debated in new ways. The demands for participation, 
representation and for changing gender power relations have become an acceptable part 
of the discourse of women’s organisations”.  
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The manner in which the WNC navigated the diversity of member’s interests was also 
central to its success, according to Meintjes (1996: 59) who opines that the broad 
spectrum of ideological and political views encompassed by the WNC membership was 
testament to the ability of the WNC to move “away from the essentialism which had 
dogged feminist initiatives elsewhere in the world”. Most importantly, “the arguments 
adopted by the [WNC] during the negotiations process emphasised the need to recognise 
and include women in the public sphere; the substance of the debate was how they should 
be included” (Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 146; Anderlini, 2004). 
 
While acknowledging the impact of increasing the representation of women in the 
negotiation talks (and thereby having an input into the formation of the new State), 
further steps had to be taken to ensure that rhetoric could be transformed into action 
after the transition period. Key to this goal would be the formalisation of gender 
equality into the founding documents of the new South Africa, particularly in the 
Constitution. The participation of women in the transitional negotiations therefore 
represented a key moment in the paths of women’s autonomy and equality: a moment in 
time during which organised women had the means to utilise the power amassed to 
create openings for future action, and thereby set the groundwork for the sustainable 
participation of women within the incoming democratic regime. 
 
4.9 A New Constitution: Formalising Gender Claims 
 
The importance of a robust legal framework within which gender claims can be 
substantiated has been demonstrated through the gains achieved as a result of 
documents such as the Beijing Declaration and the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Rai, 2004: 590; Subrahmanian, 2007: 112; 
Woodford-Berger, 2007: 124; Batliwala & Dhanraj, 2007: 27). As Sorenson points out:  
“For women, constitution-making is of uttermost importance, as the lack of 
recognition of their rights in a new constitution will have long-term impacts on their 
recovery and options for development” (Sorenson, 1998: 12). 
 
Further, the Constitution serves as the guide for new legislation as it “reflect[s] the new 
political reality, changes in power relationships, and ideological objectives” (Sorenson, 
1998: 12), and the resulting “gender-specific laws ... create new bases to overcome 
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discrimination” (Suneja, 2002: 31). Thus, the Constitution does more than define 
economic, political and social rights: it serves as a critical element in the empowerment 
of the marginalised (Sorenson, 1998: 13). 
 
The concerted power of women in the transitional period, thanks in part to the might of 
the WNC at the time, aided in the inclusion of women’s rights into a landmark 
Constitution that was internationally hailed as a monument to human rights (Meintjes, 
1996: 47; Albertyn, 2003: 99-101; Calland, 2006: 7-8; Govender, 2007: 137).  
 
This was a significant victory for women (and women’s activism), as the integration of 
gender rights into the Constitution “created a favourable context for women to make 
rights claims on this and future governments” (Baden et al, 1998: 10; Britton, 2002; 
Hassim, 2003c; Anderlini, 2004). This gender gain was further strengthened by the 
emphasis on human rights championed by the ANC and entrenched within the Bill of 
Rights, and which formed the cornerstone of the transformation agenda (Baden et al, 
1998: 10; Albertyn, 2003: 102-105; Anderlini, 2004; Ramphele, 2008: 14, 108). Together, 
these two documents legally and unequivocally entrenched gender equality into the 
institutional fabric of the new South Africa; enacting it would be a matter of political 
will. This is reiterated by Kabeer (1999: 462) who cautions that “creating constitutional 
provision for political participation ... [is] unlikely to be automatically empowering [but 
does] ... create the vantage point of alternatives which allows a more transformatory 
consciousness to come into play”. 
 
The importance of the political will (of both male and female politicians) cannot be 
underestimated, and is one of the key issues explored in the analysis of the first 
democratic regime (Chapter Five). The proportional representation system, which does 
not bind office-holders to a specific constituency, places loyalty with the party above all 
else, as the party leadership determines whether position (and prestige) will be retained. 
Thus, lasting change is only possible through collaboration and cooperation between 
both sexes. Related to the link between political will and the proportional representation 
system, is the tempering of political action due to the marginalisation, manipulation and 
compromises required to remain within party lines. While women were certainly present 
in sufficient numbers to instigate change, their power to play a transformational role was 
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necessarily constrained by their reliance on the (male) party leadership to keep them on 
the electoral party lists, as is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  
 
Nevertheless, this political reality does not diminish the magnitude of the inclusion in 
unequivocal terms of gender equality within the Constitution. As Mackay, Myers and 
Brown (2003: 90) point out, female policy makers do push alternative priorities, 
particularly in situations where the bureaucratic system has been restructured to 
empower women to challenge the agenda, which is essentially what the Constitution and 
Bill of Rights aimed to do.  
 
While the transitional government was charged with instituting a bureaucratic system 
that was open to claims from all sectors of society, particularly those that have been 
historically marginalised, the Constitution would ensure that the right to make such 
claims would be protected in the strongest terms available to the State. This represented 
a convergence of the paths of equality and autonomy, a key moment at which gender gains 
were consolidated through the entrenchment of rights within the foundational 
documents of the State, reaffirming equality as a core value of the emerging democratic 
State. 
 
4.10 Conclusion: Women at the End of the Transition  
 
In any analysis of gender and transitions, the manner in which women participated in 
the liberation movement, and the consolidation of gains in the period thereafter, 
constitutes a critical consideration (Waylen, 2003: 158). From the increased militancy of 
women in the face of escalating violence within their communities to the formation of 
strategic alliances in order to push for women’s liberation concurrently with national 
liberation, the assertion by Waylen (2003: 158) that “women’s movements often use a 
wide and adaptable strategic repertoire of different alliances and actions over multiple 
political venues” has clearly been shown to have been the case in South Africa.  
 
From the creation of new alliances and coalitions, such as the formation of the WNC 
and the UDF, or the continuation of previously effective strategies within the ANC, the 
women’s movement relentlessly pursued the twin goals of women’s and national 
Chapter Four: Transition to Democracy  138 
liberation. This process was aided by the continuing rise in women’s autonomy within 
the liberation movement, despite increasingly severe measures by the State to curtail 
political opposition. Further, the entrenchment of equality rhetoric in not only the ANC 
but also in other organisations and coalitions involved in the liberation movement 
provided new opportunities for strategic action by women and enabled a growth in their 
collective and individual power as gender roles evolved and expanded. A correlation 
between the increasing “stickiness” of ideas about equality within the liberation 
movement, and the expansion of women’s power and autonomy can clearly be seen.  
 
By the end of the transition, women had ensured that their concerns were placed on the 
agenda and that respected women leaders were participating in furthering their claims 
on the State. Their right to substantive representation at all levels (both within the party 
and the State) was acknowledged. The momentum and might created by the broad-
based WNC were being wielded to great effect.  
 
A significant achievement in the long battle for formal gender rights was the campaign 
by the WNC to place women at the negotiating table of the Multi-Party Negotiating 
Forum. The provision of a forum at which women could articulate their expectations of 
the new democratic State enabled women to actively influence the establishment of new 
institutional norms and values. This participation led directly to the second notable 
success for women’s rights during the transition period: the entrenchment of gender 
equality within the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The inclusion of explicit gender 
provisions within these foundational documents would serve as a basis for further 
action in terms of the creation of mechanisms aimed at gendering State institutions, the 
consideration of gender differentiated needs during policy formulation, and various 
other methods of entrenching gender equality and transforming institutional norms and 
values. 
 
While these achievements were laudable, the next challenge would be the utilisation of 
all their political and social power to carry these gains over to the new State structures, 
and cement their newfound influence. The steps taken by women in response to the key 
moments outlined this chapter ensured that they were strategically positioned to exercise 
the power gained over the course of the liberation struggle within the new democratic 
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structures of the State. In other words, women were poised to engage as equal actors 
within the institutions of post-conflict South Africa, with the aim of infusing the 
fledgling democratic structures with the equality-based norms of the ANC. Thus, the 
next chapter considers the consolidation of these gender gains, and the means by which 
sustainable institutional change could be achieved. How did women fare in the first 
democratic regime in terms of descriptive and substantive representation? Were the 
strategies set forth by the gender mainstreaming approach being integrated into the 
institutions of the new State? What were some of the key challenges and opportunities 
of the new democracy? This will provide the institutional context for the forthcoming 
discussion on women and the reform of South Africa’s security sector in Part III, and 
enable a contextualised investigation of the processes of gendered institutional change in 
the security structures of the State, and uncovering how gendered institutional change 
occurred. 
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By the dawn of the new democratic era, the South African women’s movement was 
strategically positioned to shape the institutional structures of the first democratic 
regime. As the two preceding chapters have shown, the increasing autonomy of women 
within the ANC arose due to a combination of three primary factors. Firstly, the seizing 
of opportunities following key moments in the history of the liberation struggle, which 
expanded women’s roles within the leadership structures of the movement, including in 
the security arena. The growth and recognition of these roles was especially notable 
following events such as the Treason Trials and the Soweto Uprisings, as detailed in 
Chapter Three, and was facilitated by the centrality of the ANC’s equality-based 
philosophy.  
 
The second factor was the entrenchment of these gains through the inclusion of gender 
rights within foundational documents such as the ANC Constitution and the Freedom 
Charter, and the formal representation of women in the governing structures of the 
ANC – an indicator of women’s increasing autonomy and the recognition of their status 
as political actors within the liberation movement. The impact of these gains was made 
evident in the role that women played during the transition process, as described in 
Chapter Four. By securing a place at the negotiating table during the Multi-Party 
Negotiation Forum (MPNF), women were later able to embed gender rights within the 
new Constitution and the Bill of Rights, providing a foundation from which measures 
for attaining gender equality within institutional structures could be built.  
 
The third factor was the changing normative environment brought about by the 
cumulative effect of the increased strength of the women’s movement, the 
entrenchment of gender gains within the founding documents of the State, and the 
ANC’s vision of a society predicated on equality and human rights. The oft-stated 
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commitment of the ANC to women’s representation in all structures (ANC, 1955, 1958, 
1991, 1998, 2002) would be put into practice with a 30% quota on party lists, which 
would guarantee women a voice within the new democratic State (Baden et al, 1998: 19; 
Geisler, 2000: 606; Albertyn, 2003: 102; Hassim, 2003c; Anderlini, 2004, 11; Waylen, 
2007a: 534; Gouws, 2008a). Britton (2002) expands on the importance of the 
consolidation of these changes within the constitutional context, noting that it enabled 
women to move “from the ‘silent backbone’ of the nation to a force of considerable 
political power and public influence” (Britton, 2002: 36). Geisler (2002: 606) also 
discusses the significance of the influx of women and the diversity of the backgrounds 
of these women, arguing that their positions of prominence, together with the 
proportion of women in Parliament, enabled women to “substantially influence both 
political cultures and policy outcomes”. These collective gains and advancements in the 
substantive and descriptive representation of women heralded the forging of a new 
path; the establishment of a fresh legacy as the historical path of women within the 
liberation movement drew to a close, and the path of women within government began. 
 
The active participation of women in the liberation process in a variety of capacities, 
from stridently militant to logistical planners to grassroots activists, heightened their 
consciousness of their increased power and influence, and their subsequent capacity to 
affect change (Meintjes, 1996; Datte & Kornberg, 2002: 5; Anderlini, 2004). With 
women actively partaking in the construction of a new institutional culture as equal 
political actors within State institutions, some values and norms began to change, 
although patriarchal norms were proving hard to shift, particularly the entrenched 
prejudices and structural inequalities of the inherited institutions of the State. How did 
women go about reconciling these conflicting value systems? In what practical way did 
the declared gender values of the ANC assist the infusion of gender equality into the 
maze of layered institutions?  
 
This chapter focuses on how women utilised this unprecedented opportunity to gender 
the institutional structures of the fledgling democracy. How successfully were women 
integrated into the general governance structures of the new State? What gender equality 
mechanisms were implemented, and how effective are these measures perceived to be?  
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The first section of this chapter presents an overview of the women in Parliament: the 
gains made in descriptive terms, and the positions that women occupied (and occupy) 
within the new democratic regime in the transitional period and medium term. The next 
part looks at the institutional environment at the time of the transition. In particular, the 
promises and limits of change as a result of the negotiated settlement that produced 
layered institutions of old and new structures which had varying impacts on the 
institutional gendering process. The repositioning of structures as a result of the 
democratic shift further altered the bureaucratic system, with some institutions gaining 
prominence and influence and others experiencing an ebb in power. The creation of 
new mechanisms, such as the gender machineries, also played a role in the gendering of 
South African governance structures, and is discussed within this section.  
 
The ramifications of the institutional layering process, combined with the relative 
strength of the women’s movement during the formative years of the new State, are 
illustrated through the example of the Women’s Budget. This also reveals the continued 
use of strategic alliances by powerful players to influence the values of the new and old 
institutions, thereby entrenching gender gains within the governance process. The next 
section considers the perceptions of the research participants towards the effectiveness 
of the State gendering process by exploring the perceived factors affecting women’s 
advancement within State governance structures. This analysis also discloses the extent 
to which women are seen to be in control of their own destiny: is the advancement of 
women contingent on the vagaries of the male leadership, or have women impacted 
sufficiently on the institutional norms of the State to advance through merit alone? The 
chapter concludes with an assessment of the position of women within the State 
governance structures, utilising the variables outlined in Chapter Two.  
 
Throughout the text, data derived from the interviews and surveys conducted with 
parliamentarians, party members and civil society practitioners in 2009 is utilised. This 
enables a picture to emerge of how the institutional gendering process is being 
perceived by institutional players, and the opportunities and constraints that are felt to 
be important to the process. What were the perceived successes and failures? What 
factors account for the advancement of women within the general governance 
structures of the State?  
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Understanding the institutional gendering process within these general structures 
enables a clearer insight into the forthcoming examination of the security structures of 
the State by identifying the factors that created the new status quo. The elements drawn 
out in this chapter also provide a point of comparison for the evaluation of women’s 
progress in the masculine enclaves of the security sector, explored in Part III of this 
thesis. 
 
5.2 Numbers and Prominence: An Overview of Women in 
Parliament 
 
The first democratic regime could be characterised as markedly positive in terms of 
gender representation. The inclusion of statistical measures of women’s representation 
in government does not imply the assumption that their mere presence will alter the 
status quo, or that all women within government will push an overtly feminist agenda 
(Cranny-Francis et al, 2003: 49; Kabeer, 2003: 2; Subrahmanian, 2007: 112; Svensson, 
2007: 13; Annesley & Gains, 2010: 4). It is, however, considered a necessary first step in 
altering the institutional culture (Britton, 2002; Annesley & Gains, 2010: 4). South Africa 
did remarkably well when using the yardstick for descriptive gender representation put 
forward by Waylen (2007b: 38) that 25% or above can be considered a positive 
outcome.88 
 
This can partly be attributed to the adoption of a 30% quota on the party list by the 
ANC (RSA NGF, 2000: 18; Britton, 2002; Lowe Morna, 2003: 4; Hassim, 2003b: 506; 
Anderlini, 2004, 13; Meintjes, 2005: 230; Waylen, 2007a: 534; Gouws, 2008b) which, in 
turn, came about through the concerted lobbying by the women’s groups over 
preceding decades, as described in Chapters Three and Four. The calls for equitable 
representation were predicated on the equality rhetoric of the ANC, and served as the 
foundation for women’s demands of the party to fulfil its promises of creating a 
participative governance structure.  
 
                                                 
88 Waylen (2007: 38) classifies representation under 10% as low, 10-25% as moderate. 
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The margin of the ANC victory placed 90 women in the first post-Apartheid 
Parliament, representing 36% of the ANC delegation (which would rise to 48% by 
2009), as reflected in Table 5.1. The table also shows a steady increase in the overall 
representation of women in the National Assembly over four elections, from 28% in 
1994 to 43% in 2009. It should be noted that while none of the opposition parties have 
implemented a gender quota, their gender representation has also generally increased 
(Hendricks, 2005: 82). This could be interpreted as an indication of the “stickiness” of 
the equality discourse infusing the structures of governance in the post-transition 
period, and an indication of the evolving institutional and societal norms acknowledging 
the new public roles of women. This view is also reflected by Britton (2002) and 
Meintjes (2005), who note that the transformative nature of the transition facilitated 
these decisive shifts in gendered societal norms and rules, aided by the strength of the 
women’s movement at the time to pressure powerful actors in the process. 
 
Table 5.1   Representation of Women in National Assembly 1994 to 2009 
 1994 1999 2004 2009 
Party Total W %W Total W %W Total W %W Total W %W 
ANC 252 90 36 266 95 36 279 104 37 264 126 48 
DP/DA 7 1 14 38 6 16 50 13 26 67 20 30 
IFP 43 10 23 33 9 27 28 5 18 18 4 22 
NP/NNP 82 9 11 28 4 14 7 0 0 - - - 
UDM    14 1 7 9 4 44 4 0 0 
ACDP 2 0 0 6 2 33 6 2 33 3 1 33 
FF    3 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 
UCDP    3 1 33 3 0 0 2 2 100 
PAC 5 1 20 3 0 0 3 0 0 - - - 
COPE - - - - - - - - - 30 14 47 
Other    5 2 40 (7) (3) (43) 4 0 0 
TOTAL 400 111 28 400 120 30 400 131 33 400 170 43 
Adapted from Hendricks (2005: 82), Meintjes (2005) and Lowe Morna, Rama and Mtonga  (2009). 
 
It is also crucial to consider the types of positions that women took up, particularly in the 
first democratic administration. Although it was a negotiated settlement, the ANC 
dominated the proceedings and this is reflected in the prominence of the appointments 
of ANC women. It is also indicative of the power exercised by these women and the 
esteem in which they were held by the leadership of the party. Women were appointed 
to a range of key ministerial positions, including Health (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma), 
Welfare and Population Development (Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi), and Arts, Culture, 
Science and Technology (Winnie Mandela). Traditionally male-dominated “hard” 
portfolios were also headed by women, including: Agriculture (Thoko Didiza), Justice 
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(Sheila Camerer), Minerals and Energy (Susan Shabangu), Public Enterprises (Stella 
Sigcau), and Trade and Industry (Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka). The 1999 Cabinet saw a 
female Foreign Affairs Minister (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) – a post she would hold 
until 2009. The post of Deputy President was held by a women from 2004 (Phumzile 
Mlambo-Nguka) until 2009 (Baleka Mbete).89 In particular, the election of Frene 
Ginwala as the first Speaker of the new Parliament was noteworthy. Fellow MP Pregs 
Govender commented: “in the most powerful seat in the National Assembly, she was a 
powerful symbol – a woman in a sari, not a suit. A significant change was being 
signalled” (Govender, 2007: 145; Meintjes, 1996: 57; Anderlini, 2004; Calland, 2006: 35). 
The choice of Frene Ginwala as Speaker represented an important gender gain, given 
the prestige and symbolism of the position, and was indicative of the progress being 
made in terms of altering societal norms with respect to the acceptability of women in 
leadership roles. 
 
The dramatic increase in the descriptive, and potentially substantive, representation of 
women in the first democratic dispensation provided an enabling environment for 
addressing the entrenched institutional norms and values of the inherited Apartheid 
structures. It also presented these women with the opportunity to participate in the 
construction of the new institutions that would be creating and operationalising the new 
norms and values by which society would be governed.  
 
The next section considers the institutional environment in which these women would 
be operating. Three aspects are examined. Firstly, the institutional layering that arose as 
a result of the negotiated transition to democracy, consequently interweaving old and 
new structures (and their attendant norms and values), and impacting on the relational 
power between the old and new structures of the State. Secondly, the formal 
mechanisms and structures aimed at mainstreaming gender throughout the system of 
governance, in terms of their placement and mandate, and their resulting power and 
influence in changing the gendered norms of the State. The third aspect considers the 
“real world” consequences of the institutional environment by presenting an example of 
how women institutionalised the consideration of gendered interests in the budgeting 
process, amongst other examples.  
                                                 
89 For a complete list of female Ministers from 1994-2009, see Appendix 5. 
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5.3 The Institutional Environment 
 
The transitional period, during which democratic gains would be consolidated, called for 
a broad-based overhaul of the country’s values and practices. The overturning of 
ingrained prejudices based on race, sex and ethnicity would be an enduring challenge for 
decades. Articulating a vision for the nation based on human rights and equality was 
necessitated by “the scale and scope of the transformation South Africa embarked on 
after Apartheid [which was] without precedence” (Ramphele, 2008: 13). Putting the 
rhetoric into practice would be a challenge that depended heavily on sufficient political 
will, not only in terms of fully integrating gender into the new structures, but also in 
putting mechanisms in place to consolidate (and protect) these gains in forthcoming 
administrations.  
 
The political and historical events discussed in the preceding chapters fundamentally 
impacted on the belief and value systems of the population at large, although not all 
deep-seated prejudices could be dislodged. The commitment of the ruling ANC to 
operationalising gender equality proved to be a significant step towards reformulating 
assumptions about women and their capacity to lead and govern. This commitment 
resulted partly from the manner in which women participated in the historical and 
political events that shaped the transition to democracy, discussed previously. As 
Waylen (2003: 163) points out, it is essential to consider not only the causes of the 
downfall of “non-democratic regimes”, but also the forms of transitions, as both will 
have an impact on the consolidation of gender gains in new democracies (Waylen, 2003: 
163). As noted above, the institutional layering which occurred as a result of the 
negotiated transition played a significant role in the gendering of State institutions, as 
the entrenched norms and values of old institutions would need to be reconciled with 
the emerging norms of new institutions. What was the effect of the institutional layering 
process in gender terms, and how did it affect relational power between structures? 
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5.3.1 Institutional Layering 
 
The nature of the negotiated settlement meant that the new democratic State would not 
be starting with a blank slate. In effect, the ANC-regime would be inheriting some of 
the old Apartheid structures intact, including the civil service and the labyrinth of 
bureaucracy that accompanied it. New structures would be created to work in 
conjunction with the old90, with some eventually replacing their predecessors. This 
complex institutional layering of old and new structures served both as an opportunity 
and a constraint for the gendering of State institutions as the prospect for meaningful 
change was tempered by the ingrained practices of old institutions that would need to 
be consciously shifted.  
 
One advantage of the layering of new institutions with old structures was that some of 
the new structures, such as the Constitution and parliamentary committees dealing 
specifically with gender, were endowed with prominence – and, therefore, had the 
necessary influence to instigate change, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Further, 
the infusion of the principles of racial and gender equality across all government 
structures, old and new, saw the re-organisation of parliamentary structures, such as the 
National Assembly (NA) and the provincial government structures, which further aided 
the task of gendering these structures in line with the new democratic vision of the 
State.  
 
The interweaving of old and new institutions transformed the power relations between 
structures. The new institutional directives, such as the emphasis on equality and broad-
based participatory mechanisms, also impacted on the relative importance and influence 
of new structures as responsibilities and spheres of influence were adjusted. The influx 
of influential men and women had a marked impact on the initial power relationships 
between these structures, not least because of the existing relationships between these 
individuals forged over the decades of the liberation struggle.  
 
                                                 
90 A range of new institutions were created by different structures and committees, with various purposes. 
For example, some institutions were created to fulfil constitutional mandates (such as the Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts). Thompson (2000), Venter (2001) and Calland (2006) are among the 
many authors who delve into the process of State formation following the 1994 elections, detailing the 
specific institutions created and their purpose within the larger bureaucratic structure. 
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The power matrix depicted in Figure 5.1, oriented according to influence and 
prominence, serves as a graphical representation of the relative power of the various 
institutions of the new democratic dispensation91. As can be seen, Parliament as a whole 
has both prominence and influence, with the institutions within Parliament having 
varying degrees of influence. For example, while the National Assembly (NA) has more 
prominence, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) has more influence 
as a result of its constitutional mandate to provide oversight and accountability. The 
matrix also reveals the ANC to have greater influence than the opposition parties (as 
would be expected from the ruling party), and a similar degree of prominence. However, 
the blurring of the divide between the party and the State increases the informal 
influence and prominence of the ANC to a significant extent – with serious 
repercussions, which are discussed in Part III of the thesis. 
 
Figure 5.1 Institutional Power Matrix 
 
Adapted from Calland (2006: 330). 
                                                 
91  The Institutional Power Matrix was adapted from the work of Calland (2006) who undertook a detailed 
study of power within the democratic structures of South Africa, including an in-depth analysis of the 
key figures involved in the governance process. The positioning of the various entities in the matrix is 
supported by the perceptions of the research participants, and by first-hand experience with the South 
African governance structures. Similar assessments on the relative power and influence of these 
institutional structures are also drawn by Venter (2001), Albertyn (2003) and Lowe Morna et al (2009). 
Chapter Five: Women and the First Democratic Regime   150 
The power matrix reveals the relative institutional prominence and power of the 
structures discussed in the earlier overview of women’s descriptive gains. It illustrates 
how the positions held by women within institutional structures that have both 
prominence and influence will imbue those office-holders with a certain degree of 
power by virtue of their position alone, without taking into account the power wielded 
due to personal alliance and party coalitions. The location of gender machineries 
(discussed later in this section) within the Office of the Presidency similarly bestows 
those office-bearers with greater legitimacy and, therefore, greater influence. 
 
Given the portfolios held by women, particularly in the first democratic regime 
(described earlier), the potential power to enact meaningful change is thus apparent 
from Figure 5.1. The relative positioning of these various structures has a direct 
correlation with the discussion on power in Chapter Two, where power is viewed in 
terms of capacity (Kabeer, 1999; Allen, 2005; Lukes, 2005; Annesley & Gains, 2010). 
Therefore, the prominence and influence accorded to these structures, by virtue of their 
relative positions within the system of State governance structures, endows the office-
bearers with the capacity to act. The potential range of women’s influence expands 
further when considered in conjunction with the power of the particular ANC women 
within these positions (power accrued from the historical legacies described in previous 
chapters). 
 
The effective exercise of this power is, however, contingent on the capacity of the 
gender machineries to entrench the changes and facilitate the continued gendering of 
institutional processes. One of the foremost challenges would therefore be the creation 
of robust gender machineries that would aid in the consolidation of these changes once 
these particular women had moved on. It must be noted that the influx of Struggle 
veterans into the governance structures of the new democratic regime was an unique 
phenomenon. Consequently, these women, who had amassed significant power and 
influence during the liberation era, would need to entrench the hard-won gender gains 
in a manner that would be sustainable for future generations92. In other words, an 
institutional environment would need to be created that was conducive to gender 
                                                 
92  The consequences of the lack of an environment open to women’s needs and interests in the post-
transition period is discussed in detail by authors such as Ray and Korteweg (1999) and Waylen 
(2007b), amongst many others. 
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claims, supported by mechanisms that would sustain the momentum of increasing 
gender gains without being reliant on the alliances and personal histories of these 
particular women93. One of the primary means by which this could be achieved was 
through the creation of formal gender machineries. The motivation behind the pursuit 
of this course of action was bolstered by the international diffusion of participatory 
gender machineries located within formal State structures, and the mechanisms 
described in international and regional instruments from the UN, SADC, and AU (UN, 
1979, 1995a; Albertyn, 2003: 102; Anderlini, 2004; Meintjes, 2005; Gouws, 2008b, 
amongst others described in Chapter Two). The establishment and strategic placement 
of gender machineries were therefore one means by which the “first generation” effect 
could be mitigated: effective machineries provide the mechanisms through which 
gender mainstreaming strategies can be more efficiently implemented, aiding in the 
gendering of institutional norms, and creating momentum for further change. 
 
5.3.2 Challenge of Gender Machineries 
 
The lobbying by women’s organisations during the transition period (most notably 
through the WNC) placed an emphasis on ensuring the meaningful representation of 
women within the new structures (especially Parliament), as well as on creating “an 
enabling environment for women to give ‘voice’ to their various interests” (Baden et al, 
1998: 4; Meintjes, 1996: 61; RSA NGF, 2000; Geisler, 2000; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 
146; Albertyn, 2003: 100-102; Anderlini, 2004; Waylen, 2007a: 524; Waylen, 2007b: 150).  
 
The combination of institutional measures entrenching gender equality (such as those 
contained within the Bill of Rights and the Constitution, and the National Gender 
Framework), together with the commitment of the ANC towards gender equality,94 
empowered women to push for transformational strategies that would be “more 
responsive to women’s demands and more representative of women” (Baden et al, 1998: 
10; Geisler, 2000; Heinecken, 2002: 718; Hassim, 2003b: 508; Albertyn, 2003: 100-102; 
                                                 
93  The potential of this aspect as a barrier to the consolidation of gender gains is discussed later in the 
thesis. Geisler (2000) demonstrates the impact of this factor on the WNC and ANCWL, illustrating 
the devastating repercussions for gender structures and their relative power when insufficient 
mechanisms for maintaining a strong leadership are not in place. 
94  The ANC was the only political party to adopt a gender quota of 30% on its party lists (Baden et al, 
1998: 19; Albertyn, 2003: 102; Waylen, 2007a: 534). 
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Anderlini, 2004; Waylen, 2007a: 524). The creation of “an integrated set of structures on 
different levels of the State with an encompassing monitoring and oversight function” 
was explicitly included in the transitional agreement in order to ensure that the 
“institutional design would ensure the participation of activists in the State and 
accountability of the State to constituencies of women (Gouws, 2008b: 548).  
 
Numerous State mechanisms were established with the express purpose of gender 
mainstreaming in the sense of serving as hubs through which policy interventions could 
be launched. However, “the acceptance of the principle of gender equality as both a 
formal constitutional value as well as a substantive policy imperative has introduced a 
new set of complexities that have to be considered in resource allocation” (Baden et al, 
1998: 5; Gouws, 2008b: 547). Thus, these machineries would need to be positioned 
strategically and be allocated sufficient resources in order to be effective. 
 
The central structures, which were established with a view to creating an integrated and 
coordinated network of mechanisms to impact on the gendering of policy processes, 
included the multiparty Parliamentary Women’s Group, based in the legislature, the 
Women’s Empowerment Unit (focused on capacity building and training for female 
parliamentarians), and the Committee on Improving the Quality of Life and Status of 
Women, which is responsible for “disaggregating and analysing the budget along gender 
lines” (Baden et al, 1998: 12; Meintjes, 1996: 61; RSA NGF, 2000: 27; 2005: 234; 
Anderlini, 2004, 13). Additionally, the Office for the Status of Women, located within 
the Presidency (in the offices of the Deputy President), provides national coordination, 
while the Commission on Gender Equality provides oversight as an independent 
statutory body (Albertyn, 1996; Meintjes, 1996: 61; 2005: 232, 234; Baden et al, 1998: 12; 
RSA NGF, 2000: 27; Geisler, 2000; Hassim & Gouws, 2000: 123; Seidman, 2001; 
Hassim, 2003b: 508-510; Anderlini, 2004, 13; Calland, 2006: 12-13; Waylen, 2007a: 535; 
Waylen, 2007b: 151; Gouws, 2008a, 2008b). 
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Figure 5.2 National Gender Machineries 
  (Adapted from Gouws, 2008b: 55). 
 
As with many such gender machineries, there is a lack of resources, both human and 
financial, which severely constrains the effectiveness of these mechanisms, while the 
sectoral approach further weakens the efficiency of the gender machineries (Albertyn, 
1996; Baden et al, 1998: 15; Sorenson, 1998: iv; Seidman, 2001; Meintjes, 2005: 234-235; 
Govender, 2007: 171; Waylen, 2007a: 535). For example, there is minimal coordination, 
insufficient operating budgets, and a distinct lack of political will in certain areas 
(Albertyn, 1996; Baden et al, 1998: 15; Gouws, 2008b)95. The “overlapping mandates” 
between the various mechanisms is an additional strain on the limited resources of the 
gender machineries (Gouws, 2008b: 550; Meintjes, 2005: 234-235), as is the slow 
progress being made in establishing fully functioning machineries at all levels (Seidman, 
2001; Anderlini, 2004). 
 
                                                 
95  This is a common problem with gender machineries, as described in detail by Byrne, Laier, Baden and 
Marcus (1996) and Anderlini (2004), amongst others. A comprehensive assessment of the gender 
machineries at the provincial level was conducted by Albertyn (1996) and reflects some of the 
setbacks also experienced at the national level, particularly with respect to scarce resources and 
ambiguous mandates. Seidman (2001) details the successes and challenges of the Gender Commission, 
noting the history and development of the explicitly feminist structure against a nuanced contextual 
analysis of the transition to democracy. 
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Further, the creation of these machineries does not imply an acceptance of the ideas and 
policies being championed. The push to incorporate gender into all government 
structures and policies was a mixed success (Albertyn, 1996; Anderlini, 2004; Waylen, 
2007a: 525, 534-36; Lowe Morna et al, 2009). One part of the problem lies in educating 
policy makers about the philosophy underlying gender mainstreaming, the importance 
of gender equality to the State-building exercise, and the practical advantages of 
following this approach. The second challenge involves putting the policy into action, 
and finding the means to effectively monitor the application of the gender 
mainstreaming toolkit.  
 
While acknowledging the limitations of the gender machineries, it is worthwhile noting 
not only the establishment of these structures, but also the prominent placement of 
some of the gender machineries. It is a positive development in the broader sense of the 
gendering process of State institutions, and speaks to the commitment of various actors 
that these institutions continue to receive resources and attention. However, in order to 
be effective, a high degree of political will remains critical, particularly in terms of 
securing more appropriate funding to maximise the impact of these structures in the 
process of gender mainstreaming in the State. This is addressed to some extent by 
Seidman (2001), who discusses the importance of the calibre of Commissioners who 
established and served in the Gender Commission, and the impact this had on the 
development of a robust feminist institution. The esteem in which these political actors 
were held due to their experiences had a significant effect on the respect afforded to the 
Gender Commission.  
 
While this reiterates the influence of specific actors and their relative power to facilitate 
and enact change, it also points to the crucial process of consolidating gains made in 
order to ensure that gendered institutional change is entrenched, and is not dependent 
on particular actors. In other words, while the power of these actors is being used to 
affect change, these modifications of institutional rules and norms must be entrenched 
in order for meaningful institutional change to have occurred, preventing a reversion to 
the status quo once these actors have left. 
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The ambiguity of policy makers towards these aspects is reflected in the responses of 
both parliamentarians and civil society respondents interviewed for this research in 
2009. For example, when considering the responses of all government respondents, 
there was agreement that senior staff understood what gender and gender 
mainstreaming issues were about. However, female government respondents reported a 
high degree of uncertainty about whether these issues were considered to be important 
or received special attention, as shown in Graph 5.1. 
 
One government respondent commented that he felt “South African society does not 
pay special attention to gender issues”96 and that this is reflected in the attitudes of 
senior staff within government. Another noted that while there was a commitment to 
gender issues in theory, this was not often seen in practice97. These findings are 
congruent with those of Seidman (2001) who discusses the limited knowledge of 
bureaucrats to the practical implications of gender inequality, and the manner in which 
policies have gender differentiated impacts. 
 
In general, civil society respondents agreed that gender mainstreaming was understood 
by senior staff (see Graph 5.2 showing civil society responses), but there was uncertainty 
about how important senior staff considered gender issues to be. Those members of 
civil society with experience in government (CS1) were slightly more critical of the 
extent to which gender issues are understood and considered important by senior staff, 
as opposed to those respondents without experience in government (CS2).  
 
                                                 
96 Survey GM-2 (Government Respondent – Male). 
97 Survey GF-3 (Government Respondent – Female). 
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Graph 5.2 Gender Issues – Civil Society Respondents 
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There was a generally ambivalent response regarding the consideration of gender issues 
during policy formulation: slightly more positive amongst some civil society 
respondents, and slightly less positive amongst female government respondents. A civil 
society respondent argued that while senior staff understood gender issues, and some 
considered it important, “this is a far cry from being able to articulate this into concrete 
actions”98. This implies that there is a lack of understanding on how to tackle gender 
equality in a practical sense, an assessment shared by some civil society respondents with 
government experience, one of whom noted that a lack of resources, investment and 
training has contributed to this uncertainty99. It also corresponds with the judgments of 
authors such as Albertyn (2003), Lowe Morna (2009) and Govender (2007). It is equally 
worth noting the ambiguity of the respondents towards the consideration of gender 
issues during policy formulation (particularly the flatlining response of government 
participants in Graph 5.1, and the perceptions of CS1 respondents in Graph 5.2), as this 
is a central element of the gender mainstreaming process. 
 
The overall results of questions related to gender and government were therefore 
somewhat varied, indicating that while there is an awareness of unequal gender relations 
and the need to address it, both within government structures and through the policies 
produced, gender/gender mainstreaming is not integrated as part of the “normal” policy 
formulation process. It is still considered a special interest issue, demonstrating that 
changes to institutional norms and values are not yet entrenched. This is also reflected 
in Graph 5.3, which shows the differences in perceptions about male and female 
leaders’ attentiveness to gender issues during policy formulation. This variable explored 
whether respondents felt that leaders understood the purpose of gender mainstreaming, 
and then encouraged the discussion of gender issues during the policy formulation 
process. The question was divided in this manner because understanding an issue does 
not necessarily imply that it is considered to be important. Consequently, if value is 




                                                 
98 Survey CS2-4 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience). 
99 Survey CS1-2 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience). 
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Graph 5.3 Gender Issues: Male versus Female Leaders 
 
 
This graph shows that while there is some agreement between civil society and 
government respondents that female leaders pay more attention to gender issues than 
their male counterparts, civil society generally shows a more negative perception of 
whether issues are understood and integrated during policy formulation. The findings 
related to the preceding series of graphs suggest that the overall perception amongst 
respondents is that gender mainstreaming is not viewed as a priority during policy 
formulation, and this would, in turn, result in policies and programmes that do not 
adequately consider gender-differentiated needs and priorities.  
 
Further, the results of the survey reiterate the importance of focusing on both genders 
during gender mainstreaming exercises. It is not only men who are sidelining gender 
issues. One respondent had conducted an analysis of speeches made in Parliament over 
a period of time, and found very few references to gender, noting that “there are 
currently very few female feminists in Parliament”100. Another civil society respondent 
                                                 
100 Survey CS1-3 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience). 
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noted that male leaders tend to “tolerate” discussions of gender issues101. A particularly 
telling comment was made that often it is “female MPs who sacrifice gender on the altar 
of their careers. On the whole ... gender issues tended to take a back seat if there were 
concessions to be made”102. In other words, while women are generally more likely to 
push the gender agenda, it is also women who water down gender concessions when it 
is politically expedient to do so. This could be interpreted as being more a case of facing 
the political reality of the current context than a statement on the state of feminism in 
Parliament. Legislation with a few gender provisions may be the best that can be 
expected in certain situations103.  
 
Despite widely varying perceptions amongst sub-sets of government and civil society 
respondents about the understanding of gender issues within government structures, 
many parliamentarians have utilised the resources available to them (including the 
formation of strategic alliances) in order to push the issue of gender equality forward. 
One of these successful initiatives was the adoption of a Women’s Budget. The process 
involved the utilisation of power and influence derived from both the positions these 
women held and from their accomplishments during the liberation struggle, and serves 
as a demonstration of the power of women in strategically organising in order to bring 
about gendered institutional change. 
 
5.3.3 Overcoming Gendered Institutional Constraints: The Women’s Budget 
and Other Examples of Gendered Change   
 
The process of initiating and activating the Women’s Budget in South Africa illustrated 
the implementation of gender mainstreaming strategies in real terms, as well as serving 
as an example of the FI view of gendered institutional change. Following the key moment 
of the democratic transition, and capitalising on the power amassed through the legacies 
of equality and women’s autonomy that had been extended into the new institutional 
                                                 
101  Survey CS2-4 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience). 
102  Survey CS2-5 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience). 
103 This is explored in greater detail by Albertyn (2003) and Lowe Morna et al (2009), both of whom 
discuss the gender differentiated approach to the legislative process, and politics in general. 
Budlender, Hicks and Vetten (2002) expand on the processes of consultation underpinning the 
approach followed by the Women’s Budget in South Africa, and the crucial role played by NGOs in 
sustaining the momentum of this initiative. 
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structures of the State, women utilised their new positions of influence and prominence 
to instigate change, capitalising on their new roles as equal political actors within the 
decision-making arena. These gendered changes sought to alter the formal rules that 
impact on policy formulation through the activation of networks and the forging of 
alliances, both with other women actors but also with men, demonstrating the 
continuation of strategies that had been used to effect change within the structures of 
the liberation movement, as detailed in Chapters Three and Four. 
 
The need for a Women’s Budget was apparent given that the broader context of 
women’s realities within South Africa would not be transformed by virtue of better 
representation in Parliament and Cabinet alone, nor by the establishment of gender 
machineries. Baden et al (1998: 11) outline some of the disparities facing women, 
particularly the inequalities born of class, race, age and location. These include 
challenges such as the preponderance of women-headed households (over 40% of 
African households, with the majority having dependents), the high percentage of 
women in the informal sector (75%), higher poverty rates (particularly in rural areas), 
and exceedingly high rates of domestic violence and abuse. A legislature more attuned 
to the specific interests of women, and the differential impact of legislation on the 
genders, is a necessary first step towards transforming the cultural and social norms 
perpetuating inequality in South African society.  
 
The necessity of considering the reality of women’s lives when drawing up budget 
priorities was thus clear. Based on the Australian Women’s Budget Statement, and 
championed by Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge and Pregs Govender, the initiative to adopt 
a Women’s Budget aimed to consider the entire budget from a gendered perspective. 
The idea was to utilise a gender checklist during the compilation of budgets, and to lay 
down clear goals with “measurable, realistic and ... clear time frames” (Govender, 2007: 
161-162; Beveridge, Nott & Stephen, 2000: 390; Geisler, 2000: 620-621; Budlender, 
Hicks & Vetten, 2002; Albertyn, 2003: 105-106; Meintjes, 2005: 235). As Govender 
(2007: 162) acknowledges “the timing was crucial. We had come into Parliament on the 
back of a powerful women’s movement, which created the space to push the boundaries 
in the interests of poor women. But it was a space that would not last too long”.  
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Utilising the power and influence of their positions, Pregs Govender, as chair of a 
parliamentary committee (and a member of the Joint Standing Committee on Finance), 
Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, Speaker Frene Ginwala, Gauteng Finance Minister 
Jabu Moleketi and Maria Ramos104 (Deputy Director-General of Financial Planning in 
the Department of Finance), together wielded sufficient clout to initiate the 
institutionalisation of the Women’s Budget (Baden et al, 1998: 23; Budlender, Hicks & 
Vetten, 2002; Albertyn, 2003: 105-106; Meintjes, 2005: 235; Govender, 2007: 162-164; 
Waylen, 2007a: 535-6). The involvement of Trevor Manuel, a respected figure in the 
financial sector, and the support of Gauteng Finance Minister Jabu Moleketi were 
especially critical – Gauteng is the economic hub of South Africa, and bringing these 
two individuals into the coalition pushing for the adoption of the Women’s Budget 
proved to be a strategically adept move. 
 
The Women’s Budget illustrates the effective power of women at a key moment of the 
new democratic regime. Creating alliances with other powerful players in order to enact 
change within traditionally male-dominated arenas, such as finance, demonstrated the 
strategic prowess of women in government. This continued utilisation of coalitions to 
bring about and entrench gendered change also shows the continuation of strategies 
developed during the liberation struggle, as described in Chapter Four, and underscores 
the assertion by Britton (2002) that part of the success of the gendering process in 
South Africa must be attributed to the ability of women to forge effective coalitions 
with a diversity of actors. 
 
Various other “gender-centric” initiatives were undertaken. The identification of 
institutional barriers to gender equality was one of the many challenges facing women in 
the first democratic administration. The capacity of women to alter their circumstances 
was greatly aided by the power and influence that these women wielded as a result of 
their prominence within the liberation movement. Women then utilised their new 
positions (and the accompanying influence) to strategically initiate change. Govender 
(2007: 147) points out that apart from adjusting to women’s political presence in the 
legislature, physical adjustments also had to be made, from adjusting the hours and 
operating style of the National Assembly to creating facilities for women, further adding 
                                                 
104 Maria Ramos became Director-General of the National Treasury in 1996. 
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to the sense of women invading a previously masculine domain. The assumption of 
formal political roles did not imply that the division of labour was in any way altered for 
these women, as many women MPs still retained primary child and home care 
responsibilities. Parliament’s lack of a schedule and the ‘old boys club’ mentality 
demonstrated that the institutional culture had not yet started adapting to the new 
gender realities (Sorenson, 1998: iv; Geisler, 2000: 617-618; Hassim, 2003c; Meintjes, 
2005: 232; Govender, 2007: 147-149).105 
 
The retention of operational procedures (such as irregular hours and a heckling debating 
style) and dismissive attitudes in some sectors towards gender issues proved difficult to 
change (Geisler, 2000: 618). The creation of an institutional environment that recognises 
the specific needs of women was one of the issues raised by both government and civil 
society respondents, including a comment by one civil society practitioner who noted 
that 
“Many of our institutions are inherited from the past and are patriarchal in nature. 
There is a need to recognise the subtle (and not so subtle) obstacles that limit 
women. One could easily point to the obvious things (like making sure that 
parliamentary breaks coincide with school holidays, the provision of child-care, 
adjusting the parliamentary schedule to make allowances for female parents etc). It 
is of vital importance that the people involved articulate what their experience is 
and what they need in order to more fully participate” 106 
 
These challenges demonstrate how the gender barriers of old and new institutions 
coincided. For example, within the old structures, women were a negligible presence107, 
and physical concessions, such as day-care facilities and restrooms, were never needed. 
The masculine culture of Parliament (and government in general) was not impeded by 
the practical considerations of childcare, and could thus be conducted at irregular hours.  
 
While the new institutions aimed to entrench equality measures into operational 
procedures from their inception, similar chauvinistic attitudes to those found in old 
institutions were encountered, although new institutions appeared more adaptable. 
Nevertheless, these challenges were confronted with mixed success through the use of 
                                                 
105 Some gender realities started being adapted: Feinstein (2007: 83), an ANC MP, remarked that to the 
best of his knowledge he was the first male MP to take paternity leave in the history of South Africa.   
106 Survey CS2-5 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience). 
107 2.7% prior to 1994 (GenderLinks, 2009). 
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institutional safeguards, such as the equity provisions set out in the Bill of Rights, and 
the influence of powerful female parliamentarians.  
 
However, the primary focus remained on the wider entrenchment of meaningful gender 
gains for the women of South Africa, as evidenced in the promulgation of important 
legislation such as the Draft National Women’s Empowerment Policy (1995), the 
Charter for Effective Equality (1994)108, the White Paper on the Transformation of the 
Public Service (1995), the Employment Equity Act (1998), the Skills Development Act 
(1998), the Housing Act (1997), and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act (2000). The enactment of these legislative gains represent the 
further entrenchment and formalisation of gender rights through the crafting of 
legislation that takes into account gender differentiated needs. For example, the Housing 
Act of 1997 specifically notes the “housing needs of marginalised women and other 
groups disadvantaged by unfair discrimination” (RSA, 1997). As another example, the 
White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1995) calls for the 
maintenance of fair labour irrespective of gender, repeatedly noting the need for a 
representative public service and stating in its mission that it aims to “facilitate the 
transformation of the attitudes and behaviour of public servants towards a democratic 
ethos underlined by the overriding importance of human rights” (RSA, 1995). The 
document explicitly identifies achieving representativeness as a priority. 
 
These important gains highlighted the manner in which women were ensuring that 
gender gains (and their collective power) would be maintained in subsequent regimes. It 
is reminiscent of the strategies utilised during the liberation struggle – consolidating 
gains within formal documents to serve as a basis for further change.  
 
While progress was demonstrably being made in various areas of the general governance 
structures, in terms of representation, changing the institutional culture, and producing 
legislation that took cognisance of gender differentiated needs, broader concerns were 
arising. Would these changes be sustainable in the future once these particular women 
left? How could the “first generation” effect be addressed? It is thus critical to 
understand the means by which women were advancing within the structures of the 
                                                 
108 Produced with the WNC. 
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State: How were positions of influence being attained? Was the institutional culture 
evolving in a manner that would facilitate the influx of new women without the Struggle 
credentials and the network of alliances of these particular women? The next section 
incorporates the perceptions of interview and survey respondents from government and 
civil society to answer the question: What factors are seen as aiding the ascent of women 
up the leadership ladder? 
 
5.4 Factors Affecting the Advancement of Women Within State 
Governance Structures 
 
It is crucial to examine the means by which women are advancing within the general 
State structures; the tools used to consolidate their positional gains. In particular, are 
these factors within their power to affect (such as qualifications, length of service), 
somewhat dependent on their own will (political party loyalty), or wholly within the 
power of others to bestow (patronage, nepotism)? The purpose of examining the 
manner in which women advance within the government structures is to ascertain 
whether the high descriptive representation of women is dependent on the political will 
of powerful allies, or whether the gains made in the first democratic regime have started 
being consolidated into the structures of governance as a matter of course. Are women 
are able to participate on their own terms as political players on an even field with their 
male counterparts? In other words, this variable considers the entrenchment of 
women’s power within the institutional process, which is a crucial consideration given 
the uneven effectiveness of the State gender machineries described above, and the 
ambivalence towards integrating gender issues into the everyday business of Parliament. 
 
All the survey respondents identified political party loyalty as the most significant factor 
(rating the highest number of “very significant” responses), followed by merit and 
patronage, as Figure 5.3 indicates. Political party loyalty was also cited by almost all 
anonymous informants as the strongest motivator for advancement. The prominence of 
this factor for advancement reiterates the emphasis placed on informal networks and 
structures in the institutional environment by Lovenduski (1998), Mackay and  Meier 
(2003), Streeck and Thelen (2005), Chappell (2006), and Kenny (2007) when explaining 
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the power dynamics that affect change (as discussed in Chapter Two).109 Given the 
pressures faced by activists during the liberation era, the emphasis placed on political 
party loyalty is unsurprising, especially when considering the often severe ramifications 
when this trust was breached (as described in Chapters Three and Four). 
 
Figure 5.3 Factors in Women’s Advancement 
 
 
                                                 
109 The influence of political party loyalty in the South African context is also discussed in broader terms 
by Calland (2006), Feinstein (2007), Gevisser (2007), Roberts (2007), Holden (2008), Pottinger (2008), 
Gordin (2010). 
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While the various opposition parties are represented within the new structures at all 
levels, the number, influence and power of the ANC representatives dominates 
proceedings within State institutions. This is somewhat tempered by the layering of 
institutions as well as by the various mechanisms for oversight and accountability built 
into the new system of governance, preventing South Africa from becoming a one-party 
State by virtue of the supremacy of the ANC at the time of the transition. Nevertheless, 
the power of the ANC has led to the infusion of the party’s culture into the structures 
of the State, and one of the central aspects of the ANC’s institutional culture revolves 
around party loyalty. Internal decision-making practices are deeply democratic, but once 
decisions are made at the upper levels of the NEC and NWC all party members are 
expected to present a united public face110 (Mandela, 1995; Calland, 2006: 122; Gevisser, 
2007; Roberts, 2007; Feinstein, 2007; Govender, 2007; Pottinger, 2008).  
 
Of course, political parties across the globe expect loyalty from their representatives. 
The South African example represents perhaps a slightly more extreme version of this 
assumption of fidelity, particularly in the open acknowledgment from parliamentarians 
that it is the overriding factor in advancement and that previously stated opinions (and 
causes vehemently fought for) will be abandoned at the will of the party leadership. The 
power of party loyalty to curb the behaviour and actions of party members is also partly 
derived from the proportional representation system, which ensures that positions of 
influence are contingent on maintaining the goodwill of the party leadership as opposed 
to being drawn from the approval of constituents (Geisler, 2000: 622-623; Hassim, 
2003c; Meintjes, 2005: 236; Calland, 2006: 109; Feinstein, 2007: 260; Waylen, 2007a: 
534-5; Gouws, 2008a). In other words, loyalty to the party trumps loyalty to gender 
equality.111 
 
The least significant influence on women’s advancement, according to respondents, was 
length of service. This could be anticipated given the relative youth of the democracy, 
and could be a time limited variable that gains more credence as the democracy matures. 
Ethnicity, like all classifications of “otherness”, was carefully and consciously included 
                                                 
110 This will be revisited in Chapter Eight where the Arms Deal is utilised to illustrate the various 
ramifications of this practice. 
111 Lowe Morna et al (2009) discuss this in greater detail, citing specific examples illustrating how this 
divided loyalty has played out in the South African context. The tension between class, ideology and 
gender is also explored by Waylen (2007b: 134). 
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within the umbrella of equality and inclusiveness throughout the liberation struggle and 
the formation of the new State structures, particularly in light of the animosity between 
the Zulu and Xhosa factions of the ANC, and between the ANC and the IFP (as 
discussed in previous chapters). Ethnicity has, to some extent, come to the fore since 
the ANC national conference in Polokwane in 2007, which led to the ousting of 
President Mbeki, as discussed in Chapter Two. Nevertheless, the turmoil within the 
ANC at the time cannot be attributed solely to ethnicity issues. The markedly different 
leadership styles of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma (Gordin, 2000; Gevisser, 2007; 
Roberts, 2007; Pottinger, 2008) are one of the many factors raised in any analysis of the 
rift within the ruling party; a view supported by analysts such as Calland (2006), 
Landsberg (2010) and Bloom (2010). 
 
The responses of government respondents across gender lines show general consensus 
on most of the categories, with the only one exception. Female government 
respondents attributed a slightly higher importance to patronage than did their male 
counterparts, which most of the women indicated was due to their increased awareness 
of the role it has played in either their own advancement or that of other 
parliamentarians, male and female. The anomalous answer from a female ANC MP is 
flagged here as it was the only time a female respondent did not acknowledge the 
influence of patronage in women’s advancement. All anonymous informants also noted 
this variable as significant, and most viewed it as positive.  
 
Given the dearth of mentorship programmes, a few respondents noted that patronage 
was akin to mentoring in some ways, as the patron served as a source of expertise in 
helping to navigate the political arena. However, one of the dangers of this practice was 
made evident in the aftermath of President Mbeki’s resignation, when some of the 
women perceived as being ideologically aligned with him were subsequently sidelined. 
This is not a gender-specific danger – male politicians experienced similar ostracism in 
the wake of the resignation. 
 
One other prominent anomaly noted in general was that female participants (both in 
government and in civil society) had a much higher rate of “unsure” answers, with male 
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respondents indicating an “unsure” response only once112: all other answers by male 
respondents were unequivocal statements. This was surprising given that the survey was 
centred around issues of gender and gender equality. Further questioning revealed that 
women only gave unequivocal responses to questions that they had had direct 
experience with, while men seemed more comfortable using their impressions of 
situations with which they had no direct experience as a basis for an unequivocal 
answer. However, some “unsure” answers were also given by women in relation to 
situations with which they did have direct experience. This suggests that women were 
less likely to record strong opinions, and raises concerns about the value women 
attribute to their experiences. The forthcoming analysis of the security sector explores 
this in greater detail. 
 
The results from the civil society respondents regarding advancement factors reveal 
greater disparities in opinion once responses are broken down into two categories: civil 
society respondents who have worked within government structures (CS1) and those 
who have not (CS2). As Graph 5.4 below shows, there is a strong correlation with 
government respondent’s answers about the prominence of political party loyalty with 
regards to the advancement of women.113 Opinions were divided amongst CS1 and CS2 
respondents on the role of ethnicity, although similar trends emerged with regard to 
merit, nepotism, patronage and qualifications. Considering the “positive”114 factors of 
merit and qualifications reveals that those civil society respondents who had experience 
working within government see these as having only an average impact on 
advancement, while the second group (without experience of government employment) 
places more significance on them. 
 
                                                 
112  In response to whether gender issues were considered during policy formulation. 
113 Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which the factors of merit, nepotism, patronage, 
ethnicity, qualifications, political party loyalty and length of service impacted on the advancement of 
women within government structures. The question was constructed on a Likert-scale from “very 
significant”, “significant”, “average”, “insignificant” and “very insignificant”. The two outlying 
categories on each side were collapsed together for the graphs. 
114 Merit and qualifications are considered “positive” factors as they are motivated by individual capacity 
rather than being dependent on the will of others, as is the case with nepotism and patronage. While 
nepotism could be considered “negative”, patronage is more neutral as the basis for patronage usually 
suggests that some reciprocal benefit can be derived. 
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Graph 5.4 Factors in Women’s Advancement – Civil Society Respondents 
 
 
Establishing the primary causes of women’s advancement gives some indication of the 
limits of their ability to exercise their power independently, and the security of their 
positions within the structures of governance. For example, the perception that merit is 
a significant factor in women’s advancement implies a wider scope of influence than if 
patronage or nepotism were considered imperative to advancement. It should be noted 
that men are also beholden to the party for the security of their positions, and that their 
actions may also be tempered by loyalty to the party line. This factor is therefore a 
structural constraint as a result of the proportional representation system. 
 
On the whole, it appears that the institutional environment in the post-transition period 
has evolved to the extent that women’s advancement is already somewhat within their 
own control; while compromises would be necessary to retain political party favour, this 
is true for male colleagues as well. The high regard for merit as a factor in advancement 
shows a recognition of women’s skills and contributions, which bodes well for the 
continued prominence of women in powerful portfolios. It is also a positive sign that 
patronage is seen as more influential than nepotism. As closely related concepts, the 
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former has a decidedly more optimistic connotation than the latter. The persistent 
perception amongst both government and civil society respondents is that patronage 
relates more closely to alliances than to nepotism. This is an encouraging view as it 
implies that both parties (women and their patrons) are deriving some benefit – it is an 
implicit acknowledgement of the influence and abilities of women. It should be pointed 
out that almost all respondents (from both government and civil society) perceived 
patrons to be male. While it was acknowledged by respondents that female mentors 
would be beneficial, there are no formal (and few informal) mentorship initiatives in 
place within government at the present time. This is not to imply that women are not 
supportive of each other, but rather that there does not appear to be a trend of ongoing 
one-on-one mentorship style support, but rather the formation of strategic alliances for 
the attainment of specific goals.  
 
Generally, the factors perceived as influential in the advancement of women within the 
general governance structures of the State can be seen as a positive indicator of the 
progress of gender equality in South Africa. The factors perceived by respondents as 
most influential - political party loyalty, patronage, and merit - fall within a positive 
subset of the factors considered. The responses regarding the lack of mentorship 
initiatives in the general governance structures of the State will be contrasted with the 
experiences of women in the security sector. The three key trends that are carried 
through to the next part of the thesis are that firstly, political party loyalty overrides all 
other fidelities. Secondly, patronage continues to play an important role in the 
advancement of women, continuing the legacy established during the liberation era. 
Lastly, the perceived value attributed to merit and qualifications as factors in 
advancement suggest that women are being recognised for their achievements and are 
thus viewed as legitimate participants in the governance process, although gender issues 
are not enjoying the same status. In other words, while women are acknowledged as 
political actors, similar credence is not attached to the importance of gender issues. 
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5.5 Conclusion: Women in General Governance Structures 
 
The overall picture of gender equality within the broad structures of governance in 
South Africa is generally positive. The dominance of the ANC during the negotiated 
settlement enabled the application of the party’s pro-rights ethos, which impacted 
positively on descriptive gender representation, especially through the use of the 30% 
quota on its party lists and the appointment of powerful women to influential positions 
in government (RSA NGF, 2000: 18; Lowe Morna, 2003: 4; Hendricks, 2005: 82; 
Waylen, 2007a: 534). Once in place, these women utilised the available institutional and 
positional resources to initiate changes that altered the institutional environment, 
entrenching some gains and creating a conducive atmosphere for transformation. These 
include initiatives such as the Women’s Budget, the creation of new parliamentary 
committees, and the restructuring of some institutions, such as the National Assembly, 
to be more receptive to women and to gender claims. The formation of gender 
machineries also has the potential to produce and entrench change at the bureaucratic 
level, although a lack of resources and capacity currently curtails the effectiveness of 
these machineries (Baden et al, 1998: 4; RSA NGF, 2000; Heinecken, 2002: 718; 
Albertyn, 2003: 100-102; Waylen, 2007a: 524). 
 
The perceptions surrounding women’s advancement in terms of power and influence 
are also encouraging, as the overall impression is that women are advancing on the basis 
of merit and political savvy, rather than as affirmative action appointees. While 
patronage continues to play an influential role, this is not necessarily perceived as a 
negative issue as the formation of strategic alliances has enabled women to utilise their 
influence more effectively, instigating changes that advance gender equality and 
entrenching gains made.  
 
The purpose of exploring the factors affecting the advancement of women in general 
government structures is to determine whether they shed some light on the gendering 
processes of the security sector as well. Have the historical legacies that empowered 
women to participate meaningfully in the transitional process, and have a voice in the 
construction of new institutional structures also enabled women to retain their positions 
of influence within the new democratic security forces? The key considerations that are 
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taken forward into Part III of this thesis, which deals with the security structures of the 
State, are pointed out in Figure 5.4. The figure utilises the analytical framework outlined 
in Chapter Two to indicate the influences on the processes of gendered change in the 
general governance structures.  
 
Figure 5.4 Framework for Analysis: Women in Government 
 
 
The historical legacies delineated in Chapters Three and Four showed how women 
amassed power and influence over the course of South Africa’s liberation struggle, 
expanding their roles within the liberation movement and enhancing their ability to 
affect change within the structures of the ANC. These legacies were grouped into three 
categories: women’s autonomy, militancy and equality.  
 
The first category, autonomy, incorporates the institutional developments within the ANC 
that facilitated the development of women’s formal leadership roles, and their increasing 
autonomy within both the ANC and the broader leadership movement through the 
setting of their own agenda and the strategic pursuit of their own goals. The creation of 
the Women’s League acknowledged the right and ability of women to organise 
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politically and independently, while the adoption of the Freedom Charter formally 
entrenched these rights (ANC, 1955; Ginwala, 2001; Hassim, 2004: 434; Gasa, 2007: 
215). It has been seen that women’s roles were further expanded with the inception of 
MK, and that their prominence within the Struggle was enhanced following their 
stewardship of the organisation when the male leadership was imprisoned or exiled in 
the wake of the Rivonia Trials (Cock, 1991; Modise & Curnow, 2000; Du Preez 
Bezdrob, 2004; Hassim, 2004; Suttner, 2007, 2008; Cherry, 2007). This established an 
important path in the development of women’s public leadership within South Africa; 
the amassing of this power and influence could (and was) effectively wielded during the 
transition to democracy.  
 
The second category, equality, facilitated the rise in women’s autonomy through the 
central placement of equal rights and participative, representative governance in the 
ANC’s institutional culture. This enabled calls for action on these principles by activist 
women, and the demand for equal representation within governance structures of the 
party and later within the structures of the democratic government. 
 
The third category, militancy, originated prior to the colonial era and refers to the 
incorporation of militancy into the culture of almost all sub-groups of the country 
(including that of the Afrikaner settlers). This is imperative in understanding the course 
of South African history and was influential in the course of the liberation struggle as 
well, as was demonstrated in Chapter Three. Prompted by the extensive and forceful use 
of the Defence Force in quelling opposition to the Apartheid State (particularly in the 
townships, and with specific reference to “Third Force” activities), the formation of 
MK catapulted women into formal militant roles, especially after the Sharpeville 
Massacre and the Soweto Uprisings (Cock, 1991; Modise & Curnow, 2000; Hassim, 
2004; Cherry, 2007; Suttner, 2007, 2008). While women had certainly been active 
participants in the internal violence taking place across the country, their ascension 
within the ranks of an “army” formalised their participation as combatants and would 
prove to be critical during the process of security sector reform in the new South Africa.  
 
Chapter Five: Women and the First Democratic Regime   174 
Utilising the insights drawn from FI (discussed in Chapter Two), a series of key moments 
were identified that impacted on the development of these historical legacies. These key 
moments served to advance the progress of women towards attaining autonomy (such as 
the creation of the Women’s League in the 1940s), and the formal recognition of gender 
equality and gender rights (such as the adoption of the Women’s Charter and the 
Freedom Charter). They arose in part due to the ability of women to organise mass 
protests as evidenced during the Defiance Campaign in the 1950s. The increased 
visibility of women’s leadership following the tumultuous events of the 1960s and 1970s 
(including the aforementioned Sharpeville Massacre, the Rivonia Trials and the Soweto 
Uprisings, and the declaration of the State of Emergency) facilitated the consolidation 
of the gender gains made in previous eras.  
 
Although the exogenous influences highlighted in Figure 5.3 impacted on the country as a 
whole, women also reaped the benefits as these events served to further entrench the 
progress made. The end of the Cold War, which had to a large extent protected the 
Apartheid government from overt Western censure, facilitated the application of 
sanctions that, in turn, aided in the decision by the NP-regime to reach a negotiated 
settlement (Welsh, 2000; Thompson, 2000; Stott, 2002; Ramphele, 2008).  
 
The experiences of African independence movements provided a range of lessons about 
the perils of poor follow-through for gender goals, and highlighted the fact that national 
liberation would not automatically result in women’s liberation (Bernstein, 1985; Cock, 
1991; Heinecken, 2002). This prompted women to devise a number of strategies to 
ensure that gender remained on the agenda, not only during the transition but in the 
first regime as well. Capitalising on the increasing emphasis on inclusivity and the 
development of a strong human rights culture, women entrenched gender rights into the 
Constitution and organised strategically to secure a place at the MPNF negotiating table 
(WNC, 1994; Baden et al, 1998; Albertyn, 2003; Waylen, 2007a, 2007b; Govender, 2007). 
These were essential for the participation of women in the creation of the new 
institutional structures of governance, and the ability to positively influence the 
normative culture of the new State.  
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The cumulative effect of these factors was the amassing of power by women within 
government structures, which enabled them to influence the ideas upon which the new 
State was built. This meant that the increase in power and influence led to the 
incorporation of the central tenets of the liberation ideology: inclusivity, equality and an 
emphasis on human rights in a gender inclusive sense. In other words, these ideological 
tenets were not narrowly interpreted. These in turn informed the understanding of the 
gendered context that the ANC women sought to create within the institutional 
structures of the new democratic regime.  
 
While all three of these ideals would undoubtedly have been present to some degree 
without the involvement of women, their entrenchment would not likely have been 
achieved to the same extent. In particular, the saturation of certain structures, such as 
the Constitution and the National Assembly, with the principles of equality, and the 
creation of mechanisms to ensure the continued attention to the rights of all citizens, 
such as the Bill of Rights and the gender machineries, were greatly aided by the 
persistent activism of the women in the new regime. Their ability to affect the 
institutional culture as they did was a direct result of their prominence during the 
liberation struggle, as was their presence within these structures in the first place. 
 
The layering of old and new institutions provided further opportunities (and challenges) for 
altering the institutional norms and values with respect to gender equality. Some 
structures (both old and new) gained new prominence and influence as a result of the 
reform process, as illustrated in the institutional power matrix (see Figure 5.1). This 
imbued women serving within those structures with further authority to revise the 
normative culture within certain spaces of the government, some with more lasting 
effects than others.  
 
The layering of institutions also changed the formal and informal distribution of power 
between structures, and between participants within those structures. Given the youth 
of the democracy, the power relationships between structures were largely informed by 
the people within these structures. The dominance of the ANC at the time of the 
transition resulted in Struggle veterans with established relationships moving into these 
positions, with the result that power relations were informed by the affiliations and 
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loyalties of particular individuals, rather than being derived from the power exercised by 
any particular structure115. Some of these established new patterns of power distribution, 
some of which have become entrenched while others have decreased in influence and 
prominence once powerful individuals left. Calland (2000) discusses this at length with 
particular reference to the South African context, and remarks that  
“People matter greatly to institutions. Institutions – any organisation – are nothing 
without the people in them. It is people who shape the institution’s vision, values 
and practice. Hence, it matters greatly to identify leadership. And, accordingly, the 
deployment of certain individuals to key posts in the public service is hugely 
significant” (Calland, 2006: 79). 
 
One consequence of this personality driven model of power and change is the 
continuing sway held by both patronage and political party loyalty. Although merit and 
qualifications are credited with the advancement of women within government 
structures, the formation of strategic alliances remains the key to enacting substantive 
change within State structures, and is imperative for influencing the normative culture 
within governance institutions. A negative consequence of the power of patronage was 
demonstrated in the recent past with the ousting of President Thabo Mbeki, who had 
over the course of his tenure in government played an essential role in the promotion of 
women to powerful positions. These women formed part of his network of strategic 
alliances, and with his departure some of these women suffered a sudden reversal in 
fortunes (including Deputy President Baleka Mbete). It can be surmised that, since they 
were immensely qualified and respected, the key strike against them was their close 
relationship with the former president: personal alliances surpassed party loyalty.   
 
This generalised overview of the gender environment in governance structures serves to 
highlight the fact that women’s substantive participation has been partly derived from 
the historical legacies of their involvement within the liberation struggle. Some 
significant changes have been achieved through a delicate interweaving of strategic 
alliances, timing, and time-limited focused interventions. The entrenchment of these 
gains within the institutional fabric of the democratic governance structures speaks to 
the sustainability of gender gains within the institutional arena. Will a different picture 
emerge when considering the same issues within the context of State security structures? 
                                                 
115 This is explored in greater detail by Helmke and Levitsky (2004), who dissect the changing power 
relations which arise due to institutional layering. 
Chapter Five: Women and the First Democratic Regime   177 
Part III of this thesis examines which of the trends noted here are present in those 
structures as well. How have women within the security realm capitalised on the 
opportunities presented during the transitional period to transform the predominantly 
masculine structures of the State security institutions? Were similar challenges 
encountered, and are the gains made equally encouraging? What means for entrenching 
gains have been pursued, and can these measures be considered successful? Uncovering 
the answers to these questions moves the thesis closer to understanding how gendered 
institutional change occurred in security institutions of post-conflict South Africa. 
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EVOLVING NOTIONS OF SECURITY:  




The transition to democracy in South Africa heralded a seismic shift in State priorities in 
all sectors. Ensuring human rights and equality for all citizens represented the normative 
foundation upon which the new State would be built, as established in Part II (Chapters 
Three, Four and Five). As a post-conflict state in the developing South, security and 
development were central and inter-related concerns. The entrenched legacy of 
militancy in South Africa, which had intensified during the Apartheid era, called for a 
new security paradigm that took the challenges confronting the State into account.  
 
The transition to democracy in South Africa occurred at a time when the international 
perspectives on security were shifting. The concept of security had traditionally focused 
on the preservation of autonomy and the integrity of national borders through the 
prowess of military capability: an externally focused “might is right” approach 
(Tshitereke, 2009: 2; Schoeman, 1998; Stott, 2002; Heinecken, Gueli & Neethling, 2005: 
120; Jones, 2009: 26).  
 
The end of the Cold War, and the cessation of related third party interference in African 
conflicts, saw the necessary evolution of the definition of security. Africa’s post-
liberation experiences amply illustrated the destructive and destabilising power of 
poverty, inequality and lack of development (Vickers, 1993: 40-41, 68-81; Schoeman, 
1998; Venter, 2001: 334, 336; Anderlini, 2004; Gueli, 2008; Hutton, 2009; Makinana, 
2009).  
 
Notions of security therefore had to go beyond the traditional militaristic approach of 
security against external threats and needed to encompass internal threats as well, such 
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as underdevelopment and inequality116 (Stott, 2002; Maclean et al, 2006; Stewart, 2006; 
and Spears, 2007; Hendricks, 2007; Svensson, 2007; Tieku, 2007; Makinana, 2009; Jones, 
2009).  
 
A new conception of the prominence and purpose of the military in society also had to 
be formulated, from its previously negative incarnation to a positive force within the 
new democracy. How could the new democratic ideals and priorities of the State, such 
as the human rights based credo, be infused through all State structures including the 
security sector? In what way could the security structures of the State be fundamentally 
reshaped to absorb the amalgamation of various fighting forces?117 Could prevailing 
gender norms be transformed as part of this process as well? Would the values ascribed 
to both femininity and masculinity within the realm of security be shifted? This 
transformation would largely be undertaken through processes such as Security Sector 
Reform (SSR), described in this chapter, which shows how the culture of the military 
can be fundamentally reorganised, thereby altering the type of influence it exerts as a 
social institution.  
 
This chapter argues that the emergence of the Human Security Paradigm as a people-
centred approach, as opposed to a State-centric approach to security, formed the basis 
for the post-conflict reconstruction of South Africa. This shift had significant 
implications for the (re)gendering of State security institutions, and adds a critical 
dimension to understanding how gendered institutional change occurred in the South 
African context. At the heart of human security lies the need for empowerment118 as the 
cornerstone for development, which is in a mutually reliable relationship with security. 
As empowerment cannot be seen as a pursuit that excludes half of the population of any 
given State, gender concerns are implicitly included in the quest for lasting security. Yet 
                                                 
116 This resonates with the South African experience, as among the many challenges faced by the new 
government were widespread poverty and underdevelopment, making it imperative to focus on 
building the capacity of State institutions to provide services such as health care, overhauling the 
education system and supplying basic infrastructure, particularly water and sanitation. Budget priorities 
were therefore geared towards social spending, with defence priorities decreasing drastically. 
117 This would, in turn,  place an additional strain on State capacity as a significant number of soldiers 
would require assistance due to varying levels of training, a multitude of affiliations, and few skills 
appropriate for the needs of the economy (or conventional military service). 
118 Empowerment in this sense refers to the provision of opportunities to participate equitably and 
meaningfully in the growth of the State, and the capacity to act on these openings. For an in-depth 
analysis of the varying definitions and usages of the term, see Oxaal & Baden (1997). 
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the traditionally hierarchical, parochial and masculine security arena has historically both 
excluded and denigrated women as victims and passive bystanders (as shown in 
Chapters Three and Four). However, the active participation of women in South 
Africa’s armed liberation struggle, and the positions they occupy in the new democratic 
structures, speak to the commitment of the State towards achieving gender equality, 
albeit with mixed results, as shown in Chapter Five.  
 
While the question at the heart of this thesis is how gendered institutional change 
occurred, it is imperative to uncover whether the same commitment towards gender 
equality is evident within State security structures as in the general governance structures 
discussed in previous chapters. This strand of questioning enables the emergence of a 
clearer understanding of the extent to which security institutions promote and foreclose 
gendered change. In particular, were the same opportunities for transformation present? 
Were women able to capitalise on the openings within the security structures facilitated 
by the paths emerging from the historical legacies described in Chapters Four and Five? 
Was the oft-stated State goal of equality and diversity in all spheres of government being 
realised? This chapter provides the background for a detailed discussion of these 
questions in Chapters Seven and Eight. It outlines the Human Security Paradigm (HSP) 
and the key features of Security Sector Reform (SSR), and presents a synopsis of the 
South African Defence Review (DR) process, focusing on the elements relating to 
integration and transformation. 
 
6.2 Shifting Security Priorities: The Human Security Paradigm 
 
“Human security is therefore not a defensive concept-the way territorial or military 
security is. Instead, human security is an integrative concept” (UNDP, 1994: 24). 
 
The 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Development Report 
contains an argument by Mahbub Ul Haq for a people-centred approach to human 
security, and puts forward a broader conceptualisation of security as an integral link 
between democratisation and development (UNDP, 1994; Schoeman, 1998; CHS, 2003; 
Stewart, 2006: 44; Maclean et al, 2006; Hendricks, 2007: iv; Clarke, 2008: 51; Jones, 
2009). The 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen further 
expanded on this link, calling for an “enabling environment” for the attainment of 
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security and stability, with an emphasis on “fundamental freedoms” centered around 
democracy, development, and basic needs (UN, 1995b: para. 5; Jones, 2009: 7). It was 
argued that suitable conditions for the pursuit of these goals were predicated on 
ensuring accountability and transparency (as part of the pursuit of good governance 
ideals), as well as promoting political participation at all levels (UN, 1995b; Jones, 2009: 
11). Further, the defence of fundamental human rights through an emphasis on equality, 
diversity, and social integration required a substantial increase in social spending 
(Vickers, 1993; UN: 1995b, 74; Jones, 2009: 7-8).  
 
The sweeping definition of human security put forward by the Commission on Human 
Security serves to illustrate the extensive reach of this new manner of viewing the inter-
connectedness of development and security:  
“human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent 
conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and 
health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil 
his or her own potential ... freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom 
of the future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the 
interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national, security” (CHS, 2003: 
4). 
 
The development and security aspects of this new conceptualisation came under 
renewed scrutiny following the end of the Cold War. Development was broadly 
characterised as “progress in human wellbeing”, although it was cautioned that 
development cannot be equated solely with economic growth (Stewart, 2006: 43)119. 
Instead, the UNDP advocated addressing the seven inter-related aspects of insecurity 
that impact upon stability and development: personal, community, economic, food, 
health, environmental and political instability (UNDP, 1994: 24-33; Jones, 2009: 32-33). 
 
Capturing the multidimensional nature of security recognises that “security cannot be 
assessed outside its social and political context”, thereby necessitating input from a wide 
range of stakeholders and actors (Svensson, 2007: 3; Anderlini, 2004). This is reiterated 
by Williams (2001) who notes: “the extent to which a coherent and integrated human 
security policy exists within a government which proves capable of integrating the 
                                                 
119 It should be noted that instability impacts negatively on economic growth as a result of falling 
production, lower export rates and increased imports (which, in turn, increases foreign debt), and the 
upsurge in military expenditure that further erodes State capital (Stewart, 2006: 46). However, focusing 
exclusively on growing the economy does not automatically result in either broad-based development 
or stability.  
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diverse elements of security (political, economic, social, military, and technological)” has 
a profound impact on the success of transformational undertakings. This paradigm shift 
is also explored by Schoeman (1998) who argues that the developing world is 
“confronted by an ‘insecurity’ dilemma rather than a security dilemma”.  
 
This relates to the forthcoming discussion on the empowerment effect of utilising local 
knowledge and local actors, allowing a redefinition of what is important in a particular 
context, including with respect to security priorities. It is argued that this context-driven 
approach would allow social and cultural norms and values to permeate the national 
discourse, providing a more practical foundation from which to build lasting change as 
opposed to imposing foreign concepts through foreign means. Retaining cognisance of 
the local context (and its influence on social and cultural norms) is also seen as an 
essential component for any viable participative approach (Svensson, 2007: 7). 
 
In essence, human security calls for socio-economic centred security thinking which 
aims to mitigate the conditions that give rise to insecurity, and in so doing 
“complements State security, enhances human rights and strengthens development” 
(Tshitereke, 2009: 2; Anderlini, 2004; Stewart, 2006; Jones, 2009, amongst others).  
 
In a more abstract sense, the reconceptualisation of security through the human security 
paradigm reflects back to the earlier discussion on militarised societies (Chapters Three 
and Four), and the manner in which this permeates all aspects of life in that society. 
Cock (1991: 25) posits that: 
“A distinction should be made between the military as a social institution (a set of 
social relationships organised around war and taking the shape of an armed force); 
militarism as an ideology (the key component of which is an acceptance of 
organised violence as a legitimate solution to conflict); and militarisation as a social 
process that involves a mobilisation of resources for war. These phenomena are 
closely related. Militarisation involves both the spread of militarism as an ideology, 
and an expansion of the power and influence of the military as a social institution”. 
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Thus, it is argued that in militarised societies such as South Africa, the post-conflict 
period necessitates a recasting of the role of the military (and militarism) in society, and 
the negotiation of a new relationship for members within the military as well.120  
 
The adoption of the Human Security Paradigm should not be viewed as a new security 
policy but rather as a new approach to a range of development and security concerns. It 
constitutes a different way of viewing the problems within the State and requires the 
participation of citizens to succeed, as it calls for the repositioning of the military within 
society and demonstrates that the State is being responsive to the needs of the 
population. The Human Security Paradigm (HSP) could be simplistically summed up as 
security for all citizens through inclusive sustainable development, with an emphasis on 
participation as a means of ensuring local ownership and sustainability (Schoeman, 
1998; Williams, 2001; Svensson, 2007; Tshitereke, 2009). 
 
6.3 Human Security and South Africa’s New Regional Mandate 
 
The move to a human-rights based conceptualisation of security represented a 
significant shift towards a revaluation of local knowledge and expertise when defining 
security needs and concerns (Anderlini, 2004; Svensson, 2007: 6; Landsberg, 2010: 124). 
This reflects the growing consensus within Africa that African problems require African 
solutions, as expressed in the philosophy of the “African Renaissance” movement 
promoted by former President Thabo Mbeki (Gevisser, 2007: 16, 32; Landsberg, 2010: 
126-131), and in the increasing role of regional and continental alliances, such as the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), 
which was in part a reaction to the effects of neoliberalism and globalisation.  
 
Emphasising the importance of local knowledge and a context-driven approach to 
African problems, these groupings aim to stimulate economic growth and stability by 
                                                 
120 The relationship between society and militarism would take on greater significance during the 
integration of the various militias into the SADF to form the new SANDF. This is discussed in 
greater detail later in this chapter, and in Chapter Seven. A detailed analysis of the practical 
ramifications of these issues on the integration of the armed forces is provided by Williams (2001), 
Stott (2002) and Anderlini (2004). 
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boosting investment and somewhat limiting interference by “outsider” states (Mansfield 
& Milner, 1997: 3; Acharya, 1999; Ntamack, 2004: 13; Kingebiel, 2005).  
 
Structured on more participatory terms than traditional super-power led alliances, these 
new regional groupings strove to lead from “within and below” by addressing human 
rights issues and basic services shortfalls through greater social spending and 
emphasising institutional transformation to meet good governance ideals (Nyikuli, 1999: 
623; Acharya, 1999; Lee, 2003: 11; Anderlini, 2004, amongst others). In other words, 
there was a distinct shift towards addressing basic needs as part of a holistic security 
policy that could be characterised as the choice of “guns versus butter” (Tshitereke, 
2009: 2). Active participation in these regional groupings is therefore another strategy 
aiding the attainment of human security, given the complementary (and overlapping) 
goals.  
 
The conviction that local experiences should influence the solutions to local challenges 
played a significant part in the reformulation of South Africa’s foreign policy within the 
sub-Continent, which was a significant departure from the Apartheid policy (Landsberg, 
2010). South Africa’s role in regional destabilisation during the NP-regime was a 
product of a militarised mindset fuelled not only by Cold War paranoia but also by the 
country’s own violent history, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four. The “total 
onslaught” policy severely undermined South Africa’s credibility within the region as it 
engaged in a sustained programme of bombing raids, economic blockades and military 
interference in Angola, Zambia, Lesotho, Mozambique and Botswana, amongst others 
(Hettne, 2001: 94; Stott, 2002; Solomon, 2004: 5; Anderlini, 2004; Heinecken et al, 2005: 
132; Holden, 2008: 3; Landsberg, 2010: 40-41). 
 
The ANC-regime thus aimed to rehabilitate South Africa’s image within Africa by 
capitalising on the moral authority endowed as a result of the peaceful transition 
process. The emergence of SADC in 1992 and the need to forge collective common 
security solutions as part of the focus on social and economic development initiatives, 
greatly contributed to the evolution of South Africa’s security thinking (Hudson, 2000; 
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Van Nieuwkerk, 2001; Anderlini, 2004; Gumede, 2005: 198; Murithi, 2008; Aboagye, 
2009)121.  
 
South Africa’s continued economic and military dominance within the region, and its 
increasing stature in the international community, positioned the country to assume a 
new leadership role within the region, thereby increasing stability nationally and 
regionally. As the South African Defence Review stated in 1998: 
“much of the sub-continent is stricken by underdevelopment and the attendant 
problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. There are large numbers of 
refugees and displaced people; an acute debt crisis; and disease and environmental 
degradation … These phenomena are not confined to national borders. They 
impact negatively on neighbouring states in the form of a range of non-military 
threats: environmental destruction; the spread of disease; the burden of refugees; 
and cross-border trafficking in drugs, stolen goods and small arms. Following 
trends in other parts of the world, South Africa is committed to the development of 
a "common security" approach in Southern Africa” (DoD, 1998; ch 4, para. 6-8). 
 
The transformation of the security sector in South Africa was directly tied in to this new 
regional focus in three key ways. Firstly, the security forces required integration in order 
to be representative of the population, by amalgamating the various liberation armies 
into one force, and discouraging internal military instability. The security forces also 
required urgent downsizing/right-sizing in accordance with the new peacetime demands 
of the democratic State. Secondly, the mandate of the defence force would need to be 
amended in order to align with the new priorities and values of the State. Lastly, the 
commitment of South Africa to regional alliances such as SADC and the AU further 
required the drastic overhaul of the defence structures to meet new obligations, such as 
the participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. This would entail a re-
consideration of the armaments retained (and purchased), as well as the numbers of 
personnel required and the skills needed to meet these obligations.  
 
                                                 
121 In 1992 SADC succeeded the 1980 South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), 
created in order to curb dependence on Apartheid South Africa, and consisted of the “Frontline 
States” of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe (with Namibia joining in 1990 upon its independence from South Africa). The current 
SADC member states are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
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There was significant pressure on South Africa to navigate the reform process 
successfully, particularly given its increasing participation and leadership within the 
regional and continental structures. Internally, it was essential in order to attract 
investment by ensuring a stable environment, and foster development through re-
prioritised spending.  Regionally, it could be viewed as leading by example: 
implementing measures to attain the good governance ideals promoted not only by the 
new democracy but also by the regional and continental groupings. 
 
As part of South Africa’s “rebranding” as a positive influence in the region, there was a 
push to revive and further expand regional mechanisms aimed at collective development 
and security. Former Presidents Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), Olusegun Obasanjo 
(Nigeria) and Abdoulaye Wade (Senegal) have been credited as being the driving forces 
behind the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African 
Union (AU) in 2002, and the promotion of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) (Cilliers, 2002: 64; Nugent, 2004: 433; Kingebiel, 2005; 
Pottinger, 2008: 300-301).  
 
Three particular aspects must be highlighted as being pertinent to the evolution of the 
South African regional re-positioning strategy and the transformation of its security 
sector122. Firstly, the establishment of proactive security mechanisms such as the AU’s 
Peace and Security Council and the African Standby Force, drawn from the regional 
brigades of groupings such as SADC, which would have the imperative to intervene 
militarily in certain cases (including on humanitarian grounds), as outlined in the 
Constitutive Act of the AU (AU, 2000: Article 4; Kingebiel, 2005).  
 
While the current lack of resources (human, financial, and materiel) remains a challenge, 
as seen in the uneven success of the 2003 African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the 
2005 African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (Pottinger, 2008: 301), the need for developing 
local capacity (whether as a regional or continental force) is essential to enable a rapid-
                                                 
122 It should be noted that while some of the mechanisms, structures and events discussed here occurred 
after the transformation of the South African security sector had begun, fledgling versions had already 
been established, or were foreshadowed by this time.  
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response to emerging crises in order to maintain stability in the region (Landsberg, 2010: 
153)123. 
 
Secondly, the creation of the African Peer Review Mechanism as a consultative process 
promoting adherence to good governance ideals amongst NEPAD (and later AU) 
member states served to underscore the continental commitment to the goals outlined 
within the human security paradigm. As a leading force in both NEPAD and the AU, 
South Africa was at the forefront of efforts to establish this mechanism (Cilliers, 2002; 
Pottinger, 2008: 301; Landsberg, 2010: 149), and would therefore need to be seen to 
lead by example by getting its own house in order. 
 
Lastly, the dominance of South Africa within both the AU and SADC allowed for 
greater participation in the development of the institutions and values of these 
groupings by the fledgling democratic state. This capacity to set the agenda was due, in 
part, to South Africa’s increased international profile, economic prowess, and 
comparative military capabilities (Venter, 2001:  337; Anderlini, 2004; Pottinger, 2008: 
313; Landsberg, 2010: 132, 140-141).124  
 
Against this regional and continental backdrop, the impetus for change within the 
security sector was also starkly apparent internally. The first concern was the legitimacy 
of the new defence force, given the historical legacies that needed to be tackled. Some 
of these legacies stemmed from the manner in which the armed forces were utilised 
during the NP-regime, and had far-reaching consequences on the way the defence force 
was perceived internally. The deployment of troops to quell civil unrest, as well as the 
notorious “third force” activities (outlined in Chapter Four), undercut the legitimacy of 
the then-SADF in the eyes of the general population.  
 
                                                 
123 The increasing need for peacekeeping missions across the continent requires the establishment of a 
capable and efficient African force given that, in 2005, 7 of the 16 UN Peacekeeping Missions were in 
Africa. In 2004, more than 17 000 personnel were deployed to Sierra Leone and 15 000 to Liberia 
(Kingebiel, 2005). Greater regional and continental capacity is required to enable faster response 
times, particularly in cases where the UN is unable to intervene or unwilling to engage for protracted 
periods of time. 
124 All three of these issues would be pertinent to the complicated arms acquisition process discussed in 
Chapter Eight. 
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With the move towards entrenching the human rights enshrined within the Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights, the new SANDF would be required to establish a new 
relationship with the people of South Africa based on a respect for democratic 
principles and political neutrality in the deployment of the armed forces (DoD, 1998; 
Stott, 2002; Heinecken et al, 2005: 133). Thus, a wide-reaching transformation of the 
security sector was undertaken through the SSR process described next. 
 
6.4 Security Sector Reform: Opportunity for Transformation 
 
The sweeping scope of the HSP calls for an equally comprehensive strategy for effecting 
change in the State security structures. SSR is a wide-ranging endeavour aimed at the 
transformation of all security related mechanisms and actors within a society, including 
political and military actors and institutions such as ministries, departments, and 
Parliament, and with particular focus on the armed forces (Zwane, 1995; Stott, 2002; Le 
Roux, 2004; Bendix, 2008; Gueli, 2008; Hutton, 2009; Jacob, Bendix & Stanley, 2008).  
 
While it is generally undertaken in post-conflict and transitional societies, stable 
developed states periodically perform SSR as well. The objective is to continuously 
assess and reformulate the security system to ensure that it upholds democratic ideals, 
entrenches good governance practices, and takes cognisance of the complex 
relationships between security concerns and other issues such as development 
(Sorenson, 1998: 3; Williams, 2001; Valasek, 2008: 1).  
 
SSR targets include the establishment of effective oversight mechanisms (predominantly 
in terms of ensuring civilian control of the armed forces), building capacity, and 
restructuring where necessary to ensure efficiency. Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) is an essential element of a successful SSR process, particularly as 
post-conflict and transitional states invariably have over-sized armed forces that are 
both inappropriate and unaffordable during peacetime. In the South African case, there 
was the additional consideration of the liberation movement armies further swelling the 
ranks. The overall purpose of SSR and DDR is to “ensure that the military remains 
strong enough to defend the State (protected by the military) and subservient enough 
not to threaten the State (protected from the military)” (Heinecken et al, 2005: 119).  
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The need for SSR can also surpass militaristic or economic considerations by forming 
an integral part of the post-conflict reconstruction of a society’s norms, creating a space 
within which former enemies can seek reconciliation and forge a new future, as 
described by Stott (2002):  
“… the legacy of the recent past will not be overcome simply by the laying aside of 
arms. Neither the old SADF, nor the liberation armies, were created or structured 
to serve in a democracy and none had an unblemished history of respecting human 
rights. For these reasons, it is of the utmost importance that potential problems and 
pitfalls in the drive to consolidate democratic gains, and fundamentally transform 
the armed services, are adequately addressed”. 
 
Thus, it can also be argued that SSR has a role to play in wider societal reconstruction, 
in that it can “present an opportunity to aim higher than merely recreating the pre-
conflict situation” (Zuckerman & Greenberg, 2004: 8). The challenges and opportunities 
of the post-conflict period lie in the reconfiguration of the roles and principles through 
which a society will be governed, and particularly in the redistribution of responsibilities 
and privileges amongst society (Koen, 2006: 2). An equitable and inclusive system is 
essential to allow the restoration of order and security (Zwane, 1995; Zuckerman & 
Greenberg, 2004; Svensson, 2007; Albrecht & Barnes, 2008), and prevent the resurgence 
of conflict.  
 
These opportunities and challenges of the post-conflict period are thus “compounded 
when viewed through a gendered lens” (Koen, 2006: 2), particularly as the nature of 
conflicts has changed to become centered around issues of “power, control, political 
loyalty and ethno-nationalism. These are all elements in the formation of political 
identities and these political identities are also gendered” (Koen, 2006: 4; Jackson & 
Pearson, 1998; Modise & Curnow, 2000; Nzomo, 2002; Pearson, 2004; Puwar, 2004; 
Genz, 2006; Pillay, 2006; Heinecken, 2009: 27).  
 
It is argued that as the fundamental benchmarks for peace and development, such as 
participation, inclusivity, and broad-based empowerment (Schoeman, 1998; Gueli, 2008; 
Hutton, 2009; Makinana, 2009), are the same as those required for achieving gender 
equality (Pillay, 2006: 1; Svensson, 2007: 9), the opportunities which arise during the 
period of democratisation following transitions from conflict may be capitalised upon in 
order to consolidate political and social transformations occurring during the post-
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conflict stages (Sorenson, 1998; Vincent, 2001; Heinecken, 2002; Koen, 2006; Pillay, 
2006; Koen, 2006: 1; Clarke, 2008). Thus, in the same manner that peace and 
development are actively linked to the overhaul of the security structures, peace and 
development are also intertwined with gender equality goals in a conscious process of 
entanglement that connects gender with security.  
 
The increasing pressure of the international community (through policies, declarations 
and other instruments125) to transform the approach of developing states towards 
human rights and gender rights through constitutional and legislative reform, allows the 
voices of marginalised groups to be heard (Sorenson, 1998: ii; Koen, 2006: 2; Hendricks 
& Hutton, 2008: 4; Valasek, 2008: 8).  
 
The potential for affecting change was aided by the 1995 Fourth World Conference on 
Women in Beijing where the Declaration and Platform for Action set out twelve issues 
of concern in the attainment of women’s equality (and numerous strategies for 
addressing them), including “numerous obligations in relation to the security sector” 
(Bastick & Valasek, 2008: 3; Cohn, 2004).  
 
Apart from ensuring gender-balanced State structures at all levels, it also called for 
targeted training of security personnel (in the military, police, judiciary, etcetera) with 
respect to gender- and human-rights (Bastick & Valasek, 2008: 3). It further noted the 
under-representation of women in decision-making positions related to security, stating 
that “the equal access and full participation of women in power structures and their full 
involvement in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts are essential for 
the maintenance and promotion of peace and security” (UN, 1995b: para. 134).  
                                                 
125 These instruments include calls for greater participation by women in all aspects of security. The SSR 
process represents an opportunity to formalise the involvement of women during the institutional 
transformation of the security system. These security-specific gender instruments emerged from 
decades of incremental gains in the protection of fundamental gender rights as laid out in, amongst 
others, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the UN GA International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952), and 
the UN Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict 
(1974), as discussed by Bastick and Valasek (2008). These conventions and declarations formalised 
equality before the law, and prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or political 
affiliations. More explicit protection and targets were laid out in further documents, including the 
1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
which called for specific legislation to ensure the abolishment of discrimination, exclusion or 
restrictions against women, protecting their right to equality in all spheres, particularly with regards to 
employment, promotions, equal remuneration, and job security (UN, 1979). 
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Two closely related instruments that significantly aided efforts to formalise women’s 
inclusion in peace and security processes were the Windhoek Declaration/Namibia Plan 
of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support 
Operations (May 2000) and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (October 2000).  
 
The Windhoek Declaration/Namibia Plan recognises the necessity for women to be 
“equal partners” in all aspects of the peace process; calls for a target of 50% women in 
managerial and decision-making positions, including in UN peace support operations; 
and the inclusion of gender in the training programmes and monitoring and evaluation 
reports of missions (UN, 2000: para. 3, 5, 6, 8).  
 
The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) goes further than any 
preceding instrument in its recognition of the contribution of women in conflict and 
post-conflict situations in a variety of capacities, and renews earlier calls for women’s 
full and equal participation in all aspects of post-conflict situations (particularly in peace 
agreements, SSR and DDR processes), expanding on the obligations by states in terms 
of ensuring compliance. As Cohn (2004) and Heinecken (2009: 27) point out, the 
Resolution affirmed that the meaningful participation of women in the security arena 
was “not only something that is beneficial, but essential”.126 
 
Other regional instruments calling for the legal elimination of discrimination against 
women, and setting forth a variety of mechanisms by which states can achieve gender 
equality, include the SADC Gender and Development Declaration (1997), the SADC 
Protocol on Gender and Development (2008), the African Union Declaration on 
Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (2002), the African Union 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa (2003), and the African Union Solemn Declaration of Gender 
Equality in Africa (2004).  
 
                                                 
126 A range of authors have analysed various aspects of the impact of these instruments on the 
advancement of gender rights. These include Byrne et al (1996); Baden and Goetz (1998); Jackson and 
Pearson (1998); Zinsser (2002); Cohn (2004); Batliwala and Dhanraj (2007); Cornwall, Harrison & 
Whitehead (2007); Mama (2007); Molyneux (2007); Mukhopadhyay (2007); Sardenberg (2007); 
Subrahmanian (2007); Woodford-Berger (2007), Bastick and Valasek (2008), amongst many others. 
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Arguably, the most innovative gender-related document to emerge from the AU was the 
2006 Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRD). It identifies 
gender as a cross-cutting element across all security concerns and acknowledges current 
institutionalised inequalities. This requires policy development needs to go beyond 
gender-sensitive planning and the provision of a legal framework for access, by 
transforming public institutions and ensuring the participation of men in the 
achievement of these goals (AU, 2006: 22). Significantly, the policy places gender 
alongside the six indicative elements of the strategy: security; humanitarian/emergency 
assistance; political governance and transition; socio-economic reconstruction and 
development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and women and gender (AU, 
2006: 7). In other words, the PCRD can be seen as the strategic coupling of gender 
equality with wider reform goals, providing a compelling basis from which women can 
agitate for change within the security sector, particularly given South Africa’s central role 
within the AU and its stated intention of being seen as a model for democratic reform 
based on a commitment to human rights.  
 
In other words, strategically utilising the shift to HSP and the opportunities presented 
by SSR, and drawing on the tools provided in the various regional and international 
instruments, provides a time-constrained opportunity to transform gendered norms 
within the security sector and create an enabling environment for continuing gendered 
institutional change. 
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6.5 Security Sector Reform: Mainstreaming Gender 
 
“War implodes the distinction between the public and private spheres. There is a 
real sense in which war is a transformative force; it initiates social change; it 
restructures relations between the sexes; it provides a kind of springboard from 
which many women have moved beyond circumscribed domestic roles into new 
arenas” (Cock, 1991: 51). 
 
The SSR process presents “an opportunity for African women to advance their status in 
the public arena” (Clarke, 2008: 49), leading to “operational effectiveness, local 
ownership and strengthened oversight” (Valasek, 2008: 1; Pillay, 2006: 7; Heinecken, 
2009: 27). By calling for robust terms of reference, targeted focus groups, and gender-
responsive policies and practices, gender issues are placed on the security agenda, 
although Valasek (2008: 5) cautions that:  
“being a woman does not automatically make someone a ‘gender expert’, and 
increasing the number of women in the room does not necessarily guarantee 
gender-responsive policy and programming. However, a balance of women and 
men at all levels of institutions creates greater possibilities for identifying and 
addressing the different impacts of policy and programming on women and men. In 
many cases, having both male and female personnel is an operational necessity”. 
 
This point of view is shared by Hendricks and Hutton (2008: 3) who argue that  
“although the presence of women is critical to creating a gender balance, this alone 
does not guarantee that defence reform or the defence forces will be gender 
responsive. A gender perspective in defence reform has to go beyond numbers. It 
must critically pose the questions: security for whom and how?” 
 
SSR creates openings to mainstream the use of “gender aware” policies that consider 
the differential impact of war and post-conflict activities on men and women, and 
“gender-blind” approaches that “largely disregards these differences” (Sorenson, 1998: 
1). This approach, which counters traditional ideas about security as a masculine realm, 
was adopted by activist women from across the political spectrum in South Africa. 
Bolstered by the success of DRW and SRW in the general governance structures of the 
State (outlined in Chapter Five), and drawing on their experiences during the liberation 
struggle (as detailed in Chapters Three and Four), female politicians and gender activists 
pushed for a gendered SSR process in South Africa.  
 
Apart from enhancing the legitimacy of the process, women’s organisations served as 
“crucial bridges between local communities and security policymakers, strengthening 
local ownership” as they have an in-depth understanding of the security needs of their 
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communities, and often have experience in the creation and implementation of 
initiatives within their districts (Valasek, 2008: 6). The active involvement of women 
through forums such as hearings and community consultations widened the potential 
human resource pool, offering additional skills to the team (Anderlini, 2004; Valasek, 
2008: 8; Heinecken, 2009: 27). This is “an operational imperative” in that “gender 
perspectives ...  recognise that a population is not a homogenous group, but constitutes 
a broad range of needs and interests” (Albrecht & Barnes, 2008: 4). It also facilitates a 
deeper understanding of conflict, allowing contextual challenges to be factored into the 
process (Zuckerman & Greenberg, 2004: 5; Hendricks & Hutton, 2008: 4). The goal is 
thus relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and transparency (Zuckerman & 
Greenberg, 2004: 6; Valasek, 2008: 16; Heinecken, 2009: 27).  
 
With specific reference to humanitarian missions, Heinecken (2009: 27) argues that 
“there is growing evidence that a better gender/racial mix is more suited ... especially in 
their interaction with local communities”, noting that greater diversity “improves the 
effectiveness of armed forces”. A noteworthy example of the effectiveness of a gender 
dimension to peacekeeping actions was the UN Mission to South Africa (UNOMSA) 
prior to the 1994 elections, a multi-mandated operation encompassing observation, 
peacekeeping (in case of civil unrest) and peacemaking (assisting local structures during 
the negotiation process) (Ndulo, 1995; King, 1997; Pillay, 2006: 5). Led by Angela King, 
at the time it was only the third operation to be under the command of a woman and 
was the first to achieve gender parity: between 46-53% female mission staff, and 50% 
female team leaders “even in the politically most volatile provinces of Kwazulu Natal 
and Gauteng” (Pillay, 2006: 5; King, 1997). In general, the mission with gender parity 
was found to have been more consultative and hands-on, facilitating better relationships 
with the community (which instilled confidence and trust), and creating networking and 
information-sharing opportunities lacking in other missions (Ndulo, 1995; King, 1997; 
Pillay, 2006: 5). 
 
The experiences and lessons learnt from the UNOMSA mission underscore the 
assertion that the involvement of women in the defence arena does more than 
transform notions of gender equality within security, serving to reframe how women are 
seen within the current social order (Zwane, 1995; King, 1997). The widely accepted 
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success of the mission amongst officials and security personnel served to reinforce 
reform efforts by legitimising the presence of women.  
 
The continual emphasis by the ANC regime on equality in all aspects, as articulated in 
all policy documents (including the Constitution, and the White Paper on Defence, 
amongst others), could, if implemented, bring about the desired shift in norms. 
Realising this shift is another matter, but it can be argued that full and meaningful 
gender integration can have a much wider impact than “just” opening all military posts 
to women. Achieving gender equality in the security sector can go beyond gendered 
institutional transformation, as representation arguments feed into this as well. 
Overcoming discrimination (in any sense) is part of the process of ensuring the 
legitimacy of the security sector (Heinecken, 2009: 26). 
 
A successful SSR process can be a means to go beyond politically correct lip service and 
meaningfully assimilate gender issues to ensure broader participation and optimal 
efficiency in various spheres (Hendricks & Hutton, 2008: 2; Valasek, 2008: 1). The 
inclusion of broad-based consultations that facilitate the input of a variety of 
stakeholders ensures non-discriminatory terms of references for the SSR process and 
aids the development of equity-oriented policies that address the “underlying tensions 
that cultural and ideological differences bring” (Heinecken, 2009: 27; Valasek, 2008: 5). 
In practical terms, SSR addresses the disproportionate effect of war on women, which is 
compounded by the added responsibilities brought about by both conflict and post-
conflict roles (Zuckerman and Greenberg, 2004: 8).  
 
The failure or poor implementation of SSR processes in a variety of contexts are usually 
attributed to poor participation, lack of capacity, inadequate infrastructure, and 
insufficient time and resources for the undertaking (Valasek, 2008: 19; Williams, 2001: 
Zuckerman & Greenberg, 2004: 6). In South Africa, as elsewhere, inequitable power 
dynamics are a formidable stumbling block, reiterating the need to address the gender 
relations that perpetuate discrimination and uphold the institutional norms reinforcing 
gender inequality (Zuckerman & Greenberg, 2004: 7; Albrecht & Barnes, 2008: 5). In 
other words, a reconfiguration of the military and the security sector in general is 
needed, not only in terms of structure and forces, but also in relation to its purpose in 
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society and its relationship with society. This must necessarily be tempered by an 
understanding of how women were/are advancing within security structures both prior 
to and post conflict. The rethinking of security and its relationship to citizens would 
enable not only a re-evaluation of women’s contributions in the past, but the opening 
up of new spaces for the future.  
 
The starting point for this process would necessarily entail an understanding of how 
roles within the security sector are gendered: the processes through which masculinity is 
privileged in relation to the military. As Tickner (2001: 7), amongst others, has pointed 
out, “new democracies are not always friendly towards women”. This is echoed by 
Enloe (1990: 13) who notes that while “women do not benefit automatically every time 
the international system is reordered”, there are instances where “re-defining masculinity 
[is] integral to re-establishing national sovereignty”. In other words, the various shifts 
occurring simultaneously within the South African security – the adoption of the HSP 
and the transformation of the SANDF, amongst others discussed in Chapters Six and 
Seven – facilitate the reworking of these concepts, but are not sufficient on their own. 
This would not be a spontaneous or natural occurrence: the social hierarchies sustaining 
inequitable gender relations in the security sector would need to be deconstructed 
(Vickers, 1993: 106-107; Tickner, 2001: 62), a task that would be difficult given the 
extensive influence of masculinised concepts of security on gendered security roles 
(Cock, 1992; Goldstein, 2001: 9; Tickner, 2001: 61). 
 
The historical subjugation of women in formal arenas for political participation has been 
discussed at length throughout this thesis. The difficulty in negotiating access to 
decision-making forums has similarly been emphasised, and underscores the importance 
of re-negotiating the way in which women (and women’s roles) are perceived. The 
mixed success of this endeavour within the general governance structures of the State 
has been scrutinised in Chapter Five, and unpicking how this process has unfolded 
within the security arena requires an understanding of the construction of gendered 
roles in relation to war and security (Enloe, 1989; Cock, 1992; Vickers, 1993: 106-107; 
Tickner, 2001: 53; Cockburn, 2007: 243). 
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In the same way that gender and gender relations are constructed through unequal 
power relations in society, so too is the concept of security mediated in a way that 
privileges masculinity, as explored by authors such as Enloe (1989), Cock (1992), 
Vickers (1993), Tickner (2001), Goldstein (2001), and Cockburn (2007). The means by 
which this occurs are plentiful, and include the denial of women’s voices in issues 
concerning security (Tickner, 2001: 37), portraying women as innately peaceful and 
nurturing (Enloe, 1989; Cock, 1992; Vickers, 1993: 43, 107; Goldstein, 2001: 322-331; 
Tickner, 2001: 57-59; Cockburn, 2007: 241), and excluding women from meaningfully 
participating in the security infrastructure of the State. 
 
The socially mediated construction of gender roles (whether in security or any other 
arena), extends to the linkage of security and masculinity, and therefore requires the 
exercise of power by elites in order to sustain the dominance of the masculine over the 
feminine. This is clearly articulated in the statement by Tickner (2001: 60) that the 
“traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity that sustain war require an exercise 
of power: they are not inevitable”, and this power “must be adaptively reproduced from 
generation to generation” (Cockburn, 2007: 240). In other words, the gendering of 
conceptualisations of war/militarism is socially mediated, privileging the masculine in 
the realm of security. The “intense socialisation and training” needed to link masculinity 
and war (Goldstein, 2001: 252; Vickers, 1993: 43; Cockburn, 2007: 227-229, 242, 250) 
must be sustained, and changing the way masculinity, war and security are interlinked 
requires a conscious shift of the norms and rules (formal and informal) surrounding 
these concepts.  
 
The combined influences of the HSP, SANDF restructuring, pursuit of gender 
mainstreaming policies, and the influx of women from MK, all served to kick start this 
process of gendered institutional change in the State security sector. Firstly, the more 
inclusive view of security increased the opportunities for change, as feminist arguments 
have asserted for some time (Tickner, 2001: 4, 63). The increase in descriptive 
representation, and the measures aimed at achieving substantive representation, detailed 
in the next chapter, all influenced the reconstruction of the formal and informal rules 
and norms governing the roles of women in security, subtly altering how masculinity 
and femininity are tied to security, and aiding the process of institutional transformation. 
Chapter Six: Evolving Notions of Security - Opportunities for Transformation 199 
Key to this process would be the undertaking of Security Sector Reform, which 
facilitates the implementation of gender mainstreaming principles as it advocates a 
participative strategy aimed at fundamentally reconstructing the security sector – 
creating openings for the substantive participation of women in the security 
infrastructure of the State. 
 
6.6 Security Sector Reform: SADF to SANDF 
 
The transformation of the South African Defence Force (SADF) to the South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF) was modelled upon the strategies developed to effect 
the broader transformation process within South Africa, and had repercussions on the 
economic, political and social structures of society. The move from an aggressive 
regional stance towards “a posture of co-operative and confidence-building defence” 
(DoD, 1998: ch 9, para. 1) was perhaps the most significant shift as it reflected the new 
vision of the State as a leading regional partner promoting peace, stability and 
development, as has been highlighted above. This is articulated within the plethora of 
government policy documents and initiatives that emerged at the time, including the 
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and various strategic plans such as the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP), and later the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution strategy (GEAR). 
 
Following the parliamentary approval of the 1996 White Paper on National Defence, a 
Defence Review (DR) was undertaken to elaborate on the policy framework outlined 
within the White Paper, providing a basis for long-term planning (DoD, 1998). The 
Defence Review clarified the new doctrine and mandate of the force, required levels of 
personnel, armaments and funding, and the transformation strategy of the SANDF to 
ensure that all forces conform to equity and representation targets, creating a “non-
racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture” (DoD, 1998; ch 10, para. 
2). 
 
According to the Defence Review, the transformation of the Department of Defence 
(DoD) was to be undertaken within three areas: civil-military relations, normative and 
cultural transformation, and organisational restructuring. Addressing civil-military 
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relations called for the alignment of the DoD with constitutional and other legal 
frameworks, including the RDP, GEAR, the White Paper on the Transformation of the 
Public Service, and the Defence White Paper, amongst others (DoD, 1998; ch 9, para. 
1).  
 
As part of this alignment process, it was proposed that accountability measures be 
strengthened, the function and composition of the defence force reconsidered, and 
stringent oversight mechanisms put in place (DoD, 1998; ch 9, para. 2). This would 
include parliamentary control of the defence mandate and budget127 to ensure the 
harmonisation of defence activities with wider government objectives.  
 
More broadly, the legislative and oversight function of the South African Parliament 
was intended to place the institution in a unique position to ensure the participation and 
inclusion of a multitude of marginalised groups, not least that of women. As 
democratically elected representatives, parliamentarians “exercise a crucial bridging 
function between government and the citizens in shaping national dialogue on security” 
(Luciak: 2008, 1; Anderlini, 2004). By building consensus through debates and hearings, 
at times conflicting views on security needs can be reconciled through the parliamentary 
process. Parliamentarians can also amend security related policies and laws, call on 
expert civilian testimony, and exercise their monitoring and evaluation powers over 
programmes and strategies (Anderlini, 2004; Luciak: 2008, 2).  
 
However, the long-established dominance of the Executive in the security arena 
constrains Parliament to an extent. The legitimacy of civilian oversight of the military 
and the commitment to good governance principles require that these traditional 
notions of control be challenged.128 This is expanded upon in Chapter Eight’s discussion 
of the Arms Deal, which illustrates the repercussions of this dominance. 
 
                                                 
127 The Joint Standing Committee on Defence, together with the National Assembly and National Council 
of Provinces defence committees would fulfil this function (DoD, 1998). This provision is of 
particular import to this study, as is the proviso for the Finance and Public Accounts parliamentary 
committees to “summon any public account holder concerning their expenditure”, including the 
Auditor General. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight during the analysis of the Arms 
Deal case.  
128 As demonstrated in Chapter Five, the Executive wields an extraordinary amount of power (see Figure 
5.2 Institutional Power Matrix). 
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The goal of the normative and cultural transformation of the defence sector was to 
remodel the values and traditions of the DoD in line with the espoused new democratic 
human-rights based culture of the South African government. This would entail, for 
example, ensuring equal opportunities to all population groups with respect to 
participation and advancement within the defence sector, including the use of 
affirmative action programmes to facilitate the achievement of a broadly representative 
defence structure that reflected the demographic profile of South Africa (DoD, 1998: ch 
9, para. 2.2.2, ch 10, para. 46-7).  
 
The final element of the SSR process, highlighted for the purposes of this study, is 
organisational restructuring, which refers to the “rationalisation and right-sizing of the 
DoD”, including the demobilisation of surplus personnel (DoD, 1998: ch 9, para. 2.3). 
The various armed movements129 involved in the struggle for democracy were integrated 
into one unified force as part of the transformation of the SADF to the SANDF, 
creating a number of challenges for the SSR process as the ranks swelled.  
 
It was understood that the assimilation of formerly antagonistic forces would need to be 
undertaken with sensitivity, particularly as the simultaneous application of affirmative 
action policies could cause animosity between personnel (Zwane, 1995; Williams, 2001; 
Stott, 2002; Anderlini, 2004, 23; Heinecken, 2009: 36). The affirmative action policies 
were aimed at achieving more than providing opportunities for previously marginalised 
groups, including women; they sought to produce a force that was more representative 
of the wider population and ensure that the “military culture will be reflective of the 
diverse military traditions within South African society” (DoD, 1998: ch 9, para. 2.2.2). 
These two challenges relate closely to the third challenge: the reduction of the number 
of surplus personnel while retaining skilled officers, and providing transferable skills to 
those leaving the force in order to facilitate their reintegration into society. This was 
particularly salient in the case of former freedom fighters that may have limited 
education as a result of the Struggle, and therefore required vocational training in order 
to enter the formal economy following their demobilisation (DoD, 1998: ch 7, para. 
                                                 
129 These include MK, APLA, and the forces of the nominally independent “homelands” of the Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC). 
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23)130. A further insight is made by Williams (2001) that “demobilisation is not simply a 
military challenge – indeed, it is not even primarily a military challenge” as the military 
has neither the human nor financial capacity to attend to the various challenges which 
accompany reintegrating former combatants, relying instead on community structures 
(traditionally dominated by women). The failure of the State to engage adequately with 
demobilised combatants in post-conflict South Africa has been well documented, with 
the most visible consequences being a rise in violent crime and domestic violence 
(Zwane, 1995; ISS, 2001; Williams, 2001; Stott, 2002). 
 
The observation that SSR transcends military considerations (Williams, 2001) reiterates 
the need to incorporate personnel from a variety of backgrounds in order to create a 
representative force aimed at transforming wider societal norms and values. The 
presence of an array of personnel with differing experiences and perspectives creates a 
pool of human capacity upon which to draw that is as diverse as the challenges facing 
the nation. Ensuring the retention of personnel with the skills required to contribute to 
the transformation process was one facet of the SSR strategy, and reiterates the 
importance of utilising the expertise of women who had participated in the liberation 
struggle.  
 
This process of organisational restructuring represented a key moment for the 
participation of women in the reform of the security sector. How could gender be 
entrenched within the new structures of the security? What mechanisms could aid the 
advancement of women within these transformed structures? What were the tools that 
women strategically wielded to sustain the gendered institutional changes wrought by 
the SSR process? This is the focus of Chapter Seven. 
 
                                                 
130 In order to achieve this, a Personnel Rationalisation Work Group (PRWG) was established to ensure 
transparency. A sub-work group provided guidance on “regionalised psychological and social support 
to members and their families who are to be affected by the rationalisation process”, together with a 
Consultation Forum that would “liaise with employee organisations about civilian members who 
could be affected by the rationalisation process” (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 48). Concerns were also 
raised about the provision of pensions to combatants who were not retained, and which could 
constitute a significant budgetary allocation (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 51). 
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6.7 Conclusion 
 
The shift towards the people-centred and development-oriented human security 
paradigm fundamentally altered the manner in which South Africa viewed security. The 
overarching need to transform both its internal and external security policies with a view 
to negotiate the various post-transition challenges (such as underdevelopment and 
broad-based institutional restructuring) and meet its regional and continental 
obligations, created a conducive environment for increased participation from all sectors 
of society. 
 
Building on past gains and the positive effects of the historical legacies of the armed 
struggle and the openings for more active involvement created by the SSR process, 
women had the opportunity to make a marked impact on the restructuring of the 
security mechanisms of the State. In light of the continued emphasis on equality, the 
prominence of women within the general structures of the State, and the status 
previously enjoyed by women within MK in particular, the prospects for meaningful 
reform appeared promising. Gender-specific provisions within various regional and 
international instruments provided further impetus for gendered institutional change. 
The movement towards a truly inclusive security arena was also supported by the State’s 
own regional leadership aspirations.  
 
Within the SANDF, the need to utilise the potential human capacity of incoming 
personnel as a result of the amalgamation of various forces further enhanced women’s 
prospects for affecting gendered institutional change. A specific focus on skills 
development and equity provisions mandated by various policies could provide another 
boost. 
 
Set against this backdrop, the following chapter explores the gender gains made in the 
security sector in South Africa. The success of the integration process undertaken 
through SSR is considered in numerical terms, as is the increased overall representation 
of women, specifically within management positions. A more in-depth analysis of the 
perceptions of women within the security structures of the State is followed by a short 
case-study of the reality of women attempting to steer State security policy. The purpose 
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is to ascertain whether the various instruments highlighted in this chapter have served to 
increase women’s substantive representation within the security structures of the State, 
or whether an increase in the descriptive representation of women was the extent of the 
transformation process. In other words, did the ideas promoted by these instruments 
(equality, participation, collective development and security) become entrenched in the 










INSTITUTIONAL GENDERING AND THE SOUTH 




The shift to the Human Security Paradigm (HSP), that emphasised a holistic people-
centric approach to security, presented opportunities to reconstitute gendered security 
roles, particularly in the post-conflict context, as noted by feminists from both the 
developed and developing world. As Clarke (2008: 49) points out, security sector reform 
may “present an opportunity for engagement with these militarised masculinities in a 
way which would allow for the emergence of an alternative society”. Cock (1991: 105) 
asserts that “in a civil war or struggle such as that waged in the eighties in South Africa, 
the landscape of combat is redrawn as the experience of war spreads among the general 
population. In this process, an important breach in the ideological constructions of 
gender is threatened”. In other words, the legacy of militarisation was the 
transformation of societal norms with respect to gendered security roles, through a 
destabilisation of stereotypical gender roles and the reinforcement of new roles that 
arose as a result of the intersection of women’s autonomy and militancy within the 
armed liberation struggle.  
 
The post-conflict period represented an opportunity to entrench some of these changes 
within the institutions of the State. The increasing autonomy of women throughout 
South Africa’s history, coupled with the legacy of militancy that expanded women’s 
roles in relation to security, thus provided women in the security sector with the relative 
power to begin consolidating gender gains during the State transformation process of 
the transition, in terms of both DRW and SRW. As Chapter Five has shown, women 
continued acting strategically to infuse new (and old) institutional structures with the 
norms and values espoused by the ANC: equality and participation in all spheres 
without discrimination. Perhaps the biggest challenge would be transforming the 
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masculine realm of the security sector, and entrenching the hard-won gains of the 
liberation era.   
 
The quest for entrenching gender gains in the evolving security structures of the State 
was aided by the new mandate of the democratic regime discussed in the previous 
chapter. The changing international and regional landscape, particularly the end of the 
Cold War and the shifting power dynamics within the region, precipitated South Africa’s 
adoption of a security policy that took cognisance of the link between security and 
development. The State needed to reposition the military within both South African 
society and the wider regional context, and the HSP dove-tailed with the broader 
foreign policy vision of the ANC-government to rebrand South Africa as a regional 
player with the moral authority to lead. In an effort to rehabilitate South Africa’s poor 
regional image, the security forces would be re-mandated to focus on peacekeeping 
activities. This reform of the security sector was intended to solve a number of potential 
problems: the new SANDF could absorb cadres from former liberation armies to man 
these missions, the defence force would be seen as more representative of the 
population (and thus have greater legitimacy), stability would be increased nationally and 
regionally, and the arms industry would remain operational. 
 
This chapter argues that the intersection of the three legacies established in Part II of 
the thesis (the legacies of militancy, increasing women’s autonomy, and the emphasis on 
equality) facilitated the process of gendering State security institutions, illustrating how 
gendered institutional change was occurring in post-conflict South Africa. These 
changes to institutional rules and norms are demonstrated through the creation of 
structural mechanisms for representation and participation, the reconstitution of the 
SANDF to reflect population demographics in a more equitable manner, and the rapid 
increase in women’s descriptive representation.  
 
This presents only a partial picture of the SSR process in South Africa, as the focus of 
this thesis is on the gendered dimension of this process. The second part of this chapter 
examines the perceptions of members of government and civil society practitioners of 
the gendering of State security structures, in order to draw a more accurate picture of 
the SRW. Is gender considered an important dimension in the formulation of security 
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policy? Are women advancing within these security structures and are their 
contributions to the SSR process valued? What factors are considered influential in the 
advancement of women, and what does this reveal about the autonomy and power of 
women within the security sector in South Africa? 
 
7.2 Structural Mechanisms for Representation and Participation 
 
The wide-ranging SSR process in South Africa aimed to reconstitute the place of the 
military in society through the transformation of the State security institutions. This 
process was guided by the Defence Review (DR), described in the previous chapter, 
which also informed the subsequent policy documents pertaining to the security 
sector.131 The ANC-regime pursued a participatory and consultative approach during the 
1998 Defence Review and the ensuing transformation of the SANDF, which enhanced 
the opportunities for gendered institutional change during the process. For example, a 
Working Group, with specialist sub-committees, was appointed by the Minister of 
Defence. These committees consisted of parliamentarians, SANDF personnel, members 
of the Defence Secretariat, and representatives from the Armaments Corporation of 
South Africa (Armscor), the defence industry, academia, and civil society. A committee 
was also established with the sole purpose of considering the role of women within the 
new SANDF. National consultative conferences and regional workshops were held, 
which were open to the public, and the findings presented to the parliamentary Joint 
Standing Committee on Defence, the Department of Defence, the Cabinet and 
Parliament (DoD, 1998: para. 8-13; Stott, 2002; Anderlini, 2004). 
 
The role of women within the security sector, and the realisation of some of the goals of 
gender equality are explicitly addressed in the Defence Review, starting with an 
overturning of the SADF restriction regarding the ineligibility of women to serve in all 
uniformed posts, and addressing the training backlogs for women wishing to serve in 
command positions (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 58). In order to speed up the reduction of 
these backlogs, a “fast tracking” strategy was outlined that would give priority placement 
                                                 
131 These include the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998), the White Paper on South African 
Participation in International Peace Missions (1999), the SANDF Code of Conduct (2000), the New 
Defence Act 42 of 2002, and the White Paper on the South African Defence Related Industries 
(1999). 
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to personnel “who display potential to qualify sooner than would normally be the case” 
(DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 16). This measure was identified by the DoD as a means to 
fulfil the constitutional equality clause (Section 9) by levelling the playing field through 
the provision of career development opportunities (SA Soldier, 2004: 40).  
 
In addition, the continuance of the MK tradition of standardised training for male and 
female personnel is an important feature of the new institutional culture being 
developed in the SANDF, and represents a marked departure from the experiences of 
female personnel in the SADF, as discussed in Chapter Three. The standardisation of 
training contributed to the evolution of institutional norms within the security sector, as 
it represented the implementation of the equality policy of the new regime. This 
mirrored the effect that standardised training had in MK, which Cock (1992) discusses: 
 “I was frequently told that the outcome of this integrated training was that the 
presence of competent and confident women was felt in a wide range of 
departments within MK. I was often told that this helped to overcome feelings of 
inferiority on the part of women cadres and sexist attitudes on the part of men 
cadres”.  
 
In other words, changing the formal rules regarding the acceptable roles of women in 
security, and providing the means through which women could attain and maintain 
these roles, demonstrates the commitment of the State in implementing the gender 
mainstreaming strategy in order to attain gender equality. This in turn affects the 
institutional norms governing gender relations, and aids the process of achieving 
gendered institutional change, not least because of the recognition of women as 
legitimate political actors in State security institutions. 
  
The primary structure coordinating the gender mainstreaming of the security sector is 
the Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate (EOCD), created as a result of the 
transformation of the SADF into the SANDF. It forms one of five divisional areas 
under the purview of the Secretary of Defence, alongside the Policy and Planning 
Division, Finance Division, Departmental Acquisition and Procurement Division, and 
the Defence Inspectorate, endowing the structure with both prominence and 
influence.132 The EOCD is responsible for creating and monitoring programmes for the 
                                                 
132 The Defence Secretariat falls directly beneath the Ministry of Defence, and the EOCD therefore has 
authority over all SANDF structures. 
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implementation of the Affirmative Action (AA) and Equal Opportunity (EO) policies 
of the DOD, and facilitating training programmes for all staff (Mdluli-Sedibe, 2003; SA 
Soldier, 2004: 37, 40; Anderlini, 2004). Its oversight functions extend to dealing with 
cases of discrimination and ensuring that awareness training is conducted at all levels, 
with a particular focus on commanding officers (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 65; Anderlini, 
2004).133 Training and gender awareness programmes are conducted through a variety 
structures, such as the Gender Focal points, the Gender Forum, and the Gender 
Sensitisation Programme, which operate at various levels within the State security 
architecture (Anderlini, 2004, 26-27).  
 
The Office of the Ombudsman, created by Act 104 of 1991, also serves as an 
investigatory body for cases of unfair discrimination, bias and corruption, amongst 
other offences (SA Soldier, 2004: 21). It is one of the processes open to security 
personnel who have grievances about the institutional environment. Its mandate was 
strengthened by the replacement of the statute with Act No 23 of 1994 linking it directly 
with the Constitution.  
 
As with the gender machineries discussed in Chapter Five, adequate resources remain a 
challenge, and full roll-out and implementation has been slow in areas (Anderlini, 2004, 
27). However, given that these structures were created with the transformation of the 
SADF into the SANDF, the depth and breadth of the envisioned gender machineries is 
an encouraging indicator of the commitment of the State towards the implementation of 
the gender mainstreaming strategy as a means to attain substantive gender equality 
within the security architecture. 
 
The manner in which South Africa pursued SSR in the transition to democracy is 
acknowledged as “an example of gender inclusiveness and participation” (Luciak: 2008, 
3; Anderlini, 2004), and incorporates a number of gender mainstreaming strategies 
aimed at facilitating the substantive participation of women. The policy formulation 
process for the 1994 White Paper on Intelligence, the 1996 White Paper on Defence 
and the 1998 Safety and Security White Paper was positively impacted by the inclusion 
of women from government and civil society, and formalised the mechanisms described 
                                                 
133 Targets and other specific measures are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
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above, in keeping with the central tenets of the gender mainstreaming strategy, as 
discussed by Anderlini (2004). For example, human security priorities gained 
prominence as “women with differing views and values and of all races were central to 
articulating the vision and shaping the process” (Albrecht & Barnes, 2008: 5; SA Soldier, 
2004: 40; Anderlini, 2004, 14), bringing previously unheard and unacknowledged 
perspectives to the design of security strategies, and suggesting that women’s 
substantive representation be enhanced through the process. An illustration of this can 
be seen in the three national conferences on women in defence held by the DoD (1997, 
2006 and 2007) and resulting in the establishment of a Gender Mainstreaming Council 
(GMC) to oversee and accelerate implementation of gender equality goals, and establish 
gender focal points across all defence divisions (Juma, 2008: 8). The aims of the 
conferences included the clarification of defence quotas of 50% at all decision-making 
levels, measures for the targeted recruitment of female defence personnel, and the 
creation of budgets for gender initiatives (Juma, 2008: 8).  
 
Practical measures for retaining female personnel were also outlined within the Defence 
Review. These included the provision of day-care facilities and pre-study materials for 
parents in order to shorten the duration of long courses that require them to be away 
from home (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 59). In more general terms, calls were made for the 
removal of “any unfair discriminatory practice or attitudes, past and present, involving 
women employed in the DoD” (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 60); the development of 
training facilities to accommodate women (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 61); and the 
challenge to SANDF personnel to “adapt their lifestyle, attitudes and behaviour to a 
specific military culture” (DoD, 1998: ch 10, para. 63). However, as Stott (2002) points 
out: “despite these developments there remain a number of institutional obstacles and 
attitudes that limit developments. They underscore the importance of realising the 
practical implementation of new policy objectives, including the gradual breakdown of 
male-dominated structures and trends in the SANDF, by ensuring that women are 
involved in every structure at all levels of command, including strategic planning and 
decision-making”. The acknowledgement of women’s representation at all command 
levels has extended to the Command Council of the SANDF, which reemphasised the 
need for the sensitising of personnel to gender issues (Stott, 2002; Anderlini, 2004). 
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The next section reviews the progress made towards the integration of women at all 
levels of the SANDF in terms of descriptive representation. This is considered in 
conjunction with the representation of women within the security-related divisions of 
government structures that have a direct influence on the formulation of security policy. 
In particular, the question is asked: Has the SSR process guided by the Defence Review 
seen a consolidation of gender gains in terms of numbers? Are women represented 
within the upper ranks of the security structures? Is an enabling environment being 
created for the pursuit of substantive gains in terms of gender and security, and does 
this suggest the emergence of new paths and legacies? In other words, is there evidence 
of the consolidation of gender gains over time, leading to the establishment of new 
paths and legacies? 
 
7.3 Descriptive Overview of Women in Security Structures 
 
The descriptive representation of women within the State security structures is viewed 
from the perspective of what the numbers say about the manifestation of the three 
legacies established in Part II of the thesis, namely militancy, women’s autonomy and 
the commitment to equality. In other words, has the power derived from the increasing 
autonomy of women within the political and security arenas of the liberation movement, 
bolstered by the ANC’s credo of equality and influenced by the legacy of militancy in 
South African society, led to demonstrable gains in the newly-formed SANDF? 
 
The emphasis placed on equality by the ruling ANC, which has been demonstrated in 
the high descriptive representation of women within the general government structures 
(Chapter Five), is also evident in the security-related parliamentary and ministerial 
portfolios. The appointment of women in these prominent and influential positions is a 
visible indicator of women’s integration into the security arena, such as the appointment 
of Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka and Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma. Further, of the nine provincial premiers, five are women - including 
Gauteng, the economic hub of the nation. Considering only overtly security related 
positions, the current Cabinet includes the following portfolios held by women: Minister 
for Defence and Military Veterans (Lindiwe Sisulu), Correctional Services (Nosiviwe 
Mapisa-Nqakula), International Relations and Cooperation (Maite Nkoana-Mashabane), 
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and Deputy Minister of Police (Makhotso Sotya) (RSA, 2010). These women previously 
occupied positions of prominence and influence as well, demonstrating the embodiment 
of the legacies being discussed. For example, Dr Sisulu joined MK following her 
incarceration in 1975, and specialised in military intelligence. Prior to the advent of 
democracy, she served as Personal Assistant to Jacob Zuma while he was Head of ANC 
Intelligence, and went on to be the Chief Administrator for the ANC at CODESA. She 
served as the Chair of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (1995), Minister of 
Intelligence (2001-2004), and as Head of the Command Centre for Emergency 
Reconstruction (2000 - 2002) (RSA, 2010). Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula has served on the 
Joint Standing Committee on Defence since 1994 and as the Chair of the Joint Standing 
Committee on Intelligence. During the liberation struggle she underwent military 
training in Angola and the USSR, and served in the political military structures of the 
ANC (RSA, 2010). 
 
At committee level, the ANC in particular has shown a tangible commitment to gender 
equality in terms of descriptive representation: 
• Joint Standing Committee on Defence is chaired by Hlengiwe Mgabadeli 
• Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans: four of the nine ANC 
members are women, while the remaining seven places on the committee are filled 
by men from various opposition parties 
• Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation: five of the nine 
ANC members are women, with men from various opposition parties occupying 
the remaining eight places 
• Portfolio Committee on Police: Chaired by Lydia Sindisiwe Chikunga of the ANC, 
five of the nine ANC positions are filled by women. Both of the DA’s 
representatives are women, and six men from various opposition parties fill the 
remainder of the seats. 
 
The numbers suggest that the State’s espoused commitment to gender equality, coupled 
with the continued strategic manoeuvring of women utilising the power amassed during 
the liberation era, was resulting in the descriptive transformation of the institutional 
security structures.  
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This is also reflected in the steady increase in the overall numbers of women in the 
armed forces from 12.92% in 1998 to 19.29% in 2007, as reflected in Table 7.1. The 
1998 figures represent a number higher than expected as women entering the armed 
forces through MK (and other structures) had already been integrated into the force to 
some extent at this stage.  
 
Women’s representation rose across the board, with Black women making the biggest 
gains in upper management (an increase of almost 5%) and middle management (an 
increase of 8.49%). Part of these increases can be attributed to the stature of women 
who had served within MK134.  
 
An important point of commonality retained from the SADF- and MK-era is the 
motivation of some of these women for participating in the security sector, namely 
patriotism and opportunities for social mobility in terms of career advancement (Cock, 
1989, 1992; Unterhalter, 1989; Gaitskell & Unterhalter, 1989; Tickner, 2001: 58; 
Anderlini, 2004, 7). While the institutional environment was poles apart in MK and 
SADF when considering the roles played by women and the dangers women were 
exposed to, the desire to serve in this manner were not dissimilar. The transformation of 
the security sector due to the reforms discussed in this chapter did not change these 
motivations, but rather provided the enabling institutional environment required for 
women to exercise their rights to participate in all aspects of the decision-making 
structures of the State.  
 
The influx of MK women in particular facilitated these changes to the institutional 
norms and rules of the SANDF, given their experiences within the liberation struggle 
(discussed in Chapters Three and Four) and their assumption that the hard-won gender 
gains would be honoured. As Geisler (2000: 623) comments “unlike Afrikaner women 
with a crippling background in Calvinism, black women expected positions in 
government” (Geisler, 2000: 623). While some women returned to civilian life, Cock 
                                                 
134 Zwane (1995) notes that SADF women were never part of active combat operations, and the number 
of women in the TBVC forces was negligible. The particular paths established by the legacies of 
militancy and autonomy (together with the legacy of equality) discussed in the thesis are therefore 
distinctive to the ANC. A more detailed discussion of women in the SADF is provided by Cock 
(1989) and Gaitskell and Unterhalter (1989), noting the roles they played in the militarisation of the 
Apartheid State. 
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(2009) notes that for the women of MK, integration into the SANDF represented more 
than an employment opportunity: “membership of MK involved considerable personal 
risk and ideological commitment ... MK cadre’s status as guerrillas was often a source of 
intense pride and was linked to their gender identity and hopes for a new generation”. 
Serving in the SANDF was therefore seen as a means to continue their contribution to 
the nation-building process, challenging ingrained notions of women’s “proper” place in 
society, and ensuring that women remained part of the formal State structures and were 
not relegated to the sidelines. The increase in descriptive and substantive representation 
of women within the SANDF is thus rendered more remarkable given the hostile 
institutional environment experienced by women in the former-SADF, discussed in 
Chapter Three. In particular, the expansion of women’s roles and the formal recognition 
of women’s contributions in these new positions is an important milestone in the 
gendering of the security sector.  
 
One noteworthy difference that emerges in Table 7.1 is that in comparison to men’s 
representation figures, women within each racial group are better represented in middle 
management than in either upper management or rank and file positions. Major General 
Ntsiki Memela-Motumi partly ascribes this to the transfer of MK ranks during the 
transformation of the SANDF, which enabled MK women to retain their positions of 
prominence within the new security structure (Hendricks & Magadla, 2010). 
 
Overall, women constitute almost 30% of middle management positions, 12.7% of 
upper management posts, and 17.7% of rank and file positions. In 2007, within “upper 
management”135, Whites constituted 58.25%, followed by Blacks (36.8%), Coloureds 
(3.79%), and Asians (1.17%). While this is an improvement in comparison to the 
situation in 1998, when Blacks only occupied 11.24% of upper management in 
comparison to that of Whites (88.06%), it is a clear indication that overall numbers of 
Blacks in the armed forces do not necessarily correlate with equality.  
                                                 
135 Upper management includes the ranks of General, Lieutenant General, Major General, Brigadier 
General and Colonel. 
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Table 7.1 SANDF Composition 
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This emphasis on numbers as opposed to better engagement at all levels is emphasised 
by both Zwane (1995) and Heinecken (2009: 29), who note similar disparities between 
overall representation figures and the racial distribution across ranks. Within “middle 
management”136, there is a slightly more even spread in terms of numbers, although the 
numbers still do not reflect population demographics. Whites make up 40.6% of middle 
management (down from 69.7% in 1998), while Blacks constitute 47.16% (up from 
24.49% in 1998). “Rank and file” members most clearly illustrate the continuing 
disparity: Whites account for only 13.77% while Blacks make up 73.36%. 
 
The dual emphasis on racial and gender equality within the Defence Review alludes to 
the acknowledgement of the parallels between racial and gender inequality in South 
African society. In particular, similar issues around competency and positive action 
measures arise in both areas. The influence of racism and sexism are obviously not 
limited to the security arena, but seem to be magnified given the central role that 
military identity plays across many cultures in South Africa (as outlined in Chapters 
Three and Four). Sexism seems unusually fraught with competing theories over 
participation: elementary sexism claims women are physically and emotionally inferior 
and are thus incapable of fighting, while certain branches of feminism assert that 
women’s “innate nurturing qualities… their creativity and pacifism” essentially makes 
them ineligible (Cock, 1991: 188-189; Vincent, 2001; Heinecken, 2002: 716; Duncanson, 
2007: 6, 14;  Clarke, 2008, amongst many others). Thus, even from within the feminist 
movement the patriarchal military institutions are defended as male domains. 
 
Not all feminists share this view: “equal rights” proponents cite the notion of “equal 
obligations and responsibilities … tied to the concept of citizenship” (Cock, 1991: 189). 
A subsection of these liberal feminists maintains that women’s right to serve in the 
military is “linked to their exclusion from economic and political affairs. They deny any 
linkage of woman with ‘peace’, asserting that women are no more or less peaceful and 
compassionate than men” (Cock, 1991: 189, 1992; Enloe, 1989; Vickers, 1993: 43, 107; 
Goldstein, 2001: 322-331; Tickner, 2001: 57-59; Anderlini, 2004; Pillay, 2006: 7; 
Cockburn, 2007: 241). This view is supported by the reality of integrating the female 
                                                 
136  Middle management includes the ranks of Lieutenant Colonel, Major, Captain, Lieutenant, and Second 
Lieutenant. All other ranks are classified as “rank and file”. 
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commanders and combatants from the armed liberation movements into the SANDF 
(particularly from MK). In combination with the extensive constitutional reforms, the 
new defence force was compelled to “acknowledge the right of women to serve in all 
ranks and positions, including combat roles” (Heinecken, 2002: 715; Anderlini, 2004, 18; 
Jacob et al, 2008; Hutton, 2009). The reconstitution of women’s roles in relation to 
combat during the armed struggle therefore provided an opportunity to transform the 
manner in which women are viewed within the security structures of the democratic 
state as well, backed by the force of various legislation, policies and protocols.  
 
This lends some credence to Cock’s (1991) view that South Africa has a vastly different 
experience with militarism, especially in comparison with the Western societies from 
which most of the feminist theories related to State security structures emerge. As a 
result, women’s relationship to and with militarism is viewed differently, tempered by 
the historical experiences of women discussed in preceding chapters, which 
fundamentally impacted on women’s notions of citizenship and identity, and the 
manner in which militarism is intertwined with these two concepts. As one informant 
remarked, women “can play any role for which they are competent. Perhaps women are 
more suited to peacekeeping roles, but this does not mean that they cannot be as 
aggressive as men, if they are trained and socialised to be so”137.  
 
The intersection between the reconfigured relationship between women and security 
and the changing context was thus paramount. The new roles assumed by women 
during the liberation struggle had been borne, in part, from the necessity of the events at 
the time. The male leadership was imprisoned or in exile, the violence of the State and 
other involved parties was encroaching into their communities, and the aggressive 
reaction to sustained oppression was the strategy by which liberation would be achieved. 
However, with the shift to democracy, many of the reasons on which the acceptance of 
these expanded roles was based by wider society (dominated by masculine norms) fell 
away. The necessity of maintaining these roles would remain critical for some women 
nevertheless, as the security arena would continue to have a tangible impact on their 
daily lives. Would the maintenance of these new roles continue to be supported by the 
leadership, or would women need to hurdle this obstacle again? Would the emphasis 
                                                 
137 CS1-2 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience). 
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placed on equality and gender mainstreaming by the State, as well as the experiences of 
male and female parliamentarians with female leaders during the liberation period, 
influence the attainment of high-profile positions by women within the security arena of 
the democratic State? 
 
Confronting the norms that privilege the masculine over the feminine in security 
matters calls for a deeper understanding of the barriers to women’s advancement within 
the security structures, and altering the institutional rules that support and perpetuate 
these norms, as was discussed in the previous chapter. For example, one of the 
stumbling blocks to the integration process was the question of professional military 
standards and the contentious debate over what this implied. SADF personnel assumed 
that the TBVC and guerrilla armies would “lack the requisite professional standards”, 
while others argued that technical skills should not be the sole criteria for professional 
ability: political and ethical issues should be considered as well (Zwane, 1995).  
 
This issue intertwines with both race and gender as the base assumption in the debate is 
that “every white officer is a competent professional who has reached his position on 
merit alone” (Zwane, 1995). Cock (1991: 44-45) takes this statement further arguing 
that: 
“There are important similarities between racism and sexism. Both define either 
blacks or women as inferior, secondary and dependent. The conception of blacks in 
racism defines them as irresponsible and incompetent. This conception commonly 
includes qualities such as passivity, stupidity, or at least a poor ability for abstract 
thought and logical argument. Sexist definitions of femininity commonly include all 
these qualities. In addition, females are assumed to have a special emotional capacity 
for sympathy and compassion. Both sexism and racism are inscribed in South 
Africa society and have generated extremely violent and vicious practices”. 
 
In an inherently skewed system, such as Apartheid, patronage played an important role 
in promotion through ranks, particularly on the basis of political and ideological beliefs. 
Similarly, in the gender debate, it is assumed that men are legitimately in positions of 
authority on the basis of merit and skill, whereas women had to rely on powerful 
patrons and the “helping hand” of affirmative action.  Both of these concerns remain 
issues not only within the SANDF today, but within broader society as well.  
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At the time, Zwane (1995) commented that  
“The birth of the ‘new South Africa’ created the assumption that the old South 
Africa died suddenly on 27 April 1994, and that we were all ‘born again’. Change 
however takes longer to effect and is therefore useless to promote black and 
women officers to higher positions while the organisational culture within the 
SANDF remains the same … Black and women officers should be taught that their 
colour and sex will not afford them special privileges. Officers should know that 
affirmative action will not mean employing more and more incompetent blacks and 
the redundancy of more and more competent whites … The past cannot be 
ignored. Assumptions of racial inferiority and superiority are still present, and these 
should be openly and constructively debated in forums facilitated by professionals 
so that a common value system can be developed that is applicable to the military 
environment”. 
 
A similar view was put forward by one research participant, who comments that 
“culture and gender continue to be an issue. White and black women experience gender 
equality and gender mainstreaming differently … [and there is] not enough emphasis on 
this”138. 
 
The entrenchment of discriminatory norms within the institutional culture thus 
necessitated the formal targets for integration found in the Defence Review. These 
demographic targets, reflected in Table 7.2, show that Black personnel increased 
substantially from 39.2% (1994) to 69.2% (2007), exceeding the target set (64.6%), as 
did Coloureds (11.4%) and Indians (1.2%). Whites went from being over-represented 
(46.8% in 1994) to under-represented139 (18.1% in 2007) in just over a decade. This 
suggests that the various affirmative action and force integration strategies outlined 
within the Defence Review are being effectively implemented.  
 
Table 7.2 Overview of Demographic Targets and Integration in the SANDF 
 African Coloured Indian White 
Review Target 1 64.68 10.22 0.75 24.35 
SANDF 1994 2 39.2 12.6 1.3 46.8 
SANDF 1998 3 57.6 9.8 1.2 31.3 
SANDF 2007 4 69.2 11.4 1.2 18.1 
Population 1996 5 76.8 8.9 2.5 10.6 
Population 2010 6 79 8.8 2.5 9.7 
1 DoD (2006:12)  2 Post Integration Statistics (Adapted from Heinecken, 2009: 29)  3 DoD (1998)  4 DoD 
(2007) 5 StatsSA (2010)  6 Mid Year Estimate (StatsSA, 2010). 
 For a detailed breakdown of 1998 figures see Appendix 6; for a detailed breakdown of 2007 figures see 
Appendix 7. 
 
                                                 
138 CS1-2 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience). 
139 Under-represented in terms of the Review target, which aimed to retain some skilled White personnel. 
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Further, Table 7.3 shows that the combined former liberation forces of MK, APLA, and 
TBVC accounted for 26% of the 2007 armed forces, in comparison with 32% of former 
SADF personnel, and 42% SANDF personnel. The top three military ranks (General, 
Lieutenant General, and Major General) are dominated by Black men, with the former 
liberation forces accounting for 53% of the upper ranks, in comparison with 47% of the 
SADF. This indicates that progress is certainly being made, as a decade earlier the 
figures were 19% and 81% respectively. It is also an indication that the personnel 
integrated from the former liberation forces fared well in terms of advancement in the 
SANDF, given their continued dominance of the upper ranks. It could be inferred that 
the prominence of these cadres aided the promotion of female former freedom fighters 
as well, given their status within liberation armies such as MK (as was discussed in 
Chapter Three). 
 
Table 7.3 Composition by Former Force and Rank (1997 and 2007)  
                 (as percentages) 
 Former Force 
1997 
Rank Profile 




Brig-Gen - Gen 
MK 15 14 13 37 
APLA 5 1 6 9 
TBVC 11 4 7 7 
SADF 58 81 32 47 
SANDF* 11 0 42 0 
* The SANDF composition reflects those who joined after 1994 and who had no former force 
affiliation. 
Adapted from (Heinecken, 2009: 35). 
 
The decisive increase in the number of women in middle management ranks, in 
particular, indicate a substantial improvement in the gender (and racial) profile of the 
SANDF, an assessment shared by Heinecken (2009: 37) who notes that “great strides 
have been made to improve the gender profile and to remove barriers that restrict the 
full integration of women”. 
 
The descriptive representation of women in the security arena, reflected in the 
consideration of the quantitative gains, does not represent the whole picture of the 
gendering of the State security structures. The broader institutional environment must 
also be considered, particularly the norms and values governing gender relations, in 
order to draw conclusions about the substantive representation of women. The array of 
formal rules and informal norms informing these relations are uncovered through the 
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perceptions of participants within these structures, and individuals interacting with the 
State security machinery, such as civil society practitioners. The next section presents 
the findings of the interviews and surveys conducted primarily during the 2009 
fieldwork period (described in Chapter Two). The central questions revolve around the 
advancement of women within the State security structures: which factors are perceived 
as important? Are gender issues considered during the policy formulation process? Are 
gender concerns viewed as legitimate within the security arena? By developing a clearer 
understanding of how gender is viewed within the security realm, a better 
comprehension of the complete institutional gendering process can be gained. 
 
7.4 Perceptions of Gender in State Security Institutions 
 
The processes of gendered institutional change incorporate more than the development 
of structural mechanisms to facilitate the gendering process. Confronting the 
discriminatory norms governing gender relations is an integral part of the change 
process, and the perceptions of players within these structures are indicative of the 
success of the gendering process in transforming prejudicial norms and values. While 
the introduction of formal institutional rules aimed at embedding gender-conscious 
values is a necessary component of the institutional gendering process, the adoption of 
these new rules by players within the system is also a crucial element for enacting change 
within the system.  
 
This section therefore examines participants’ perceptions on two broad issues: the 
extent to which gender has been mainstreamed into the security sector, and the factors 
perceived as influential to women’s advancement. This does not entail an assessment of 
the gendering of policy or the effectiveness of gender equality measures. Rather, the 
purpose is to uncover how “sticky” the gender rhetoric is within the State security 
structures: Are prejudicial norms being overturned? Are the gains made during the 
liberation era being maintained? 
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7.4.1 The Consideration of Gender Issues in the Security Sector 
 
This section of the surveys and interviews was composed of a series of questions aimed 
at discerning the perceptions of participants towards the consideration of gender issues 
within the State security institutions at various levels, and the participation of women in 
the development of security policies.  
 
Overall perceptions were positive, although this was largely attributed to the dedication 
of particular men and women within both the security sector and broader government 
structures than on the institutional mechanisms put into place by the SSR process. For 
example, one respondent commented that the presence of strong women leaders 
(specifically within key parliamentary portfolios) changed the “way in which defence is 
conceptualised by DoD [and therefore] shows the participation of women”140. However, 
as the presentation of the survey and interview results below will show, gains in the 
gendering of State security institutions are tempered by the sense that ingrained 
prejudicial norms are proving difficult to change within the traditionally male domain of 
the security sector. 
 
An illustration of this is reflected in Graph 7.1, which shows that while government 
respondents felt that women made substantive inputs into the new security policies of 
the State as prominent participants in the SSR process, women were not always treated 
as credible experts during the formulation of the new security policies. Nevertheless, 
government respondents felt that women made a useful contribution to the SSR process 
in South Africa, citing the high number of women in prominent and influential 
positions within the security sector, including as Ministers and chairs of Portfolio 
Committees, commenting that “women bring a different perception to issues of 
security”141 and have “considerable influence”142. 
 
                                                 
140 CS2-6 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience). 
141 GF-4 (Government Respondent - Female). 
142 GM-2 Government Respondent - Male). 
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Graph 7.1 Gender and Security: Government Respondents 
 
 
There was also a perception that women “tend to think out of the box and therefore 
bring fresh ideas. Women are often not easily intimidated and more willing to speak 
their minds”143. One male parliamentarian noted that 
“Women are beginning to assert themselves, they are beginning to claim their 
rightful place, and overcome the prejudices that have been levelled against them. 
There are extremely competent and qualified women in South Africa that can 
hold their own against any male ... But I think more can be done to empower 
women”144. 
 
Civil society respondents reported more negative perceptions, as shown in Graph 7.2. 
Respondents commented that “women attempt to shift the thinking and actions of the 
security sector but are a minority voice against the military and forceful approaches of 
[the South African] security sector”145. Other participants noted that “the security sector 
has traditionally been a very male dominated sector in the country. Therefore, when new 
                                                 
143 GF-4 (Government Respondent - Female). 
144 Interview, 27 September 2009, Male Government Informant. 
145 CS1-1 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience). 
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security policies were formulated, women's input has been very little (if at all)”146, 
although “this is slowly changing”147.  
 
Graph 7.2 Gender and Security: Civil Society Respondents 
 
 
There was a split in opinion between civil society respondents about whether women 
made a valuable contribution towards the SSR process in South Africa, although most 
respondents regardless of experience in government security structures reported 
negative perceptions. As an indicator of whether perceptions towards women in the 
security sector were shifting, respondents were asked to assess the value men placed on 
women’s contribution towards security issues. Male government respondents appeared 
unsure whether women’s inputs were valued by men, while female government 
respondents felt that they were not. The majority of civil society respondents agreed 
with the negative assessment, including all the participants with experience in the 
government security structures (CS1). When asked how respondents themselves rated 
women’s contribution in the security sector, male government participants answered 
“average”, while most female participants (both from government and civil society) 
                                                 
146 CS1-3 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience). 
147 CS1-2 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience). 
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responded “highly” and “very highly”, commenting that “women are much more likely 
to think "safety" than simply "security". Women are typically less bellicose and more 
developmental in their thinking”148. 
 
This might suggest that the paradigm shift within the security sector towards HSP is 
permeating institutional values with respect to what security entails, enhancing the 
potential for women to meaningfully contribute to the continuing development of the 
“new” mandate of the State. This assessment is shared by Anderlini (2004), who argues 
that women played a significant role in reformulating a broader definition of security 
and integrating this new normative framework into the institutional security structures 
of the State. However, these uneven responses also indicate that some gendered 
institutional norms are proving more difficult to change, particularly in comparison with 
the perceptions of participants discussed in Chapter Five’s assessment of gender 
equality in general government structures. Interlinking with the revised security mandate 
is the sustained emphasis of the ANC-regime on ingraining equality within all sectors of 
South African society, particularly State institutions. To this end, the next set of 
questions explored the perceptions of participants towards the consideration of gender 
issues in policy formulation.  
 
Male government respondents were of the opinion that senior staff within the security 
structures of the State understood what gender mainstreaming was about and 
considered it important, while their female colleagues disagreed, as did the majority of 
civil society respondents. Similar results were obtained when questioning respondents 
about the consideration of gender during the formulation of security policy, as reflected 
in Graphs 7.3 and 7.4.  
 
 
                                                 
148 CS1-1 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience). 
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Graph 7.3 Gender Issues: Government Respondents 
 
 
Graph 7.4 Gender Issues: Civil Society Respondents 
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This suggests two scenarios. Firstly, that these male government respondents may be 
aware of the rhetoric of gender equality, but are not attuned to the underlying 
transformational purpose of gender mainstreaming to the same extent that these 
particular female respondents are. The second scenario is that the male respondents do 
understand the structural goals of gender mainstreaming, but are paying lip service to 
the espoused norms of the State.  
 
Although government respondents considered gender issues to be relevant and 
appropriate to the work of the security sector, all government respondents indicated 
that gender issues did not receive special attention within the security sector. 
The majority of civil society respondents felt that gender continues to be viewed as 
irrelevant by policy-makers within the security sector, and therefore did not receive 
special attention. One practitioner with experience within the State security sector noted 
that “at the political level [there is] great emphasis and commitment to the importance 
of gender mainstreaming. [The] problem lies in implementing policies”149. This was 
echoed by a male MP who noted: 
“I think we have come a long way as South Africa in ensuring that we redress 
the imbalances of the past; the gender equality, the race equality, the religious 
prejudices and things like that. And whilst I think we have got policies in place, 
the implementation of those policies still leaves a lot to be desired”150. 
 
The same respondent commented: 
“There is still a lot of stereotyping in South Africa, particularly amongst the 
African man. I mean if they see a woman as the head of a security institution, 
they tend to look again, and not probably give, not show the same kind of 
respect to a woman as they would to a man, because they feel the women are 
weaker. Yes, they are physically weaker but mentally they could be much 
stronger and in terms of ability, much better as well. But there is that prejudice 
and I think that is going to take a long time for us, for men in South Africa, to 
get rid of that. And that’s why I said we have excellent policies, but 
implementation of those policies, and allowing people, women especially, to 
function normally in an environment that is male dominated is something that 
we have to work at”151. 
 
This remark is indicative of the perceptions of most respondents: that the conversion of 
the rhetoric of gender equality into meaningful reforms within the security sector has 
been slower than in the general government structures of the State. This stems in part 
                                                 
149 CS1-2 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience). 
150 Interview, 27 September 2009, Male Government Informant. 
151 Interview, 27 September 2009, Male Government Informant. 
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from a need to clearly articulate the goals of gender mainstreaming, as asserted by one 
civil society respondent:  
“We need a shift in consciousness and that is not automatic ... there has got to 
be some planned, conscious effort to shift ... there has to be an understanding 
on what is gender equality – why should we put this on the agenda? What tells 
us that this is a problem?” 152 
 
Another government respondent serving on a parliamentary security portfolio 
commented: “I do not believe that it even comes up during the discussion of policy 
formulation. Maybe an inclusion in the Cabinet Memorandum format of a specific 
question/s to ask whether consideration was given to gender mainstreaming in the 
policy formulation and how the policy will contribute towards that goal, will focus the 
need”153. This was echoed by a civil society respondent who added “there is no visible 
policy debate at this level”154.  
 
Other civil society participants provided more optimistic assessments, arguing that the 
“new policy for peace missions, for example, now speaks directly to gender 
mainstreaming”155, and noting that the women who participate in policy discussions are 
“vociferous, tenacious and willing to take on the patriarchy that they encounter”156. The 
achievements of specific individuals were also cited: “[gender was not adequately 
considered during policy formulation] in the past, but under the leadership of General 
Nsiki Motumi gender has gained greater prominence and there is a dedicated sector that 
manages equal opportunities. Progress is slow but there is progress”157. Another 
pragmatic response was that “[gender] is considered to the extent that it doesn’t clash 
with other policy imperatives ... economic and strategic advantage being the main over-
riding factors”158. This can partly be attributed to the masculine and hierarchical nature 
of the security sector, discussed in previous chapters. It can also be ascribed to the 
scope of the transformation process undertaken by the SANDF, and the resultant 
prioritising of other issues such as racial equality. 
 
                                                 
152 Interview, 30 September 2009, Female Civil Society Informant. 
153 GF-4 (Government Respondent – Female). 
154 CS1-1 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience). 
155 CS2-6 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience). 
156 CS2-5 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience). 
157 CS1-2 and CS1-3 (Civil Society Respondents with government experience). 
158 CS2-5 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience). 
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The responses gathered from both government and civil society respondents therefore 
raise the question: if gender is not being emphasised, what accounts for the (relatively) 
rapid progression of women within the SANDF? As the preceding overview of the 
descriptive representation of women in the security sector shows, women are advancing 
within the defence arena. What are the perceived means by which this is occurring? 
What do these perceptions reveal about the institutional gendering process of the 
security sector? 
 
7.4.2 Factors in the Advancement of Women within the Security Sector 
 
Despite the establishment of mechanisms for participation (outlined earlier in this 
chapter), there was an overall perception that these structures were ineffective and did 
not play a substantial role in the advancement of women, as seen in the indicative 
comment of one respondent that “women advancing in the security structure [do] so 
despite the absence of gender mainstreaming programmes”159. The majority of 
participants felt that women were not afforded the same leadership opportunities as 
men, due to “resistance in some areas”, with the same respondent adding that “where 
women are successful and meet the ‘male standard’ [these women] often advance 
quicker than men”160. Opinions were more evenly divided about the advancement of 
women within State security structures, with a slight majority asserting that in their 
estimation women were advancing. 
 
Comparing the factors perceived as influential to women’s advancement shows some 
correlation between general government structures and security structures, as 
represented in Figure 7.1.  
 
                                                 
159 GF-4 (Government Respondent – Female). 
160 CS1-2 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience). 
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Figure 7.1 Factors in Advancement – Comparison of General 
Government Structures and the Security Sector  
 
 
Political party loyalty remains the dominant factor in women’s progression in State 
security institutions, according to participants from both government and civil society, 
followed by merit (government respondents) and ethnicity (civil society respondents). In 
general, these results reflect the responses given for the general government structures 
in Chapter Five. One civil society respondent noted that “the distinction between 
government and the ruling political party is poorly defined, and often seen as one and 
the same. As a result, those women that are advanced are often those who carry the 
party colours”161. This was echoed by another civil society practitioner in the security 
arena, who stated that “In South Africa, ethnicity and political party loyalty and 
                                                 
161 CS2-4 (Civil Society Respondent without government experience). 
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patronage have been the over-riding factors - not education or length of service (unless 
one counts length of service in terms of loyalty to the ANC)”162.   
 
Some incongruent results emerged in the comparison of the two spheres, as shown in 
Figure 7.1. For example, within the general government structures, there was agreement 
between respondents that qualifications were the least influential factors in women’s 
advancement. However, within the security sector, this factor rose in perceived 
importance, particularly amongst government respondents. This was attributed to the 
prestige inferred to former MK-cadres, and the boost this would give to women’s 
advancement in the ranks of the SANDF. In other words, the experiences of women, 
and the prominent role that they played both during the Struggle and during the 
transition, appeared to have made some headway into challenging the norms around 
women’s roles.  The importance of qualifications was also rated higher within the 
security sector, although civil society respondents placed both merit and qualifications 
as factors of lesser importance for women’s advancement.  
 
A significant change was the perceptions around the influence of patronage. Within 
general government structures, patronage was ranked as the third most influential factor 
in women’s advancement by all respondents. However, this fell to being the least 
influential factor within the security sector, despite political party loyalty remaining at 
the top. It would be expected that perceptions of the influence of patronage and 
political party loyalty would be clustered given the close relation between the two 
concepts. Patronage tends to originate from within the party, providing an informal 
means by which loyalty to the party can be enforced.  
 
Further, given the evidence that exists from personal accounts of men and women 
within the liberation armies, patronage has been shown to be an important factor in 
women’s advancement in the security forces. As was noted in Chapter Four, respected 
commanders such as Chris Hani and Joe Modise had an acknowledged impact on 
entrenching the principles of gender equality within military structures such as MK 
(Modise & Curnow, 2000: 37; Hassim, 2004: 440; Suttner, 2007: 240; Suttner, 2008: 
126). While this would not automatically alter the views of all personnel, it helped to 
                                                 
162 CS1-2 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience). 
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instil a culture of equality within which women could prove their mettle. It was 
suggested by one civil society respondent that ensuring the presence of women in 
decision-making structures related to security allows women to “not only serve as role 
models to other women, but in the long-term can also influence long-standing 
perceptions among both males and females on women’s positions in society - it can 
contribute in changing cultural perspectives”163. 
 
These results would then imply that either the effects of patronage are more subtle 
within the SANDF than they were in MK, or that there are fewer instances of such 
relationships within the new defence structures than in the general structures of the 
State. The second scenario is unlikely, given that political party loyalty remains the most 
influential factor in the advancement of women, which will be explored in greater depth 
in the next chapter. As one male MP argued “obviously patronage and nepotism and all 
these kinds of things are going to play a factor, it plays a factor with males as well, but 
it’s a universal tradition that you put your friend in a job”164. The support for women 
might be less overt in the security structures than in the general government structures, 
implying that gendered institutional norms are being transformed more slowly within 
the security sector. As one female MP suggested, there is a need to foster “a better 
understanding of the unique contribution that women can make in this sector and the 
willingness to accept it is not a male exclusive domain”165. 
 
Government respondents rated ethnicity as one of the least influential factors in 
women’s advancement, while civil society respondents considered it highly influential. 
The civil society view is supported by Heinecken (2009: 38), who cites a 2001 DoD 
survey in which female personnel regarded race and ethnicity as a significant issue166. 
Some informants felt that they were held back due to their lack of ties to MK, as well as 
                                                 
163  CS1-3 (Civil Society Respondent with government experience). 
164  Interview, 27 September 2009, Male Government Informant. 
165  GF-4 (Government Respondent – Female). 
166 The considerable under-representation of Zulus within the SANDF was also raised. Given the 
dominance of MK within the new security structures, there was a perception that Xhosas were over-
represented. With President Jacob Zuma as the first Zulu President, personnel and analysts are aware 
that political appointments and leadership re-shuffles may aim to alter this situation (Heinecken, 
2009: 30, 45).  
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their ethnicity167. While this view was more common amongst White women most 
women, regardless of race, felt that other factors such as merit and qualifications were 
also considered sufficiently by the higher ranked officers during the promotion process 
in order to ensure advancement, albeit at a slower rate.  
 
The integration process of the security sector (both within State governance structures 
and within the armed forces) encountered similar issues to those faced in the general 
governance structures. This was largely as a result of the institutional layering discussed 
previously, in that existing structures (and their norms and values) were merged and 
overlapped with new institutions. This required a fundamental shift not only from the 
leaders of these structures, but also from the staff (whether they be personnel in the 
armed forces or senior staffers in ministries) in order to affect meaningful institutional 
change. It is apparent that this process has been somewhat uneven, given the conflicting 
perceptions amongst both government and civil society respondents about the influence 
of women within the security structures. This ambivalence towards the full and 
meaningful integration of gender was made apparent during the contentious arms 
acquisition process that occurred as the first democratic regime came into power, and is 
explored in greater detail in the next chapter.  
 
7.5 Conclusion: Possibilities and Limits of Gendered Institutional 
Change in the Security Sector 
 
“... people are employing women in senior positions, and you look at the 
Maria Ramos’s and the Gill Marcus’s, and you look at people like that, you 
look at the Mamphela Ramphele’s. Ten years ago where were they? They 
were around but they were not given an opportunity to bloom. But if they 
were, they were suppressed to a very large extent, but now that they have 
been given this freedom to expose themselves, to express themselves, they 
are reaching great heights. And that’s what we need, we need to create the 
space for women to actually do whatever they want to do”168.  
 
The advent of democracy in South Africa presented an opportunity to transform the 
norms and values of the institutional structures of the State, as the women cited by the 
respondent above attest. Maria Ramos served as Director General of the National 
                                                 
167 Only two informants of colour expressed the view that they were held back due to their ethnicity: both 
were Coloured personnel serving in rank and file positions, and had no affiliation with either the ANC 
or MK.  
168  Interview, 27 September 2009, Male Government Informant. 
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Treasury (1996-2003) before going on to prestigious positions as Group Chief 
Executive at Transnet (2003) and the ABSA Group (2009). Gill Marcus became the first 
female Governor of the Reserve Bank in 2009, following service as the Deputy Minister 
of Finance. Mamphela Ramphele, the first black female Vice Chancellor of a South 
African university (University of Cape Town) has gone on to become one of four 
Managing Directors at the World Bank – a position never held by a South African.  
 
Within the gendered context of this study, three legacies have emerged which underpin 
the manner in which this transformation of institutional roles and rules has occurred. 
Firstly, the determination of the new regime to entrench institutional values based on 
human rights and equality in all spheres, which was evident in the policies and initiatives 
pursued, as outlined in Chapters Five and Six. Secondly, the legacy of militancy running 
through South African history (as described in Chapters Three and Four), the 
consequences of which would constitute a key challenge for the young democracy. 
Together, these two legacies required a new approach towards security as a whole, and 
presented an opportunity for the further development of the third legacy: the increasing 
autonomy of women within leadership structures of the State.  
 
The process of overhauling the State security structures in order to deliver on the new 
mandate and realise South Africa’s new vision for the nation and the region would be an 
immense undertaking. Deep-seated animosities would need to be addressed on a 
number of fronts, including the distrust between the former-SADF personnel and the 
incoming liberation cadres, racial tensions between various ethnic groups, and political 
animosities, as well as the ingrained institutional norms that were discordant with the 
revised mandate of the security sector.  
 
Applying the model for analysis (dissected in Chapter Two), utilised similarly in Chapter 
Five’s analysis of the general governance structures of the State, illustrates the promises 
and limits of the gendering of the State security institutions.  
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Figure 7.2 Framework for Analysis: Women in the Security Institutions  
of the State 
 
 
A central exogenous influence that assisted in the creation of an enabling environment for 
gendered institutional change was the adoption of the HSP, which reflected a wider 
international trend emphasising the link between security and development and 
promoting a people-centred approach to security. This shift in security thinking was 
aligned with the ANC-regime’s equality-centric credo that had been utilised to great 
effect by women in the past. Further, the HSP explicitly identified gender as a crucial 
element in attaining and maintaining both security and development, as evidenced in the 
many significant instruments that emerged at the time (and which developed over the 
next decade), and to which South Africa was party. These included the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1325 (October 2000), the UN Windhoek Declaration and the 
Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional 
Peace Support Operations (May 2000), and the AU Post Conflict Reconstruction and 
Development Policy (2006).  
 
The effect of the paradigm shift in security thinking dovetailed with the new mandate of 
the State to focus on peace support operations in the region, as part of the rebranding 
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of South Africa’s armed forces. This created new openings for the participation of 
women at all levels of the security sector, as constitutionally mandated by both the Bill 
of Rights and the ratification of various regional and international instruments described 
in Chapter Six. The experience gained by women during the militant struggle for 
democracy, and the attendant power which had been amassed as a result of the legacies of 
increasing autonomy and entrenching gains in equality, provided further impetus for 
change as the ANC-regime began the arduous task of transforming the military 
structures of the State in accordance with the new defence mandate. 
 
The Defence Review set out clear guidelines for the integration of the armed forces, 
establishing targets to ensure that the revised composition of the SANDF was more 
favourably aligned with the demographics of the country. The steady increase in the 
overall numbers of women in the armed forces, the growing number of women in 
“middle management” positions, and the prominence of the ministerial portfolios under 
the purview of women were all encouraging indicators of a gender-receptive security 
environment. However, the transformation of prejudicial institutional norms within the 
traditionally masculine and hierarchical sector has proved more challenging, as this 
chapter has shown. 
 
As discussed, the possibilities for gendered change were tempered somewhat by the 
ingrained institutional culture of the security sector. This presented a different set of 
challenges to those encountered within the general governance structures of the State, 
described in Chapter Five. The institutional norms of the governance and security 
structures are vastly different. For example, masculine ideals influencing the institutional 
culture are more ingrained within the security structures, as is evidenced by the 
comments of the research participants and authors such as Cock (1991, 2007), Modise 
and Curnow (2000), Anderlini (2004), Motumi (2006), Suttner (2007), and Clarke (2008). 
The acknowledgement of the importance of gender within the security sector is 
contradicted by the perception that gender issues are not considered important during 
policy formulation, and that women (despite their wealth of experience) are not treated 
as credible experts.  
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Rigidly hierarchical modes of interaction are also a consistent feature within the security 
sector, rendering change more difficult. However, the sanctity of the chain of command 
can also have the effect of aiding the gendering process, in that the leadership of a 
higher ranking officer, regardless of their sex, must be obeyed. In other words, 
positional authority may counter-balance cultural attitudes towards women. This limits 
the extent of non-compliance, and can have a positive effect on the transformation of 
gendered norms over time, particularly as women are advancing into positions of 
authority, as was shown in this chapter. 
 
As in the general governance structures of the State, the negotiated settlement resulted 
in the layering of institutions, creating an amalgamation of new institutions operating 
alongside “old” institutions that were re-purposed. The layering of the security sector is 
however most akin to the concept of conversion, described by Streeck and Thelen (2005: 
26)169 as the process whereby institutions are  
“redirected to new goals, functions, or purposes. Some redirection may come 
about as a result of new environmental challenges, to which policymakers 
respond by deploying existing institutional resources to new ends, or it can 
come about through changes in power relations, such that actors who were not 
involved in the original design of an institution and whose participation in it 
may not have been reckoned with, take it over and turn it to new ends ... 
existing institutions are adapted to serve new goals or fit the interests of new 
actors”. 
 
This has been shown to be the case in South Africa, as the environmental challenges 
(the shift to the HSP, the adoption of a new defence mandate, and the need to 
rehabilitate South Africa’s image) necessitated an extensive overhaul of the security 
architecture of the State, involving both layering and conversion processes. The 
assumption of power by the ANC, and the influx of cadres from various previously 
antagonistic armed forces, further challenged the redesign of existing institutions.  
 
The institutional layering had an impact on the gendering process through the creation 
of new mechanisms for participation and the use of policy directives such as the setting 
of demographic targets for equitable representation. These measures created openings 
for women’s participation, and provided a means though which meaningful reforms of 
the prevailing institutional culture of the “old” security institutions could be instigated. 
                                                 
169 While layering and conversion are described as two different processes by Streeck and Thelen (2005), 
elements of both processes can be seen within the South African security sector. 
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In essence, the institutional layering and conversion process created the possibility for 
infusing security structures of the State with the values of equality and 
representativeness and establishing them as the new norm. This is a reflection of the 
work of Streeck and Thelen (2005:23), who describe this process of institutional change: 
“... new dynamics are set in motion by political actors working on the margins 
by introducing amendments” and these changes can, over time, fundamentally 
alter the overall trajectory of development ... [and] assume an ever more 
prominent role in governing individual behaviour”. 
 
In other words, while the rhetoric of gender equality has been slow to infiltrate the 
institutional norms of the security sector, the equality credo has been more “sticky” due 
to the conversion and layering process, creating an opening for women’s continued 
participation as equality becomes more entrenched and develops into the new 
institutional norm. 
 
The comparative importance of qualifications and length of service within the security 
sector (as opposed to its importance within the general governance structures of the 
State) suggests a measure of sustainability is being established for the entrenchment of 
gender gains, as neither factor is contingent on patronage or political party loyalty. This 
implies a continued valuing of MK cadres’ experience, and the transference of this 
respect to women’s service within the SANDF. This is also supported by the perception 
amongst respondents that qualifications are considered more important within the 
security sector than in the general governance structures of the State, and that the 
“stickiness” of women’s equality as it relates to roles within the military is increasing. 
 
While political party loyalty and patronage were more closely correlated in the general 
governance structures of the State, the perceived importance of patronage as a factor for 
advancement fell dramatically within the security sector. This may be attributed to the 
dominance of the military’s internal power dynamic, whereby promotion is largely based 
on length of service and merit, therefore diminishing the influence of individuals 
(however powerful) to significantly affect the rate of women’s advancement. The 
continuing perception of the influence of political party loyalty as the most significant 
factor in women’s advancement is a crucial element. It speaks to how women initially 
entered the security structures, and also relates to the impact of the various types of 
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coalitions that might arise within the security sector, as is explored in the following 
chapter’s discussion of the Arms Deal case.  
 
The gendering of the institutions within the security sector has been shown to be a 
mixed success. The relatively high descriptive representation of women, particularly in 
middle management positions, is a positive development in a traditionally masculine 
environment perceived as hostile to gender demands. The establishment of various 
mechanisms for promoting diversity and participation, coupled with gender-specific 
provisions within key documents, provides a strong foundation from which to continue 
pushing for and entrenching change. However, the perception amongst respondents 
remains that institutional norms are not evolving as readily as institutional rules, and that 
informal rules privileging the masculine over the feminine continue to subvert the 
substantive transformation of the institutional culture. The following chapter delves into 
this perception by considering how these institutions operate within a real world 
scenario. Can the mechanisms established to protect the ideals of equality function 
effectively under pressure? How do informal coalitions (influenced by political party 
loyalty) factor into this process? Are women able to effectively gender new policy 
initiatives?  
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LESSONS FROM THE ARMS DEAL 
 
“[The Arms Deal] was a catalyst that divided the ANC ... exposed the fragility of the 
constitutional institutions, and revealed the darkest side of a political movement 
once rightly lauded as an icon of modern reformism on the African continent” 




The process of gendering the institutional structures of the State has been shown to be 
influenced by a range of factors both internal and external to the system. In addition to 
the effect of international instruments and wider political events, the State-building 
process has also impacted on the opportunities available to women to consolidate the 
gains made during the liberation struggle, particularly in the security sector. One 
component of entrenching these gains is the establishment of structural mechanisms for 
participation that contribute to the sustainability of women’s participation in all aspects 
of decision-making and in all arenas, including the security sector, in accordance with 
the gender mainstreaming approach described in previous chapters. These mechanisms 
are not necessarily women-centric, but are aimed at upholding the values of equality and 
good governance upon which the new regime is predicated. The effectiveness of these 
mechanisms in altering the norms of institutions is gauged according to the perceptions 
of participants within the system, and of members of civil society who interact with the 
security system.  
 
As the previous chapter has shown, the realisation of gender equality in the State 
security structures has been a mixed success. In descriptive terms, great strides have 
been made in increasing the number of women serving in positions of influence within 
the security sector, including at ministerial levels. However, the perception amongst 
respondents interviewed for this research is that gender is not considered an integral 
part of the work of the security sector, suggesting that the implementation of gender 
mainstreaming has not been consistently applied across the security architecture. This 
implies that the rhetoric of gender equality has not substantially altered the norms of the 
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security sector, despite the enabling environment created by the State’s new defence 
mandate and the gains made by women within the security realm throughout the 
liberation struggle.  
 
This chapter uses the “case-study within a case study” of the Arms Deal to explore how 
women are engaging with State security issues through the mechanisms established to 
foster and protect their participation. What are the practical implications of the issues 
raised in previous chapters, such as the emphasis placed on political party loyalty, the 
ramifications of the party-list system, and the difficulties of realising an idealistic 
mandate? How do the mechanisms upholding new institutional norms (such as equality, 
accountability and other indicators of good governance) operate under pressure? Are 
masculinist security policies being challenged, in accordance with the values espoused by 
the HSP and the gender mainstreaming strategy? In other words, the purpose of this 
chapter is to illustrate how the factors raised in Chapter Seven, including the 
perceptions of participants and the mechanisms for participation created as part of the 
integration process, have played out in the security sector, using the Arms Deal as a 
contextual backdrop.  
 
The case study will demonstrate the limits of gendered institutional change within the 
security sector, particularly the difficulties faced by women actors in contesting the 
status quo, which continues to be maintained by an elite hierarchy of men. While certain 
aspects of the case study will allude to the shifting gendered norms and rules of the 
security sector, the losses in terms of the gender gains initially made through policies 
such as the Defence Review and the adoption of the HSP are an indicator of the 
complexity of transforming a rigidly masculine set of institutions.  
 
This chapter begins with a description of the background to the Arms Deal: how do the 
regional responsibilities arising from the new defence mandate impact on domestic goals 
such as creating employment and stabilising the security sector? What are the 
international influences on South Africa’s economic and political agenda? An overview 
of the arms package introduces the controversy in which the acquisition has become 
mired, including the circumvention of oversight mechanisms and procurement 
procedures, and considers how pervasive the influence of political party loyalty was in 
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this process. In particular, what informal rules and alliances can be seen playing out 
within the case of the Arms Deal, and how do these interact with the formal rules and 
mechanisms of the State? How does the exercising of power, discussed in relation to the 
gendering of security in Chapter Six, play out in reality, and what is the impact on 
women’s substantive participation in the security arena?  
 
These questions are addressed by focusing on the actions of various women such as 
Speaker Frene Ginwala and MP Pregs Govender, as well as opposition MPs including 
Patricia de Lille, and military veterans such as Thandi Modise. How did these women 
confront the erosion of gender gains that occurred due to the actions of party elites? 
What does this case study reveal about the realities of the institutional transformation 
process, particularly the effect of the masculinity of Realpolitik on gendering the security 
process? The answers to these questions deliver a practical perspective on the research 
question: how has gendered institutional change occurred in the South African security 
sector? 
 
8.2 Background to the Arms Deal 
 
The underlying philosophy of the Human Security Paradigm (HSP), in conjunction with 
the Security Sector Reform (SSR) imperatives and demands of the new defence mandate 
of the ANC-regime, necessitated the right-sizing170 of the defence force and a decrease 
in defence spending (DoD, 1998: ch 9, para. 2.3; Stott, 2002; Anderlini, 2004; 
Heinecken et al, 2005: 119, Dunne, 2006: 40; Gevisser, 2007: 680).  
 
As discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, the integration of the various armed forces 
involved in the liberation struggle formed part of the SSR obligation to demobilise 
soldiers and equip them with transferable skills. Military equipment needs would be 
altered and reduced, with any new acquisitions being subject to the new peace support 
mandate of the State. Expenditure in general would be focused towards socio-economic 
spending, in keeping with the development-oriented security ethos adopted by the State, 
and in accordance with the findings of the Defence Review discussed in Chapter Six. 
                                                 
170 Right-sizing in this context is used to mean the reduction of personnel in order to reduce costs and 
maximise efficiency while still meeting domestic and regional security obligations. 
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This shift in mandate and spending priorities has been recognised by feminists as 
conducive to creation of opportunities for change within the security sector, as 
discussed by Enloe (1989), Vickers (1993), and Tickner (2001) amongst others in 
Chapter Six. The institutional conditions for instigating gendered change was therefore 
promising, and the Arms Deal would be the first real test of these new rules and 
mechanisms. However, the political and economic reality of the new State tempered this 
vision in four key areas (for the purposes of this discussion): South Africa’s regional 
aspirations, the need to create a unified force supporting a stable State, the importance 
of the arms industry to South Africa’s economic growth, and international political and 
economic considerations. 
 
8.2.1 Regional Aspirations: Africa’s Peacekeeper 
 
The recasting of South Africa’s regional role was a strategy to both rebrand the negative 
continental image of Apartheid South Africa’s use of its defence forces in neighbouring 
states, and a desire to realise the promise of the human security paradigm. As discussed 
in Chapter Six, the explicit linkage of security and development tied South Africa’s 
future stability and prosperity with that of its regional neighbours.  
 
The increased stature of the country gained by the transition process was perceived as a 
boon to the repositioning of South Africa as a regional leader. Gevisser (2007: 682) 
describes the efforts of Thabo Mbeki in particular as  
“leading South Africa diplomatically ... towards the role of continental peacekeeper 
... this was the cornerstone argument of his African Renaissance: that South Africa’s 
own growth and development was not possible on a decaying, conflict ridden 
continent, and so investment in the neighbourhood must be an essential 
component of the country’s own growth strategy ... One could well understand 
Mbeki feeling this ... it had been the most conflict-ridden year in Africa since the 
ANC had come to power – from the alleged assassinations in Nigeria ... to the 
threat of civil war on South Africa’s borders in Lesotho, to the beginnings of a 
tumultuous Congolese war which would claim three million lives. Through all these 
conflicts, Mbeki had been building a profile, for South Africa, as the continent’s 
peacemaker”. 
 
The pressure to retain its newfound status as a model transitional State was intense, 
particularly given the scope of the domestic transformation required to retain stability, 
and the magnitude of the regional commitments being considered by the new regime.  
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One analyst commented that 
“Since its first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa has moved into a new 
category: instead of appearing as an outlier, it is now increasingly treated as an 
exemplar, a case that illustrates the post colonial condition. Led by an unusually 
articulate and self-conscious group of reformers and blessed by an unusual degree 
of international legitimacy, South Africa in the 1990s appears to offer new ways to 
think about the consolidation of democracy and strategies for development at the 
turn of the century” (Seidman, 1999: 429). 
 
Any arms acquisitions would therefore need to balance South Africa’s domestic 
responsibilities and regional aspirations. As a leading force behind the development and 
expansion of regional entities such as SADC, NEPAD and the AU, particularly in terms 
of the effectiveness of their peace and security organs, any new equipment would need 
to fulfil the needs of the SANDF on multilateral peace missions. The weight of this 
burden is articulated by Venter (2001: 350):  
“South Africa is expected by many in and outside Africa to take a leading role on 
the continent; to take up the responsibility of being both an economic motor to 
drive the rest of the continent forward and a force for reconciliation and peace. The 
government has responded to these expectations by involving itself in multilateral 
institutions, building economic links and supporting peace-building efforts ... In 
Africa [South Africa] contributes towards a broader picture, based on the 
government’s determination to play a full part in the continent’s affairs. That fuller 
role is illustrated by a commitment to conflict resolution and reconciliation. South 
Africa has made major contributions to political settlements on its own borders, in 
Mozambique and Lesotho. It has also spread its wings farther afield, including 
playing an impressive part in the transformation of Zaire into DRC in 1997 ... Yet 
there are limits to South Africa’s leadership role in the continent. Uncertainty exists 
about whether South Africa has the financial and personnel resources to maintain 
such a role, especially as a new government with harsh and bitter domestic 
problems to deal with”.  
 
The defence requirements of the SANDF had to be adjusted to address the domestic 
crises in the broader societal sense, as well as the domestic needs of the transformed and 
newly mandated SANDF. Both of these considerations had positive implications for 
gendered claims on altering the institutional norms of the State, as elements of equality 
and participation were central to the foundational doctrines of the transformed SANDF 
and the development agenda of the State. The opportunities for strategically gendering 
institutional norms were therefore promising from a theoretical perspective. 
 
8.2.2 Domestic Crises: Creating a Unified and Capable Force 
 
The nature of the negotiated settlement meant that the ANC-regime inherited security 
structures that would need significant transformation to meet its reformed vision for the 
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defence sector, while integrating a variety of formerly antagonistic forces, and 
addressing deep-seated issues centred around equality. Some of these issues have been 
addressed in Chapters Six and Seven, and serve as examples of how institutional layering 
affects processes of change. The introduction of new values into “old” institutions 
within the context of broader societal transformation is a delicate process of competing 
claims for power, as occurred during the Arms Deal process.  
 
While the ANC’s overwhelming victory at the polls gave it immense power, the scope 
(and cost) of the transformation process was a cause for concern, given the many 
competing demands arising from the establishment of a new democratic state. The 
defence force was a particular cause for concern, as described by Gevisser (2007: 680): 
“Suddenly the Mandela government found itself responsible not only for a 
voracious defence force suffering from serious fatigue – in terms of both morale 
and hardware – but for integrating the demobilised liberation movement armies into 
it too: even before 1994, the generals had made it clear to their political masters that 
their ongoing quiescence was dependent on the upgrading of the force. The new 
government immediately launched a public review process in which Joe Slovo, the 
struggle’s pre-eminent military hero turned custodian of the nation’s homeless, put 
the ‘butter’ position most succinctly: ‘South Africa’s greatest defence will be a 
satisfied population’ ”. 
 
The loyalty of both the retained and incoming personnel was also a cause for unease, as 
Gevisser (2007: 685) expands upon, arguing that “if [Alec] Erwin and [Joe] Modise are 
to believed ... the security Mbeki was buying South Africa with a R30 billion price tag 
was not against external aggressors, but against the internal threat of a disaffected 
military, still sceptical – on both sides – about the negotiated settlement, and still 
carrying, in its increasingly obsolete arsenal, the serious threat of destabilisation”. The 
deterioration of military capacity in the Air Force and Navy was a further cause for 
concern, as defence spending had been concentrated in the Army due to the internal 
focus of SADF during Apartheid (Cilliers, 1998: 1-2; Stott, 2002; Anderlini, 2004, 14; 
Holden, 2008: 3; Pottinger, 2008: 51; Gordin, 2010: 77).  
 
The challenges of unifying a fragmented military, while implementing major changes to 
the institutional structures of the security sector and transforming the culture of the 
SANDF, were further exacerbated by the need to demobilise a large number of 
combatants and create employment not only for these personnel, but for citizens as 
well. This reiterated the linkage between security and development – economic growth 
Chapter Eight: Lessons from the Arms Deal   247 
would be a critical factor in providing employment for demobilised soldiers, generating 
the revenue required to address shortfalls in military capability, and foster investor 
confidence in the ability of the new regime to ensure a stable and peaceful State. To this 
end, the role of Armscor and the local defence industry moved to the fore. 
 
8.2.3 The Role of the Local Defence Industry 
 
The Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) originated during the Second 
Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) when local companies began manufacturing advanced 
weaponry for the Boer forces (Dunne, 2006: 40; Armscor, 2010). An Advisory 
Committee on Union Defence Force Equipment Requirements was appointed in 1948, 
formally establishing Armscor.  
 
Armscor is the “officially appointed acquisition organisation of the [DoD] and with the 
approval of the Minister of Defence also renders a professional acquisition service to 
other government departments and public entities” (Armscor, 2010). The Armscor 
Board of Directors is chaired by an appointee of the Minister of Defence, and all equity 
is held by the State (Armscor, 2010).  
 
The Acts171 establishing Armscor prohibit the manufacture of products that compete 
with the private sector supply chain, leading to the split of Armscor into two entities in 
1992: Armscor and Denel (Dunne, 2006: 41; Armscor, 2010). Denel would fall under 
the purview of the Minister of Public Enterprises, and is a “major supplier of 
manufactured products and systems”, while Armscor focuses on “programme 
management and acquisition”, and “government to government marketing” (Sylvester & 
Seegers, 2008: 57; Armscor, 2010).  
 
During the Apartheid era, the State expanded the local defence industry to meet its 
armament needs and counter the impact of arms sanctions (Venter, 2001: 345; 
                                                 
171 Armscor is governed by the conditions stipulated in Act 57 of 1968 and Act 51 of 2003, and Denel by 
Act 46 of 1992 (Armscor, 2010). 
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Anderlini, 2004, 14; Dunne, 2006: 40; Landsberg, 2010: 111)172. Given the ANC-
regime’s desire to govern by example in order to boost its regional and international 
stature, the manner in which the arms industry operated would need to be carefully 
monitored. The arms industry contributed the largest share of export earnings in 1994, 
estimated at R103 billion, and employed more than 50 000 workers (Spence 1998:13 
quoted by Venter, 2001: 345; Dunne, 2006: 41). It was an essential component of South 
Africa’s continued economic growth, particularly after the UN arms embargo was lifted 
and the State’s client list could be expanded (Venter, 2001: 345; Landsberg, 2010: 111). 
The list of customer states was not, however, in keeping with the foreign policy 
mandate of the new State173. 
 
The State thus needed to find a means to balance the export and employment potential 
of the arms industry with the strategic requirements of maintaining an exemplary good 
governance record to uphold the country’s “moral authority” (Venter, 2001: 345). To 
this end a high level Cabinet Committee was formed in 1995 – the National 
Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) – which would “regulate arms sales 
and transfers, and ... give moral sanction to South Africa’s arms deals” (Venter, 2001: 
345; Skosana, 2002; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 59; Landsberg, 2010: 111-112). The 
committee was chaired by Kader Asmal174, described by Landsberg (2010: 111) as a 
“staunch critic of the secretive and clandestine nature of arms sales during the 
Apartheid years, [who] wished to see democratisation of the practice [arguing that] ‘our 
future foreign policy cannot be determined by shadowy merchants of death in foreign 
countries’”175. This tension between political and economic interests is described by 
Venter (2001: 347) as being primarily between the ideologues and the neomercantilists, 
the latter viewing the “government’s declared commitment to human rights and issues 
of good governance ... an unnecessary albatross around South Africa’s neck”.  
                                                 
172 Among the armaments manufactured for export were G5 and G6 Howitzers, armoured and mine-
resistant vehicles, the Rooivalk helicopter, mine-detecting clearance equipment, and battle tanks 
(Landsberg, 2010: 111; Armscor, 2010).  
173 The furore over inappropriate customer states began with the Wazan debacle in which arms were sold 
to Yemen via Lebanon, despite the civil war prohibiting such sales (Skosana, 2002). This raised 
questions about the sale of arms to other client states such as Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Colombia, and 
Angola, given the South African regime’s desire to rebrand the State’s image. 
174 Professor Asmal was also the Chair of the Joint Parliamentary Sub-Committee of Ethics and Members' 
interests.  
175 The NCACC only became a statutory body in 2000, a year after the Arms Deal was approved. 
However, the deal was not sent through the NCACC process, although the committee was 
operational at the time (Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 59). 
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8.2.4 International Pressure 
 
As democratisation efforts got underway, South Africa slowly started emerging from the 
state of isolation imposed by the international community due to the policies of the 
Apartheid regime. One of the consequences was the increasing pressure placed on the 
transitional government as Pretoria become the focus of the arms lobbyists, desperate 
after the rapid decline in arms sales following the fall of the Berlin Wall (Vickers, 1993: 
39; Crawford-Browne, 2004: 329-330; Holden, 2008: 5). The push for arms contracts 
did not come only from the dealers; foreign dignitaries came armed with proposals and 
letters pushing the relative merits of the defence contractors from their home states 
(Cornish & Cameron, 1995; Cilliers, 1998: 3; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 72). As a new 
government, the ANC was mindful of the need to demonstrate to the international 
community that it was a major player in the defence sector, and “needed to demonstrate 
the capacity to govern: to command, to spend” (Gevisser, 2007: 685).  
 
In a similar vein, some analysts have suggested that the intent was to demonstrate to 
foreign powers that South Africa was able to be a player in international markets, willing 
to allow free trade and playing by the global market rules after decades of isolation 
(Gevisser, 2007: 682). This was part and parcel of the GEAR [Growth, Equality and 
Redistribution] policy that drove economic strategy at the time (Gumede, 2005: 44-45; 
Landsberg, 2010: 91). In essence, the strategy promoted “expansionary spending by the 
State” aimed at promoting foreign direct investment and international trade, which 
would in turn lead to rapid sustainable growth and job creation, thus allowing “targeted 
social spending on the poorest of the poor” (Feinstein, 2007: 66-67). The Arms Deal 
was viewed by members of government such as Alec Erwin (Minister of Trade and 
Industry) as a means to “attract vital industrial development” while developing the 
technological skills base in the country (Gevisser, 2007: 681). Ronnie Kasrils (Deputy 
Minister of Defence) lauded the deal as a major advancement for the achievement of the 
African Renaissance, and argued that the offsets would create jobs and boost the 
economy (Holden, 2008: 12).  
 
The pursuit of the Arms Deal was thus explained partly as an attempt to allay investor 
fears of undue communist influence from the ANC’s alliance partners on economic 
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policy, and partly as a means of “gaining the acceptance of the global economic power 
brokers” (Feinstein, 2007: 66). Further, the Department of Foreign Affairs was heavily 
lobbying for a South African seat on the UN Security Council (Venter, 2001: 346), and 
the deal was seen as a form of “economic foreign policy” (Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 
57). In other words, in order to realise the State’s leadership ambitions “it actually had to 
amass the firepower to warrant being respected, as the region’s giant, by both its 
neighbours and the global community” (Gevisser, 2007: 682). 
 
It was against this backdrop of conflicting and competing goals that the Arms Deal took 
place. The new regime was attempting to transform the military culture while integrating 
personnel from previously antagonistic fighting forces. It aimed to be Africa’s 
peacekeeper while cutting military expenditure. It strove to realise its new mandate of 
development-led security following an election campaign promoting social spending by 
diverting funds to the acquisition of hardware that was incompatible with this vision in 
order to realise broader goals of foreign investment.  
 
Throughout this process, the mechanisms established to uphold the integrity of the new 
regime and protect the participation and input of policy makers would be eroded and 
circumvented, illustrating the difficulties of putting new institutional norms and values 
into practice. The Arms Deal would also show the simultaneous wielding and loss of 
power experienced by women in the early years of the new democratic regime, as the 
ideological transformation of the State was tested by the emergence of ‘Realpolitik’176. In 
other words, the increasing pressure on the State in terms of regional and international 
commitments and influences would test the institutional mechanisms created within the 
security sector to ensure participation and robust oversight. The wielding of power by 
elite actors within the party and the State resulted in a decision-making process that did 
not consider gender differentiated needs in the spending of the defence budget (as 
discussed in Chapter Five and Six), in terms of focusing the budget on socio-economic 
priorities, and limited the potential for the substantive participation of women in the 
procurement decision-making process. The next section outlines this process in general 
terms, after which the gendered dimensions of the Arms Deal are considered. 
                                                 
176 ‘Realpolitik’ is used here in reference to a relentless realism focused on power over ideology in the 
Bismarckian sense that “realpolitik involves the pursuit of political settlements unencumbered by 
moral and ethical limitations” (Bassiouni, 2003: 191; Holborn, 1960). 
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8.3 Controversy and the Arms Deal  
 
Following the announcement of the opening of the tendering process in 1994 by 
Minister of Defence Joe Modise, protests were raised by large sectors of civil society, 
the general public and parliamentarians from all parties, as will be discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter. The objections centred around the cost of the deal given 
other development priorities, the unsuitability of the equipment for the State’s new 
security mandate177, and the manner in which the procurement process was being 
conducted, particularly the inclusion of offsets as the deciding factor in the awarding of 
contracts.  
 
The reactions to the proposed deal prompted Cabinet to delay a decision on the arms 
acquisition until a Defence Review was conducted which would chart the country’s 
defence strategy  in greater detail (Stott, 2002; Anderlini, 2004; Gumede, 2005: 111; 
Holden, 2008: 10; Pottinger, 2008: 50; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 59; Gordin, 2010: 
77)178. As the previous chapters attest, the 1998 Defence Review identified regional 
security as one of the primary functions of the defence sector, with particular reference 
to peacekeeping as a result of various regional and international defence commitments 
including those with SADC, the AU, and the UN (DoD, 1998: ch 3, para. 8.8; ch 5, 
para. 1; Stott, 2002: 44; Gevisser, 2007: 681-2; Pottinger, 2008: 50; Sylvester & Seegers, 
2008: 63). In order to meet national obligations, a “core force” recommendation was 
put forward outlining the current (and future) needs of each arm of the defence force in 
                                                 
177 An overview of the equipment purchased is included in Appendix 8. The unsuitability of the 
equipment purchased for the purposes of peacekeeping operations is a serious concern, given South 
Africa’s role as a regional mediator and participant in various multilateral initiatives on the continent. 
The ongoing conflicts throughout the sub-region have seen an increase of peacekeeping troops from 
around 12 000 to over 70 000, with UN contributions continuing to decrease and the shortfall being 
supplied locally (Cilliers, 2008; Neethling, 2009: 2-3). Since the incident in Somalia in 1993 where 18 
US troops died, UN peacekeeping personnel contributions have declined from 40 000 to less than 
1600, and peacekeeping operations have fallen from 7 in 1993 to only 3 in 1999 (Neethling, 2009: 3). 
With the establishment of the African Standby Force (and other regional security initiatives), South 
Africa will increasingly be called upon to provide support for multidimensional peace support 
operations: massive expenditure on inappropriate equipment is therefore questionable on this basis 
alone. 
178 The Defence Review was overseen by a Working Group under the coordination of the Minister and 
Secretary of Defence, with various sub-committees drawn from representatives of Parliament, the 
Defence Secretariat, the Defence Force, Armscor, academia and civil society, who consulted widely 
with various stakeholders regionally and nationally (DoD, 1998: ch 1, para. 8-11). The Review also 
“produced very progressive policies in terms of the rights of women” (Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 59; 
Valasek, 2008: 6). 
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terms of personnel and materiel (DoD, 1998: ch 8, para. 6, 14, 40; Cilliers, 1998: 1). The 
need to ensure that procurement must be “needs-driven and cost-constrained” (DoD, 
1998: ch 1, para. 19) was emphasised and must also “be tempered by national priorities 
and the budgetary realities” (DoD, 1998: ch 1, para. 22).    
 
The emphasis on cost-effectiveness was reiterated with the call for utilising the ample 
local arms manufacturing capabilities (DoD, 1998: ch 8, para. 3), described in the 
previous section. Related to this is the assertion that the largest and, at times, the only 
client of the local defence industry is the SANDF, and given that:  
“The SANDF funds a large portion (approximately 50%) of research and 
development spending in the industry and therefore owns much of the immaterial 
rights of the products manufactured in the industry. The SANDF also contracts a 
large portion of the logistic and operational support of its equipment to the 
industry. The technology and know-how and capacity for the maintenance of the 
weapons systems and supply of services such as informatics, command and control, 
etc, reside within the industry. This makes the industry part of the SANDF’s logistic 
and operational capability and capacity during peace and war” (DoD, 1998: ch 13, 
para. 21). 
 
Economic considerations in terms of employment and attracting foreign investment 
were one of the key drivers of the process. However, cost was excluded as a deciding 
factor in the arms procurement process at an early stage. Instead, a strong emphasis was 
placed on the controversial component of offsets.  
 
The touting of the offsets as providing a sound economic basis for the deal was 
misleading. Offsets, or counter-trade measures, are supplementary incentives from arms 
suppliers, which promise large-scale investments in the purchasing country’s economy. 
Reports on the scale of the offsets in the arms deal range from R3 billion to R7.6 billion, 
in various forms179, and investment in the state worth R100 billion (Gevisser, 2007: 680-
81; Holden, 2008: 9-20; Pottinger, 2008: 51; Gordin, 2010: 75).  
 
Both the South African defence industry and Armscor focused on the economics of the 
deal, pushing it as an “industrial participation package” that would contribute towards 
                                                 
179 The British tender guaranteed employment for 25 000 people and the construction of 10 000 houses, 
while the Spanish tender included a new hake fishing fleet, which it subsequently turned out would be 
completely unviable given the fish stocks (Holden, 2008: 8-9). All told, around 65 000 jobs would be 
created through the offsets, but by 2006 only 13 000 had materialised (Gevisser, 2007: 681; Holden, 
2008: 24), falling far short of compensating for the shortfall in socio-economic spending caused by the 
Arms Deal. 
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the RDP goals of the State with an estimated R2 billion net inflow into the country 
(Holden, 2008: 9). This element of the deal – emphasising offsets as a motivation for 
the purchase – highlights the emergence of competing coalitions of actors within 
government and the party, and the conflicting preferences that would play a major role 
in the controversial acquisition, with women in the losing coalition. These coalitions 
spanned old and new structures (the Apartheid-era military leadership, together with 
high-ranking MK personnel, were in favour of the acquisition), intra-party alliances 
(ANC MPs objecting to the deal), and cross-party coalitions (opposition party MPs also 
objected to the deal). The tension between the rhetoric of the party and the ‘Realpolitik’ 
mindset of some high-ranking party members’ actions was also becoming more 
apparent.  
 
The costs of the deal soon began to spiral; by 1998 the R12 billion deal had 
mushroomed to R30 billion, and in less than a decade the figure would almost double to 
R53.2 billion, excluding financing costs (Gumede, 2005: 111; Holden, 2008: 17, 25-26). 
Warnings about the ballooning costs had already been issued through both a 
commissioned independent study (Pottinger, 2008: 51; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 67) 
and an Affordability Report issued by the Department of Finance, which cautioned that 
the cost of deal would “crowd out other pressing social demands” (Holden, 2008: 27).  
 
At the same time that the deal was pressing forward, Health Minister Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma argued that essential antiretrovirals (ARVs) would not be provided to 
HIV-positive pregnant women as the cost was too prohibitive (Feinstein, 2007: 154). 
However, the Report of the Joint Health and Treasury Task Team released shortly 
thereafter stated that  
“providing ARVs to everybody who would need them by 2008 would cost R5.7 
billion a year (10 per cent of the estimated cost of the Arms Deal at the time), and 
would ‘defer’ the deaths of 1 721 329 people as well as the orphaning of 860 000 
children” (Holden, 2008: 28). 
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One political analyst, using the cost of the arms deal in real 1999 terms, noted that any 
of the following could have been funded for the same amount:  
• 1 993 333 RDP houses at R15 000 each (this was the subsidy amount offered for an 
RDP house in 1999), roughly 300 000 fewer than would be needed to clear the 
country’s housing backlog as it stood in November 2007; 
• The salaries of 474 603 educators for a year at an average annual salary of R63 000 
(over double the number of educators employed by government in 1999); 
• The salaries of 590 909 members of the police and correctional services for a year 
at an average annual salary of R50 600 (triple the number of police and correctional 
services employees employed by the government in 1999); 
• The salaries of 590 909 nurses for a year at an average annual salary of R63 000 
(nine times the number of nurses employed by the government in 1999); 
• The salaries of 381 864 medical doctors at an average annual salary of R78 300 (a 
staggering 29 times the 13 000 doctors employed in 1999); 
• A power-station the size of Lethabo, which produces 3 558 MW, more than the 
total electricity demands of a city the size of Johannesburg, or roughly 16 per cent 
over what we would need to avoid our current spate of ‘load-shedding’ (Holden, 
2008: 30). 
 
The alternative purchases outlined above show the range of pressing development 
issues that could have been positively impacted by adhering to the stated budgetary 
priorities of the new regime. These would also have a more gendered impact than an 
arms acquisition, given the realities of life for South African women, as elaborated upon 
by Schoeman (1998) and Govender (2007), amongst others. It also serves as a clear 
indication of the reversion to masculinist security norms that preclude the consideration 
of wider socio-economic concerns, of which the contemplation of gender differentiated 
needs is an important component, and is in stark opposition to the values prescribed by 
the HSP, SANDF mandate, and the vision for security espoused by the State. 
 
What was purchased? The Navy would receive four Corvettes with “blue sea” capacity 
for search and rescue operations, and three submarines equipped with stealth mode to 
protect coastal trade. The Air Force would get twenty-eight Advanced Light Fighter 
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Aircraft (known as the Gripens), described as “multi-role supersonic combat aircraft” 
used during conventional warfare, and twenty-four Lead-In Fighter Aircraft (known as 
the Hawks), which provide flight training for the Gripens and have limited capabilities 
for search and rescue, reconnaissance and patrolling missions. It was reported to 
SCOPA that the Hawks do not adhere to the Air Force’s operational requirements, and, 
according to the Chief of the Air Force, would only be accepted if “they were ‘politically 
obliged’ to do so” (Feinstein, 2007: 215). Thirty Light Utility Helicopters (Agusta) were 
also purchased, and these were the only components of the deal to fully comply with the 
State’s focus on peace support operations as they were designed to be used for medical 
and humanitarian assistance operations (Cilliers, 1998: 4; Feinstein, 2007: 155, 215; 
Holden, 2008: 18-20; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 52-53). The unsuitability of the 
equipment purchased for the revised defence mandate of the State further inflamed 
tensions over the massive expenditure (Gumede, 2005: 111; Gevisser, 2007: 683, 677; 
Holden, 2008: 31; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 53; Pottinger, 2008: 50). The technical 
aspects of the equipment purchased fall beyond the scope of this study, and are briefly 
outlined in Appendix 8.  
 
The comparative costing of the Arms Deal in terms of real socio-economic spending 
priorities serves to highlight the divergence of the State from the repeated emphasis on 
development as a driver for security. In other words, the Arms Deal provided a measure 
against which social policy could be costed – the provision of antiretrovirals180 in 
particular served as a powerful rhetorical device highlighting the extent of the State’s 
(and the party’s) deviation from its core philosophy.  
 
Further, the sound reasoning behind the development-security link, discussed in 
Chapter Six, was an ideological and practical fit with the State’s broader vision for South 
Africa, and the departure from this course of action clearly demonstrated a turn towards 
‘Realpolitik’. In essence, the vested interests of powerful individuals, both in formal 
alliances in the upper echelons of the SANDF and Cabinet and in informal coalitions 
                                                 
180 It has been projected that at current infection rates, ten million South Africans will die of AIDS-related 
illnesses by 2015 (Arndt & Lewis, 2000: 857), making a pro-active State response to the pandemic 
essential. Crawford-Browne (2004: 333) states that with an estimated AIDS-related death toll of 600 
people per day, the pandemic has a “casualty rate that would be inconceivable even in full-scale war”. 
For a detailed analysis of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in South Africa, and the economic implications 
thereof, see De Klerk (2006). 
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within the party, were able to engineer the pursuit of contradictory goals to those 
formally mandated by the State and the party. This speaks to the strength (or lack 
thereof) of the decision-making processes of the new democratic State. Despite the 
objections of parliamentarians that the expenditure should be directed towards the 
socio-economic commitments made by the government, informal networks were 
activated to circumvent the mechanisms that facilitate meaningful participation and 
oversight. A relatively small number of players with considerable power and prominence 
were thus able to exert the necessary influence to subvert the democratic process and 
purchase equipment that was not considered necessary by either the SANDF 
(representing narrow defence interests) or policy makers (speaking for broader societal 
interests). 
 
Within the context of the exploration of processes of institutional change, the 
circumvention of mechanisms for participation and oversight during the Arms Deal is a 
critical factor in understanding the gendering of the security sector. It illustrates the 
manner in which issues such as political party loyalty and patronage interact with (and at 
times interfere with) the establishment and entrenchment of good governance ideals, 
which aid in the implementation of gender mainstreaming processes and thereby 
facilitate the substantive participation of women. It also shows how the shifting power 
relations between actors in layered institutions can both advance and erode gender gains 
in institutional structures. The next section provides a brief explanation of the structures 
mandated to oversee the arms procurement process, before demonstrating some of the 
means by which these mechanisms were undermined and evaded, thereby limiting the 
opportunities for gendered institutional change and eroding the gender gains made. This 
had implications for the entrenchment of the institutional values espoused by the new 
democratic regime, particularly in terms of the substantive representation and 
participation of women, as their voices and interests were sacrificed to the alternative 
agenda being pushed by security sector elites.  
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8.4 Decision-making Structures and Processes 
 
A major arms acquisition involves a multitude of parties within the State, with varying 
levels of power and influence over the process. In the case of the Arms Deal, Cabinet 
would take the final decision, given that the acquisition was more economically and 
politically driven than technically motivated (Cilliers, 1998: 1; Gumede, 2005: 138; 
Gevisser, 2007: 675; Holden, 2008: 10, 16-17; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 57). 
Responsibility for the procurement process lies with the Department of Defence 
(DoD), and occurs at three levels: the Armament Acquisition Council (AAC), chaired by 
the Minister of Defence, the Armament Acquisition Steering Board (AASB), chaired by 
the Secretary for Defence, and the Armament Acquisition Control Board (AACB), 
chaired by the Chief of Acquisition in the Defence Secretariat (Cilliers, 1998: 1; Sylvester 
& Seegers, 2008: 54-56). The process was overseen by the Cabinet sub-committee on 
Acquisitions, chaired by then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, and included the Minister 
of Trade and Industry (Alec Erwin), the Minister of Public Enterprise (Stella Sigcau), 
the Minister of Finance (Trevor Manuel), and the Minister of Defence (Joe Modise) 
(Holden, 2008: 16)181.  
 
Despite the recommendations of the 1998 Defence Review to reduce expenditure and 
tailor any acquisitions towards the new peace support mandate of the State, the Arms 
Deal was approved by these structures in 1998 (Gevisser, 2007: 675; Holden, 2008: 16-
17; Pottinger, 2008: 50-51). The decision reflects a major departure from the established 
decision-making rules of the ANC and from the institutional processes that the ANC 
was attempting to entrench within the State.  
 
The accepted norm was for vigorous internal debate, ensuring that actions taken were in 
accordance with the ANC’s vision. Thereafter a united front would be presented for the 
implementation of the agreed course of action (Gumede, 2005: 137; Feinstein, 2007: 
204; Hassim, 2009: 459). The decision taken by the Executive, without the established 
                                                 
181 A series of related sub-committees would evaluate different aspects of the deal, involving 
representatives from the Departments of Defence, Trade and Industry, and Finance, as well as 
delegates from Armscor (Holden, 2008: 16). 
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participative procedures within either the party or Parliament, was described by 
Sylvester and Seegers (2008: 73) as being indicative of  
“the degree to which power within government has been centralised. This was 
evident from, among others, the marginalisation of Parliament and the punishment 
meted out to critics of the [Arms Deal], including critics within the ruling party. So 
it can be about political commitments, but this would be only those of a handful of 
people. The executive’s dominating role in the [Arms Deal] is strongly reminiscent 
of the PW Botha era in SA’s civil-military relations”. 
 
This implied that the institutional culture of the ruling ANC was taking on 
characteristics of the system that was being transformed: secretive and unilateral action 
was being undertaken without consultation, checks and balances were no longer being 
applied. While this is consistent with political Executives elsewhere, and indeed was a 
characteristic of the previous regime, it represented an early departure from the ideals 
espoused by the ANC regime – the party leadership was not fighting for a new political 
order. It is also an example of the ease with which new institutional rules and norms 
were eroded, and in particular the loss of truly participatory processes, which are integral 
to substantive gendered participation. 
 
Many ANC MPs spoke out about the decision to go ahead with the acquisition. For 
example, the chairperson of the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Defence, 
Tony Yengeni, is said to have commented that “the levels of poverty in the country are 
so high that most victims of poverty cannot comprehend that a new democratic 
Parliament can endorse spending a substantial amount on corvettes” (quoted by 
Holden, 2008: 6)182. Cabinet ministers such as Jay Naidoo (Minister overseeing the 
RDP) and Finance Minister Trevor Manuel also expressed concerns. Pottinger (2008: 
51) recalls the confusion within the ANC that the oft-stated priority of social spending 
was being sidelined in favour of an acquisition that the security industry had already 
admitted it did not need, and which would total R43 billion by 2000. This is echoed by 
Gumede (2005: 138) who comments “what made the Arms Deal especially sensitive was 
that it was at variance with the moral convictions of many ANC members. The party 
came to power pledging drastic cuts to the defence spending that characterised the 
                                                 
182 Yengeni later reversed his position and became embroiled in the allegations of corruption surrounding 
the deal. In 2003 he accepted a plea bargain following charges of fraud, perjury and forgery laid 
against him in 2001, while he was serving as ANC Chief Whip. Yengeni was sentenced to four years 
imprisonment for accepting a discounted luxury vehicle from one of the companies involved with the 
Arms Deal (Crawford-Browne, 2004: 332; Gumede, 2005: 302; Holden, 2008: 298-301). 
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Apartheid era, in favour of social services”. This assessment again reinforces the central 
concern of the majority of female actors in the security sector that development-
oriented security policy was critical for the stability of South Africa, as reflected in the 
centrality of this issue during the first democratic elections.  
 
Minister of Housing Joe Slovo (also former head of MK), Minister of Intelligence Joe 
Nhlanhla, and MP Pregs Govender also opposed the proposed expenditure in favour of 
socio-economic spending (Gumede, 2005: 138; Govender, 2007: 198; Pottinger, 2008: 
51). The misgivings were related not only with the expenditure on arms given the critical 
socio-economic priorities of the party and the State, but also with the manner in which 
the tendering process was being administered (Gumede, 2005: 138). Govender (2007: 
198) argued that even if the money remained part of the Defence Budget, there were 
better uses for it such as the reintegration of soldiers and programmes for retraining 
retrenched combatants in line with the SSR commitments and human security focus of 
the State, as opposed to “borrowing money from countries like Britain, Germany and 
Sweden to buy arms that they themselves found redundant” (Crawford-Browne, 2004: 
339).  
 
Govender was admonished by President Thabo Mbeki, with her objections being 
dismissed as she was a “pacifist” and “lacked the knowledge and experience to make a 
judgment call on the Arms Deal” (Govender, 2007: 194). Following the accusations of 
undue interference, Govender (2007: 193-194) commented that:  
“the committee on women was expected to stick to ‘women’s issues’, as if 
prioritising weapons of war above fully implementing ... the Domestic Violence Act 
did not legitimise the war in bedrooms and borders”. 
 
ANC MPs who opposed the deal were warned by Thabo Mbeki that their 
chairmanships of parliamentary committees were gained and lost through the ANC, 
since they were elected as ANC members (Gumede, 2002; Govender, 2007: 198). Thus, 
toeing the party line was more important that challenging policy. ANC MP Andrew 
Feinstein was fired over his determination to uncover the corruption in the Arms Deal 
(Feinstein, 2007: 203-207; Govender, 2007: 199; Holden, 2008: 57). This incident serves 
to highlight that even as the State was pushing to infuse the workings of governance 
structures with the values of equality and participative governance, pockets of the 
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institutional culture were not being meaningfully reformed. Expressing conflicting views 
prompted a reversion to traditional modes of decision-making in certain quarters: 
security was the purview of men, an area in which “women’s issues” had no part. The 
return of this patriarchal mode of institutional decision-making represented a loss in 
terms of gendered institutional change, as being denied a legitimate voice in the 
decision-making process is a significant element of a successful gender mainstreaming 
strategy. 
 
Two factors must be considered regarding this turn of events. Firstly, the backlash 
against detractors of the deal was centred more around the issue of political party loyalty 
than individual concerns (or gender prejudice), as evidenced by the sidelining of both 
male and female parliamentarians. Secondly, the larger issue was the unilateral decision-
making process that led to the decision to purchase the arms: power was being 
centralised in the Executive183 (Thompson, 2000: 289; Venter, 2001: 279; Anderlini, 
2004; Feinstein, 2007: 150; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 58, 73), bypassing the established 
decision-making processes of the ANC and the new State. This is clearly demonstrated 
in the account provided by Govender (2007: 202-204) about her meeting with then 
Secretary-General of the ANC Kgalema Motlanthe184 and the Assistant Secretary 
General Thenjiwe Mtintso185 who confirmed that the decision to go ahead with the arms 
deal had not been discussed or agreed upon in the NEC, the highest decision-making 
body of the ANC. This centralisation of power within the Executive is not an 
uncommon feature in other transitional states186, and speaks to the tension between the 
vision of transformation espoused by the democratic State and the ‘Realpolitik’ of 
governance in a post-conflict state. 
 
                                                 
183 Sylvester and Seegers (2008: 58) described the Executive as “an active, if not dominating, participant” 
in the arms acquisition process, citing its direct negotiations with States including Britain and 
Germany. 
184 Motlanthe, a former MK operative, served as President of South Africa from 2008 to 2009, completing 
Mbeki’s second term after Mbeki was ousted from office. He is currently Deputy President of South 
Africa, and Deputy President of the ANC. 
185 Mtintso was a former commander in MK who had challenged the chauvinism within the armed 
movement, serving as chair of the first gender commission in SA, and is described by Govender as a 
“feminist communist” (Govender, 2007: 202). 
186 Annesley & Gains (2010), for example, discuss the gender implications of the power focused in the 
Executive. 
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The importance of demonstrating loyalty to the ANC government at all costs was 
therefore highlighted early on in the Arms Deal process, even when it appeared to 
directly contradict the core values of the party. The occurrence of such undemocratic 
attitudes in the early years of the democracy rang alarm bells. If the party leadership 
(and the party acting as the government) was willing to sacrifice its good governance 
ideals so easily on an issue in contravention to its central philosophy, how strongly 
would it stand up for less tangible ideals such as gender equality? Would the structures 
and mechanisms established to entrench and protect these ideals function effectively, 
thereby protecting the gender gains made thus far? The scandal surrounding the Arms 
Deal proved to be a baptism by fire, and none of the institutional mechanisms 
protecting the participatory rights of parliamentarians would emerge unscathed. 
 
8.5 Scandal Breaks: Oversight Mechanisms Under Strain 
 
The inauspicious start to the Arms Deal revealed weaknesses in the institutional 
mechanisms established to ensure equitable democratic participation, which is a key 
element in attaining the substantive representation of women in terms of the gender 
mainstreaming strategy. The ability of powerful players to circumvent the measures 
aimed at entrenching core values of good governance was further demonstrated as the 
scandals around the procurement process (and the subsequent investigation thereof) 
broke.  
 
Patricia de Lille,187 an experienced parliamentarian from the opposition PAC, tabled a 
briefing document in Parliament in September 1999 signed by “concerned ANC MPs” 
(Holden, 2008: 38; Crawford-Browne, 2004: 332; Anderlini, 2004: 28; Govender, 2007: 
200;  Pottinger, 2008: 52; Gordin, 2010: 76)188. The documents, which became known as 
the De Lille Dossier, raised a range of allegations of irregularities and corruption 
associated with the deal, and named a number of high-ranking ANC members as being 
                                                 
187 De Lille was a MP for the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) at the time, and would go on to form the 
Independent Democrats (ID) in 2003. 
188 De Lille refused to divulge who released the document to her, or to name the “concerned MPs” or any 
of the accused identified in the document, calling instead for a judicial enquiry to establish the veracity 
of the claims (Holden, 2008: 38). 
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involved189. The Auditor-General (AG) was called upon to table a report about the 
matter, in which it was confirmed that numerous irregularities had occurred (Pottinger, 
2008: 52). Concerns raised included issues with the tender approval process, the lack of 
sufficient guarantees for the counter trade measures, the substantive departure from 
standard procurement procedures such as ignoring pricing as a factor, awarding 
contracts to foreign bidders when local vendors could produce the same equipment for 
less money, and not heeding the recommendations of the military as to the specific 
equipment required (Feinstein, 2007: 158; Pottinger, 2008: 52; Gordin, 2010: 76). 
 
The investigation was guided by a set of terms of references agreed upon by the relevant 
ministers, in accordance with the Auditor-General’s Act of 1995, and which included 
the Defence Special Account Act of 1974 (Holden, 2008: 39-40). The decision taken by 
powerful figures within the new regime to exercise this section of the Act serves as an 
example of the consequences of layering old and new institutions and institutional 
processes that have conflicting values. The purpose of the 1974 Act is described by 
Holden (2008: 40) as enabling the government  
“to censure any report submitted by the Auditor-General that was to the ‘detriment 
of the public interest’. In reality it allowed the Apartheid government to break arms 
sanctions placed on the government by excising whatever it felt necessary from an 
Auditor-General’s report. In other words, the ANC government would do exactly 
what the Apartheid government did: use legislation that contracted the 
Constitution’s dictate that ‘no person or organ of State may interfere with the 
functioning of these institutions’ to censor the report of an independent 
government institution”190.  
 
The democratic government was utilising the relics of “old” institutional rules to 
undermine the strengthening of “new” institutional mechanisms. These efforts to 
conceal the circumvention of procedures designed to root out corruption and poor 
governance practices were subverting the entrenchment of the core values and norms of 
                                                 
189 These included allegations that then Defence Minister Joe Modise (who headed MK in exile) received 
payoffs ranging between R10 and R35 million from bidders, and that the ANC itself was the recipient 
of multimillions of rands, ostensibly to fund the 1999 election campaign (Feinstein, 2007:155; 
Gevisser, 2007: 677; Pottinger, 2008: 52).  
190 An audit steering committee was therefore formed to “direct the investigation”, and included members 
of the arms acquisition sub-committee and representatives from the auditor-general’s offices (Holden, 
2008: 40). Two of the representatives serving on the audit steering committee were later found to have 
themselves been in contravention of arms procurement procedures: Chippy Shaik for breaching 
conflict of interest rules for his brother, and Vanan Pillay, who was “fired by the Department of Trade 
and Industry for accepting a R55 000 discount on a Mercedes-Benz sold by one of the Arms Deal 
contenders” (Holden, 2008: 40; Govender, 2007: 198; Gordin, 2010: 76). 
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the ANC into the democratic structures of the State. Put differently, formal rules that 
ran contrary to the values of the new regime were being activated by informal networks 
of high ranking ANC members to subvert the functioning of new formal rules aimed at 
entrenching the core values and norms of the ANC.  
 
From a gendered perspective, this demonstrated that the gains made were not 
guaranteed: elites still had the relative power to diminish the gendered gains made by 
altering the rules that provided women with an arena for substantive participation. By 
reintroducing “old” norms that privileged the decision-making power of an elite 
(masculine) clique, “new norms” aimed at entrenching good governance (such as 
exercising oversight over arms acquisitions or conducting investigations of irregularities) 
were weakened. It is these new norms upon which women were building gendered 
institutional gains, as they also protected women’s rights to participate substantively in 
the decision-making process. The circumvention of these new institutional norms and 
values therefore reduced the substantive representation of women within certain areas 
to merely descriptive roles. 
 
However, other agencies with wider powers were entering the fray, some of which were 
new mechanisms established by the new regime with the express purpose of halting 
infringements on the integrity of democratic governance institutions. Investigations 
were launched by the Special Investigating Unit, the Office for Serious Economic 
Offences (the “Scorpions”) and the Public Protector’s Office (Holden, 2008: 43; 
Gumede, 2005: 301). Coordination between these investigations would be provided by 
the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). 
 
8.6 The Silencing of SCOPA 
 
SCOPA is the “parliamentary watchdog committee that oversaw public expenditure and 
conduct and undertook remedial action if it found that an arm of the government had 
misspent public funds” (Holden, 2008: 43; Feinstein, 2007: 71-72). Due to its 
constitutional mandate, SCOPA had been transformed from a rubber stamp for the 
Apartheid government’s policies to a highly respected, non-partisan oversight 
committee (Feinstein, 2007: 71). 
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At the time of the Arms Deal, SCOPA was chaired by the opposition (IFP MP Gavin 
Woods), and had a number of esteemed ANC members in its ranks, including Barbara 
Hogan191, Andrew Feinstein, and ex-Robben Islanders Laloo Chiba and Billy Nair. 
Respected political commentator Richard Calland described SCOPA as “a vital 
committee, perhaps the most important sub-institution of Parliament” (Calland, 2006: 
104). While many of the issues brought before the committee prior to the Arms Deal 
were controversial, the committee’s professional and independent manner was protected 
by the Chief Whip Max Sisulu and at times by the President (Feinstein, 2007: 72). It was 
seen as an exemplary model of democracy at work.  
 
Upon receiving the Auditor-General’s report, SCOPA began a series of hearings to 
ascertain the veracity of the allegations. The 14th SCOPA report submitted to Parliament 
(and unanimously passed) recommended a multi-agency investigation into the debacle 
“to prove or disprove once and for all the allegations which cause damage to 
perceptions of the government” (SCOPA, 2000; Crawford-Browne, 2004: 333; Holden, 
2008: 47; Pottinger, 2008: 53)192. This “independent and expert forensic investigation” 
would consist of the Auditor-General, the Heath Special Investigating Unit, the Public 
Protector, and the Investigating Directorate of Serious Economic Offences “so that the 
best combination of skills, legal mandates and resources can be found for such an 
investigation” (SCOPA, 2000)193. The SCOPA report further recommended that the 
scope of the investigation should not be limited given the “complex and cross-cutting 
nature of the areas to be investigated” (SCOPA, 2000). Upon completion of the 
                                                 
191 Described by fellow committee member Andrew Feinstein as “a pugnacious, thorough and fearless 
MP, Barbara had devoted her life to the ANC. She was the country’s longest serving white woman 
political detainee under Apartheid” (Feinstein, 2007: 71). 
192 In the report, the committee found more than 50 instances of non-compliance with the procurement 
process, including inconsistent and insufficient evaluation procedures, and the lack of a suitable audit 
trail (Feinstein, 2007: 211).  
193 The Special Investigating Unit’s ability to function effectively would be continually eroded through 
political interference, starting with the removal of Judge Willem Heath who has been described as a 
“high-profile public figure with an uncompromising approach to corruption” (Holden, 2008: 49; 
Pottinger, 2008: 53). The Scorpions, a unit within the National Prosecuting Authority that investigated 
corruption and organised crime, was also disbanded despite their investigative success in a range of 
cases (Gordin, 2008: 267; Pottinger, 2008: 53).  
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investigation, coordinated by SCOPA, a report of the findings would be submitted to 
the National Assembly194. 
 
The response of the ANC (both as the party195 and acting as the government) was to 
defensively malign the committee’s findings (Holden, 2008: 49). At a press conference 
held soon after the submission of SCOPA’s report to Parliament, the Ministers of 
Defence, Finance, Public Enterprises and Trade and Industry made the following 
statement: 
“[Cabinet] takes serious issue with the ill-informed conclusions drawn from the 
Auditor General’s Review and the SCOPA Report. These fail to understand the 
most elementary features of the defence acquisition process. It is our view that the 
Review and the Report were too cursory to do justice to this matter and have called 
into question the integrity of government without justification. 
  
We also find it strange that so many people in our country have been driven into a 
virtual frenzy by mere allegations of wrongdoing, without a single shred of evidence 
of actual wrong doing being produced. 
 
The Government will go ahead to implement the defence acquisition to meet its 
constitutional obligations to the country and to the National Defence Force. 
 
The Government remains committed to cooperate in any legitimate investigation 
into any elements of the defence acquisition process, but will not allow itself to be 
diverted to participate in what amounts to mere fishing expeditions.  
 
For its part Government remains convinced that nothing that was done in the 
context of the Strategic Procurement suggests in any way that corruption occurred. 
We await convincing evidence to prove this otherwise. 
 
Whilst Government is ready to cooperate with any investigation, we believe that it is 
our duty to challenge any insinuations that question the integrity of government’s 
decision making processes in this regard. We will also not respond to campaigns by 
those who may have lost out in the bidding process or those who are in principle 
opposed to the decision to undertake the Strategic Procurement” (RSA, 2001). 
 
This statement captures the conflicting institutional processes undermining the 
entrenchment of the new good governance values articulated by the ANC in the various 
foundation documents discussed in previous chapters. The commitment to transparency 
and equality, which was demonstrated in the establishment of institutional mechanisms 
                                                 
194 The final report, which was the result of the joint investigations conducted by the Auditor-General, the 
Public Protector, and the Scorpions (prior to their disbandment), was heavily edited by the Executive 
prior to submission, and had been subjected to “significant changes” (Feinstein, 2007: 212-213; 
Anderlini, 2004; Pottinger, 2008: 53). 
195 The dissension within the party about the deal was curtailed as this chapter describes – a publicly 
united face was to be presented through the wielding of mechanisms such as political party loyalty. 
This was an effective strategy given the power the proportional representation system gave the party 
over its members, as discussed previously. 
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with constitutionally-mandated powers of oversight, was being called into question as 
these same mechanisms were being derided when their findings were not supportive of 
the actions of the ruling party elites. The declaration that the acquisition would go ahead 
despite evidence of irregularities further eroded confidence in the ability of these 
institutional mechanisms to uphold the core values espoused in the Constitution, as did 
the implied sidelining of these important oversight structures with the statement that the 
government would cooperate with “legitimate” investigations, suggesting that these 
prominent ministers did not consider the work of SCOPA as legitimate196. A similar 
observation is noted by political analyst Xolela Mangcu, whom Holden (2008: 53) 
quotes as arguing that “Mbeki’s decision to exclude the unit and publicly accuse the AG 
and SCOPA of wrong-doing subverts the separation of powers and undermines the 
instruments of accountability in so fragile a democracy”. 
 
The curtailment of SCOPA’s independence continued as the ANC brought its 
representatives on the committee in line. Minister in the Presidency Essop Pahad 
reportedly berated the ANC members of SCOPA, asking “who do you think you are, 
questioning the integrity of the government, the Ministers and the President?” 
(Feinstein, 2007: 175). A similar statement was reportedly made by then Deputy 
President Zuma who “told MPs it was folly to go against the party line” (Gumede, 2005: 
141). Feinstein (2007: 194) commented that following the announcement that the ANC 
would “exercise political control over SCOPA ... the role of the Public Accounts 
Committee as a non-partisan arbiter on matters of financial management was over”. 
 
When Feinstein defended the findings of SCOPA, together with SCOPA Chair Gavin 
Woods, he was recalled from the committee by the ANC leadership (Holden, 2008:  57). 
Shortly thereafter, the ANC “moved a motion showing support for and appreciation of 
the Speaker, a motion that was carried by the ANC’s majority”, and Feinstein’s decision 
to abstain from voting resulted in his forced resignation from Parliament (Holden, 2008: 
                                                 
196 The controversy around the improper conduct of high-ranking officials continues, spurred by the 
conviction of Tony Yengeni (former ANC Chief Whip) and Shabir Shaik (brother of senior arms 
procurer Chippy Shaik) for his “corrupt relationship with then deputy president (Jacob Zuma) relating 
to bribes from a French defence contractor”; and the trial of President Jacob Zuma on charges related 
to bribes from one of the principal arms dealers (and the ensuing cover up, and the continued refusal 
of the ANC-regime to cooperate with UK and German investigations into the irregularities) (Gevisser, 
2007: 677; Govender, 2007: 198; Pottinger, 2008: 54-57; Gordin, 2010: 76). 
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57; Feinstein, 2007: 203-207)197. Feinstein noted that the abstention was “the first time 
in my seven and a half years as an ANC representative, I did not vote with my comrades 
... I had voted with my conscience”, and expressed “sadness that it had come to this; 
that the ANC had behaved so despicably over the Arms Deal; that Parliament was being 
subjugated to the interests of the party” (Feinstein, 2007: 204). The comment reflects 
back to the circumvention of the ANC’s internal democratic processes, wherein 
rigorous debate had always been encouraged before decisions were taken. This enabled 
a variety of views to be heard, after which MPs would be expected to “endorse 
government policy without fundamental change” (Gumede, 2005: 137).  
 
The impact of the new ANC loyalist majority serving on SCOPA was immediate: “only 
four days after Feinstein had abstained from the Ginwala vote, ANC members on 
SCOPA claimed that they were ‘too busy’ to continue investigating the Arms Deal ... 
SCOPA would no longer pursue the matter” (Holden, 2008: 58). SCOPA Chair Gavin 
Woods resigned early the following year, releasing a statement that the committee was 
“losing its focus and with that a dramatic loss of productivity and of work standards. 
This translated directly into a serious loss of scrutiny and oversight and with it the early 
signs of government departments losing their respect for SCOPA” (SAPA/News24, 
2002; Holden, 2008: 58). Andrew Feinstein commented on Woods’ resignation in the 
Mail & Guardian newspaper, calling it “a massive blow to the credibility of the 
committee and to the cause of vigorous parliamentary oversight and accountability”, 
remarking that “unless the ANC can pull itself back from the brink and revert to the 
position it introduced with the advent of democracy by insulating SCOPA from party 
politics and allowing the members of the committee to determine by consensus whether 
financial regulations have been transgressed, reports of SCOPA’s death will not have 
been premature” (Feinstein, 2002; Holden, 2008: 58).  
 
This is a reflection of the earlier discussion on the layering of “old” and “new” 
structures and their sometimes conflicting rules and norms. The importance of the 
independence of SCOPA is critical to its effective functioning as an oversight body, but 
the norms which govern the behaviour of actors towards this entity were subverted by 
                                                 
197 Feinstein’s decision to abstain from the vote was in large part due to the role played by Frene Ginwala 
in suppressing the investigation into irregularities, as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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the reversion to “old” norms privileging decision-making by elites. Parallels can be 
drawn to a number of gender entities which similarly rely on “buy-in” by other actors in 
terms of the norms supporting the purpose and effectiveness of the machineries aimed 
at integrating a gendered view into policy: if a few elites with sufficient relative power 
deem an entity troublesome, its efficiency can be severely curtailed. 
 
The concerns SCOPA expressed about the financial dimension of the deal were well 
founded. The promised offsets (the primary motivator behind the deal) have, perhaps 
predictably, not been realised. Firstly, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) generally 
prohibits such measures (with the exception of developing states), given the inherent 
leeway for corruption that it contains, and categorically states that offsets should never 
be the sole basis for awarding an arms contract (Gevisser, 2007: 680-81; Holden, 2008: 
22). Pottinger describes offsets or counter-trade measures as a “common and much 
abused system”, and argues that a “mountain of evidence from past arms deals around 
the world shows that these deals rarely survive the arms-sale signing ceremony and 
invariably fall far short of the promise” (Pottinger, 2008: 51) 198. Thus, while the 
inclusion of offsets may be a requirement in a tender, it must not be used as a “deal 
breaker” given that “if a country signed a deal purely on the basis of an offset agreement 
and not on the necessity of the goods purchased, it would be tantamount to legal 
bribery” (Holden, 2008: 23). Secondly, there are no substantive penalties for non-
compliance. Holden (2008) cites numerous sources that argue the impacts of offsets are 
negligible and in many respects unenforceable- an issue which arose within the SCOPA 
hearings.  
 
Between the Department of Trade and Industry and Armscor, it has been claimed that 
from R9 billion to R11.4 billion in returned investment has been realised, although some 
argue that it is an exceedingly poor return on a substantially higher investment on 
                                                 
198 In the course of the SCOPA enquiry in 2000, Chief of Acquisitions Chippy Shaik and Chief Negotiator 
Jay Naidoo disclosed that defaulters would pay a penalty of 10% of the purchase price (approximately 
R3 billion), which represented less than 3% of the total worth of the R100 billion offset package 
(Holden, 2008: 24). Andrew Feinstein, ANC MP on SCOPA, argued that “most arms companies have 
little intention of fulfilling these obligations and tend to build the penalty costs into the price they 
charge” (Feinstein, 2007: 163). Despite attempts by the State to conceal the progress of the counter-
trade measures under the commercial confidentiality clauses (Section 217) of the Constitution, some 
details have emerged about the extent to which the offsets have failed to materialise. Three arms 
contractors (Ferrostaal, BAe/Saab and Thales) had defaulted on their first offset delivery deadlines by 
more than R5 billion (Holden, 2008: 24). 
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equipment that was not needed (Holden, 2008: 25; Sylvester & Seegers, 2008: 63-67). 
Feinstein (2007) reiterates this view, stating that even as the promised impact of the 
offsets was downgraded from being “pure butter” to the more sedate “economically 
neutral”, expectations continue to be lowered. The promises of job creation also failed 
to materialise, and the math involved in calculating the benefit to the economy was also 
shaky at best, as Holden (2008: 31) demonstrates:  
“Working from the estimate of R29.9 billion for the total cost of the package, which 
would produce 65 000 jobs, it would have cost the South African taxpayer R460 
000 per job created – almost six times the average annual salary of a medical doctor 
in 1999”199. 
 
Putting aside the specific problems with the deal, and focusing on the broader view of 
the situation, the manner in which independent oversight mechanisms such as SCOPA 
were circumvented and undermined raises a number of questions about the processes of 
institutional change. In particular, the apparent ease with which mechanisms for 
participation and oversight were bypassed. What is the impact of informal rules such as 
political party loyalty overriding formal rules established within institutions? What are 
the implications for entrenching gendered change if core ideals related to good 
governance are eroded?  
 
8.7 Women and the Arms Deal 
 
The interaction of formal rules (such as the functioning of mechanisms for participation 
and oversight) with informal rules (such as political party loyalty) in the Arms Deal 
highlighted some of the limits of enacting institutional change. The level of political will 
required to sustain the permeation of new norms and values into these layered 
institutions was not consistently applied, with the effect that confidence in some 
institutions was eroded. While women were present in influential and prominent 
positions, their capacity to impact the process was therefore curtailed by the persistence 
of informal rules and norms, particularly political party loyalty. 
 
                                                 
199 In 2006 Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota confirmed that of the promised 65 000 jobs that the offsets 
would generate, only 13 000 had materialised (Holden, 2008: 309). By the end of 2007, the 
Department of Trade and Industry reported the creation of 15 689 direct jobs, and a further 34 620 
indirect jobs created by the offset scheme (DTI, 2007: 12). 
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A prominent example is the role played by Frene Ginwala, the Speaker of Parliament200. 
Her reputation as a strong force for gendered change had already been well established 
within the ANC, and her efforts continued within the new democratic structures of the 
State: as Speaker, she established the ad hoc Committee on the Improvement of the 
Quality of Life and Status of Women (Govender, 2007: 157). This would later become a 
standing committee chaired by another ANC veteran, Pregs Govender, who 
commented that “Frene Ginwala’s strengths are legend. She was able, for example, to 
get the male leadership of the ANC to listen to women’s demands” (Govender, 2007: 
130). Despite her feisty reputation and “independent streak”, the party pressure around 
the Arms Deal impacted on her role as Speaker (Pottinger, 2008: 44). 
 
While she initially lent support to the SCOPA investigation (Feinstein, 2007: 161; 
Pottinger, 2008: 53), Ginwala was soon called upon to bring “deviant” ANC members 
in-line. For example, following the release of the 14th Report, Ginwala and Naledi 
Pandor (then head of the National Council of Provinces) berated the ANC SCOPA 
members for their conduct (Holden, 2008: 56). Pottinger (2008: 44) asserts that “she 
failed to protect the integrity and independence of Parliament to the required level, 
particularly in regard to the seminal arms deal inquiry ... increasingly, the legislature was 
subjected to acts of gratuitous insult from the executive in, for example, failing to 
answer members’ questions or not arriving for committee sessions”.  
 
When questioned about maintaining impartiality while being accountable to both the 
ANC and Parliament given conflicting interests such as in the Arms Deal, she 
responded “you must remember that I am a politician ... and I became a politician 
before I became a Speaker” (Streek, 2001). This was evidenced in a 2001 letter to Jacob 
Zuma in which Frene Ginwala provided “the Executive ample cover” (Holden, 2008: 
55) by facilitating the exclusion of Judge Heath and enabling the systematic weakening 
of the investigation. This suggests that the autonomy and power amassed by women 
over the course of the liberation struggle are not necessarily sufficient to overcome the 
negative influence of political party loyalty, even once these women obtain positions of 
                                                 
200 Ginwala was involved with the creation of the Women’s National Coalition upon her return from 
exile, as well as being an active member of the ANCWL. Currently she serves as a member of the 
United Nations Advisory Panel of High-Level Personalities on African Development to the UN 
Secretary-General and is a Commissioner on the Commission on Human Security (CHS, 2011). 
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influence and power. The example of Frene Ginwala’s role in the Arms Deal 
(particularly the investigation and its aftermath) touches on a number of discussions on 
women’s roles in the institutional gendering process. For example, the contentious 
assumption that women will “act for” women, as debated by Gouws 2008b), Mackay 
(2004) and Waylen (2007b: 15), amongst many others noted in Chapter One. The 
actions of Frene Ginwala add to these arguments that aim to debunk this essentialist 
assumption. Her actions contributed to the erosion of gendered gains, as women’s 
oversight roles as parliamentarians and committee members were not defended but 
weakened, and women seeking to hold the State to its development promises, which 
had a very real impact on women’s lives, were not supported by the highest ranking 
woman in parliament. 
 
Another ANC MP, Pregs Govender, came under similar pressure to cease her protests 
to the manner in which the deal was conducted. Recounting her intention to vote 
against the deal and resign, Govender (2007: 203-204) commented:  
“I had begun to feel worn down by the way Cabinet seemed to ignore the needs of 
the majority of the people who had voted us into power. I had grappled with the 
question of who ANC MPs, including myself, should be loyal to. There were new 
values and priorities underlying policy choices such as the Arms Deal, and 
Parliament’s power to influence the course we were now on was severely limited”.  
 
While the resignation of MPs such as Pregs Govender could be construed as surrender 
in the face of overwhelming institutional obstacles blocking women’s meaningful 
participation in decision-making processes, Govender’s legitimacy as a political actor 
(based on her history within the liberation struggle and her achievements within 
government such as the establishment of the Women’s Budget) provided her with a 
public platform from which to voice her dissent. Although the cost of this dissent was 
her departure from parliament, it served to draw attention to the erosion of gender gains 
within institutional structures, particularly the weakening of oversight and participatory 
mechanisms. She was thus contributing to keeping the gender on the agenda, both by 
continuously highlighting the impact of the Arms Deal on women’s lives, and by calling 
attention to the sidelining of important institutional norms and rules by party elites. In 
other words, Govender was among the women challenging the return of the masculinist 
model of security decision-making that was subverting the development agenda in 
favour of arms. 
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The pressure on remaining MPs to demonstrate loyalty to the leadership of the party (or 
rather, loyalty to a powerful coalition of ANC leaders), rather than loyalty to the 
espoused values of the party. This is an important distinction, since the stated party 
objectives were in synergy with the policy directives of the State, and would therefore 
provoke minimal conflict in values. However, the Arms Deal introduced a new dynamic 
whereby core values and norms of the party, established over the preceding decades, 
could be disregarded be an elite few. If the new regime aimed to infuse the institutional 
structures of the State with its good governance philosophy, a dangerous precedent was 
being set.  
 
The pervasiveness of informal rules, such as political party loyalty, and the negative 
influence that such rules can have on the effective functioning of institutions, is a 
serious issue for the entrenchment of good governance ideals such as gender equality201. 
The consolidation of gender gains in institutional mechanisms cannot be meaningfully 
utilised if these mechanisms can be circumvented by informal means, and if the 
weakening of these institutions is sanctioned by the same actors who are supposed to be 
instilling new norms and values of accountability and equality in the institutions of the 
democratic State. While there are still many unanswered questions around the Arms 
Deal, the continued lack of transparency speaks to the persistent interference from 
powerful figures (Gumede, 2005: 302; Feinstein, 2007, Govender, 2007; Pottinger, 2008; 
Holden, 2008). This subversion of good governance practices (another tenet 
emphasised in both SSR and human security) further weakens the stability of the State. 
 
The maintenance of Executive dominance, which was highlighted by the manner in 
which the Arms Deal played out, speaks to a continuation of Apartheid-era norms202. 
This suggests that institutional changes related to good governance in terms of 
participation and equality were not being firmly entrenched, or rather, could be 
suppressed through informal coalitions of powerful actors with alternative agendas. 
Further, the Arms Deal highlighted the negative repercussions of informal rules such as 
                                                 
201 Waylen (2007b) discusses the gendered impact of party discipline on policy formulation in South 
Africa (including on reproductive policy) in a comparative analysis of gender and transitions, as does 
Hassim (2003c). 
202 The pervasiveness of “old” institutional norms that was demonstrated in this case has parallels with the 
concept of ‘nested newness’ discussed by Mackay (2010) and Chappell (2011: 165-166). 
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political party loyalty, and the manner in which this informal rule was utilised in this 
particular scenario.  
 
However, political party loyalty as a feature of the institutional gendering process is not 
necessarily a negative force. The power of political party loyalty to unify actors behind 
causes that strengthen institutional structures has been demonstrated, such as with the 
Women’s Budget discussed in Chapter Five. Even with the Arms Deal, some women 
sought to gain some gendered changes despite their objections to the process. For 
example, Thandi Modise, chair of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence and MK 
veteran, forcefully argued about the importance of parliamentary oversight of the 
acquisition and investigation, and repeatedly sent legislation related to the National 
Conventional Arms Control process back to parliament for strengthening (Anderlini, 
2004: 30). In the face of strong pressure from the party, Modise demonstrated her 
confidence in the relative power derived from her position of influence and 
prominence, gained over decades within the MK structures.  
 
Modise continued pushing the gender agenda and fulfilled her role as an active 
participant in the decision-making processes of the security sector. By ensuring that the 
National Conventional Arms Control process was as robust as possible, oversight of 
future arms acquisitions and trade would be better protected. Although this represented 
a limited gain within the broader context of the Arms Deal, Modise’s stature within the 
ANC by virtue of her standing within MK enabled her to utilise the new institutional 
rules for women’s formal participation in security decision-making processes. In this 
case, political party loyalty protected Modise’s right to participate substantively in the 
development of security policy. In other words, ANC women worked within the 
constraints imposed by the developments following the Arms Deal to continue 
instigating and entrenching gendered change within the security arena.  
 
Further examples of limited gender gains within the context of the Arms Deal are cited 
below, primarily within the SANDF structures. Although the women cited are affiliated 
with the ANC, the constraints imposed on the exercising of their power within the 
security arena are different. Political party loyalty played a role in women’s advancement 
within MK structures, but, once they took up positions within the SANDF, the military 
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hierarchy superseded that of the party. In other words, pressure could not be exerted in 
terms of removing them from their positions of power and influence. This can be 
viewed as a practical example of the assertion by Chappell (2010: 185) that “different 
levels of the State are, or may be, gendered in different ways”. Thus, the way in which 
the norms of the security arena operate, which are generally obstructive to the 
furthering of gender equality, served to aid the gendering process in this scenario. These 
women utilised the entrenched command structure that provided them with influence 
and power to initiate and entrench change within the acquisition process in often very 
practical ways. Their power as political actors within the security structures of the State 
was not curtailed by the informal norms of party loyalty in the same way as women 
within parliament, and the formal hierarchy of the SANDF facilitated the exercise of 
this power. 
 
For example, Major General Ntsiki Memela-Motumi (Chief Director of Transformation 
Management in the SANDF) had first-hand experience with the difficulties of 
performing effectively with cumbersome equipment designed for men during her time 
as an MK Commander. She therefore pursued practical amendments in conjunction 
with institutional initiatives to assist the advancement (and acceptance) of women in the 
SANDF. In the case of the Arms Deal, she ensured the roll out of gender-friendly 
equipment, which included an initiative to retro-fit the ejector seats of fighter planes to 
accommodate the lighter weight of women and thereby enable them to utilise the new 
equipment (Hendricks & Magadla, 2010). At an institutional level, Major General 
Memela-Motumi introduced a monthly committee meeting to keep track of progress 
and challenges on gender mainstreaming implementation, working according to an 
action plan that clearly delineated areas of responsibility to specific individuals with 
definite timeframes (Hendricks & Magadla, 2010).  
 
During the same time period that some institutional mechanisms for participation were 
being weakened, women within the security sector were striving to further the progress 
made. Some examples include SANDF women’s pension benefits being equalised, and 
women being promoted to certain positions for the first time, including: 
• Director of Base Support and Systems for the Air Force 
• Director of Military Judges 
Chapter Eight: Lessons from the Arms Deal   275 
• Director Air Force Liaison 
• General Officer Commanding of the SANDF College of Educational 
Technology 
• Director Foreign Relations 
• Logistics Coordinator for the Air Force 
• First female helicopter pilot 
• First female combat pilot 
• First female sheet metal worker on airframes 
• First female to command an Infantry Battalion (Hendricks & Magadla, 2010; 
Vuthela, 2004; Visser, 2004). 
 
The ability of Major General Memela-Motumi, Major General Jackie Sedibe, and the 
Honourable Thandi Modise amongst others, to utilise the power and influence of their 
positions to initiate limited gendered change and sustain this change through the power 
of informal networks, suggests that the institutional environment is conducive to 
gendered change if existing mechanisms for participation and oversight are supported. It 
also shows how even slowly changing institutional rules can be co-opted to serve new 
purposes. 
 
The responses of women in various institutional structures related to the Arms Deal, 
from Parliament to the SANDF, also speaks to the assertion by Gouws (2008b: 554) 
that women continue to devise new strategies in response to shifts in the political arena: 
while direct activism is no longer utilised to the extent that it was in the past, women are 
using “institutional channels” to achieve their goals. In other words, the range of actions 
available to parliamentarians may have been constrained by the political realities of party 
loyalty, but the women within the SANDF leadership found that the rigidly hierarchical 
institutional processes of the security sector aided their efforts to gender certain aspects 
of the Arms Deal.  
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8.8 Conclusion: Lessons from the Arms Deal 
 
“Transformation is essentially a political function driven by political pressures and 
agendas” (Venter, 2001: 116). 
 
The arms procurement process demonstrated that the transformation of ideals into 
formal rules and institutional values is not a simple process, particularly when layering 
institutions with conflicting purposes and ideals. The South African security sector 
proved to be an institutional arena with a range of obstacles. The security sector 
conformed to traditional expectations in terms of deeply ingrained opposition to 
change, and the proposed transformation was vast: the reduction of military 
expenditure, a new mandate, the comprehensive overhaul of the forces to be 
representative, and a range of civilian oversight mechanisms aimed at transferring power 
to elected officials. Keeping the top brass loyal in the wake of these upheavals was one 
factor leading to the decision to embark on an epic arms acquisition process. This was 
coupled with the desire by the new State to be seen as a global player, open for business 
and investment, and to be seen actively working towards realising its stated objective of 
being a regional security player.  
 
However, the objections from parliamentarians on both sides of the aisle, civil society 
and the general public, that the deal was in direct opposition to the stated values of the 
new democratic State set in motion a chain of events that demonstrated the limits of 
institutional change. The Arms Deal showed the existing government processes to be 
weak and susceptible to corruption at the highest levels, allowing the purchase of 
obsolete equipment that was neither needed nor wanted by the military at a time when 
social spending was being cut in contradiction to stated policy priorities. The 
circumscribing of established mechanisms for decision-making and the weakening of 
oversight and accountability measures were exhibited throughout the Arms Deal 
process, as evidenced by the experiences of the Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts (SCOPA) tasked with investigating the irregularities surrounding the deal. The 
lack of support for the mechanisms designed to foster a stronger democracy impacts 
negatively on the entrenchment of good governance ideals, including gender equality. 
The message sent is that some institutional values can be discarded, despite their 
entrenchment in foundational legislation such as the Constitution. 
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The influence of political party loyalty to stymie opposition was made apparent 
throughout the course of the deal, with parliamentarians made aware that their positions 
(and their voice in the decision-making process) would be taken away if they did not toe 
the party line. This points to both the continued power of informal networks within the 
layered institutions of the State, and the weakness of the party-led proportional 
representation system in entrenching good governance values. The ability of coalitions 
of influential party members to wield sufficient power to subvert the core ideals of the 
party and the State limits the potential for meaningful change. This is exacerbated in 
sectors such as security, where deeply ingrained norms and values at odds with the 
broader transformation goals of the State already exist, particularly in terms of 
mechanisms for oversight, participation or equality.   
 
There were, however, instances in this case of women defending the core values to 
which the ANC and the State had committed. The exposure of the irregularities of the 
deal was presented to Parliament by a woman (Patricia de Lille); initial support for an 
intensive investigation was issued by a woman in a prominent and powerful position 
(Frene Ginwala); and a woman repeatedly raised the issue of the deal’s incompatibility 
with the ANC’s core vision, and eventually resigned over the party’s continued deviation 
from stated objectives and commitments (Pregs Govender). Equally, there were women 
(and men) who were brought into line through the power of political party loyalty. As 
this influential force had played a widely acknowledged role in their attainment of 
positions of influence and prominence, parliamentarians were discovering that it was a 
double-edged sword. 
 
During the 1996-1998 Defence Review, women parliamentarians demonstrated strong 
political will in pushing the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Defence to 
ensure widespread public participation (particularly women’s organisations) during the 
national consultation process which aimed to uncover the range of stakeholders’ and 
actors’ needs and emerge with a clear idea of the current security context and which 
areas required prioritisation (Valasek, 2008: 6). This commitment to ensuring a 
representative and legitimate review process was demonstrated through the use of 
military vehicles for the transportation of a wide variety of civil, community and 
religious organisations’ representatives to meetings and workshops. The issues 
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uncovered resulted in the formation of two Defence Secretariat sub-committees, and 
the emergence of a national consensus on the role and goals of the new security 
institutions (Valasek, 2008: 6). It is this approach for which the new regime was lauded 
prior to the Arms Deal scandal: inclusionary and participatory governance strategies that 
created spaces for a diversity of voices and allowed for the identification of priorities. 
This vision of the possibilities of the democratic State is captured by Seidman (1999: 
432-3): 
“South Africa is not just another developing country, of course; it stands out from 
the rest, in its visibility and in the legitimacy of its current reform efforts. South 
Africa offers a remarkably visible and transparent example of restructuring. Since 
the 1994 elections, the wholesale reconstruction of state institutions has involved 
open and heated public debate”. 
 
However, political party loyalty was also shown to have a positive role to play. Women 
who had initially attained their current positions of influence and power due to their 
long-standing involvement in the party, and who were now placed strategically within 
the SANDF, could wield their power in more effective ways. Given that the military’s 
rigidly hierarchical command structure was somewhat insulated from the same tactics of 
threatening demotion for non-compliance, these women could realise some of the 
promises for change.  
 
Although derailing the deal would not be possible, there were limited opportunities for 
enacting some gendered changes, such as the relatively “small” gains of retrofitting of 
fighter jets to enable women to participate fully in missions. This did not overcome the 
larger losses to gendered institutional change incurred as a result of the circumvention 
of important institutional processes. However, important lessons about the functioning 
of the security sector at different levels were learnt. For example, the manner in which 
women  in the SANDF leadership structure in particular navigated existing institutional 
rules and norms (both formal and informal) in order to continue pushing for gendered 
change reveals how strategies utilised within the liberation movement are adapted and 
reshaped to suit the new environment in which these women operate. Although some 
mechanisms were being weakened and bypassed (such as the oversight structures for the 
acquisition process), other structures (for example the gender machineries and gender 
focal points) were being utilised for maximum effect.  
 
Chapter Eight: Lessons from the Arms Deal   279 
By maintaining the momentum of the structural and normative changes instigated earlier 
in the democracy, gendered change continued to be effected, due in no small part to the 
power of these women as savvy political actors. Lost gains would need to be recovered, 
but the limited reach of informal rules and norms (such as political party loyalty) within 
the SANDF leadership structures meant that gender gains were less vulnerable within 
the SANDF, indicating that the gender mechanisms operating within that arena could 
make a significant impact. The mechanisms for women’s participation within the 
broader security structures of the State were revealed to be more vulnerable to 
manipulation by informal rules and norms, a surprising turn of events given the 
traditional resistance of the security sector to change.  
 
Both the promises and limits of the new institutional environment were exposed. The 
Arms Deal revealed the darkest inner workings of the informal networks bending 
institutional rules to the breaking point. As Sylvester and Seegers (2008: 73) commented: 
“its impact [the Arms Deal] cannot but weaken the supposed political commitment to 
modernise ... the most obvious policy lesson of the [Arms Deal] is that future decisions 
and decision-makers will have to pass through the very small eye of the ethical needle”. 
The dominant ideas of a few elites with greater relational power triumphed over the 
ideals of the party and the norms of the new State. The timing of the Arms Deal in the 
early stages of the new democracy presented an opportunity to shift the rhetoric of the 
transitional State (particularly the vision for good governance) into an institutional 
reality by following the established mechanisms for oversight and accountability. 
Instead, the promise of this change was limited by the strategic wielding of power by the 
informal networks connected to the party. 
 
However, as the Arms Deal occurred relatively early in the new democracy, women 
such as Major General Memela-Motumi, Thandi Modise, and Pregs Govender still had 
sufficient relational power derived from their personal histories within the liberation 
struggle, and positional power gained through their roles in the new institutional 
structures, to pursue limited gender gains within the context of the Arms Deal. These 
changes were, however, curtailed by the oppositional power of the afore-mentioned 
elites. The limits imposed by the informal party norms did not prevent women from 
speaking out, demonstrating the confidence of these women in the legitimacy of their 
Chapter Eight: Lessons from the Arms Deal   280 
roles as political actors within State institutions. It can be seen as indication of the 
partial success of the gender mainstreaming initiative aimed at attaining substantive 
gender equality that these women confronted the flawed processes of the acquisition 
and investigation, and exhibited assurance in their right to question the decisions being 
made, and continued to push the gender agenda in an arena that was traditionally seen 
as a male-only realm. Nevertheless, the reversion to masculinist modes of decision-
making in the security sector, dominated by a few elites with disproportionate power 
and little regard for institutional mechanisms aimed at ensuring oversight and 
participation, remains a critical concern for the gendering of State security institutions 
and the substantive participation of women.  
 
The challenge for the State, not only in the security sector but more broadly within 
governance structures, is to reaffirm its commitment to the stated core values of good 
governance and equality, and to support and strengthen the institutional mechanisms 
established in the transitional period to oversee and protect the promises of 
transformation upon which the new democratic South Africa was built. Fortifying the 
independence and integrity of oversight mechanisms and supporting the development 
and entrenchment of institutional structures such as gender machineries, would have the 
effect of furthering the broader goals of infusing the norms of equality and participation 
into the institutional structures of the State, as mandated by the Constitution and 
espoused by the ruling party. Further, the effective operation of these institutional 
devices would also facilitate continued gendered change to the rules and norms 
governing power relations. The importance of this undertaking is demonstrated by the 
case study of the Arms Deal, which has demonstrated how gendered institutional 
change can be limited by the imposition of informal rules and norms that are in 
opposition to the formal rules and values upon which the State is built. 




GENDERED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY SECTOR 
 
How does gendered institutional change occur? What factors influence the entrenchment 
of gender gains in post-conflict transitional societies? This thesis explored the process of 
gendered institutional change in post-conflict South African security structures, 
investigating how South African women negotiated a place within the security structures 
of the democratic State, and the perceptions of policy makers and civil society 
practitioners about the entrenchment of the gender gains made.  
 
The confluence of historical events that facilitated openings for women’s strategic 
action was central to this investigation, as the establishment of three key legacies 
enabled the creation of spaces for women’s participation and for the consolidation of 
gender gains in institutional structures. The interlinked legacies of militancy, autonomy 
and equality empowered women to confront the prejudicial norms and values within the 
political and security arenas, expanding their power and capacity to act, and entrenching 
the core values upon which the new democratic regime would be founded. There is a 
demonstrable link between the development of these three legacies and the creation of 
structures for representation and participation in the new democratic South Africa. 
Similarly, the advances in equality made within the armed liberation movement were 
carried over into the reformation of the State security sector, formalising the gender 
gains made in the security realm.  
 
The exploration of the processes by which gendered institutional change occurred in the 
security structures of the South African State was informed by an analytical model 
grounded in feminist institutionalist theory. This model was utilised to chart the factors 
affecting women’s relative power; including mapping the historical legacies that enhanced 
women’s capacity to act in the formal political arena, identifying some of the key moments 
that consolidated women’s political gains, outlining the exogenous influences that fed into 
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the process, and describing the strategic organising that enabled women to seize the 
opportunities arising from the transformation of the state. Some of the promises and 
limits of change were then considered in the post-Apartheid State through the “case 
study within a case study” of the Arms Deal.  
 
Developing an understanding of gendered institutional change is necessarily tempered 
by a variety of contextual factors. These dynamics influence the opportunities and 
constraints inherent to the system, as well as providing new openings for change as the 
system evolves and adapts over time and through the manoeuvrings of actors inside and 
outside the network of structures making up the system. The use of a feminist 
institutionalist model enabled these dynamics to be analysed in a manner that captured 
the cause and effect of some of the variables, thereby enabling an understanding of how 
gendered change occurred within the system.   
 
The descriptive representation of women can be determined through a statistical 
overview, and the various policies and machineries aimed at integrating gender into the 
security structures of the State can reveal the strategies being pursued. However, these 
indicators are not sufficient to identify whether gendered institutional norms are 
changing. For this reason, a range of parliamentarians, security personnel, and civil 
society practitioners were consulted in order to gauge their perceptions of gender 
equality within the security sector. This provided a deeper understanding of the manner 
in which the institutional culture was (or was not) transforming with respect to gender 
equality.  
 
The overall findings of the research are therefore oriented towards identifying the 
elements that supported sustainable substantive change of the institutional culture, 
embedding gender equality as an institutional norm and altering perceptions of women 
within the security sector, in keeping with the use of the benchmarks provided by the 
gender mainstreaming strategy as a means of assessing both the DRW and SRW in the 
South African post-conflict security structures. The findings of this research are not 
presented as a blueprint for other post-conflict developing states. Instead it is posited 
that the manner in which women in South Africa went about institutionalising gender 
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equality may have useful applications in other post-conflict states; in other words, 
presenting a “best practice” case study.  
 
The contribution of the research to original knowledge is two-fold: adding to the 
methodology of FI by presenting a specific approach to understanding gendered 
institutional change; and secondly, contributing to the South African gender literature in 
the under-researched security sector. The research can be seen as a contribution to the 
growing theoretical body of work emerging around the concept of Feminist 
Institutionalism, situated at the intersection between FPS and NI, as it explores the 
explanatory power of FI within post-conflict transitional institutional structures. In 
particular, the construction and application of a framework for analysis that takes 
cognisance of a range of normative values and the interaction of these various elements 
represents another facet of the contribution to theoretical knowledge.  
 
As the thesis considers gendered institutional change within a specific time and place – 
the post-conflict security structures of the South African State - the research expands 
the understanding of women’s experiences, strategies and goals during and after the 
liberation struggle for democracy in South Africa. The interaction between historical 
legacies, various key moments and exogenous influences, and their collective influence 
on gendered power relations, provide a deeply contextualised account of the gendering 
of transitional post-conflict States. The consideration of these variables through an FI-
lens also provides a slightly more optimistic view of the progress made in achieving 
gendered institutional change, in comparison to some of the traditional studies 
discussed in this thesis. 
 
These contributions are linked through the contemplation of particular configurations 
and transferable mechanisms that explain gendered institutional change, firstly through 
the development of the theoretical construct of the model, and then through the 
application of this model to the South African security context. Further, the 
consideration of the Arms Deal from this gendered institutionalist standpoint represents 
an original perspective not yet applied to the particular case study. 
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9.1 Devising a Feminist Institutionalist Framework 
 
Drawing on the foundations set by both contemporary feminist literature and the NI 
view on institutional change, a new analytical model was created with the complexities 
of the South African case in mind. The normative view of institutions put forward by FI 
acknowledges the centrality of the social and political context to shaping the formal and 
informal rules that explain continuity and change, while the integration of gender further 
expands the utility of FI in explaining the institutional impact on women’s agency, 
particularly in transitional states. An institutional focus has thus been adopted given the 
opportunities for gendered change that are created through the reconfiguration of 
structures that set the agenda and promulgate the laws for their attainment.  
 
The purpose of the model has been to discern the process by which gendered 
institutional change occurred in the South African security sector, particularly in terms 
of establishing both descriptive and substantive representation within these bastions of 
masculinity. The application of the theoretical constructs of FI to the history of South 
Africa in terms of gender equality has thus contributed to the knowledge of women’s 
advancement within formal governance structures. The exploration of the advancement 
of women within the security sector (particularly within the context of post-conflict 
states) further enhances the understanding of the opportunities and constraints for the 
expansion and formalisation of women’s leadership roles in developing states.  
 
The analytical model presented in Chapter Two takes as its starting point the assertion 
that the formal and informal rules and norms that constitute relations between actors 
and institutions explain processes of continuity and change (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; 
Mackay et al, 2009). Particular emphasis has been placed on the normative notion that 
the social interactions and relationships that maintain institutional norms are bounded 
and transformed by the power of ideas – “stickier” ideas can fundamentally alter 
institutional values. The factors that influence the development of both the rules and 
norms of institutions must therefore be considered as variables with multi-directional 
impacts, while retaining cognisance of the importance of timing, which has been shown 
to have a bearing on the shifting power of actors within institutions. The important of 
context in relation to these variables underscores the suitability of the FI framework 
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utilised in this study to answer the question of how gendered institutional change occurs, 




Power was placed at the heart of this explanatory model, based on the view that shifting 
power relationships (between actors and between actors and institutions) enable new 
ideas about the role of gender in governance to gain credence and transform the 
institutional culture. This is a key strength of the FI approach, given the emphasis on 
actors and how they wield power to promote or foreclose change. A multi-dimensional 
view of power has been utilised within the model, with an emphasis on the relational 
nature of power within the institutional context, and the value-dependent nature of 
power (Kabeer, 1999; Lukes, 2005: 26, 30, 54; Annesley & Gains, 2010; Schmidt, 2010). 
The over-arching conceptualisation of power lies in its capacity to bring about change 
through influencing the norms and values of institutions (Kabeer, 1999; Allen, 2005; 
Lukes, 2005; Annesley & Gains, 2010). 
 
The ideational slant derived from the work of Hall & Taylor (1996:947), Lovenduski 
(2011: viii), and Waylen (2011, 149), amongst others, emphasises the intertwining of 
institutional and social contexts, and the impact that these contexts have on both 
structure and agency. This was clearly demonstrated in the centrality of the notion of 
equality as a social ideal within the institutional philosophy of the ANC, and the impact 
this had on the increase in women’s autonomy. 
 
The feminist institutionalist emphasis on ideas as shaping the transformation process of 
institutions, and influencing the integration of new concepts of gender equality into 
these structures (Kabeer, 2003:47; Schmidt, 2008; Krook & Mackay, 2011: 10), further 
informed the central placement of ideas within the new model for analysis. Thus, 
“ideas” are conceived as the expression of the normative orientations of actors, or 
groups of actors. These ideas can prompt either change or the retention of the status 
quo, depending on the manner in which the power of the actors involved is exercised.  
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The factors that impacted on these fluctuating power dynamics were categorised into 
historical legacies (and path dependencies), key moments and exogenous influences, in an 
effort to capture the many dynamics of the institutional gendering process and enable 
the systematic charting of the interaction between actors, institutions, and the broader 
context within which they relate. In particular, how did ideas about gender, gender 
equality, and evolving gender roles infiltrate the institutional culture of the security 
sector, were these ideas entrenched, and how did this process occur? 
 
The commensurate emphasis placed on formal and informal institutions in accounting 
for institutional continuity and change is a further strength of the NI/FI approach, 
particularly when considering the gendered nature of institutions and the manner in 
which altering gender norms occurs (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Leach & Lowndes, 
2007; Franceschet, 2011: 61-62). This has been especially salient in the analysis of South 
Africa’s security structures in which overlapping informal networks vied for power and 
resources: the old boy’s network of the former SADF, the respective networks of the 
former liberation armies integrated into the new SANDF, and the alliances forged 
during the transition, all of which boosted the profile of gender with respect to security.  
 
In the democratic era, informal networks have continued to impact on the power 
relations within institutions in both positive and negative ways, as seen with the 
Women’s Budget and the Arms Deal. As a feature of the institutional environment, 
informal networks in the South African case are closely aligned with issues of political 
party loyalty and patronage, as was shown in Chapters Five, Seven and Eight. 
 
The integration of formal and informal institutions into the FI approach enhanced the 
analysis of post-conflict South Africa as it enabled the consideration of the institutional 
“layering” that occurs as a result of pacted transitions, as described by Waylen (2009) 
and Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 16), amongst others. The displacement and 
overlapping of ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutions within democratic South Africa opened new 
spaces within which prevailing norms could be contested, and relative power and 
influence shifted as accepted gender roles were challenged. This process was aided by 
the insertion of mechanisms for mainstreaming gender within “old” institutions, and the 
integration of gendered norms from the inception within “new” institutions. These 
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changes to the institutional gendered norms of both the general State governance 
structures and the security sector are a testament to the impact of the decades of 
incremental gender gains, aided by the rise in women’s autonomy in the liberation 
movement, the emphasis on equality as a core value of the now-ruling party, and the 
resituating of gender roles within the security sector.  
 
The cumulative effect of these multiple sources of change and continuity reflected an 
inter-dependent relationship between institutions, actors and society. The provisions 
within FI for appreciating the nuances affecting the gendered nature of these factors 
further bolters the statement by Waylen (2009: 247) that institutions serve both as 
strategic resources and constraints for actors. In other words, the interaction of the 
various factors integrated into the model affected the opportunities that opened up, and 
the manner in which women strategically utilised these openings to further the goal of 
gender equality.  
 
9.2 Historical Legacies: Militancy, Autonomy and Equality 
 
The application of the theoretical foundation provided by the model presented in 
Chapter Two revealed three dominant strands that created opportunities for women’s 
empowerment in terms of openings for action and the amassing of political power. 
These three historical legacies were: the centrality of equality as a core value in the ANC, 
the increase in women’s autonomy and, related to this, the entrenched militancy of the 
South African society. The paths that led to the transitional tipping point (when the new 
State was being structured) were punctuated by a number of key moments that served as 
moments of significant import for the country as a whole, as well as representing 
consolidation points for the increasing power of women within the political landscape. 
The progression of the respective legacies and the events that marked their development 
and consolidation were the focus of Chapters Three and Four, while the impact of these 
legacies on the creation of the new democratic State was explored in Chapters Five and 
Seven. 
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9.2.1 Autonomy and Equality: Paths to Participation 
 
The historical legacies of equality and autonomy were intricately interlinked, as advances 
along the path of broad-based equality were reflected in the rise of women’s autonomy, 
particularly within the ANC. Chapters Three, Four and Five demonstrated how women 
organised strategically in order to systematically increase the formal recognition of their 
contributions and thereby begin “activating” or claiming the rights acquired within 
political parties (and later formal rights within the State). For example, the formation of 
the Bantu Women’s League in 1918 (and the reformation of the ANC Women’s League 
in 1943) provided a space within which women’s demands could be articulated, resulting 
in the formal inclusion of gender equality within foundational documents such as the 
1955 Freedom Charter and ANC Constitutions (ANC, 1955, 1958, 1991, 1998, 2002).  
 
As women continued to organise politically not only for gender rights but also more 
broadly for political equality for all citizens, their collective power grew as they arranged 
mass protests and expanded their networks and alliances, forming coalitions that would 
be utilised in the gendering of the democratic institutions of the State in the post-
liberation transition period.  
 
The 1960s dramatically advanced the prominence of women in the political and security 
arenas. The combination of the State of Emergency (which simultaneously banned 
political parties and their leaders), the Rivonia Trials (which imprisoned male leaders not 
in exile), and the influx of new women members following the Sharpeville Massacre, all 
represented key moments in the progression of the legacies of autonomy, militancy and 
equality. Women stepped up to keep the liberation movement alive, through the 
maintenance of communication networks (both internally and abroad), the provision of 
safe houses, the smuggling of cadres into and out of the country for military training, 
and by performing other logistical tasks, including the “traditional” roles of social 
services. Women also took on “masculine” roles such as undergoing military training 
alongside male cadres, smuggling in arms and commanding divisions within MK. The 
continuously expanding and evolving roles of women, particularly in relation to security, 
were amply illustrated during the period of the liberation struggle, as the divide between 
“traditional” masculine and feminine duties blurred further.  
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A significant part of this change was due to the context. The absence of much of the 
male leadership due to exile and imprisonment necessitated the more prominent 
involvement of women. The inclusion of women in the formal leadership and military 
structures of the ANC served to further enhance their perceived legitimacy as leaders 
within the movement. The burdens created by the turmoil in the country were 
disproportionately shouldered by women, in the political, social and economic sense. 
While women had been fulfilling variations of these roles for years, it was during this 
time that the prominence of these roles was highlighted, and the legitimacy of women 
discharging these duties became more widespread. This would prove significant later 
during the transition to democracy. 
 
At the same time that women were agitating for greater political representation and 
acknowledgment of their contributions to the liberation struggle, the international 
feminist movement was making great strides, representing an exogenous influence on the 
evolution of ideas about gender and the State. The successive UN Women’s 
Conferences (and other regional and international instruments) were calling for the 
formalisation of women’s representation within decision-making structures, and the 
consideration of differentiated gender needs in policy formulation. The experiences of 
women in liberation struggles across the developing world were also informing the 
strategies of women in South Africa, who noted that national liberation did not 
necessarily result in women’s liberation. The continuous entrenchment of gender gains 
made, through the inclusion of gender rights in foundational documents and the active 
participation of women in all aspects of the liberation struggle, was one of the ongoing 
strategies pursued by organised women in South Africa.  
 
The infusion of equality into the core of the ANC’s philosophy was an immense boon 
to the women’s movement in South Africa. It was on the basis of gender, racial and 
religious equality that a culture of diversity infused the ANC, and validated calls for 
inclusion by women. The form of this participation would become increasingly 
formalised, thereby enhancing the status of women within the organisation and broader 
society. The rise of women within the leadership of MK was a particularly noteworthy 
trend as the success of women in this most “masculine” of spheres enhanced their 
credibility as leaders within the movement. Continuously raising the “glass ceiling” on 
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the basis of the stated policies of the ANC led to demonstrable gains in terms of 
leadership positions. A similar strategy was shown to be repeatedly employed over the 
course of the Struggle, through the transitional period, and into the democratic era.  
 
In order to perpetuate the success of this strategy within the new democratic State, 
women would need a place at the negotiating table. During CODESA/MPNF, which 
constituted a key moment of significant import, the political and social power 
incrementally amassed throughout the Struggle served to ensure women’s formal 
participation in the negotiations that would establish popular democracy in South 
Africa. Women’s involvement in this important State-building forum was bolstered by 
the broad support base of the WNC, as well as by previous gains such as the formal 
inclusion of gender equality in the Freedom Charter, which legitimated calls for 
participation. Significantly, the coalition of women from all sectors of South African 
society gave women a voice in the writing of the landmark Constitution, and the 
entrenchment of gender rights therein. This foundational document would serve as the 
philosophical cornerstone of the new State, and the explicit inclusion of gender rights 
was therefore a significant achievement. These events are also a clear example of 
Pierson’s (2004) concept of causal chains, as each event demonstrably influenced the next, 
building towards an envisioned outcome – the entrenchment of gender equality in the 
new democratic State. 
 
The ramifications of these explicit provisions for women’s equality in the founding 
documents of the State were widespread. Women would be represented at all levels of 
State institutions, providing a strong base for the substantive involvement of women in 
the creation of a new democratic state and thereby the gendering of State institutions. It 
also served to strengthen the process of transforming institutional norms and values as 
equality was re-affirmed as a core value of the new democratic State. The key moment of 
the transition to democracy illustrated once again the close correlations between the 
entrenchment of equality as a core value of the State and the rise and consolidation of 
women’s autonomy and power. In particular, the transitional period demonstrated the 
exercise of the amassed power of the women’s movement to affect demonstrable 
change in the institutional mechanisms of the State, in terms of descriptive gains and the 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion                                    291 
establishment of structures for sustaining the momentum of the gendering process 
(such as the gender machineries and Women’s Budget, amongst others). 
 
The entrenchment of these gender gains was a reflection of the evolution of the norms 
and values of the ANC, which, due to its overwhelming electoral victory, facilitated the 
infusion of gendered norms into the new institutional structures of the State.  
 
The meteoric increase in the descriptive representation of women within institutional 
structures bears testament to this change in the institutional culture, rising from 2.7% 
prior to democracy to 28% under the first ANC regime, with women currently 
constituting 43% of the National Assembly.  
 
The prominence and influence of the positions women attained under the democratic 
dispensation further underscored the commitment of the ANC leadership to realising 
the core values of equality and participative representation that characterize the good 
governance ideals towards which the government was striving.  
 
In order to sustain these gains, a number of institutional mechanisms were established. 
These included dedicated parliamentary committees such as the multiparty 
Parliamentary Women’s Group and the Committee on Improving the Quality of Life 
and Status of Women, the Office for the Status of Women located within the 
Presidency, and the independent Commission on Gender Equality.  
 
Although these structures faced similar challenges to those confronting women’s 
machinery elsewhere in the world (lack of sufficient resources, unclear mandates due to 
the sectoral approach, and coordination issues), some notable successes were achieved. 
Prime among these was the establishment of a Women’s Budget, which considered the 
gendered impacts of policies during the formulation process, brought to fruition 
through a coalition of powerful male and female parliamentarians, including the Speaker 
of Parliament Frene Ginwala, Minister of Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, Gauteng 
Finance Minister Jabu Moleketi, Deputy Director-General of Financial Planning Maria 
Ramos and MP Pregs Govender.  
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9.2.2 Militancy and the Gendering of State Security Structures 
 
The legacy of militancy established in the early history of South Africa played a 
significant role in the recasting of gendered security rules. The violent opposition to 
colonialism in the form of skirmishes and wars between indigenous people, the colonial 
forces, and Afrikaners, embedded militancy in the norms of the various South African 
cultures, and had a marked impact on identity and accepted masculine and feminine 
roles. This entrenchment of militancy would be continuously demonstrated throughout 
the course of South African history, and would reach a zenith with the widespread 
deployment of the defence force in suppressing opposition to Apartheid rule internally 
and externally.  
 
The militant response of the State prompted liberation movements to take up arms, 
partially in self-defence and partially as a means to bring about more urgent regime 
change, given that the State was utilising the army against its own people. The massacre 
of protesting civilians at Sharpeville by State security forces in 1960 directly contributed 
to the formation of MK in 1961. Later clashes between students and armed forces in the 
1976 Soweto Uprisings created another influx of cadres into MK – including many 
women.  
 
The ongoing emphasis of prominent ANC leaders on the importance of equality as a 
core value of the ANC created the opening for women’s participation on an equal 
footing with men in MK. The exercising of their right to equality enabled women to 
begin transforming gendered notions of “acceptable” security roles, as they undertook 
perilous missions both within and outside South Africa’s borders. The willingness of 
these women to take these risks raised the esteem in which they were held within MK. 
The acceptance of women in combat positions was slow, with many of the duties 
carried out by women (even those with an overt security element) continuing to be 
dismissed as “women’s work” given the comparatively high number of women involved 
in logistical tasks. However, the penalties applied by the State for these logistical 
activities were harsh, including imprisonment in solitary confinement and banning 
orders, and would have significant consequences on the lives of these women, as 
discussed in Chapters Three and Four. The stature enjoyed by MK cadres within the 
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liberation movement was a significant development in the rising autonomy of women in 
the political and security arena, and contributed to the changing gender norms within 
pockets of the security sector.  
 
This legacy of militancy also expanded women’s roles and responsibilities within their 
specific cultures and, as these evolving roles confronted the ingrained notions of 
acceptable gendered duties, prevailing norms began to shift. The insidious nature of the 
armed conflict that was increasingly being waged within communities (through the use 
of “third force” operatives) impacted on all aspects of day-to-day life, drawing more 
women in as the roles needed for survival expanded. Women were fulfilling new and 
varied functions within their communities and liberation structures, slowly amassing 
prominence and influence, although formal positions of power at the highest levels 
initially remained the dominion of men.  
 
At the time of the transition to democracy, a significant shift in the conceptualisation of 
security was occurring throughout the developing world. The Human Security Paradigm 
(HSP) explicitly linked development and security, moving from previously State-centric 
security models towards a holistic people-centred approach that considered the 
protection of human rights and good governance ideals as critical components in the 
creation of sustainable development and the provision of a stable and secure 
environment (Schoeman, 1998; Hendricks, 2007; Clarke, 2008, amongst others).  
 
HSP had synergy with the ANC’s philosophy as it reflected the core values that laid at 
the heart of the new State-building process. Both the HSP and the ANC’s vision for the 
security policy of the democratic South Africa were informed by key developments in 
the international and regional environments, chiefly the end of the Cold War and the 
impact that this had on regional power dynamics. In essence, the prominence of 
regional groupings in addressing conflicts increased, and South Africa was positioning 
itself to be a key player in the development of regional collective security organs in 
SADC and the AU. This was viewed as a means to ensure South Africa’s own security 
and stability, as well as rebranding South Africa’s role in Sub-Saharan Africa following 
the Apartheid era policies of regional destabilisation that had isolated the State from its 
neighbours. 
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This inclusive approach towards regional security and development aimed to capitalise 
on the moral authority derived from the relatively peaceful transition to democracy in 
South Africa, and would be employed towards entrenching good governance ideals in 
the region as a means of ensuring regional stability and, therefore, sustainable growth.  
 
South Africa became a strong player in regional political and economic affairs in order 
to advance its interests, presenting itself as a model of good democratic governance. 
This necessarily called for a radical repositioning of the military within society, not only 
in terms of the military’s mandate but also with regard to the manner in which it was 
perceived internally and externally. The military would be primarily oriented towards 
humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, which would in turn assist with the national 
strategy of security sector transformation.  
 
As part of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process in which the defence force was 
resized and re-oriented in accordance with its new mandate, the former liberation forces 
were merged into the SADF, forming the new SANDF, which was to be broadly 
representative of the population in demographic terms. This process of integration was 
a vital step towards repositioning the military within society, and rehabilitating the 
manner in which the defence force was viewed by the broader population, given the 
destructive role played by the SADF during the liberation struggle. 
 
In gender terms, the new security mandate and the SSR process provided a means to 
consolidate the gains made by women during the liberation era and created additional 
openings for the influx of women on the grounds of creating a demographically 
representative force. The foundation of equality upon which the new State was based 
carried through to the policies of the SANDF, with the aim of entrenching non-
discrimination within the armed forces as well. This meant that new female recruits 
would receive the same training and the same opportunities for advancement as their 
male colleagues. Although this did not imply that ingrained attitudes about women and 
combat were automatically transformed, efforts were being made to create a conducive 
environment for the abolishment of discriminatory practices and the eventual 
reconstruction of the norms surrounding women in the armed forces. The process of 
formal institutional gendering began with the entrenchment of women’s formal rights to 
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fulfil any role in the defence sector within the Constitution and the regulatory policies of 
the SANDF. Oversight mechanisms for addressing discrimination were established, and 
monthly committee meetings dedicated to the monitoring of the implementation of 
gender mainstreaming policies were instituted by experienced female MK veterans such 
as Major-General Memela-Motumi and Major-General Jackie Sedibe. These efforts were 
supported and furthered by prominent and influential women within the Defence 
Ministry, including Thandi Modise and Lindiwe Sisulu.  
 
The disproportionate number of MK veterans (male and female) in the SANDF played 
a significant role in the transformation process of the SANDF, as the politics of 
presence came into play. Female commanders strove to retain the respect they had 
earned during the Struggle, while male cadres were already accustomed to serving 
alongside women, aiding the process of gender integration with SADF and other forces 
that had previously been all-male (in terms of combat positions). The patronage of 
influential male commanders continued within the SANDF, further aiding the infusion 
of gender equality as a base value of the SANDF. The transference of MK ranks also 
resulted in a proportionately large number of women entering the SANDF in “middle 
management” ranks, as explored in Chapter Seven.  
 
Together these factors contributed to the formal transformation of the security 
structures, and aided in the modification of the traditional informal norms and formal 
rules of the security sector. The “first-generation” effect was exaggerated by the high 
influx of MK cadres and by the network of informal alliances that increased their 
relative power out of proportion with the influence of their ranks. Subsequent 
generations of women would possibly not be able to replicate the manner in which 
women attained these positions. However, the institutionalisation of equality measures, 
together with the emphasis placed on proportionate gender recruitment, indicates that 
the advancement of women to positions of influence is a sustainable phenomenon 
within the security sector.  
 
The impact of both the practical and strategic changes to the institutional rules and 
norms in the security sector has been positive in descriptive terms, both within the 
corps of the SANDF and the ministerial and parliamentary positions that wield 
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influence over the formulation and execution of security policies. The shift in South 
Africa’s security policy towards peace support operations also provided new 
opportunities for women to consolidate acceptance of expanded gender security roles. 
Following similar strategies to those that had so effectively increased women’s 
autonomy and equality in the liberation struggle, women in the armed forces drew on 
the various regional and international instruments to which the State was party 
(particularly the UN SCR 1325, the Windhoek Declaration, and the AU’s PCRD 
discussed in Chapter Six) to call for representation at all levels of missions. The 
gendered approach to SSR and to peace operations emphasises the repositioning of 
women (and acceptable gender roles) within the social and political context. 
 
The paths set in motion by the three interlinked legacies of equality, autonomy and 
militancy have certainly created openings for strategic action by women. These 
opportunities were seized and built upon in order to entrench gender gains within the 
institutional fabric of the new democratic State, aided by key moments and exogenous 
influences from regional and international developments. Clear descriptive gains were 
made, and substantive changes to the formal institutional rules were enacted. How 
effective were these strategies in changing prejudicial gendered institutional norms? 
What did the perceptions of policy-makers and civil society practitioners reveal about 
the gender values of State security institutions in democratic South Africa? 
 
9.3 Changing Gendered Institutional Norms: Perceptions of 
Participants 
 
Policy makers from across the political spectrum were interviewed about their 
perceptions of gender equality gains in the structures of government, including in the 
security sector. Civil society practitioners with varying levels of experience within 
government security structures were also consulted about their views on the progress 
made in the institutional gendering of the democratic State. The data yielded from the 
surveys and interviews conducted was corroborated and expanded upon by anonymous 
informants from different areas of the security structures of the State and various 
sectors of civil society.  
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Overall perceptions amongst parliamentarians and civil society respondents were that 
gender as a relational concept, and gender mainstreaming as a policy initiative, were 
understood by senior staff and leadership within both the general governance and 
security structures of the State. Gender issues were perceived to be considered more 
important within general governance structures: an indication that participants viewed 
the security sector as adapting more slowly to the new institutional norms and values of 
the democratic State. Female leaders within government were seen as more open to the 
consideration of gender issues during policy formulation, with the security sector again 
being viewed as less open to the gendering of policies.  
 
These survey results, together with the comments recorded by participants (discussed in 
Chapters Five and Seven), indicate that the framework for the gendering of State 
institutions has been established and that changes to institutional norms are occurring, 
albeit at a slow pace. Respondents also indicated that the high descriptive representation 
of women would continue to have a positive impact on altering prejudicial norms and 
values, particularly in light of the supporting legislation and institutional mechanisms for 
participation put into place. In other words, the awareness of gender issues by a range of 
actors at various levels of these structures points to the success of keeping gender on 
the agenda. However, the discordant perceptions of these actors with regard to the 
importance placed on these issues suggest that some of these gender gains may be 
superficial in terms of institutional transformation.  
 
Participants also considered the factors perceived as important to the advancement of 
women within both the general structures and the security institutions of the State. In 
both realms, political party loyalty was cited as the most influential variable, which has 
both positive and negative repercussions for the entrenchment of gender equality in 
State institutions, as explored in Chapter Eight’s discussion of the Arms Deal. In the 
positive sense, political party loyalty provided opportunities for participation and 
expanding openings for the creation of alliances and coalitions to realise gendered 
institutional change. Negative repercussions included the curtailment of women’s 
capacity to act, given the limitations of the proportional representation system that 
endowed the party with significant power over the retention of positions within 
Parliament. 
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Throughout the research process, women were more likely than men to acknowledge 
the importance of patronage, perhaps due to a keener awareness of its role. Women at 
various levels within both the governance and security structures of the State spoke of 
the influence of patronage in consolidating the gains made by women, as did civil 
society practitioners. Patronage was continuously cited as one of the most critical factors 
in women’s advancement. The centrality of equality to the ANC’s credo prompted some 
male leaders to actively support the implementation of gender equality measures, 
including in the security wing of MK and later in the SANDF. In general, patronage was 
not perceived as a nepotistic action as women were given the opportunity to operate on 
the same playing field as men, rather than receiving promotions over more qualified 
men. In other words, it was the signal from the leadership that discrimination based on 
gender was unacceptable that removed some of the barriers preventing women from 
being recognised for their skills and contributions.  
 
However, mentorship was not as highly rated, which suggests that patronage is not seen 
as a capacity-building exercise but rather as a political support. In other words, 
patronage was perceived as a quasi-alliance, rather than an experienced individual 
guiding a less experienced colleague through their political careers. Most respondents 
noted the lack of effective mentoring programmes (both in government and security 
structures), and considered this an important aspect for development. It is also worth 
noting that very few female leaders were named as mentors. This does not imply that 
women are not assisting other women in moving up the ranks; anecdotal evidence 
suggests that women in the higher ranks are supportive of their colleagues, but this 
support is not often as overt as in the case of male patrons. For example, Major General 
Memela-Motumi (Chief Director of Transformation Management for the SANDF) was 
cited by respondents and analysts as supportive of female personnel on a range of 
issues, as well as furthering gender equality at the institutional level in a practical 
manner. An indicative example is the consideration of gender-appropriate materiel and 
gear, which stems from her experience in MK grappling with equipment manufactured 
for men (Johwa, 2009; Hendricks & Magadla, 2010). Major General Memela-Motumi 
has also called for the expansion of recruitment targets for women to 40% (from 30%) 
in order to create a larger “feeder pool” from which to draw female personnel for 
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advancement to senior ranks (Memela-Motumi, 2009), particularly as the female leaders 
of the MK-era begin moving out of the SANDF system. 
 
Women whose prominence stemmed from the historical legacies of the Struggle, who 
were shaped by their liberation struggle experiences, and who formed personal working 
relationships with other powerful players, are wielding this influence to entrench gender 
in the inherited security structures of the State and transform the culture of these 
structures to consider women as equal and qualified participants in the security sector. 
Thus, the paths established by these Struggle women have served to enable subsequent 
entrants to progress faster, as the institutional culture accepts and adapts to new norms 
with respect to gender roles. A further example is the standardised provision of training 
for male and female personnel, which means that a wider base of women have the same 
skill sets as men and are being given the opportunities to advance – as seen by the large 
number of middle management positions still occupied by women in the SANDF.  
 
However, some anecdotal evidence based on the perceptions of participants in the study 
suggests that the consolidation of gender gains has seen uneven results. One area of 
concern is the weakness of gender machineries in terms of influence and resources, 
which renders them insufficient to significantly further the goal of gender equality, 
particularly within the security sector. It remains a task pursued predominantly by 
individual women within the security (and broader governance) structures to affect 
change. Therefore, the substantial gains made in terms of descriptive representation in 
the security structures have proved to be critical, particularly within middle management 
posts and the significant proportion of women holding cabinet level posts related to 
security. Women occupying substantive positions exert the greater influence in affecting 
institutional change, both by virtue of their actions within these posts and through their 
presence - demonstrating the ability of women to be effective political actors in security 
structures. This is a clear demonstration of the gender mainstreaming emphasis on the 
importance of achieving both descriptive and substantive representation of women in 
order to attain and entrench gendered institutional change. 
 
The power of women within security-related posts enabled a two-fold assault on gender 
inequality in the security sector. Firstly, their presence in positions of prominence 
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signified the willingness of the State to abide by its commitments stated in party, 
national, regional and international instruments. From these positions of State-
sanctioned authority, women were able to agitate for change during the formulation and 
revision of policies and programmes related to security in order to ensure that the 
gender dimension was considered. Secondly, these women had the ability to strengthen 
institutional arrangements for the sustainability of these gains in terms of clarifying 
recruitment targets, playing a mentorship role, and implementing strategies aimed at 
transforming the institutional culture.  
 
9.4 Lessons from the Arms Deal Case Study 
 
The mini-case study of the Arms Deal revealed some of the promises and limits of 
changing institutional norms, and the impact that this could have on the entrenchment 
of gender equality within institutional structures. The setbacks experienced in terms of 
the entrenchment of good governance ideals raises concerns about the reliability and 
sustainability of the gender gains made, particularly given the prominent role played by 
political party loyalty in both cases. In other words, while the mini-case study speaks to 
the difficulty of enacting change within institutional structures in a more general sense, 
the implications for gendered institutional change is made clear as well. For example, the 
apparent ease with which oversight mechanisms aimed at upholding new ideas about 
good governance were circumvented through the exercising of political party loyalty 
calls into question the safety of gender equality gains. 
 
The manner in which the procurement process and the subsequent investigation of 
procedural irregularities were carried out highlighted some of the challenges that can 
arise due to the nature of a negotiated or pacted transition. The layering of old and new 
institutions, with a mixture of competing norms, values, formal rules and informal 
networks, created an environment of continuously contested change as ideas competed 
for dominance. The ideals that are entrenched are those whose supporting rule 
structures are continually reinforced and sustained, while those values not integrated 
into the institutional core lose traction. In the case of equality and participation, the 
Arms Deal revealed a lack of commitment to the effective functioning of institutional 
mechanisms for oversight and accountability – the same institutions that were mandated 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion                                    301 
to ensure the implementation of good governance principles, such as gender equality. 
This subversion of equality and other good governance ideals demonstrated the impact 
of the proportional list system, coupled with the dominance of political party loyalty 
(recognised as the most influential factor in the advancement of women), and the vast 
scope of the broader State transformation process, particularly in the security sector.  
 
The proportional list system proved a boon to women’s descriptive representation due 
to the quota provisions of the ANC, which greatly increased the numbers of women 
entering Parliament for the first time. However, the lack of designated constituencies 
places MPs at a remove from the general population, and has the effect of placing party 
interests foremost in MPs allegiances since they are not reliant on a single constituency 
for re-election. This has the effect of foregrounding the importance of political party 
loyalty on the retention of positions of power and influence and, therefore, on the 
ability to participate in the political process. During the arms procurement process, MPs 
objected to the deal on the grounds that the expenditure ran contrary to the core values 
and stated philosophy of the State to concentrate on socio-economic development as a 
means to ensure security. Nevertheless, the Executive persisted with the deal, warning 
objectors within the party that positions of influence and prominence were contingent 
on loyalty to the party (although not necessarily to party ideals). The “mobilisation of 
bias” (Lukes, 2005: 26; Franceschet, 2011: 65) demonstrated during the Arms Deal was 
a setback to the entrenchment of not only gender equality ideals, but more broadly to 
the consolidation of good governance ideals such as oversight and accountability, which 
assist with the sustainability of gender gains, particularly in terms of implementing an 
effective gender mainstreaming strategy. 
 
The circumvention of oversight mechanisms designed to ensure that the ideals of good 
governance were upheld (including core values such as equality, participation, and 
transparency) pointed to the interlinking of two processes that served to limit gendered 
change: the influence of political party loyalty and the centralisation of power in the 
Executive. The disproportionate power wielded by a small number of highly placed 
individuals therefore had the capacity to weaken the institutional mechanisms through 
which change was being enacted, calling into question the ability of MPs (men and 
women) to effectively defend the stated objectives of the State.  
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The case study also showed the continued pervasiveness of hegemonic ideas of 
masculinity grounded in ‘Realpolitik’, and the tension this created with the liberal 
philosophy of the State. In effect, the development-centric priorities that initially created 
opportunities for security policy to be more effectively gendered (in terms of 
considering the gender-differentiated needs of the population) were soon abandoned in 
favour of the previous regimes’ traditional approach to security. This signalled a return 
of a masculinist decision-making process that curtailed oversight and participation, 
resulting in the loss of gendered institutional gains in terms of substantive input into the 
development of security policy. This regression in institutional norms and rules also 
weakened the mechanisms through which women participated in the decision-making 
process, and the arena for gendered intervention was further reduced as a result of the 
informal rules of political party loyalty. 
 
The inherited labyrinth of institutional structures that was layered together with the new 
institutions created to realise the ambitious new vision of the democratic South Africa 
was put to the test and was found wanting. However, the experience did yield some 
insights into the processes by which gendered institutional change occurs, in both the 
positive and negative sense.  
 
In a positive sense, women demonstrated confidence in the power inferred by their 
positions of prominence and influence: a female opposition MP, Patricia de Lille, 
formally tabled the allegations of corruption in Parliament, and a female ANC MP put 
her objections to the deal on the record despite the political costs to her career. Various 
other female actors raised objections to the deviation from State policy with respect to 
the Arms Deal and the subsequent investigation, particularly in terms of the gendered 
impact of the deal. Female commanders within the SANDF used the opportunity to 
expand women’s roles by ensuring that the new equipment was “gender-friendly”, 
although this was a limited gain given the erosion of more substantive gendered 
institutional changes made prior to the deal. In other words, despite the curtailment of 
women’s ability to effectively wield the power endowed by their positions of 
prominence and influence without undue interference from informal rules like political 
party loyalty, women continued to push for change where they could.  
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However, the serious undermining of institutional processes aimed at ensuring the 
substantive participation of women in decision-making in the security arena (particularly 
with regards to oversight) shows the limits of gendered institutional change when 
confronted with a few powerful elites, and the current weakness of formal institutional 
rules protecting women’s substantive participation in the security sector. 
 
The element that reconciles the two apparently contradictory narratives of limited 
positive gendered change against the “Realpolitik” that emerged from the Arms Deal 
case study is the nature of the power wielded by women in the security sector. By 
formalising gains in foundational documents of the State and the ruling party, and 
continuing to wield relational power by virtue of their positions of prominence and 
influence, women in the security sector maintain a delineated sphere of authority within 
which change can be affected. At times, such as with the Arms Deal, this sphere of 
influence contracts. In other instances, such as with the Women’s Budget, the range of 
issues over which women can exert influence expands.  
 
The point of commonality is that while women’s relational power may be tempered in 
certain instances by the opposing forces of “Realpolitik”, this power is derived from the 
positional placement of women, and is therefore not a temporary phenomenon. In 
some ways, the power of women is more constant within the security sector as a result of 
its rigidly hierarchical institutional structure, as opposed to the situation in the general 
governance structures of the State where women are dependent on the goodwill of the 
party leadership to remain in office.  
 
This is a critical lesson in understanding how gendered institutional change occurs: the 
power of these women as political actors within the security arena was not solely 
contingent on alliances or informal rules. Their power to enact change was conferred 
through their relative positions of influence and prominence within the security 
institutions, and strengthened by the legitimacy with which these positions are viewed 
by other actors, which are all formally determined and bound by institutional rules. This 
demonstrates how substantive representation (in terms of attaining positions of relative 
power and influence), together with increased descriptive representation, assist with the 
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creation of an enabling environment for change, as theorised by the gender 
mainstreaming approach.   
 
Viewed from the perspective of the analytical model, a logical thread can be drawn 
illustrating how this institutional change occurred. The legacies of equality and militancy 
increased the relative power of women as legitimate actors within the security arena. 
The consolidation of these gains within the security structures of the democratic State 
further solidified these gains by formalising the influence and prominence of women in 
these roles. The establishment of mechanisms for participation and oversight extended 
the arena in which women operated, as the layered structures of the security sector 
provided some reprieve from the potentially limiting influence of political party loyalty 
as an additional source of informal rules. The Arms Deal thus illustrated that the 
constantly shifting informal rules of institutions may foreclose change, but can also be 
utilised to continue pushing the gender agenda, albeit in new ways, given the existence 
of formal mechanisms for participation and actors in positions of prominence and 
power. 
 
9.5 Gendered Institutional Change in the South African Security 
Sector: An Ongoing Process 
 
The thesis examined the process of how institutional gendering occurred in the South 
African security sector from a feminist institutionalist perspective. The application of 
the theoretical constructs put forward by FI contributed to the understanding of 
institutional gendering processes in post-conflict states by highlighting the strategies that 
have been effectively applied in the South African context and by illustrating the gains 
made as a result of the intersection of various processes.  
 
The paths established by the historical legacies of equality, autonomy, and militancy 
expanded women’s roles and power within the security arena and altered gendered 
norms and values. Demanding formal substantive participation at all decision-making 
junctures and bodies by holding the party leadership to the commitments made in 
landmark documents such as the Freedom Charter, women further entrenched their 
power by ensuring they had a voice within a forum where it would be heard. The 
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pattern of strategic manoeuvring followed by formalised entrenchment of gains would 
be continuously repeated, from the effective lobbying of the WNC in securing female 
representatives within the CODESA/MPNF negotiating delegations to the drafting of 
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, which embedded gender equality in the 
foundations of the new democratic state. These gender gains were further entrenched 
through the establishment of institutional mechanisms for participation that aided in 
mainstreaming the rhetoric of gender equality into the institutional structures of the 
State. 
 
A similar cycle could be seen within the security sector, where the commitments made 
by the State with various regional and international organisations (exogenous influences) 
enabled women to move gender to the fore, particularly with respect to peace support 
operations. In the same vein, the shift towards the development-oriented Human 
Security Paradigm and the State’s new security mandate and the subsequent 
transformation of the SANDF, created openings for the further entrenchment of 
gender within the security structures as South Africa sought to transform its image on 
the regional, continental and international stages. 
 
As the importance of historical legacies demonstrated, the amassing of power and 
influence empowered women to play active roles within the political liberation of South 
Africa, utilising their collective strength and wide-ranging alliances to operate 
strategically within the institutional environment of the new democracy. This facilitated 
the dissemination of gender narratives throughout the various government structures, 
raising the profile of gender equality issues, and institutionalising gender equality to an 
extent. In other words, the path established in the early history of the party with respect 
to the recognition of gender rights was being continued with the advent of democracy. 
In many ways, the increasingly formal recognition of gender rights in all spheres, in the 
form of legislation and policies, embedded these rights more firmly within the 
institutional structure, although this does not imply that the institutional culture was 
automatically altered as result. 
 
Tying in with the process of formalised consolidation of gains is the second “best 
practice” derived from the findings: the continued use of strategic alliances to integrate 
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gender within the institutional culture. Women effectively utilised the central credo of 
equality that continues to underlie the ANC’s philosophy to push for change by forming 
alliances within governance and security structures. This practice was facilitated by the 
maintenance of a large number of women in these structures (descriptive 
representation) as well as through the assistance of women in high-ranking (substantive 
representation) positions. Women have also continued garnering support from 
influential figures (patronage), particularly when the initiatives align with ANC policy 
(political party loyalty) and are championed by prominent women who have amassed 
political power through their struggle credentials (historical legacies, merit).  
 
The continued strategic wielding of power, gained through the increasing positions of 
prominence and influence held by women, is demonstrably contributing to the gradual 
transformation and gendering of State security institutions. Progress is somewhat 
tempered by the dominance of the ANC Executive, which exerts pressure on members 
through the use of political party loyalty as a means of advancement within State 
institutions. While this has benefitted the status of women through the patronage of 
powerful individuals, it can also weaken the effective functioning of the oversight 
mechanisms of the democratic State.  
 
The thesis has shown the strategies utilised by women in post-conflict South Africa 
towards establishing gender within the fabric of the new institutions of the State, 
particularly within the security sector, with admittedly uneven results in terms of 
sustainability. This “battle plan” saw women advance (gains made through capitalising on 
the opportunities arising due to the historical legacies of militancy, autonomy and 
equality); entrench (formalising gender gains in foundational documents); form alliances 
(with various influential party figures and other organisations); and win (the war slowly) 
(by increasing the numbers of women in government, particularly in positions of power, 
prominence and influence). 
 
Time will tell if the institutional mechanisms established are sufficient to maintain the 
emphasis on equality, representation and participation as central ideals of the democratic 
State, especially in the security sector. With new women entering the security arena, will 
the rhetoric of gender equality “stick” and become the institutional norm?  
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The progress made has been remarkable, given the relative youth of the democracy and 
the social, political and economic context within which these gender gains were made. 
Confronting the challenges of widespread poverty and under-development in a 
continent with fluctuating stability, while participating in the democratic overhaul of a 
patriarchal and racist State structure, women have succeeded in keeping gender on the 
agenda, and continue to agitate for change through demonstrating the immense value 
that women bring to the security arena.  
 
Understanding how gendered institutional change occurs in the security sector, 
unravelling the variables that strengthen and weaken the mechanisms for entrenching 
these changes, and appreciating the strategies employed by women and men to create an 
equal participative society can foster a deeper appreciation for the immense changes 
occurring in the post-conflict developing South. What can be learnt from the triumphs 
and failures of the women who participated in the transformation of South Africa? 
Incremental changes can build up to substantive gains. Opportunities for gendered gains 
can be found even within seemingly disastrous situations. A deeply divided and 
conflicted society can be transformed into a flawed yet hopeful society striving to meet 
its ambitious goals of equality, peace and stability for all citizens.  
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Appendix 1  Timeline of Gender Instruments 
 
 Women in Development (WID) 
Focus: Suffrage/ Legal equality/ Positive Action 
Gender and Development (GAD) 
Focus: Gender Mainstreaming/ Substantive 
Transformation 










1948: United Nations General Assembly Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 
 
1966: United Nations General Assembly 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
1975:  1st World Conference on Women (Mexico) 
 
1979: Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
 
1980:  2nd World Conference on Women 
(Copenhagen) 
 
1985: 3rd World Conference on Women (Nairobi) 
 
1995: 4th World Conference on Women, Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action 
 
2000: 23rd United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session Beijing +5 Political Declaration 
 
2000: Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan 
of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective 
in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations 
 
2000: UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on 







1981: Organisation of African Union Banjul Charter 
on Human & People’s Rights 
1996: Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
Resolution on the African Commission on Human 
& Peoples' Rights 
 
2002: African Union (AU) Declaration on 
Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate 
Governance 
 
2003: African Union (AU) Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human & People’s Rights on the Rights 
of Women 
 
2004: African Union (AU) Solemn Declaration of 
Gender Equality in Africa 
 
2006: African Union (AU) Post Conflict 





 1997: Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Declaration on Gender & Development 
 
1999: Pan African Parliament (PAP) Women’s 
Declaration & Agenda for a Culture of Peace in 
Africa 
 
2005: Commonwealth Secretariat Commonwealth 






 1994: First Democratic Elections 
 
1996: Bill of Rights & Constitution 
 
2000: National Framework for Empowerment & 
Equality 
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Appendix 2  Conflicts in Africa (1948- 2008) 
 
Date Description State/States Involved 
                                                     1940s 
1946-1952 Civil War Ethiopia/Eritrea2 
1947-1948 Colonial Rebellion Madagascar2 
1948-1994 Anti-Apartheid Struggle/Violence South Africa1 
 1950s  
1952-1956 War of independence Tunisia3 
1952-1960 Mau Mau Uprising Kenya1 
1953-1955 Civil & Interstate War Sudan, United Kingdom2 
1954-1962 War of independence Algeria1 
1955-1960 War of independence Cameroon2 
1955-1972 Civil War Sudan1 
1957-1958 Border dispute Mauritania, Morocco2 
1958 Military Coup Sudan2 
1958 Political Instability Guinea2 
1959-2004 Series of military coups Sudan2 
1959 Overthrow of monarchy Rwanda2 
 1960s  
1960-1963 Conflict Rwanda1 
1960-1965 Congo Crisis DRC2 
1960-1965 Civil War Zaire (DRC) 2 
1961-1991 War of independence Eritrea1 
1961-1974 War of independence Angola1 
1962-1964 Conflict Rwanda, Burundi2 
1962 Conflict Ethiopia, Eritrea2 
1962 Failed coup Senegal2 
1963-2005 Series of military coups Togo2 
1963-1974 War of independence Guinea-Bissau1 
1963-1965 Post Independence War Congo (Zaire)1 
1963-1965 Interstate Conflict Benin, Niger2 
1963 Sand War Algeria, Morocco3 
1964-1974 War of independence Mozambique1 
1964-1980 Bush War Rhodesia/Zimbabwe1 
1964 Civil violence Zambia2 
1964 Civil Violence (Zanzibar) Tanzania2 
1964 Ogaden Clashes Ethiopia, Somalia 2 
1964-1967 Civil war Kenya2 
1964 Civil War Gabon2 
1964-1965 Interstate Conflict Ethiopia, Sudan2 
1964 Interstate Conflict Ethiopia, Somalia2 
1964 Civil War Uganda2 
1964-2004 Ethnic violence, military coups Nigeria2 
1965-1979 Civil War Chad1 
1966-1988 War of independence Namibia1 
1966 Civil War (military faction) Ghana2 
1966 Military Coup Burkina Faso2 
1966 Military coup Burundi2 
1966 Series of military coups Central African Rep. 2 
1967-2004 Series of military coups Ghana2 
1966-2003 Series of military coups Guinea2 
1966-2004 Series of military coups Sudan2 
1967-1970 Civil War Nigeria1 
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1967-1997 Series of military coups Sierra Leone2 
1967-2005 Series of military coups Congo-Brazzaville2 
1968 Adverse regime change Zambia2 
1968-1996 Series of Military Coups Mali3 & 2 
1969 Coup Libya1 
1969 Coup Somalia1 
1969 Failed coup Equatorial Guinea2 
 1970s  
Ongoing Civil War Sudan1 
Ongoing Series of Military coups Sudan2 
Ongoing War of independence Eritrea1 
Ongoing War of independence Angola1 
Ongoing Series of military coups Togo2 
Ongoing War of independence Guinea-Bissau1 
Ongoing War of independence Mozambique1 
Ongoing Bush War Rhodesia/Zimbabwe1 
Ongoing Ethnic violence, military coups Nigeria2 
Ongoing Civil War Chad1 
Ongoing War of independence Namibia1 
Ongoing Series of military coups Ghana2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Guinea2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Sudan2 
Ongoing Civil War Nigeria1 
Ongoing Series of military coups Sierra Leone2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Congo-Brazzaville2 
Ongoing Series of Military Coups Mali3 & 2 
Ongoing Anti-Apartheid Struggle South Africa1 
1970-1974 Internal Conflict Burundi1 
1970 Military Coup Somalia2 
1971 Military Coup Chad2 
1971 Dictatorship Instated Lesotho2 
1971 Civil War Madagascar2 
1971-1979 Internal Conflict Uganda1 
1971-1997 Series of Military Coups Sierra Leone2 
1972 Ethnic Violence Burundi2 
1972 Military Coup Benin2 
1972 Military Coup Ghana2 
1972-1979 Ethnic Violence Zimbabwe2 
1973 Dictatorship instated by King Swaziland2 
1973 Interstate Zambia, Zimbabwe2 
1973 Military Coup Rwanda2 
1973-1991 War Western Sahara1 
1974 Series of Military Coups Ethiopia2 
1974 Military Coup Angola2 
1974 Military Coup Central African Republic 2 
1974 Military Coup Madagascar2 
1974-1975 Interstate Burkina Faso, Mali2 
1974-1999 Series of Military Coups Niger2 
1975 Series of Military Coups Nigeria2 
1975 Military Coup Comoros2 
1975 War of Independence Comoros1 
1975 Military Coup Benin2 
1975 Military Coup Chad2 
1975-2004 Civil War Angola2 
1975-1979 Interstate Violence Mozambique, Zimbabwe2 
1975-1989 Colonial War Mauritania, Morocco 2 
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1975-1991 Civil War Ethiopia1 
1976 Coup Comoros2 
1976 Military Coup Burundi2 
1977-1978 Series of Military Coups Comoros2 
1977-2002 Civil War Mozambique1 
1977 Military Coup Ghana2 
1977 War Libya, Egypt3 
1977 Interstate Sudan, Ethiopia2 
1977 Military Coup Angola2 
1977 Interstate Dispute Angola, Zaire2 
1977 Military Coup Benin2 
1977 Military Coup Chad2 
1977-1978 Ogaden War Somalia1 
1977-1979 Interstate Zambia, Zimbabwe2 
1978 Military Coup Ghana2 
1978 Military Coup Mali2 
1978-1979 War Uganda, Tanzania3 
1978-1987 Conflict Chad, Libya3 
1979-1982 Civil War Chad1 
1979 Series of Military Coups Ghana2 
1979 Military Coup Central African Republic 2 
 1980s  
Ongoing War of independence Eritrea1 
Ongoing Series of military coups Togo2 
Ongoing Bush War Rhodesia/Zimbabwe1 
Ongoing Ethnic violence, military coups Nigeria2 
Ongoing War of independence Namibia1 
Ongoing Series of military coups Ghana2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Guinea2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Sudan2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Sierra Leone2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Congo-Brazzaville2 
Ongoing Series of Military Coups Mali3 & 2 
Ongoing Anti-Apartheid Struggle South Africa1 
Ongoing Series of Military Coups Sierra Leone2 
Ongoing War Western Sahara1 
Ongoing Series of Military Coups Niger2 
Ongoing Civil War Angola2 
Ongoing Colonial War Mauritania, Morocco2 
Ongoing Civil War Ethiopia1 
Ongoing Civil War Mozambique1 
Ongoing Conflict Chad, Libya3 
Ongoing Civil War Chad1 
1980-1987 War  Libya, Chad1 
1980-1985 Ethnic Violence Nigeria2 
1980-1982 Interstate Zaire (DRC), Zambia 2 
1980-2003 Series of Coups and Military Coups Liberia1&2 
1980 Military Coup Burkina Faso2 
1980 Military Coup Mali2 
1980 Military Coup Guinea-Bissau2 
1980 Military Coup Rwanda2 
1980 Military Coup Zambia2 
1981-1984 Series of Military Coups Ghana1 
1981 Military Coup Central African Republic 2 
1981 Military Coup Comoros2 
1981-1986 Bush War Uganda1 
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1981-1987 Civil War Somalia2 
1981-1987 Ethnic Violence Zimbabwe2 
1981 Military Coup Zambia2 
1982 Civil War Kenya2 
1982 Border War Ethiopia, Somalia1 
1982 Military Coup Central African Republic2 
1982 Military Coup Burkina Faso2 
1982 Military Coup Chad2 
1982 Military Coup Madagascar2 
1983 Coup Nigeria1 
1983 Interstate Chad, Nigeria2 
1983 Military Coup Burkina Faso2 
1983-2005 Civil War Sudan1 
1984-1989 Internal Conflict & Military Coups Burundi2 
1984 Military Coup Cameroon2 
1984 Military Coup Guinea2 
1985-86 Interstate Burkina Faso, Mali2 
1985 Military Coup Guinea2 
1985 Military Coup Guinea-Bissau2 
1985 Military Coup Comoros2 
1985-1988 Armed Conflict Angola, SA, Cuba7 
1986-1991 Series of Military Coups Lesotho2 
1987 Military Coup Burkina Faso2 
1987 Ethnic tension Zimbabwe2 
1987 Military Coup Comoros2 
1988 Military Coup Benin2 
1988 Military Coup Somalia2 
1988 Military Coup Zambia2 
1989 Military Coup Chad2 
1989-1991 Border War Mauritania, Senegal3 
1989-1991 Civil War  Ethiopia2 
1989-1997 Civil War Liberia1 
 1990s  
Ongoing Series of Military Coups Mali3 & 2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Congo-Brazzaville2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Sierra Leone2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Sudan2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Guinea2 
Ongoing Ethnic violence, military coups Nigeria2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Ghana2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Togo2 
Ongoing War of independence Eritrea1 
Ongoing Anti-Apartheid Struggle South Africa1 
Ongoing Civil War Ethiopia2 
Ongoing Series of Military Coups Sierra Leone2 
Ongoing War Western Sahara1 
Ongoing Series of Military Coups Niger2 
Ongoing Civil War Angola2 
Ongoing Civil War Ethiopia1 
Ongoing Civil War Mozambique1 
Ongoing Series of Coups and Military Coups Liberia1&2 
Ongoing Civil War Sudan1 
Ongoing Series of Military Coups Lesotho2 
Ongoing Border War Mauritania, Senegal3 
Ongoing Civil War  Ethiopia2 
Ongoing Civil War Liberia1 
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1990-1994 Internal Conflict Burundi1 
1990-1993 Series of Military Coups Chad2 
1990-1996 Civil War Liberia2 
1990-1998 First Tuareg Rebellion Mali, Niger3 
1990-2002 Civil War Sierra Leone1 
1991-1996 Civil War & genocide Rwanda1 
1991-1999 Civil War Somalia2 
1991-1994 Civil War  Djibouti3 
1991-1996 Series of Military Coups Mali2 
1991-2002 Civil War Algeria3 
1991-2002 Series of Military Coups Cote d’Ivoire2 
1991 Military Coup Comoros2 
1992 Military Coup Comoros2 
1992- present Niger Delta Conflict Nigeria3 
1992-1997 Civil War Angola2 
1992 Interstate Sudan, Uganda2 
1992 Military Coup Benin2 
1992 Military Coup Burundi2 
1993-2006 Civil War Burundi1 
1993 Military Coup Zambia2 
1993 Military Coup Cameroon2 
1994 Military Coup Cameroon2 
1994 Military coup Gambia2 
1995 Military coup Comoros2 
1995 Military Coup Benin2 
1995-present Ogaden insurgency Ethiopia4 
1996 Military coup Niger2 
1996 Interstate Cameroon, Nigeria2 
1996 Coup Sierra Leone3 
1996 Military Coup Central African Republic 2 
1996-1997 Civil War Uganda2 
1996-1997 Kabila Uprising Congo (Zaire)1 
1997-2002 Civil War Sierra Leone3&2 
1997-1999 Civil War Congo (Brazzaville)1 
1997 Military Coup Zambia2 
1998-2005 Series of Military Coups Guinea-Bissau2 
1999 Military coup Comoros2 
1999-2003 Second Civil War Liberia1 
1999-2004 Interstate DRC, Rwanda2 
1999-2007 Ituri Conflict DRC4 
 2000s  
Ongoing Series of military coups Sudan2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Togo2 
Ongoing Ethnic violence, military coups Nigeria2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Ghana2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Guinea2 
Ongoing Series of military coups Congo-Brazzaville2 
Ongoing Civil War Angola2 
Ongoing Civil War Mozambique1 
Ongoing Series of Coups and Military Coups Liberia1&2 
Ongoing Civil War Sudan1 
Ongoing Civil War Sierra Leone1 
Ongoing Civil War Algeria3 
Ongoing Series of Military Coups Cote d’Ivoire 
Ongoing Niger Delta Conflict Nigeria3 
Ongoing Civil War Burundi1 
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Ongoing Ogaden insurgency Ethiopia4 
Ongoing Civil War Sierra Leone3&2 
Ongoing Series of Military Coups Guinea-Bissau 
Ongoing Second Civil War Liberia1 
Ongoing Interstate DRC, Rwanda 
Ongoing Ituri Conflict DRC4 
2000-2001 Mano River War Ghana1 
2000-2003 Civil Violence Liberia2 
2000 Military Coup Comoros2 
2000 Armed Conflict Chad7 
2000 Armed Conflict Senegal7 
2001 Military Coup Central African Republic 2,7 
2002-2007 Civil War Cote d’Ivoire4 
2003 –present Darfur Conflict Sudan4 
2003 Military coup Central African Republic2 
2003 Military Coup Burkina Faso2 
2003 Military Coup Guinea-Bissau2 
2004 Military Coup Ghana2 
2004 Series if Military Coups DRC2 
2004-present Kivu Conflict DRC2 
2004 Ivorian French Conflict Cote d’Ivoire, France4 
2004-present War Chad6 
2006-present War Somalia7 
2007 Armed Conflict Mali7 
2007-2008 Civil Unrest Kenya4 
2008 Invasion Comoros5 
1(Global Security, 2008);  2(Marshall, 2005); 3(OnWar, 2008); 4(International Crisis Group, 
2008); 5(Kato, 2008); 6(Axe, 2008); 7 (UCDP/PRIO, 2009)   
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Appendix 3  Research Survey 
 
SECTION 1: RESPONDENT DETAILS 
1 Full Name 
2 Job Title 
3        Department/Ministry etc 
4 Gender    [  ] Female   [  ] Male 
5 Race        [  ] African  [  ]Asian  [  ] Coloured  [  ] Indian  [  ] White [  ] Other 
6 Year of Birth 
7 Political Party 
8 Are/were you a Member of Parliament?  
8.1  No  (Please proceed to Question 9) 
8.2  Yes, I am currently a Member of Parliament From  To 
8.3  Yes, I was a Member of Parliament From  To 
9 How long have you worked within Government? From  To 
10.1 Have you been active in the security sector?  
           [  ] No   (Please proceed to Question 11) 
           [  ] Yes  (Please continue to Question 10.2) 
10.2    In which structure? (MK/SANDF/ Ministry etc)                                   [    ] Anonymous                                                                                                   
10.3 For how long? From   To 
10.4 Comments 
11. How would you prefer to be identified? 
           [  ] Name and Title 
           [  ] Title Only 
           [  ] By Department/Ministry Only (e.g. “A senior official in the Department of Defence”) 
           [  ]Other.   Please specify:  
 
SECTION 2: GENDER POLICY 
 In your opinion, how is gender mainstreaming viewed within your  department/ ministry/ 
parliament? 
Please mark the extent to which you agree with each statement below. 
1.1 Senior staff in the department/ministry/parliament understand what gender  
mainstreaming is about. 
       [  ] Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
1.2 Senior staff in the department/ministry/parliament consider gender mainstreaming  
        to  be important. 
       [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
1.3   Gender issues are considered during policy formulation and implementation. 
       [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
1.4   Gender issues receive special attention. 
       [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
1.5 Comments                                                                                                     [    ] Anonymous 
2 In general, how would you describe the attitude of male and female leaders in government towards gender mainstreaming? 
          Please mark the extent to which you agree with each statement below. 
2.1     Male leaders in government understand what gender mainstreaming is about. 
          [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
2.2      Female leaders in government understand what gender mainstreaming is about. 
          [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
2.3     Male leaders encourage the discussion of gender issues during policy  
          formulation and implementation. 
          [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
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2.4     Female leaders encourage the discussion of gender issues during policy  
          formulation and implementation. 
          [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
2.5     Comments                                                                                                  [    ] Anonymous 
 
3.1     Do you think it is necessary to implement measures to assist women in advancing 
          within government? 
          [  ] Definitely Yes  [  ] Probably Yes  [  ] Probably No  [  ] Definitely No 
3.2    In your opinion, what measures would assist women in advancing within  
          government?                                                                                              [    ] Anonymous                                         
4.1 In your opinion, are there sufficient mentoring programs within government? 
         [  ] Definitely Yes  [  ] Probably Yes  [  ] Probably No  [  ] Definitely No 
4.2   Do the mentoring programs within government assist women in realising their  
        leadership potential?                                                                                   [    ] Anonymous  
5.1 In your opinion, are women advancing within the government structures? 
        [  ] Definitely Yes  [  ] Probably Yes  [  ] Probably No  [  ] Definitely No 
5.2   To what extent do you feel the following factors play a role in the advancement  











Merit      
Nepotism      
Patronage      
Ethnicity      
Qualifications      
Political party 
loyalty 
     
Length of 
service 
     
5.3 Comments                                                                                                     [    ] Anonymous 
 
SECTION 3: WOMEN AND SECURITY 
This section is focused on the role of women within the Security Sector. 
1 How did women participate in the Security Sector Reform process? 
          Please mark the extent to which you agree with each statement below. 
1.1     Women made substantive inputs into the new security policies of the state. 
          [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
1.2    Women made substantive inputs into the decision to acquire new armaments. 
        [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
1.3 Woman were treated as credible experts during the formulation of new security   
        policies. 
         [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
1.4   Women were prominent participants in the security sector reform process. 
        [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
1.5    Comments                                                                                                  [    ] Anonymous 
2.1    Do you feel women made a valuable contribution towards the Security Sector  
         Reform process in South Africa? 
         [  ] Definitely Yes  [  ] Probably Yes  [  ] Probably No  [  ] Definitely No 
2.2    Please elaborate on your answer:                                                             [    ] Anonymous 
3.1 Do men value the contribution of women towards security issues? 
         [  ] Definitely Yes  [  ] Probably Yes  [  ] Probably No  [  ] Definitely No 
3.2    How do you rate the value of the contributions of women towards security issues?  
          [  ] Very highly  [  ] Highly  [  ] Average  [  ] Low [  ] Very low 
3.3 Comments    [    ] Anonymous 
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4 In your opinion, how is gender mainstreaming viewed within the security structures of the state? 
          Please mark the extent to which you agree with each statement below. 
4.1     Senior staff in the security structures of the state understand what gender   
           mainstreaming is about. 
          [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
4.2    Senior staff in the security structures of the state consider gender mainstreaming to  
         be important. 
         [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
4.3    Gender issues are considered to be irrelevant/inappropriate to the work of the 
         security sector. 
          [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
4.4     Gender issues receive special attention. 
          [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
4.5     Comments                                                                                                 [    ] Anonymous 
5.1 Are women afforded the same leadership opportunities as men within the security  structures of the state? 
          [  ] Definitely Yes  [  ] Probably Yes  [  ] Probably No  [  ] Definitely No 
5.2      Comments                                                                                                 [    ] Anonymous                                                                  
6.1 
Some may argue that measures such as gender quotas are inappropriate for the 
security structures of the state. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this 
statement? 
          [  ]Strongly Agree  [  ] Agree  [  ] Unsure  [  ] Disagree  [  ] Strongly Disagree 
6.2      Please provide comment on your reasons                                              [    ] Anonymous 
7.1      In your opinion, are women advancing within the state security structures? 
          [  ] Definitely Yes  [  ] Probably Yes  [  ] Probably No  [  ] Definitely No 
7.2    To what extent do you feel the following factors play a role in the advancement  











Merit      
Nepotism      
Patronage      
Ethnicity      
Qualifications      
Political party 
loyalty 
     
Length of 
service 
     
7.3 Comments                                                                                                      [    ] Anonymous 
8 In your opinion, what measures could assist women to advance within the security structures of the state?                                                                              [    ] Anonymous 
9.1 In your opinion, is gender adequately considered during the formulation of security policy?  
          [  ] Definitely Yes  [  ] Probably Yes  [  ] Probably No  [  ] Definitely No 
9.2 Please explain why you give that response.                                                 [    ] Anonymous 
10  What role do you believe women should play within the security structures of the state?  
                                                                                                                               [    ] Anonymous 
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SECTION 4: GENERAL 
1 Are there any specific issues which you feel should be addressed within this study? 
                                                                                                                               [    ] Anonymous 
2 
Are there any specific people whom you would recommend I contact with regards to 
this study? If so, please provide their name, email or cell phone number in order that 
I may forward a survey form to them. Should you not wish to be identified as the 
referee, please mark the “Anonymous” box on this question               [    ] Anonymous 
3      Would you like to receive a copy of the findings of this study?               [  ] Yes  [  ] No       
4 Would you be willing to be contacted for any follow up questions?   [  ] Yes  [  ] No      
 
[End] 
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Appendix 4  Major South African Battles (1779-1902) 
The battles listed below are represented on Map 3.1, and correspond to the numerical 


































Year Battle Involved Parties  
1838 Bloukraans Afrikaners/British 1 
1848 Boomplaats Afrikaners/British 2 
1881 Majuba Afrikaners/British 3 
1881 Laingsnek Afrikaners/British 4 
1881 Schuinshoogte/Ingogo Afrikaners/British 5 
1899 Talana Hill Afrikaners/British 6 
1899 Lombaardskop Afrikaners/British 7 
1899 Colenso Afrikaners/British 8 
1899 Ladysmith Afrikaners/British 9 
1899 Belmont Afrikaners/British 10 
1899 Magersfontein Afrikaners/British 11 
1900  Scheepersnek Afrikaners/British 12 
1900 Wagon Hill Afrikaners/British 13 
1900 Pieters Afrikaners/British 14 
1900 Tugela Heights Afrikaners/British 15 
1900 Paardeberg Afrikaners/British 16 
1900 Poplar Grove Afrikaners/British 17 
1901 Blood River Poort Afrikaners/British 18 
1901 Groenkop/Tweefontein Afrikaners/British 19 
1901 Elands River Afrikaners/British 20 
1901 Groenkloof Afrikaners/British 21 
1901 Bakenlaagte Afrikaners/British 22 
1902 Tweebosch Afrikaners/British 23 
1902 Rooiwal Afrikaners/British 24 
Indigenous/Indigenous Battles 
Year Battle Involved Parties  
1819 Gqokli Hill Zulu 1 
1830 Sand River Zulu/Ndebele 2 
1856 Ndondakusuka Zulu 3 











Year Battle Involved Parties  
1836 Vegkop Afrikaners/Ndebele 1 
1837 Mosega Afrikaners /Ndebele 2 
1837 Mariqua Afrikaners /Ndebele 3 
1838 Blood River Afrikaners /Zulu 4 
British/Indigenous Battles 
Year Battle Involved Parties  
1779 1st Xhosa War British/Xhosa 1 
1789 2nd  Xhosa War British/Xhosa 2 
1799 3rd  Xhosa War British/Xhosa 2 
1811 4th  Xhosa War British/Xhosa 4 
1818 5th  Xhosa War British/Xhosa 5 
1834 6th  Xhosa War British/Xhosa 6 
1838 Tugela British/Zulu 7 
1846 7th  Xhosa War British/Xhosa 8 
1850 8th  Xhosa War British/Xhosa 9 
1877 9th  Xhosa War British/Xhosa 10 
1879 Nkambula British/Zulu 11 
1879 Rorke’s Drift British/Zulu 12 
1879 Isandlwana British/Zulu 13 
1879 Ulundi British/Zulu 14 
1879 Gingindlovu British/Zulu 15 
Adapted from Mayhew (1980: 10, 11, 153, 345), Welsh (2000: xiv-
xv, 98-99, 141, 142-144, 154-155, 204-205, 211), Thompson 
(2000: 3, 34, 74, 82, 89, 149), SA-Venues (2011), and South 
African History Online (2011). 
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Appendix 5  Women in Government 1994-2009 
 
1994-1999 
Agriculture (Thoko Didiza) 
Arts, Culture, Science & Technology (Winnie Mandela) 
Health (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) 
Justice (Sheila Camerer) 
Minerals & Energy (Susan Shabangu) 
Public Enterprises (Stella Sigcau) 
Trade & Industry (Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka) 




Agriculture & Land Affairs (Thoko Didiza) 
Communications (Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri) 
Health (Manto Tshabalala-Msimang) 
Foreign Affairs (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) 
Minerals & Energy (Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka) 
Public Works (Stella Sigcau) 




Deputy President (Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka) 
Agriculture & Land Affairs (Thoko Didiza, then Lulama Xingwana) 
Communications (Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri) 
Education (Naledi Pandor) 
Foreign Affairs (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) 
Health (Manto Tshabalala-Msimang) 
Home Affairs (Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula) 
Housing (Lindiwe Sisulu) 
Justice & Constitutional Development (Brigitte Mabandla) 
Minerals & Energy (Lindiwe Hendricks, then Buyelwa Patience Sonjica) 
Public Service & Administration (Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi) 
Public Works (Stella Sigcau, then Thoko Didza) 
Water Affairs (Buyelwa Patience Sonjica then Lindiwe Hendricks) 
 





Deputy President (Baleka Mbete) 
Agriculture & Land Affairs (Lulama Xingwana) 
Communications (Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri, then Manto Tshabalala-Msimang) 
Education (Naledi Pandor) 
Foreign Affairs (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) 
Health (Barbara Hogan) 
Home Affairs (Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula) 
Housing (Lindiwe Sisulu) 
Minerals & Energy (Buyelwa Patience Sonjica) 
Public Enterprises (Brigitte Mabandla) 
Minister in the Presidency (Manto Tshabalala-Msimang) 




Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Tina Joemat-Peterson) 
Basic education (Angie Motshekga) 
Correctional Services (Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula) 
Defence and Military Veterans (Lindiwe Sisulu) 
Home Affairs (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) 
International Relations and Co-operation (Maite Nkoana-Mashabane) 
Labour (Mildred Oliphant) 
Mineral Resources (Susan Shabangu) 
Public Works (Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde) 
Science and Technology (Naledi Pandor) 
Social Development (Bathabile Dlamini) 
Water and Environmental Affairs (Edna Molewa) 
Women, Youth, Children and People with disabilities (Lulu Xingwane) 
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Appendix 6  SANDF Personnel Statistics 1998 
 
African Personnel (1998) 
Rank AFRICAN TOTAL 
 Men Women TOTAL Men Women TOTAL 
GEN 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
GEN % 2 100% - 100% 100% - 100% 
LT GEN 1 2 0 2 8 0 8 
LT GEN % 2 25% - 25% 100% - 100% 
MAJ GEN 1 6 0 6 30 1 31 
MAJ GEN % 2 19.35% - 19.35% 96.77% 3.23% 100% 
BRIG GEN 1 30 1 31 139 4 143 
BRIG GEN % 2 20.98% 0.70% 21.68% 97.20% 2.80% 100% 
COL 1 55 2 57 647 33 680 
COL % 2 8.09% 0.29% 8.38% 95.15% 4.85% 100% 
LT COL 1 166 11 177 1469 226 1695 
LT COL % 2 9.79% 0.65% 10.44% 80.67% 13.33% 100% 
MAJ 1 364 52 416 1502 433 1935 
MAJ % 2 18.81% 2.69% 21.50% 77.62% 22.38% 100% 
CAPT 1 510 206 716 1745 807 2552 
CAPT % 2 19.98% 8.07% 28.06% 68.38% 31.62% 100% 
LT 1 814 175 989 2179 737 2916 
LT % 2 27.91% 6.00% 33.92% 74.73% 25.27% 100% 
2LT  1 63 9 72 398 180 578 
2LT % 2 10.90% 1.56% 12.46% 68.86% 31.14% 100% 
CPLN 1 36 1 37 127 2 129 
CPLN % 2 27.91% 0.78% 28.68% 98.45% 1.55% 100% 
WO1 1 73 2 75 1687 199 1886 
WO1 % 2 3.87% 0.11% 3.98% 89.45% 10.55% 100% 
WO2 1 217 15 232 1889 421 2310 
WO2 % 2 9.39% 0.65% 10.04% 82.77% 18.23% 100% 
SSGT 1 604 87 691 3887 797 4684 
SSGT % 2 12.89% 1.86% 14.75% 82.98% 17.02% 100% 
SGT 1 1904 406 2310 5960 1301 7261 
SGT % 2 26.22% 5.59% 31.81% 82.08% 17.92% 100% 
CPL 1 5007 688 5695 8669 1558 10227 
CPL % 2 48.96% 6.73% 55.69% 84.77% 15.23% 100% 
L CPL 1 5088 620 5708 7060 1036 8096 
L CPL % 2 62.85% 7.66% 70.51% 87.20% 12.80% 100% 
PTE 1 23643 1369 25012 26367 1756 28123 
PTE % 2 84.07% 4.87% 88.94% 93.76% 6.24% 100% 
AUX SERV 1 162 1 163 233 1 234 
AUX SERV% 2 69.23% 0.43% 69..66% 99.57% 0.43% 100% 
TOTAL 1 38745 3645 42390 63997 9492 73489 
TOTAL % 2 52.72% 4.96% 57.68% 87.08% 12.92% 100% 
1 Department of Defence 1998 Personnel Statistics  2 Calculated across ranks from Totals 
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Asian Personnel (1998) 
Rank ASIAN TOTAL 
 Men Women TOTAL Men Women TOTAL 
GEN 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
GEN % 2 - - - 100% - 100% 
LT GEN 1 0 0 0 8 0 8 
LT GEN % 2 - - - 100% - 100% 
MAJ GEN 1 0 0 0 30 1 31 
MAJ GEN % 2 - - - 96.77% 3.23% 100% 
BRIG GEN 1 0 0 0 139 4 143 
BRIG GEN % 2 - - - 97.20% 2.80% 100% 
COL 1 1 0 1 647 33 680 
COL % 2 0.15% - 0.15% 95.15% 4.85% 100% 
LT COL 1 2 2 4 1469 226 1695 
LT COL % 2 0.12% 0.12% 0.24% 80.67% 13.33% 100% 
MAJ 1 5 3 8 1502 433 1935 
MAJ % 2 0.26% 0.16% 00.41% 77.62% 22.38% 100% 
CAPT 1 9 11 20 1745 807 2552 
CAPT % 2 0.35% 0.43% 0.78% 68.38% 31.62% 100% 
LT 1 13 8 21 2179 737 2916 
LT % 2 0.45% 0.27% 0.72% 74.73% 25.27% 100% 
2LT  1 5 1 6 398 180 578 
2LT % 2 0.87% 0.17% 1.04% 68.86% 31.14% 100% 
CPLN 1 1 0 1 127 2 129 
CPLN % 2 0.78% - 0.78% 98.45% 1.55% 100% 
WO1 1 8 0 8 1687 199 1886 
WO1 % 2 0.42% - 0.42% 89.45% 10.55% 100% 
WO2 1 39 0 39 1889 421 2310 
WO2 % 2 1.69% - 1.69% 82.77% 18.23% 100% 
SSGT 1 154 2 156 3887 797 4684 
SSGT % 2 3.29% 0.04% 3.33% 82.98% 17.02% 100% 
SGT 1 172 12 184 5960 1301 7261 
SGT % 2 2.37% 0.17% 2.53% 82.08% 17.92% 100% 
CPL 1 212 25 237 8669 1558 10227 
CPL % 2 2.07% 0.24% 2.31% 84.77% 15.23% 100% 
L CPL 1 109 21 130 7060 1036 8096 
L CPL % 2 1.35% 0.26% 1.61% 87.20% 12.80% 100% 
PTE 1 61 10 71 26367 1756 28123 
PTE % 2 0.22% 0.04% 0.26% 93.76% 6.24% 100% 
AUX SERV 1 0 0 0 233 1 234 
AUX SERV% 2 - - - 99.57% 0.43% 100% 
TOTAL 1 791 95 886 63997 9492 73489 
TOTAL % 2 1.08% 0.13% 1.21% 87.08% 12.92% 100% 
1 Department of Defence 1998 Personnel Statistics  2 Calculated across ranks from Totals 
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Coloured Personnel (1998) 
Rank COLOURED TOTAL 
 Men Women TOTAL Men Women TOTAL 
GEN 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
GEN % 2 - - - 100% - 100% 
LT GEN 1 0 0 0 8 0 8 
LT GEN % 2 - - - 100% - 100% 
MAJ GEN 1 0 0 0 30 1 31 
MAJ GEN % 2 - - - 96.77% 3.23% 100% 
BRIG GEN 1 1 0 1 139 4 143 
BRIG GEN % 2 0.70% - 0.70% 97.20% 2.80% 100% 
COL 1 3 1 4 647 33 680 
COL % 2 0.44% 0.15% 0.59% 95.15% 4.85% 100% 
LT COL 1 25 1 26 1469 226 1695 
LT COL % 2 1.47% 0.06% 1.53% 80.67% 13.33% 100% 
MAJ 1 92 1 93 1502 433 1935 
MAJ % 2 4.75% 0.05% 4.81% 77.62% 22.38% 100% 
CAPT 1 92 36 128 1745 807 2552 
CAPT % 2 3.61% 1.41% 5.02% 68.38% 31.62% 100% 
LT 1 169 34 203 2179 737 2916 
LT % 2 5.80% 1.17% 6.96% 74.73% 25.27% 100% 
2LT  1 35 11 46 398 180 578 
2LT % 2 6.06% 1.90% 7.96% 68.86% 31.14% 100% 
CPLN 1 8 0 8 127 2 129 
CPLN % 2 6.20% - 6.20% 98.45% 1.55% 100% 
WO1 1 118 0 118 1687 199 1886 
WO1 % 2 6.25% - 6.25% 89.45% 10.55% 100% 
WO2 1 266 2 268 1889 421 2310 
WO2 % 2 11.52% 0.09% 11.61% 82.77% 18.23% 100% 
SSGT 1 695 17 712 3887 797 4684 
SSGT % 2 14.84% 0.36% 15.20% 82.98% 17.02% 100% 
SGT 1 1037 74 1111 5960 1301 7261 
SGT % 2 14.28% 1.02% 15.30% 82.08% 17.92% 100% 
CPL 1 1469 253 1722 8669 1558 10227 
CPL % 2 14.36% 2.47% 16.84% 84.77% 15.23% 100% 
L CPL 1 844 127 971 7060 1036 8096 
L CPL % 2 10.42% 1.57% 11.99% 87.20% 12.80% 100% 
PTE 1 1700 67 1767 26367 1756 28123 
PTE % 2 6.04% 0.24% 6.28% 93.76% 6.24% 100% 
AUX SERV 1 26 0 26 233 1 234 
AUX SERV% 2 11.11% - 11.11% 99.57% 0.43% 100% 
TOTAL 1 6580 624 7204 63997 9492 73489 
TOTAL % 2 8.95% 0.85% 9.80% 87.08% 12.92% 100% 
1 Department of Defence 1998 Personnel Statistics  2 Calculated across ranks from Totals 
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White Personnel (1998) 
Rank WHITE TOTAL 
 Men Women TOTAL Men Women TOTAL 
GEN 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
GEN % 2 - - - 100% - 100% 
LT GEN 1 6 0 6 8 0 8 
LT GEN % 2 75% - 75% 100% - 100% 
MAJ GEN 1 24 1 25 30 1 31 
MAJ GEN % 2 77.42% 3.23% 80.65% 96.77% 3.23% 100% 
BRIG GEN 1 108 3 111 139 4 143 
BRIG GEN % 2 75.52% 2.10% 77.62% 97.20% 2.80% 100% 
COL 1 588 30 618 647 33 680 
COL % 2 86.47% 4.41% 90.88% 95.15% 4.85% 100% 
LT COL 1 1276 212 1488 1469 226 1695 
LT COL % 2 75.28% 12.51% 87.79% 80.67% 13.33% 100% 
MAJ 1 1041 377 1418 1502 433 1935 
MAJ % 2 53.75% 19.48% 73.28% 77.62% 22.38% 100% 
CAPT 1 1134 554 1688 1745 807 2552 
CAPT % 2 44.44% 21.71% 66.14% 68.38% 31.62% 100% 
LT 1 1183 520 1703 2179 737 2916 
LT % 2 40.57% 17,83% 58.40% 74.73% 25.27% 100% 
2LT  1 295 159 454 398 180 578 
2LT % 2 51.04% 27.51% 78.55% 68.86% 31.14% 100% 
CPLN 1 82 1 83 127 2 129 
CPLN % 2 63.57% 0.78% 64.34% 98.45% 1.55% 100% 
WO1 1 1488 197 1685 1687 199 1886 
WO1 % 2 78.90% 10.45% 89.34% 89.45% 10.55% 100% 
WO2 1 1367 404 1771 1889 421 2310 
WO2 % 2 59.18 17.47% 76.67% 82.77% 18.23% 100% 
SSGT 1 2434 691 3125 3887 797 4684 
SSGT % 2 51.96% 14.75% 66.72% 82.98% 17.02% 100% 
SGT 1 2847 809 3656 5960 1301 7261 
SGT % 2 39.21% 11.14% 50.35% 82.08% 17.92% 100% 
CPL 1 1981 592 2573 8669 1558 10227 
CPL % 2 19.37% 5.79% 25.16% 84.77% 15.23% 100% 
L CPL 1 1019 268 1287 7060 1036 8096 
L CPL % 2 12.59% 3.31% 15.90% 87.20% 12.80% 100% 
PTE 1 963 310 1273 26367 1756 28123 
PTE % 2 3.42% 1.10% 4.53% 93.76% 6.24% 100% 
AUX SERV 1 45 0 45 233 1 234 
AUX SERV% 2 19.23% - 19.23% 99.57% 0.43% 100% 
TOTAL 1 17881 5128 23009 63997 9492 73489 
TOTAL % 2 24.33% 6.98% 31.31% 87.08% 12.92% 100% 
1 Department of Defence 1998 Personnel Statistics  2 Calculated across ranks from Totals 
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Appendix 7  SANDF Personnel Statistics 2007 
African Personnel (2007) 
Rank AFRICAN TOTAL 
 Men Women TOTAL Men Women TOTAL 
GEN 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
GEN % 2 100% 0 100% 100% 0 100% 
LT GEN 1 4 0 4 7 0 7 
LT GEN % 2 57% 0 57% 100% 0 100% 
MAJ GEN 1 25 1 26 36 1 37 
MAJ GEN % 2 68% 2% 70% 98% 2% 100% 
BRIG GEN 1 67 8 75 148 17 165 
BRIG GEN % 2 40% 5% 45% 89% 11% 100% 
COL 1 230 43 273 707 113 820 
COL % 2 28% 5% 33% 86.3% 13.7% 100% 
LT COL 1 450 110 560 1452 354 1806 
LT COL % 2 25% 6.1% 31.1% 80% 20% 100% 
MAJ 1 678 249 927 1583 609 2192 
MAJ % 2 30.9% 11.3% 42.2% 72.3% 27.7% 100% 
CAPT 1 852 389 1241 1616 900 2516 
CAPT % 2 34% 15.5% 49.5% 64.3% 35.7% 100% 
LT 1 722 273 995 1058 509 1567 
LT % 2 46.1% 17.4% 63.5% 67.6% 32.4% 100% 
2LT 1 170 103 273 226 166 392 
2LT % 2 43.4% 26.3% 69.7% 57.7% 42.3% 100% 
CPLN 1 81 12 93 117 15 132 
CPLN % 2 61.3% 9.1% 70.4% 88.6% 11.4% 100% 
WO1 1 406 43 449 2060 338 2398 
WO1 % 2 16.9% 1.8% 18.7% 85.9% 14.1% 100% 
WO2 1 635 123 758 2029 452 2481 
WO2 % 2 25.6% 5% 30.6% 81.8% 18.2% 100% 
SSGT 1 2002 615 2617 4603 1221 5824 
SSGT % 2 34.4% 10. 6% 45% 79.1% 20.9% 100% 
SGT 1 4447 894 5341 6624 1359 7983 
SGT % 2 55.7% 11.2% 66.9% 82.9% 17.1% 100% 
CPL 1 6081 1119 7200 7473 1475 8948 
CPL % 2 68% 12.5% 80.5% 83.5% 16.5% 100% 
L CPL 1 3640 669 4309 4218 845 5063 
L CPL % 2 71.9% 13.2% 85.1% 83.3% 16.7% 100% 
PTE 1 15333 3139 18472 16906 3751 20657 
PTE % 2 74.2% 15.2% 89.4% 81.8% 18.2% 100% 
CO 1 28 31 59 30 56 86 
CO % 2 32.5% 36% 68.5% 34.9% 65.1% 100% 
AUX SERV 1 63 0 63 81 0 81 
AUX SERV% 2 77.8% 0 77.8% 100% 0 100% 
TOTAL 1 35915 7821 43736 50975 12181 63156 
TOTAL % 2 56.8% 12.4% 69.2% 80.7% 19.3% 100% 
1 Department of Defence 2007 Personnel Statistics  2 Calculated across ranks from Totals 
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Asian Personnel (2007) 
Rank ASIAN TOTAL 
 Men Women TOTAL Men Women TOTAL 
GEN 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
GEN % 2 0 0 0 100% 0 100% 
LT GEN 1 1 0 1 7 0 7 
LT GEN % 2 14% 0 14% 100% 0 100% 
MAJ GEN 1 0 0 0 36 1 37 
MAJ GEN % 2 0 0 0 98% 2% 100% 
BRIG GEN 1 2 1 3 148 17 165 
BRIG GEN % 2 1.2% 0.8% 2% 89% 11% 100% 
COL 1 6 2 8 707 113 820 
COL % 2 0.7% 0.2% 0.9% 86.3% 13.7% 100% 
LT COL 1 16 11 27 1452 354 1806 
LT COL % 2 0.9% 0.6% 1.5% 80% 20% 100% 
MAJ 1 13 22 35 1583 609 2192 
MAJ % 2 0.5% 1% 1.5% 72.3% 27.7% 100% 
CAPT 1 31 11 42 1616 900 2516 
CAPT % 2 1.2% 0.4% 1.6% 64.3% 35.7% 100% 
LT 1 19 16 35 1058 509 1567 
LT % 2 1.2% 1% 2.2% 67.6% 32.4% 100% 
2LT 1 7 8 15 226 166 392 
2LT % 2 1.8% 2% 3.8% 57.7% 42.3% 100% 
CPLN 1 2 0 2 117 15 132 
CPLN % 2 1.5% 0 1.5% 88.6% 11.4% 100% 
WO1 1 63 1 64 2060 338 2398 
WO1 % 2 2.6% 0.1% 2.7% 85.9% 14.1% 100% 
WO2 1 58 3 61 2029 452 2481 
WO2 % 2 2.3% 0.1% 2.4% 81.8% 18.2% 100% 
SSGT 1 120 11 131 4603 1221 5824 
SSGT % 2 2.1% 0.2% 2.3% 79.1% 20.9% 100% 
SGT 1 139 22 161 6624 1359 7983 
SGT % 2 1.7% 0.3% 2% 82.9% 17.1% 100% 
CPL 1 65 27 92 7473 1475 8948 
CPL % 2 0.7% 0.3% 1% 83.5% 16.5% 100% 
L CPL 1 27 5 32 4218 845 5063 
L CPL % 2 0.5% 0.1% 0.6% 83.3% 16.7% 100% 
PTE 1 33 12 45 16906 3751 20657 
PTE % 2 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 81.8% 18.2% 100% 
CO 1 0 5 5 30 56 86 
CO % 2 0 5.8% 5.8% 34.9% 65.1% 100% 
AUX SERV 1 0 0 0 81 0 81 
AUX SERV% 2 0 0 0 100% 0 100% 
TOTAL 1 602 157 759 50975 12181 63156 
TOTAL % 2 1% 0.2% 1.2% 80.7% 19.3% 100% 
1 Department of Defence 2007 Personnel Statistics 2 Calculated across ranks from Totals 
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Coloured Personnel (2007) 
Rank COLOURED TOTAL 
 Men Women TOTAL Men Women TOTAL 
GEN 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
GEN % 2 0 0 0 100% 0 100% 
LT GEN 1 0 0 0 7 0 7 
LT GEN % 2 0 0 0 100% 0 100% 
MAJ GEN 1 0 0 0 36 1 37 
MAJ GEN % 2 0 0 0 98% 2% 100% 
BRIG GEN 1 5 0 5 148 17 165 
BRIG GEN % 2 3% 0 3% 89% 11% 100% 
COL 1 30 4 34 707 113 820 
COL % 2 3.6% 0.5% 4.1% 86.3% 13.7% 100% 
LT COL 1 104 5 109 1452 354 1806 
LT COL % 2 5.8% 0.3% 6.1% 80% 20% 100% 
MAJ 1 153 31 184 1583 609 2192 
MAJ % 2 6.9% 1.4% 8.3% 72.3% 27.7% 100% 
CAPT 1 196 114 310 1616 900 2516 
CAPT % 2 7.8% 4.5% 12.3% 64.3% 35.7% 100% 
LT 1 148 89 237 1058 509 1567 
LT % 2 9.5% 5.7% 15.2% 67.6% 32.4% 100% 
2LT 1 16 27 43 226 166 392 
2LT % 2 4.1% 6.9% 11% 57.7% 42.3% 100% 
CPLN 1 7 0 7 117 15 132 
CPLN % 2 5.3% 0 5.3% 88.6% 11.4% 100% 
WO1 1 292 3 295 2060 338 2398 
WO1 % 2 12.2% 0.1 % 12.3% 85.9% 14.1% 100% 
WO2 1 399 32 431 2029 452 2481 
WO2 % 2 16.1% 1.3% 17.4% 81.8% 18.2% 100% 
SSGT 1 899 131 1030 4603 1221 5824 
SSGT % 2 15.4% 2.2% 17.6% 79.1% 20.9% 100% 
SGT 1 1167 198 1365 6624 1359 7983 
SGT % 2 14.6% 2.5% 17.1% 82.9% 17.1% 100% 
CPL 1 876 180 1056 7473 1475 8948 
CPL % 2 9.8% 2% 11.8% 83.5% 16.5% 100% 
L CPL 1 343 100 443 4218 845 5063 
L CPL % 2 6.8% 2% 8.8% 83.3% 16.7% 100% 
PTE 1 1164 497 1661 16906 3751 20657 
PTE % 2 5.6% 2.4% 8% 81.8% 18.2% 100% 
CO 1 1 11 12 30 56 86 
CO % 2 1.2% 12.8% 14% 34.9% 65.1% 100% 
AUX SERV 1 11 0 11 81 0 81 
AUX SERV% 2 13.6% 0 13.6% 100% 0 100% 
TOTAL 1 5811 1422 7233 50975 12181 63156 
TOTAL % 2 9.2% 2.3% 11.5% 80.7% 19.3% 100% 
1 Department of Defence 2007 Personnel Statistics  2 Calculated across ranks from Totals 
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White Personnel (2007) 
Rank WHITE TOTAL 
 Men Women TOTAL Men Women TOTAL 
GEN 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
GEN % 2 0 0 0 100% 0 100% 
LT GEN 1 2 0 2 7 0 7 
LT GEN % 2 29% 0 29% 100% 0 100% 
MAJ GEN 1 11 0 11 36 1 37 
MAJ GEN % 2 30% 0 30% 98% 2% 100% 
BRIG GEN 1 74 8 82 148 17 165 
BRIG GEN % 2 45% 5% 50% 89% 11% 100% 
COL 1 441 64 505 707 113 820 
COL % 2 54% 8% 62% 86.3% 13.7% 100% 
LT COL 1 882 228 1110 1452 354 1806 
LT COL % 2 48.8% 12. 6% 61.4% 80% 20% 100% 
MAJ 1 739 307 1046 1583 609 2192 
MAJ % 2 34% 14% 48% 72.3% 27.7% 100% 
CAPT 1 537 386 923 1616 900 2516 
CAPT % 2 21.3% 15.3% 36.6% 64.3% 35.7% 100% 
LT 1 169 131 300 1058 509 1567 
LT % 2 10.8% 8.3% 19.1% 67.6% 32.4% 100% 
2LT 1 33 28 61 226 166 392 
2LT % 2 8.4% 7.1% 15.5% 57.7% 42.3% 100% 
CPLN 1 27 3 30 117 15 132 
CPLN % 2 20.5% 2.3% 22.8% 88.6% 11.4% 100% 
WO1 1 1299 291 1590 2060 338 2398 
WO1 % 2 54.2% 12.1% 66.3% 85.9% 14.1% 100% 
WO2 1 937 294 1231 2029 452 2481 
WO2 % 2 37.8% 11.8% 49.6% 81.8% 18.2% 100% 
SSGT 1 1582 464 2046 4603 1221 5824 
SSGT % 2 27.2% 7.9% 35.1% 79.1% 20.9% 100% 
SGT 1 871 245 1116 6624 1359 7983 
SGT % 2 10.9% 3.1% 14% 82.9% 17.1% 100% 
CPL 1 451 149 600 7473 1475 8948 
CPL % 2 5% 1.7% 6.7% 83.5% 16.5% 100% 
L CPL 1 208 71 279 4218 845 5063 
L CPL % 2 4.1% 1.4% 5.5% 83.3% 16.7% 100% 
PTE 1 376 103 479 16906 3751 20657 
PTE % 2 1.8% 0.5% 2.3% 81.8% 18.2% 100% 
CO 1 1 9 10 30 56 86 
CO % 2 1.2% 10.5% 11.7% 34.9% 65.1% 100% 
AUX SERV 1 7 0 7 81 0 81 
AUX SERV% 2 8.6% 0% 8.6% 100% 0 100% 
TOTAL 1 8647 2781 11428 50975 12181 63156 
TOTAL % 2 13.7% 4.4% 18.1% 80.7% 19.3% 100% 
1 Department of Defence 2007 Personnel Statistics  2 Calculated across ranks from Totals 
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Appendix 8  Overview of Arms Deal Acquisitions 
 
The table below outlines the equipment procured in the Arms Deal, the cost, the use of 
the equipment and the supplier, and the controversy attached to the equipment. It 
demonstrates that the stated purpose of the equipment did not (and does not) align with 
the stated security objectives of the State (particularly in terms of the key SSR objectives 
of reducing military expenditure and decreasing State arsenals), nor does it correspond 
to the peacekeeping mandate undertaken during the Defence Review. In fact, despite 
the Defence Review underlining the importance of peace support operations as the 
SANDF’s primary mandate, and the statement in the 2008 Budget that argues that 
“landward forces are the backbone of South Africa’s peace and stability initiative on the 
continent” (Holden, 2008:31), the arms deal focused exclusively on air and sea materiel.  
 
Overview of Arms Deal Equipment 
Corvettes (Meko A200) 
Description:  




 German Frigate Consortium  (Germany) providing the ship platform 
 Thomson-CSF (France)  
 African Defence Systems (South Africa) providing the combat suite 
 
Quantity: 4   Cost: R6.92 billion 
 
Scandal:  
Thomson-CSF was alleged to have bribed Jacob Zuma, amongst others, while 
African Defence Systems has been exposed as a front company for Shabir Shaik. 
Submarines (Class 209 1400 MOD) 
Description:  




 German Submarine Consortium (Germany) 
 
Quantity: 3   Cost: R5.35 billion 
 
Scandal: No references found in Defence Review (or elsewhere) about credible 
threats in terms of coastal attacks. 
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Advanced Light Fighter Aircraft (The Gripen) 
Description:  
The “multi-role supersonic combat aircraft” provides armed cover & support for 
land-based attacks, reconnaissance, air-borne dogfights and airspace control. 
 
Contractor/Supplier:  
 SAAB and British Aerospace as joint British-Swedish Consortium  
 (UK/Sweden) 
 
Quantity: 28   Cost: R15.77 billion 
 
Scandal:  
While useful for conventional military operations, it is of little use within peace 
support operations, as Defence Chief Director of Acquisitions, Major-General Otto 
Schur admitted in 2007, given that transport capability is of greater importance in 
peace support operations.  
 
Prior to the finalisation of the contracts, BAe (formerly British Aerospace) made a 
R5 million donation to the MK Veterans Association, of which Joe Modise was the 
Life President (Feinstein, 2007:155).  
 
Part of the alleged deal was the purchase of a large number of shares in Conlog for 
Joe, a defence subcontractor likely to benefit from the successful bid. Modise became 
chair of Conlog within weeks of leaving office (Feinstein, 2007:155). 
Lead-In Fighter Trainer Aircraft (The Hawk) 
Description:  
Providing flight training for the Gripens, the Hawks have limited capabilities for 
search & rescue missions, reconnaissance, and patrolling. 
 
Contractor/Supplier:  
 British Aerospace(UK) 
 
Quantity: 24   Cost: R15.72 billion 
 
Scandal:  
Chosen over the cheaper Italian Aeromacchi MB3391, the UK’s Royal Air Force 
(RAF), which uses the Hawk, found the Aeromacchi was ‘far and away better than 
anything the RAF possesses’” (Holden, 2008:18-20). The original report emerging 
from the SCOPA investigation revealed that the Hawk was dropped from the 
shortlist in 1997 as, apart from its cost, it did not adhere to the Air Force’s 
operational requirements. At the time (after pressure from Modise), the Chief of the 
Air Force stated that the Hawk would only be accepted if they were ‘politically 
obliged’ to do so (Feinstein, 2007: 215). In 2006, an Air Force Chief confirmed that 
the Defence Force had notified the procurement committee that “the investment in 
fighter aircraft was basically pointless. There were insufficient qualified engineers to 
maintain them or pilots to fly them at optimum operational efficiency” (Pottinger, 
2008:58). It was also stated that “the Air Force still had a number of boxed Cheetah 
jets which still had 10 years of life in them” (Feinstein, 2007:232). 
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Light Utility Helicopter (30) (Agusta A109M) 
 
Contractor/Supplier:  
 Agusta (Italy) 
 
Quantity: 30   Cost: R1.95 billion 
 
Adapted from Cilliers (1998: 4), Feinstein (2007:155, 215), Holden (2008:18-20), Sylvester & Seegers 
(2008: 52-53), and Pottinger (2008:58). 
